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P R E FAC E
This book explores, from both a theoretical and a practical basis, how and why
Serbian and Croatian nationalist elites used victim-centred propaganda to
legitimate new state creation during the collapse of Communist Yugoslavia
and the conflict that followed (1986–99). This often involved applying
imagery from the Jewish Holocaust, with overt comparisons between Jewish
suffering and the perceived genocides of Serbs and Croats. Chapters 1 and 2
discuss why a rhetoric of victimisation and persecution has been an enduring
aspect of national identity, from the ancient Hebrews onwards. This theoreti-
cal section develops a model for analysing nationalist teleology, comprising a
Golden Age, a Fall from grace, and a Redemption. It also provides a critique of
nationalism theory, analysing its successes and failures in understanding the
importance of victim-centred propaganda and the impact of the Holocaust in
nationalist writings. 
Chapters 3 to 8 examine how a fear of genocide was used by Serbian and
Croatian nationalists to push their people into wars of ‘self-defence’. Through
a detailed examination of primary source material, these chapters dissect
many of the arguments advanced during the conflicts in Kosovo, Croatia, and
Bosnia-Hercegovina. Important comparisons can be made about how history
was revised and what purposes these revisions served. Serbian and Croatian
propaganda is divided into specific time-periods. The time-periods examined
include the earliest eras, from the third to the fifteenth centuries AD, followed
by the medieval era, and the nineteenth century. The twentieth century is
divided into several periods, beginning with the first kingdom of Yugoslavia
(1918), the Second World War, Communist Yugoslavia, the breakdown of the
Federation, and the rise of nationalism and violence. A chapter on Bosnia-
Hercegovina and the Bosnian Moslems demonstrates how effectively Serbian
and Croatian propaganda was applied to a third party. 
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Introduction
There is a saying in the Balkans that behind every hero stands a traitor. The diffi-
culty, as often as not, is to determine which is which. Again and again, there is
something heroic about the traitor and something treacherous about the hero.
(Fitzroy MacLean, The Heretic)
IN 1991, THE WORLD watched in amazement as the Socialist FederativeRepublic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) began what was seemingly a fratricidalcivil war. Formerly peaceful republics, joined for almost five decades under
the banner of ‘Brotherhood and Unity’, would soon end their coexistence
when the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) rolled into Slovenia to prevent
Slovenian independence by force. In Croatia, Serbian irregulars instigated
violent clashes with Croatian paramilitary forces, followed once more by the
intervention of the JNA. As the fighting spread from Eastern Slavonia to
the Krajina, and then south-east to Bosnia-Hercegovina, it was clear that
Europe was witnessing its first major military conflict since the Second World
War, and few understood what was going on. 
While several constituent nations, such as the Macedonians,
Montenegrins, and Slovenians, played a peripheral role in the conflict, the
principal actors were to be the Kosovar Albanians, the Bosnian Moslems, the
Serbs, and the Croats. The wars that followed the collapse of Yugoslavia would
be dominated by an intense Serbian–Croatian rivalry. As extremely bloody
wars were being fought on the ground, a war of words took place through
magazines, journals, newspapers, and books, as well as on television, the
radio, and the internet. All modern means of communication were actively
subordinated to the goals of ethnic nationalist leaders in Serbia and Croatia,
seeking to promote revised images of their respective histories.
This book explores the rather strange predicament Western observers
encountered when trying to understand the collapse of Yugoslavia. Seven
distinct national groups, each with their own religious traditions, colonial
history, and cultural trappings, had lived in relative peace since 1945. Now
1
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four of these sought to advance the same claim – that they were victims of the
first genocide on European soil since the Second World War. Serbs, Kosovar
Albanians, Croats, and Bosnian Moslems each claimed to be defending them-
selves from annihilation, arguing that one or more dangerous enemies were
trying to destroy their nation, according to an age-old blueprint for hatred and
treachery. Images of Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian Moslem, and Kosovar
Albanian genocides and ‘holocausts’ frequently appeared in the popular
media, and the reader, listener, or internet surfer was berated with a continu-
ous stream of material, all seemingly arguing the same thing: ‘we are the
victims first and foremost – our war is legitimate because we are fighting
against annihilation’.
The French Slavicist Paul Garde, at a recent gathering in Paris to unveil
the second edition of his 1992 classic Vie et mort de la Yougoslavie, noted that
at the beginning of the war he was severely hampered by a lack of informa-
tion, not only in terms of factual reporting, but more importantly in terms of
viewpoints, as to how each side was justifying its role in the conflict. Nine
years later he had exactly the opposite reaction – there was a superfluity of
information, and contemporary books on Yugoslavia adorned two entire
walls in his large study. In 1991, there was practically nothing to be found on
the conflict; but within two years, a war of journals, books, pamphlets, news-
papers, and internet sites had begun. Croatian journalist Slavenka Drakulic´
described this early period in Balkan Express: ‘Long before the real war, we had
a media war, Serbian and Croatian journalists attacking the political leaders
from the opposite republic as well as each other as if in some kind of dress
rehearsal. So I could see a spiral of hatred descending on us, but until the first
bloodshed it seemed to operate on the level of a power struggle that had
nothing to do with the common people.’1
The former American Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmermann,
added this more prescient comment during the escalation of hostilities in
1992: ‘What we witnessed was violence-provoking nationalism from the top
down . . . Many people in the Balkans may be weak or even bigoted, but in
Yugoslavia, it is their leaders who have been criminal.’ Historian Noel
Malcolm described the climate in Serbia before the war as comparable to ‘all of
television in the USA [being] taken over by the Ku Klux Klan’.2 And what was
true of Serbia was sadly often true of Croatia as well.
This book will address two particular problems: the manipulation of
victim imagery, and the powerful war of words that accompanied and often
preceded military violence. Of central importance is understanding how and
why each side so assiduously chose to portray itself as a victim of genocide, not
just in the present, but also in the past. Anyone who followed the conflict from
1991 onwards would have been struck by the constant emphasis on histori-
cal victimisation and suffering. This situation paradoxically gave rise to the
Introduction
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view that the wars in Yugoslavia were the result of ‘ancient ethnic hatreds’
between traditionally hostile ethnic groups. Such propaganda would confuse
rather than clarify.3 While it is important to explore the nature of such
imagery, it is also important to understand the philosophical and theological
underpinnings of a victim-centred strategy in nationalism, while systemati-
cally unravelling and comparing Serbian and Croatian propaganda. This
involves charting how different periods of history have been revised to make a
nation’s history one of constant danger, defeat, and martyrdom. 
There have been several attempts to understand the nature of Serbian
propaganda. Some examples of Serbian propaganda analysis include
Branimir Anzulovic´’s Heavenly Serbia, Anto Knezevic´’s Analysis of Serbian
Propaganda, and Philip Cohen’s Serbia’s Secret War. Of these, only Anzulovic´’s
analysis does not seem to advance an overtly pro-Croatian viewpoint.
Whatever the motivations of these writers, their greatest sin by far has been to
study Serbian writing by itself, without adequate reference to what Croats,
Kosovar Albanians, or Bosnian Moslems were also arguing at the same time.
This has only decontextualised Serbian nationalism, removing it from the
environment in which it was written and distributed. Since many Serbian
writers were actively debating facts about historical dates, numbers, and key
historical personalities with the other parties to these conflicts, studying only
one side ignored the motivations and provocations of the Serbs. 
Without a clear view of Serbian and Croatian arguments, half the debate
is missing. Clearly, a comparative study of Serbian and Croatian propaganda
is long overdue. While it is obvious that the Serbs were the main aggressors in
Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo, there is no doubt that Croats, Kosovar
Albanians, and Bosnian Moslems were not simply innocent bystanders,
waiting to be ‘ethnically cleansed’. There were many examples of these other
three groups either instigating violence, or responding to it with force of their
own. 
To many, it might seem obvious why Serbs and Croats would have wished
to portray their histories as long periods of suffering and decline, why playing
the victim should now, more than ever, seem like a good idea. Since the intro-
duction of the United Nations Conventions on Genocide and Human Rights in
1948, many people have felt a greater sense of responsibility for human rights
abuses around the world. Rather than adopting a policy of non-interference in
the internal affairs of other countries, we have become more concerned about
what goes on behind closed doors, and more interventionist than ever before.
Many feel that the existence of UN conventions gives us the right and the duty
to ‘care’ for the treatment of other people living under despotic regimes. This
is a relatively new phenomenon. Geoffrey Robertson has argued that before
the Second World War: ‘It dawned on no political leader, even after the
carnage of the First World War, that international institutions might tell
Introduction
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states how to treat their nationals.’ ‘Human rights’, he suggests, mattered
little until ‘Hitler made them irrelevant.’4
Since 1945, many Western academics have assured themselves that the
heyday of Nietzschean nihilism is past. Most no longer believe that the weak
are extinguished by history, nor do they believe that the ‘will to power’ is all
one needs to control the world. Rather, we tend to sympathise with the victims
rather than the aggressors. The human rights sociology favoured by journal-
ists and academics such as Michael Ignatieff demonstrates that the rights of
others, or as he terms it ‘the needs of strangers’ override our more common
impulses to stick to our own business and keep our noses out of trouble.5
Elazar Barkan recently identified a ‘victim culture’ as becoming increasingly
important in international affairs, as evidenced by the plethora of restitution
cases that emerged during the 1980s and 1990s. As he explains in The Guilt of
Nations: 
No longer does the brute and immediate existential need for security form the sole
legitimate justification or motive in formulating foreign policy. Instead, opposi-
tion to genocide, support for human rights, and the fear of being implicated in
crimes against humanity (even by inaction) have become practical, not merely
lofty, ideals. These ideals increasingly shape political decisions and the interna-
tional scene.6
In Yugoslavia, an obvious solution for nations struggling to free them-
selves from decades of Communist rule was to portray themselves as victims –
to appeal to a heightened sense of global responsibility and morality. While
Serbs and Croats both shared a historic belief in their own victimisation as
nations, I will argue that this sense of victimisation was exacerbated during
the Tudjman and Milosˇevic´ eras, and became a central pillar of national iden-
tity. The NATO-led bombing of Bosnian Serb positions in 1995, and
rump-Yugoslavia in 1999, demonstrated that violence against minorities (at
least in Europe) would not be tolerated indefinitely. Once Roy Gutman’s lead
article in Newsday in 1992 – ‘The Death Camps of Bosnia’ – established the
Moslems as victims of seemingly Nazi-esque atrocities, America seriously
began to get involved.7 Sadly, such intervention, even if too late to prevent the
horrors of Manjac´a, Omarska, and Trnopolje, was not to be found at all in
Rwanda, East Timor, or Chechnya. 
The rise of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), with tremendous
resources and media power, should also alert our attention to the very real
benefits to be gained by portraying oneself as the victim of aggression. Human
Rights NGOs now dominate the international arena; by 1994, some 67 per
cent of the European Union’s relief aid was channelled through such organi-
sations. According to the International Red Cross, NGOs collectively disburse
more money than the World Bank. One quarter of Oxfam’s £98 million budget
comes from governmental sources, while in 2000 World Vision US gained
Introduction
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$55 million in aid from the American government.8 These groups have a
direct line to governments around the world, contributing to agenda setting.
They help to define who is a victim and how victimised they are. They also
wield considerable power in determining the identity of aggressors, even if, as
in the case of Rwanda, there is little international will to carry out their
recommendations. 
Generally, we live in a world where victims are now the subject of pity and
financial assistance, not scorn. While these are compelling reasons that
explain the practicalities of portraying oneself as a victim, this does not
explain why we as outside observers have become more receptive to claims of
victimisation. Neither Serbs nor Croats were seeking to curry the favour of
NGOs, nor did they invoke international conventions against each other
during the conflict itself.9 Certainly, both sides were seeking international
recognition for the new state of affairs in their respective republics. The break-
down of federal authority and legitimacy in Communist Yugoslavia after Josip
Broz Tito’s death in 1980 changed the nature of the country considerably.
The republics, rather than the federal centre, became the new loci of
power, as republic-based elites began building networks of power and influ-
ence. Tito’s Communism was never able to guarantee the withering away of
the state. While he promised that the borders of Yugoslavia’s individual
republics were nothing more than ‘lines on a marble column’, it was clear that
borders continued to play a pivotal role in Yugoslav politics. After his death in
1980, every aspect of his system was open to dispute, including the adminis-
trative divisions of the country, which in some cases were also national. 
It is important to understand not only why Serbs and Croats sought to
reconstruct their histories as periods of suffering and persecution, but also
why Western policy-makers appeared receptive. Chapters 1 and 2 explore
how and why victim-centred propaganda has become important in the
modern world. Chapter 1 examines how early national entities developed
myths, in order to advance a unique view of their place in world history. For
the ancient Hebrew nation, a cyclical form of teleology, composed of a Golden
Age, a Fall, and a Redemption, constituted what Northrop Frye and others
have termed a ‘covenantal cycle’. Covenants imply faith in an omnipresent,
omnipotent god, able to guide the nation in times of distress and hardship. In
return for obedience and faith, the Hebrew god assured his people of their
divine election and their ‘chosenness’ – making them a more spiritual, more
special people than any other. Ideas of Covenant, chosenness, Golden Age,
Fall, and Redemption have formed the core of several modern nationalisms. 
Another important aspect of cyclical teleology has been the constant
battle between good and evil throughout history – the ‘chosen’ nation versus
its many enemies. The links between such mythology and Serbian and
Croatian nationalism will become obvious. Both subscribed to a cyclical view
Introduction
5
2441Introduction  16/10/02  8:02 am  Page 5
of history; both groups saw themselves as ‘chosen’ and unique, while at the
same time, they portrayed their own histories as a series of battles against
powerful enemies. Both groups consistently held that by proving their own
Falls throughout history, they could legitimate the struggles necessary for
Redemption. 
In Chapter 2, the twentieth-century application of these early Judaeo-
Chrisitan concepts will be understood with reference to the Jewish Zionist
movement. There was much in Serbian and Croatian nationalism that relied
on the Zionist contribution to the history of ideas. For nineteenth-century
Zionists, the presence of anti-Semitism confirmed for some that the only way
the Jewish people would be free of persecution was through their own
Redemption in a territorially bounded nation-state. Zionists modernised cycli-
cal teleology and used it to create their own state, free from the horrors of
centuries of discriminatory legislation, pogrom, and massacre. Perhaps the
most important aspect of Zionism, however, was something over which they
had little control. The Holocaust, which occurred between 1941 and 1945,
saw almost 6 million Jews systematically killed by the German Nazi regime –
arguably the greatest Fall in the history of Judaism. Some viewed the creation
of the State of Israel in 1948 as the greatest recompense and Redemption since
the restoration of the Kingdom some 2,000 years before. Thus, the greatest
Fall and Redemption of the twentieth century followed one after the other
within a three-year period.
An important concept throughout this work will be the idea of perform-
ing, or acting out a genocide. On the basis of the legacy of Jewish suffering and
the perception (or misperception) that the Holocaust was instrumentalised by
Zionist leaders to achieve the State of Israel, historians from marginalised
nations, including the Romani, the Armenians, and the Ukrainians, have
compared their own historical persecution to that of the Jews. Such historical
revisionism has formed the basis of a ‘comparative genocide debate’, which
employs the images and symbols of the Holocaust as a template. This debate
has pitted a number of Jewish historians (who argue that the Holocaust is a
unique and unprecedented event in modern history) against another group of
historians, who claim that their own group’s experience of suffering is equal
to or in some respects worse than that of the Jews. For many national groups,
articulating myths of persecution and victimisation has become an essential
part of reconstructing histories and legitimating state-building projects. As I
will demonstrate from Chapters 3 to 8, Serbs and Croats entered into this
timely and controversial debate. Both groups used claims of victimisation and
persecution to legitimate their own state-building or state-expanding projects,
with often violent consequences. 
Both the Judaeo-Christian covenantal culture and the instrumentalisa-
tion of Holocaust imagery have been of central importance in structuring
Introduction
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Serbian and Croatian representations of the past and present. History was
reinvented in the 1980s and 1990s, in order to paint each nation as a long-
suffering victim of ancient, predatory enemies, bent on their destruction. The
following chapters will discuss how Serbs and Croats used such imagery to
their advantage. For both groups, portraying history as a series of never-
ending ‘ancient ethnic antagonisms’ or ‘centuries of hatred’ performed an
important function. Events in the 1980s and 1990s were presented as only an
extension of past conflicts. By proving that the Other had been an aggressor
throughout history, one could prove that history was repeating itself, that the
nation was simply defending itself against yet another attempt at annihila-
tion. 
As Yugoslavia slowly collapsed, gone was any ambiguity or inner reflec-
tion about how one’s nation might have committed historic atrocities. A
Manichaean morality pervaded both sides, in which the other was unequivo-
cally evil, and the self could do no wrong. Any periods of friendly association
or harmonious political projects (such as Illyrianism or Yugoslavism) were
excised from a history that became more and more decontextualised. More
‘authentic’ national enemies, such as the Ottomans, the Bulgarians, the
Austro-Hungarians, and the Italians, were quietly brushed aside as mere
backdrops to the more important contest between Serb and Croat. Even Nazi
Germany emerged more as a facilitator of Serb and Croat evil, than as the
instigator of crimes in the Balkans.
Chapter 3 begins with the rise of nationalism in Serbia, from the death of
Josip Broz Tito in 1980 to Slobodan Milosˇevic´’s historic speech in 1987 to the
Kosovo Serbs, pledging to defend their national rights in Kosovo, no matter
what the cost. Milosˇevic´’s genius was to identify the Kierkegaardian ‘right
moment’ in Serbian politics, when he was able to transform himself from
a Belgrade banker and communist official into a nationalist phenomenon.
Milosˇevic´, however forceful a speaker, was never much more than an oppor-
tunist. Nevertheless, his own lack of fundamentalism would be mitigated by
the presence of dozens of nationalist believers, from author-politicians Dobrica
C´osic´ and Vuk Draskovic´, to paramilitary warlords such as Zˇeljko Razˇnatovic´
Arkan and Vojislav Sˇesˇelj. 
The invention of ‘Serbophobia’, often likened to anti-Semitism, was a
curious facet of the conflict. Serbs would continually compare themselves to
the Jews as fellow victims in world history. This invariably involved a trage-
dising of history, from the 1389 Battle of Kosovo to the 1974 Yugoslav
Constitution – every aspect of Serbian history was seen to be another example
of persecution and victimisation at the hands of external negative forces. The
Kosovar Albanians, as the first group within part-Tito Yugoslavia to experi-
ence a national awakening (in 1981), were the first targets of Serbian
nationalism. Kosovo would be important as a template or pattern for the more
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important propaganda war against the Croats – Serbia’s most important
competitor during the break-up of Yugoslavia. This chapter will concentrate
on the early threats of Croatian nationalism – its strong links to a supposedly
xenophobic and expansionist Roman Catholic Church, its genocidal ambi-
tions against Serbia during the nineteenth century, and its hatred of diversity
and compromise in the first Yugoslavia. 
For Croats, the issue of persecution would be of equal importance.
Chapter 4 begins with the rise of Franjo Tudjman and his Croatian Democratic
Alliance (HDZ). Tudjman was a true believer in the nationalist cause, and in
Croatia there was a thorough process of centralising power and propaganda
within the state. Croatian propagandists focused most of their attacks on
Serbia, which was in the process of invading and occupying one-quarter of
their newly independent country. Croatian reappraisals of history often
involved the conjuring up of a ‘Greater Serbia’ – an evil, expansionary, anni-
hilatory other, seeking first to invade, then to enslave, and then to
exterminate the Croatian people. From the time of the Great Schism between
Catholic and Orthodox worlds, Croats were supposedly confronted with a
Serbian desire to destroy small and peaceful nations. Other key historical
periods include the nineteenth century, when the ideals of ‘Greater Serbia’
were supposedly put into practice, through to the First Yugoslavia after the
First World War, when Serbs and Croats entered, along with the Slovenes,
into political association for the first time in their history. 
Other important myths include the Antemurale Christianitatis, the belief
that Croatia represented the easternmost outpost of European civilisation.
Across the divide were the Serbs, often presented as being on a lower level of
civilisation, with an ‘Asiatic’ mentality, and distinct racial and psychological
features, as well as different linguistic and cultural forms of identity. Such
forms of differentiation would buttress Croatian arguments that, at all levels,
Serbs were more backward, barbarous, and warlike. These innate or primor-
dial characteristics were cited as the cause of Yugoslavia’s breakdown and the
wars that followed.
Chapters 5 and 6 examine the Second World War, arguably the most
important historical period for both sides. Serbs and Croats accused each other
of being willing and zealous collaborators with the Nazi occupiers. Each
accused the other of being an enthusiastic participant in the Final Solution
against Yugoslavian Jews, through membership in the Serbian Cˇetniks or the
Croatian Ustasˇa. Each side also claimed to have suffered a ‘Holocaust’ at the
hands of the other – the Serbs at the Ustasˇa-run death camp Jasenovac, the
Croats, after the war, at the Austrian town of Bleiburg, when Communist
Partisans (perhaps Serbian) massacred escaping collaborators. Inflating the
number of victims among one’s co-religionists, while reducing the numbers
killed by one’s own side, became a full-time occupation for many academics.
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Croatian writers inflated the Bleiburg dead, while reducing Jasenovac to the
status of a medium-sized massacre. Serbs, by contrast, touted Jasenovac as the
third largest death camp in Europe – often labelling it the ‘Serbian Auschwitz’.
The purpose of such revisions was clear. Both sides needed a powerful example
of the genocidal capabilities of the other, in order to prove that more contem-
porary atrocities were simply a repetition of the past.
Chapter 7 will be divided into two parts, the first dealing with Serbian and
Croatian views of Tito’s Communist Yugoslavia, a country that suppressed
nationalism, while preaching a form of consensus and harmony. Predictably,
both groups would claim to have been the victims of continued persecution by
the other, who they claim dominated the federation. Typically, the borders of
republics were attacked, as well as the ethnic imbalances in the military, the
government, and the civil service. The second and more important part of this
chapter details how both Serbs and Croats constructed their pasts, and how
they drew parallels between past and contemporary events. Here, Second
World War comparisons were the most important, particularly for the Serbs.
While the Croats too have used this period of history to their advantage, they
also used earlier periods, such as the nineteenth century, and the First
Yugoslavia, to argue that the Serbs had followed a continuous pattern of
genocide for over a century.
Chapter 8 explores Serbian and Croatian propaganda from a fresh angle –
through their reactions to a third party. The war in Bosnia-Hercegovina
displayed both sides at their most cynical and opportunistic. Tudjman and
Milosˇevic´ had already divided the republic on paper before a single shot was
fired. Both sides committed war crimes, which included ‘ethnic cleansing’
(using terror to force people from the villages where their families had lived for
centuries), the establishment of concentration camps, or ‘collection centres’
(where victims were beaten, tortured, raped and often killed), the destruction
of physical property (including the destruction of approximately 1,400
mosques), and numerous massacres of civilian populations. Bosnian Moslems
were presented as little more than an invented artificial nation, with no
historic claims to territory. At best, they were members of either the Serbian
or the Croatian ‘authentic’ nation, which meant that their lands and their
language could be brought back into the national fold. At worst, the Moslems
were the harbingers of a dangerous Islamic conspiracy, poised to take over the
Balkans and Western Europe. 
While large numbers of Serbs and Croats supported this immense propa-
ganda campaign, there were some notable exceptions. While this work is
concerned with distinctly nationalist literature, there have been conscien-
tious writers on both sides, attempting to debunk many of the myths that
emerged as a corollary to nationalism. The independent press in both coun-
tries was highly critical of their respective regimes, often infusing the debate
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with strong attacks on extreme nationalism within the government. Editors
and journalists often suffered accordingly. Similarly, some writers and
academics stood firm against the onslaught of nationalism. In Croatia,
Dubravka Ugresˇic´ and Slavenka Drakulic´ deserve special mention, as does
former Croatian diplomat Vane Ivanovic´. During the war, numerous Croatian
academics collaborated in a well-known edited work by Rada Ivekovic´,
deploring the rise of nationalism and the escalation of violence in their
country.10
In Serbia, several attempts were made to combine impartial Serbian
scholarship with analysis from Western academics and politicians. One such
work, edited by Michael Freeman, Dusˇan Janjic´, and Predrag Veselinovic´,
carefully analysed the importance of liberal theories of justice and their appli-
cability to minority rights in Yugoslavia.11 Another ambitious work, entitled
Serbia Religion and War, contained critical lectures and articles published by
Serbian academics who had fled Serbia in the 1980s.12 Such publications
entailed certain risks, but demonstrated that not everyone had fallen into the
nationalist trap, despite the strong jingoistic mentality that pervaded almost
every aspect of life. There were also many politicians who chose not to partic-
ipate in the violence as such, and openly condemned Tudjman and Milosˇevic´
for their excesses. The new group of elected officials – the Yugoslav President
Vojislav Kostunica, the Croatian Prime Minister Ivica Racˇan, and the
Croatian President Stipe Mesic´ – are just a few national leaders who did not
subscribe to an exclusivist or distinctly violent view of national identity. Such
leaders would assume power after Tudjman’s death in December 1999 and
Milosˇevic´’s losses in the Serbian elections during the summer of 2000.
As will be clear, many Serbian and Croatian nationalist writers have
distorted and given a distinctly nationalist slant to both early and recent
history. Of course, the question arises as to whether there are any ‘real’ or
accurate representations of history. Hayden White has taken issue with the
idea that there are any ‘correct’ historical accounts, with only ‘certain rhetor-
ical flourishes or poetic effects’ to distract readers from the truth of what they
are reading.13 Rather, White argues that all forms of history, be they ‘annals’,
‘chronicles’, or ‘history proper’, are all subject to a process of narrativising,
whereby historians try to create a story from the ‘real events’ of history, often
a story with a beginning and a conclusion, and some type of moral lesson that
can be learned. 
As White argues, the biases, desires, and fantasies of the historian cannot
be considered separately from the events he/she is describing. Which events
are chosen and how they are presented will depend on a number of personal
factors. As White asks:
What is involved then, in that finding of the ‘true story’, that discovery of the ‘real
story’ within or behind the events that come to us in the chaotic form of ‘histori-
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cal records’? What wish is enacted, what desire is gratified by the fantasy that real
events are properly represented when they can be shown to display the formal
coherency of a story? In the enigma of this wish, this desire, we catch a glimpse of
the cultural function of narrativising discourse in general, an intimation of the
psychological impulse behind the apparently universal need not only to narrate
but to give to events an aspect of narrativity.14
While there is perhaps no ‘true story’ or ‘real story’ that can emerge from
any historical appraisal, both the Serbian and Croatian cases often show delib-
erate attempts to mislead, by either altering or removing aspects of historical
events, so that these alterations cast their nation in a favourable light. In
short: they rarely aimed for ‘truth’ in any sense of the word. For White, the
historian’s objectives are often an ‘enigma’, the product of ‘psychological
impulses’. In these cases, however, the objectives are clearer than in the
rather opaque medieval texts White reviews. The process of ‘narrativising’
was certainly heightened during the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, to the extent
that fantasies and desires of nationally oriented writers replaced any
semblance of presenting a ‘real story’ à la White. Indeed, the emphasis here
was on presenting history from one’s own perspective rather than striving for
some utopian impartial standard. While this is certainly not a process
confined only to Serbs and Croats, this pernicious aspect of identity creation
during the 1990s was crucial to legitimating a wide variety of nation-building
activities – many of them violent. This book will compare and contrast these
nationally biased views of history, highlighting the discrepancies between
them. 
A note on methodology
The term ‘propaganda’ has many negative connotations, but is not itself
intrinsically negative. Political parties and corporations around the world use
propaganda, or spin-doctoring, on a daily basis, to outlaw fox-hunting,
promote the Euro, or sell soap. For a definition, I defer to Oliver Thomson,
who, in his excellent study of mass persuasion techniques, described propa-
ganda as ‘the manipulation of public opinion’ and the ‘management of
collective attitudes’ by use of both ‘political’ and ‘significant symbols’, those
symbols that represent state power and national culture. In terms of how it is
spread, Thomson argued that it includes ‘any means of projecting or trans-
mitting images, ideas or information which influences behaviour in every
active or passive sense. This covers every aspect of art and communication,
because nearly all messages have either deliberately or accidentally some
persuasive content.’15
This is a very general definition of propaganda, which covers almost
everything. Within the context of this work, Thomson’s definition needs to be
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narrowed down. I will not be discussing accidental forms of persuasion, but
rather deliberate attempts by Serbian and Croatian writers to manipulate
public opinion in support of mobilisation for war, and the maintenance of war,
both in Croatia and in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Before continuing, please allow
me to add the following caveat: this book will also be examining the writings
of what we might call ‘armchair’ nationalists – believers throughout the
world who promote their own interpretations of history and current events on
the internet, and in the popular press. Such people formed a crucial base of
support for Croatian and Serbian nationalist regimes, climbing aboard the
nationalist bandwagon even though they were often unaffiliated with either
government. I am not arguing that such people had any cynical plans to
destroy other nations or promote violence as such, nor that they are guilty by
association of ‘ethnic cleansing’. Nevertheless, in their own ways, they
contributed to the escalation of events by adding more fuel to the fire; and
sometimes their arguments were used in ways that they neither intended nor
could have foreseen. 
Throughout this book, I will be using a form of discourse analysis to
explore the themes, ideas and vocabulary present in Serbian and Croatian
propaganda. I have used a qualitative method of analysing primary material,
isolating their most important themes and images. This is in line with Oliver
Thomson’s suggestion of paying attention to ‘the more obvious pattern
frequencies that come from a general view of contents.’16 This book, however,
strives not only to present an analysis of general themes and ideas in Serbian
and Croatian historical revisions but also to analyse the vocabulary and struc-
ture of their language and how it has been used. 
While I have chosen a form of qualitative discourse analysis, the role of
quantitative analysis should not be discounted. In a 1993 study commis-
sioned by the Stryelsen for Psykologist Forsvar (Centre for Psychological
Research) in Sweden, Marjan Malesic´ and a team of researchers evaluated
213 newspaper articles from Serbia and Croatia (between August 1991 and
January 1992). Using a quantitative approach, they drew up tables charting
the frequency of certain topics and terms used by the domestic media in each
country.17 The results of this study were illuminating. In Croatia, the team
noted frequent ‘homeland-related metaphors’, based on ‘blood and soil
imagery’. The media described the government’s actions and those of
Croatian forces as ‘peace-oriented activities’, with an emphasis on countering
accusations that Tudjman was a ‘proto-fascist’.18 The team noted similar
themes in the Serbian press, with priority given to proving the self-defensive
nature of their activities. Tudjman was frequently denounced as a fascist,
while the persecution of the Serbs in Croatia was constantly stressed.19
The team’s findings were in some ways similar to my own, that: ‘commu-
nications in abnormal and extreme situations are characterised by
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generalisations combined with the use of stereotypes, labelling and value-
weighted, emotionally charged attributes.’ They further noted the following:
Such simplifications can be productive in the short term, especially in abnormal
situations, since they ensure the required speed and simple identification. At the
same time the effect of categorical patterns of thinking and of labelling is still
further enhanced by the use of value-weighted and emotionally negatively
charged characterisations, which possess a powerful mobilising force . . . Mass
media completely accomplished the role of political propaganda and war-monger-
ing given them by the politicians.20
Even in an analysis of newspaper articles from the early stages of the
conflict, it was clear that both sides were mobilising their people for an esca-
lation of hostilities. Thus, either method of discourse analysis should furnish a
clear picture of how Serbian and Croatian nationalist elites justified the rise of
nationalism and escalation of hostilities to their own people, as well as to the
outside world. 
Hopefully, this study will be a new contribution to the expanding field of
International Relations. Recently, Iver Neumann remarked in his challenging
new book, The Uses of the Other, that ‘The discipline of international relations
(IR) is witnessing a surge of interest in identity and identity formation. This
development has been permitted and facilitated by the general uncertainty of
a discipline which feels itself to have spent the 1980s barking up the wrong
trees. A lack of faith in the old has made it easier for the new to break
through.’21 Fresh insight into the links between the Holocaust, nationalism
theory, and contemporary warfare is long overdue. My goal throughout is to
provide scope for new reflection on these and other issues.
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1What is the nation? Towards a teleological
model of nationalism
The tradition of the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the
living. And just when they seem engaged in revolutionising themselves and
things, they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service and borrow
from them names, battle cries and costumes in order to present the new scene of
world history in this time honoured disguise and borrowed language. (Henry
Tudor in Political Myth)
FOR SERBIAN AND Croatian nationalists, the manipulation of myths andnational history performed an incredibly important role during thecollapse of Yugoslavia in the 1980s, and the wars of succession that
followed after 1990. Before analysing these national myths, and their specific
political objectives, it will be useful to understand what species, or general
types, of myths have been used – and why. Reviewing the works of many
major nationalism theorists, this chapter introduces a useful analytical model
to help understand the nature of Serbian and Croatian myths, the types of
imagery they invoke, and how they are structured. This will lay the ground-
work for a more detailed study of how national myths have been used
instrumentally in Serbia and Croatia to promote self-determination, the shift-
ing of borders and populations, and the installation of despotic and corrupt
regimes. 
Another goal of this chapter is to examine the legacy of the Biblical tradi-
tion on conceptions of nationalist myth and understandings of time in history.
This involves applying Northrop Frye’s cyclical view of history (Biblical teleol-
ogy) to explain why certain myths (Covenant, divine election/chosenness,
Fall/persecution, and Redemption) were so frequently used in the wars follow-
ing the collapse of the SFRY. The use of Biblical teleology will also allow us to
structure many of the pre-existing theories of nationalism into an analytical
framework, with myths of Covenant, Fall, and Redemption acting as hubs in
a cyclical view of how nationalists portray mythical time in history. 
Central to my analysis is an examination and understanding of Jewish
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nationalism, and its importance in the development of general species of
national myths. Jewish nationalism does not figure as a third case-study here.
However, specific aspects of Jewish nationalism have formed a template that
Serbian and Croatian authors, politicians, and other leaders, used to legiti-
mate many often violent acts of statecraft. That every Fall leads to a
Redemption through a covenantal relationship was a central theme of Jewish
nationalism, an idea that was assiduously assimilated by Serbs and Croats.1
While such a cyclical view of nationalism can be seen in the work of many
contemporary theorists, there are some notable detractors. Writers of the
Modernist school have generally dismissed the importance of mythology in
the formation of nationalism, and many have rejected the concept of negative
myths (Fall and persecution) as important aspects of nationalist legitimacy.
Equally obvious is Modernism’s poverty in dealing with how and why nation-
alist cohesion is created. While Modernism certainly has its positive aspects, it
ignores much that is highly pertinent to the study of nationalism in
Yugoslavia.
Myths of the nation: teleology and time
A central tenet of this study is that Biblical history and teleology have
contributed greatly to the development of many forms of ethnic national iden-
tity. Liah Greenfeld, in her study of nationalism, posited that the return to Old
Testament narratives and myths of divine election was of central importance
in the development of the first nationalism (which she locates in early modern
England), and by extension to all subsequent national movements. Similarly,
Michael Walzer has noted the importance of Biblical exodus history, and how
it has shaped the ‘civic-political aspirations of national liberation move-
ments’.2
Certainly the Biblical tradition has played an important role in the devel-
opment of European history and philosophy, and in the evolution of
nationalism. As Conor Cruise O’Brien and Adrian Hastings have both argued,
Hebrew collective identity in the Old Testament was one of the first instances
of territorial nationalism, functioning as a template for future generations.
O’Brien posited that a territorial ‘promised land’ was always seen to be
synonymous with the Jewish ‘Heaven’, an idea that was rigorously removed
from the Christian Bible, when redemption through the suffering of Christ was
advocated in its stead.3 Hastings asserted that ‘nations originally “imagined”
. . . through the mirror of the Bible’.4 For this reason, he also placed the
Hebrew Bible at the centre of early nationalism, with ‘the true proto-nation’
being responsible for the development of nationalism in Christian countries,
inspired, rather than hindered, by religion.5
While the Old Testament certainly provided an example of a tribal group
Balkan holocausts?
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seeking, and then gaining, a homeland, one of the main features of Hebrew
nationalism was the covenantal culture it created – a special relationship or
series of agreements made between a people and their deity. Much of Zionism,
and indeed nationalism in general, revolved around the concept of status
reversal, or Covenant, the promise of deliverance in the midst of hardship. The
Covenant was absolutely central to Jewish identity, in particular the concept
of ‘chosenness’, according to the historian Donald Harman Akenson.6 The
Zionist writer Martin Buber placed the Covenant as central to the transforma-
tion of the Jewish people from ‘tribe’ to ‘Israel’.7
Following from this idea, Hans Kohn isolated three essential aspects of
nationalism introduced by the Jews: ‘the idea of the chosen people’; ‘the
consciousness of national history’; and ‘national messianism’.8 For Kohn, the
invention of the Covenant was the defining moment in Jewish nationalism.
While other tribes maintained a dialogue between elites and their deities, a
Covenant between God and the ‘people’ made each person an equal member
of the nation. Such a distinction gave the Hebrews a ‘national ideal and
purpose’ in history.9 More importantly, perhaps, a sense of direct Covenant
eliminated the need for a specialised caste of priests and other elites function-
ing as intermediaries with the divine. A form of democratic nationalism was
the result. Such a covenantal culture provided a cyclical view of history, a
teleology where hardships would be followed by rewards for the faithful, as
long as they kept their Covenant with their god. 
A reading of philosopher Northrop Frye’s critical appraisal of Biblical
myth and structure is a useful method by which to understand how Biblical
teleology operates. For Frye, a cycle of ‘rise, fall and rise again’ figured as the
primary method by which history progressed in the Bible, what Frye dubbed a
‘covenantal cycle’. Here, each negative event was followed by an equally posi-
tive reward – or Redemption. Frye posited that biblical myths were in many
ways of a common type, ‘express[ing] the human bewilderment about why we
are here and where we are going, and [they] include myths of creation, of Fall,
of exodus, of migration, of destruction of the human race in the present
(deluge myths) or the future (apocalyptic myths), and of Redemption’.10 But
while the myths themselves were common, the uniqueness lay in the struc-
ture of Biblical narrative, which Frye describes as cyclical, a ‘Divine Comedy’,
with: 
[An] apostasy followed by a descent into disaster and bondage, which in turn is
followed by repentance, then by a rise through deliverance to a point more or less
on the level from which the descent began. This U-shaped pattern recurs in litera-
ture as the standard shape of comedy, where a series of misfortunes and
misunderstandings brings the action to a threateningly low point, after which
some fortunate twist in the plot sends the conclusion up to a happy ending. The
entire Bible, viewed as a Divine Comedy, is contained within a U-shaped story of
What is the nation? Towards a teleological model
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this sort, one in which man loses the tree and water of life at the beginning of
Genesis and gets them back at the end of Revelation.11
Thus Biblical history, and the history of the world for practising
Christians, was U-shaped. Within a large U-shaped cycle, which encapsulated
the totality of Biblical history, were a series of smaller U-shaped cycles. As Frye
summarised these: ‘In between, the story of Israel is told as a series of declines
into the power of heathen kingdoms: Egypt, Philistia, Babylon, Syria, Rome,
each followed by a rise into a brief moment of relative independence.’12 Some
small cycles covered several days, while the largest comprised the entire
history of the world – from its creation to its destruction. Of interest to the
study of nationalist mythology was the metaphorical linking together of all
important Biblical events and symbols, what Frye called a ‘sequence of
mythoi’. In the hands of early myth-makers, the Garden of Eden, the Promised
Land, Jerusalem, and Mount Zion became interchangeable symbols for the
home of the soul. Similarly, Egypt, Babylon and Rome all became symbols of
the Hebrew national Fall.13
While such geographic locations thus constituted symbols of Rise and
Fall, good and evil, individual characters also came to embody parts of a
general agency or force – either positive or negative. Positive actors advanced
the Hebrews forward towards a common teleological destiny, while negative
actors brought about a series of Falls. Thus, the Pharaoh of the Exodus,
Nebuchadnezzar, Antiochus Epiphanes, and Nero were spiritually the same
person, personifying negative forces. At the same time, the deliverers of Israel
– Abraham, Moses, Joshua, the Judges, David, and Solomon – were all proto-
types of the Messiah or final deliverer.14 Simply put: evil forces caused Falls,
good forces engendered Redemptions. For Frye, this constant antagonism
propelled Biblical history forward, ultimately allowing for the deliverance of
the righteous. In this sense, both positive and negative were essential: the one
negated the other. The presence of both created a ‘non-self-contradictory’
ethical system, where the Hebrews were redeemed, while their enemies were
destroyed. 
Frye described several main Falls in the Bible, beginning with the physical
banishment from the Garden of Eden. This represented humankind’s alien-
ation from nature, and allegorised humanity’s acquisition of sexual
knowledge, and the knowledge of good and evil.15 The myth of the Tower of
Babel (Genesis 11: 1–9) became significant, as an attempt to build an edifice to
overcome the Fall, to bridge the gulf between man and God. Babel’s ambitious
architects ultimately failed, leading only to the confusion of tongues – and a
second great Fall. This not only continued the alienation between man and
nature, but heightened the alienation of man from man. The Fall was now
complete, with human beings now alienated from God, nature, language, and
each other.16
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It is from this low point that the epic struggle of the Hebrew people began.
At this third stage of the cycle, the individual dispersed units joined together.
Here, the concept of kerygma provided the chosen with a knowledge of the
divine plan, imparting to them the idea of destiny and teleology. Kerygma
figured as a means of ‘revelation’ – the conveying of information from an
objective divine source to a subjective human receptor. This ‘kerygmatic’
process occurred throughout Biblical history, as the Hebrew people received
instructions and laws to govern their interactions and worship.17 What
emerges from a reading of Frye is the importance of a strict teleology in
Biblical narratives, the axiomatic link between Fall and Redemption, impart-
ing hope in the midst of hardship. Equally important is the constant battle
between positive and negative forces. The Hebrews as the divine elect were
constantly delivered when negative forces plotted their destruction. Resulting
from such a narrative was the self-perception of a righteous and progressive
nation, fighting against negative forces throughout history, in a continuous
battle between good and evil. 
Historian Norman Cohn has argued that a cyclical teleological view of
history stemmed from Jewish experiences of oppression, and their need to
create hope for the future. Prophecies were used as a means of rallying
members of a group together against the threat of external attack. Cohn notes:
‘Precisely because they were so certain of being the chosen people, Jews
tended to react to peril, oppression and hardship by fantasies of the total
triumph and boundless prosperity which Yahweh, out of his omnipotence,
would bestow upon his elect in the fullness of time.’18 Thus the greater the
calamity, the greater the belief in recompense. Fall and Redemption were inti-
mately bound together.
From an instrumentalist perspective, the belief in a covenantal cycle kept
Jews loyal to their faith, and to the culture that sustained it. It provided hope
for the future, as well as a belief in historical destiny and a sense of predictabil-
ity in history – perhaps also a passive acceptance of hardship, and a faith in
future Redemption. What emerges from a critical reading of Biblical myth and
structure are three distinct types of myth, each essential to a belief in the valid-
ity of a covenantal culture. 
● The first is a belief in the structure itself, a belief that every Fall will auto-
matically lead to a Redemption for the faithful, through the intercession
of some benevolent and divine being. Thus the idea of history as a series of
turning-points is very important. 
● The second concerns the divine or chosen status of the nation, how and
why it deserves to be saved. These types of myths deal with the greatness,
heroism, faithfulness and overall goodness of the nation, stressing those
positive traits which make it a candidate for deliverance. 
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● The third type of myth revolves around the importance of Fall myths – the
nation as a victim of evil, ahistorical and eternal negative force, which
forces it to suffer before Redemption can come about. In this sense, the
third is largely based on the other two types. One has to believe that one’s
people will be saved, and that one is deserving of being saved, before such
an eventuality can realistically be contemplated. 
Of these types of myths, the first is usually assumed. If a nation is divine
and good, and it can prove its persecution at the hands of evil forces, then it
will be delivered. The second needs to be enshrined as part of the founding
myth of the nation. As such, these types of myths can remain more or less
unchanged, although they require constant reiteration and repetition to
retain their influence. Of the three, the third type is the most important, since
each Redemption or deliverance depends on proof of continued persecution. 
Before proceeding further, it is important to understand how a nationalist
teleology or covenantal cycle can be situated within the confines of existing
theories of nationalism. This will involve more detail about each stage of the
cycle, as well as an examination of the subdivisions within each group. The
result will be a workable analytical model, which will prove extremely useful
for analysing and describing the nature and character of nationalist move-
ments in Serbia and Croatia. The first group of myths I have termed ‘myths of
Covenant and renewal’. The second group of myths, focusing on the chosen-
ness or divinity of the nation, I have termed ‘primary myths of identification’,
since these, in the created history of nationalism, describe the moment or
series of events when the nation was either created or chosen, and imbued
with righteous qualities. The third group of myths I have termed ‘negative
myths of identification’, simply because they rely on negative forces or agen-
cies seeking to subvert the nation’s destiny, or in more extreme cases, to
assimilate or destroy the nation altogether. 
Myths of covenant and renewal
In his study of political myth, Henry Tudor argued that most political myths
employed a teleological view of history, to give the members of a nation a fixed
point of reference, allowing them to express their feelings and explain their
experiences of suffering.19 According to Tudor, the political myth-interpreter
orders his experience on the assumption that contemporary events are but an
episode in a story, allowing the myth-maker to contextalise the present day
within the larger sweep of history, a process similar to that described by White
in the case of the ‘narrator’. Myths allow individuals to understand their
nation’s role in history, and the specific stage or time in history in which the
nation finds itself. Tudor linked the concepts of political mythology with
Biblical mythology, in its teleological similarities. Both are cyclical, and as
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Tudor asserted: ‘Mythical time is reversible. What was done is not forever lost.
It may in the fullness of time repeat itself. Every myth is a story of death and
rebirth, of an end or eschatos [sic; sc. eschaton] with simultaneously a new
beginning.’20
Events in the past or present fit into a complex paradigm by which the
world is viewed, thus claiming significance far beyond their present-day
reality. As Tudor has argued, this applies not only to historical events, but also
to land, where national territory can carry with it certain mythical and
emotional connotations: 
Depending on the myth to which he subscribes, he [the myth-interpreter] will see
a particular tract of land as part of the territory from which the chosen people
were expelled, a particular year as the one in which Christ will establish his
kingdom on earth, a particular trade-unionist as an agent of a world-wide
communist conspiracy, or a particular industrial dispute as a crucial incident in
the class war.21
Dusˇan Kecˇmanovic´ has similarly discussed what he terms a ‘watershed’,
or the ‘theme of the right moment’ in the life of a nation or group.
Paraphrasing a nationalist view of teleology, he explains: ‘We went through a
period of national decline, of dissolution, of corruption and anarchy, our
national interests were more or less systematically suppressed and ignored to
the point where we must do something to radically change our destiny, to take
it into our own hands, to make a new order emerge.’22 Thus a nation that is
partially destroyed or suppressed by a Fall may reawaken when the time is
right. Of course in most cases the national leader, and not ‘History’ as such,
determines when this period of national renaissance will begin. George
Schöpflin has termed such imagery ‘myths of rebirth and renewal’, which also
encapsulates the ‘palingenetic’ or messianic tradition of Judaism and Biblical
teleology. Here, like Kecˇmanovic´ and Tudor, Schöpflin describes these myths
as ones where ‘rebirth can create a sense of a clean state, a new start, in which
the awfulness of the past can be forgotten’.23
What emerges from this view of national history and time is the impor-
tance of chosenness and Fall as the keys to Redemption. At a certain point, a
nation is given the opportunity to reawaken, and to redeem itself after having
suffered a Fall. History is thus composed of Falls and Redemptions, as well as
positive and negative forces and individuals – those who help the nation, and
those who hinder its progress. While there may be a belief that the nation will
always come out ahead, there is still a sense of constant threat from the
outside world, forcing co-nationalists to rally together to preserve their
customs and traditions. 
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Primary myths of identification
In this series of mythologies, two distinct types are present. The first deals with
the deification of the nation, as holy and chosen, an ideal based on the Jewish
example. The second type deals with more secular or ‘classical’ myths of the
nation as heroic and triumphant. These types of myths can exist exclusively,
or can underwrite each other. Each claims strong links between the nation
and its national territory, from which it draws its strength. 
The concept of national chosenness is primarily based on the Jewish
example. William Pfaff has described how nationalism elevates the nation to
‘a simulacrum of the Deity’.24 Peter Alter has seen the process of national
myth creation as a time when ‘the religious is secularised and the national
sanctified’.25 Many theorists of nationalism have attempted to understand
exactly how and why nationalism bears many similarities to religious belief.
As Kecˇmanovic´ has understood the process, support for traditional religion
declined in the nineteenth century, and people began to abandon their faith in
heavenly salvation and eternal life. They began looking for more meaning on
earth, and a traditional view of religion was successfully replaced by the
‘pseudo-religious qualities of ethnic identification’.26 The elevation of the
nation to something mystical and eternal created a new focus of loyalty,
encouraging people to sacrifice everything for their national lands, even if this
meant laying down their lives.27 Thus the adoption of religious imagery by
nationalist leaders was an instrumental process, designed to protect a specific
territory or legitimate the expansion of the borders of an existing nation-state.
Schöpflin has similarly advanced ‘myths of election’, where the nation
believes it has been specially chosen by God or History to perform some special
mission, because of its unique or noble virtues. While such myths are rooted
in the Christian tradition, the secularisation of religion in nationalism has
forced nationalists to look for other forms of proof that the nation is superior
to its rivals. Thus, a nation’s capacity for ‘civility’, ‘literacy’ or ‘Europeanness’
would rank it above rival neighbouring groups, legitimating an assumption of
moral and cultural uniqueness and pride.28
Kecˇmanovic´ has advanced a similar view, arguing: ‘A fixed belief that
they are brighter, more courageous, more honest, more righteous, more
freedom loving, and the like helps to explain and justify their insufficient
regard for the rights and interests of people of other ethnonational groups.’29
Further, these myths were often applied in times of crisis, such that: ‘“we”. . .
have better warriors and are more skilled in arms and military dexterity than
“our” foe. At the negotiation table the nationalists will claim to be more toler-
ant, more fair and more respectful of their given word than their counterparts
on the other side of the table.’30 As Kecˇmanovic´ and Schöpflin have both
argued, secularised religious imagery and a sense of national superiority have
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grown out of a religious tradition, even if national ‘believers’ possess only
vestiges of religious belief.
Certainly, religion, whether in vestigial form or fully elaborated, can often
be an important aspect of national identity. In many cases, nationalists have
adopted and manipulated, rather than condemned, religion. In the conflict
between Serbian Orthodoxy and Croatian Catholicism or in the cases of the
Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland, the Palestinians and Israelis in
Israel, the Greeks and the Turks in Cyprus, or even the Québecois in Canada,
a rise in national awareness and sense of chosenness was often accompanied,
or preceded, by a return to religion as a strong focus of identification. While
religion may not have been the primary cause of conflict, it did become a
justification for the escalation and maintenance of it. Linkages at different
levels between nations and their religions can be of central importance in
convincing members of nations that their consolidation into national units is
somehow part of a divine plan, or the outcome of natural forces. 
The golden age of nationalism
Certainly the most complete analysis of Golden Age mythology has been
undertaken by Anthony Smith, although his zeal has led to a certain myopia.
Arguing for a more secular interpretation of primary identification myths,
Smith has taken pains to reduce the importance of religious identification,
while similarly marginalising myths of persecution.31 For Smith, national-
ism’s most attractive feature is its ability to make members of the nation
immortal, ‘through the judgement of posterity, rather than through divine
judgement in an afterlife’.32 Nationalism’s ability to create secular heroes,
saints, and great leaders allows co-nationals to dream of a glorious destiny
within their own national history. Smith, perhaps as a result of his own clas-
sics and art history background, has seen nationalism as a secular and
aesthetic phenomenon, one that relies heavily on myths of the Golden Age.
These are further buttressed by ‘the foundation charter’, and ‘ethnic title
deeds’, derived from a nation’s long attachment to the land.33 Such reasoning
is similar to that of Pfaff, Alter, Kecˇmanovic´ and Schöpflin, but has many
notable differences.
For Smith, the Golden Age is the central component of nationalism and
national identity. It promises ‘a status reversal, where the last shall be first
and the world will recognise the chosen people and their sacred values’.34
Nationalists look to their ancient past for inspiration and self-love. Further, as
Smith has argued, a nation’s ‘immortality’ (its eternal or historically signifi-
cant qualities) has been based on its ability to ‘unfold a glorious past, a golden
age of saints and heroes, to give meaning to its promise of restoration and
dignity’.35 He has termed this ‘the myth of the historical renovation’, where
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one is returned to a basic national ‘essence’, a ‘basic pattern of living and
being’ – the ‘Golden Age’ of the nation.36 Thus, we are presented with descrip-
tions of ‘poetic spaces’, ‘nature’, and ‘authenticity’, as well as ‘vivid
recreations of the glorious past of the community’.37 While this bears some
similarity to myths of Covenant and renewal, the purely secular bent of
Smith’s thinking, coupled with his aversion to any negative myths of identifi-
cation, makes it somewhat different.
Smith’s taxonomy of myths is also rooted in this type of national mythol-
ogy, which he has argued both ‘defines the historic culture community’, and
also endows it with a ‘particular energy and power’.38 His taxonomy includes:
myths of origin (ancient and unique origins of nations rooted in folklore);
myths of descent (noble lineage and genealogy of nations, myths of founding
fathers or tribes); and myths of the heroic age (the Golden Age or high point of
the original nation). These types of myths, he has argued, ‘set a standard of
culture and achievement that has rarely been equalled and can act as a model
for subsequent generations and other communities’.39
Smith has therefore argued from an instrumentalist perspective. The
communal past of a nation forms a ‘repository or quarry from which materi-
als may be selected in the construction and invention of nations’.40 History
becomes nothing more than a ‘useable past’, where nationalists select the
myths they need in order to advance certain views of the nation, necessary for
rallying people together to reclaim national greatness.41 Unfortunately, Smith
has prioritised these types of myths, to the extent that he sees no other. While
he has argued for the importance of warfare as an important ‘mobiliser of
ethnic sentiments’, and as a ‘provider of myths and memories for future gener-
ations’, he has also concluded that ‘it would be an exaggeration to deduce the
sense of common ethnicity from the fear of the ‘outsider’ and paired antago-
nisms’.42 As will become obvious from the Serbian and Croatian cases, it was
indeed the fear of powerful expansionary empires, complete with alien
systems of government and religion, that encouraged people to stand together
and forge a sense of common identity. 
In his discussion of ‘anti-colonialism’, Smith has also dismissed any sort of
fear or loathing of others. Consolidating national identity by means of a hatred
of ‘conquering outgroups’ is denounced as a ‘simple and untenable’ theory.
‘Men’, he writes, ‘do not seek collective independence and build states simply
to react to a “common enemy”.’43 Smith has accused colonised groups of
exaggerating the problems they have encountered through colonialism. He
has even criticised the use of the labels ‘foreigner’ and ‘alien’ to describe colo-
nial leaders, since even foreign masters eventually developed some sort of
indigenous characteristics.44 In his taxonomy of groups (tribe, ethnie, and
nation) Smith has included ‘In-group sentiment’ as an important criterion,
but excludes any mention of how fear or loathing of the outgroup could also
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be important.45 Curiously, the fear of persecution, Fall, or any aspect of
national decline, has not played a role in spurring nations to band together.
Rather, Smith describes ‘lifting present generations out of their banal reality’
as the true motive of national mythology.46 Such imagery attributed national
resurgence to the product of a mundane existence – a theory squarely at odds
with reality. 
Rather than engaging with those who see persecution as central to
national identification, Smith has deflected criticism by the term ‘ethnicism’,
a form of identity for ethnic groups, which exists separately from nationalism.
The basis of ethnicism, but not nationalism, is to ‘resist . . . perceived threats
from outside and corrosion within’. Smith has described ‘Ethnicism’ as ‘funda-
mentally defensive’, only appearing in times of ‘military threats’,
‘socio-economic challenges’, and ‘culture contact’ (when a less developed
culture come into prolonged contact with a more developed one).47 While
ethnicism gets closer to other ideas of nationalism, Smith has failed to discuss
the relevance of these threats, or how ethnic groups were able to mould exter-
nal threats into myths for collective action. Additionally, by dividing certain
groups into ‘ethnies’, Smith has been able to deflect challenges to his narrow
definition of what constitutes a ‘nation’. By dismissing myths of persecution or
threat as ‘anti-colonial’ or ‘ethnic’ only, he has avoided analysing them as
part of the nationalist phenomenon. This artificial separation of nationalism
and ethnicism is often at odds with the reality of many nationalist movements
around the world. 
Problematically, while Smith has described a ‘useable past’ for national-
ism, anything to do with ethnicity is seen as decidedly different. He has derided
those who would seek to use ‘ethno-history’ in the same way as a nation’s
cultural history. Thus his patronising conclusion: ‘Ethno-history is no sweet
shop in which nationalists may “pick and mix”; it sets limits to any selective
appropriation by providing a distinctive context and pattern of events . . . It
furnishes a specific but complete heritage which cannot be dismembered and
then served up à la carte.’48
In one of his more recent works on nationalism theory, Smith purposely
excluded discussion of genocide, ethnic cleansing, national minorities and
several other current topics, first, in order to save space, and secondly and
more importantly, because ‘while analyses of these issues are vital and
immensely valuable in their own right, it is by no means clear that they can
further the task of explaining the origins, development and nature of nations
and nationalism’.49 His limited view of national mythology excludes any
discussion of negative elements, which could explain why certain nations
have pursued genocidal policies against national minorities within their own
borders. Certainly during the pre-modern period in Europe, as well as during
Europe’s colonial débâcles in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, geno-
What is the nation? Towards a teleological model
25
2441Chapter1  16/10/02  8:03 am  Page 25
cide and the forced transfer of populations were integral to creating homoge-
neous cultures, on which modern nation-states or colonies could be
constructed. 
While Smith has overestimated the importance of the Golden Age in his
study of nationalism, his analysis is nevertheless rigorous and well argued.
The Golden Age is certainly an important part of nationalist identity, and
credit needs to be given where it is due. Moreover, his ‘myths of origin’, ‘myths
of descent’, and ‘myths of the heroic age’ provide invaluable sub-species of
myths that are of use in dissecting nationalist historical narratives.
Nevertheless, there is much more to nationalism than Smith’s Golden Age.
Other theorists of nationalism, such as Ernest Gellner, have been more
dismissive of the Golden Age, labelling it a ‘putative folk culture’, drawn from
myths of the ‘healthy, pristine, vigorous life of the peasants’.50 While Gellner
found it laudable that indigenous cultures were able to stand up to oppression
and subjugation by an ‘alien high culture’, he argued that, in most cases, an
‘invented high culture’, was introduced after nationalism had been success-
ful, rather than there being a retention of any sort of traditional ‘low culture’
on which the aesthetics of the new nationalism were constructed.51
Gellner’s argument is valid, in that nations rarely attempt to re-create any
form of ‘authentic’ Golden Age, when an idealised history is far more flatter-
ing. Nevertheless, inauthentic reproductions of past national culture do not
diminish the importance of this type of imagery. Seen first and foremost as an
instrumental construction, ‘primary myths of identification’ allow the nation
to dream of a glorious and heroic past, positing origins of chosenness or divine
election. This gives national members a feeling of self-worth, while at the same
time forcing them to look to the past for their inspiration. These myths also
reinforce a sense of tragedy: that the nation has somehow fallen from grace,
and must therefore be redeemed. That the nation was once great and then
somehow Fell, owing to internal or external forces, is often a central element
in spurring a nation to reassert itself. Smith’s insistence on marginalising Fall
myths is a major failing of his approach, even if his analysis of the Golden Age
is extremely lucid. 
Negative myths of identification
Throughout, I will argue that negative myths have formed the nodal point of
Serbian and Croatian nationalism, providing a much-needed stock of
metaphors and imagery. Such myths enabled nationalists to legitimate many
insalubrious and violent acts of statecraft. Myths of persecution and Fall
explain why the nation has fallen from its Golden Age. These myths situate the
nation within a teleological framework, where external forces persecuting the
nation will be judged and dealt with as the nation struggles to deliver itself.
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Without these types of images, a national revival is simply unnecessary. 
For those writing on the Jewish model of nationalism, persecution and
Fall were a result of a unified negative force in history. Hugh Trevor-Roper
argued that such imagery became normal in European nationalism, and his
definition of ‘normal nationalism’ included a sense of persecution and victim-
isation. Nationalism, as he saw it, was ‘the expression of wounded nationality:
the cry of men who have suffered great national defeat, or whose nationality
is denied, or who live insecurely on exposed national frontiers, surrounded,
and in danger of being swamped by foreigners’.52 In other words, it was both
understandable and commonplace for nations to invoke allegations of perse-
cution or victimisation in order to justify defensive action against external
enemies. 
Peter Alter, while not including a sense of persecution or oppression in his
‘common structural components’ of nationalism, has identified ‘disrespect for
and animosity towards other people’ as an important aspect of identity.53 He
has further argued: ‘social groups also tend to define their national identity
and national consciousness in negative terms . . . Encounters with “alien”–
other forms of language, religion, customs, political systems – make people
aware of close ties, shared values and common ground.’54 Thus, contrary to
Smith’s proposition that only positive imagery is important in nationalism,
Alter argues that negative encounters with external ‘others’ are also crucial
in creating a cohesive national identity. 
Kecˇmanovic´ has also argued for the centrality of the other in identity
formation. ‘Counteridentification’, as he has explained, reinforces a manda-
tory respect for ‘national standards’ and the ‘observance of prescribed rituals’.
The identification of a ‘group enemy’, ‘smoothes, buffers, or completely
neutralises intragroup antagonisms’.55 Indeed, without a sense of discrimina-
tion and aggressiveness against strangers, it is very difficult to maintain
strong bonds of friendship or co-operation among co-nationals.
Counteridentification is close to Kecˇmanovic´’s ‘pseudospeciation’, a term that
describes the human tendency to split off into separate groups, creating ‘pseu-
dospecies’ that behave as if they were separate species – with completely
different traditions, cultural habits, and psychologies.56 This appears to be
little more than a modernised definition of racial consciousness, echoing the
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century idea that each race had separate
unchangeable physical and psychological characteristics that made it behave
differently from other races. Again, the main issue here is that of differentia-
tion between one’s own group – be it a nation, pseudospecies, or race – and an
external negative force trying to destroy it.
Claude Lefort’s image of the ‘People as one’ similarly invokes the impor-
tance of an external negative force in the creation of an internally coherent
system. For Lefort, membership in the nation is considered the highest form of
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association, with one’s most important duties being loyalty to the nation, and
one’s pledge to defend it. Lefort’s work has very much dealt with the relation-
ship between Communist states and nationalism:
At the foundation of totalitarianism lies the representation of the People-as-one.
In the so-called socialist world, there can be no other division than that between
the people and its enemies: a division between inside and outside, no internal divi-
sion . . . the constitution of the People-as-one requires the incessant production of
enemies. It is not only necessary to convert, at the level of phantasy [sic], real
adversaries of the regime or real opponents into the figures of the evil Other, it is
also necessary to invent them.57
Lefort’s conception invoked the centrality of the other to the formation of a
stable and homogeneous internal identity. 
As Marc Howard Ross has further explained the phenomenon, the isola-
tion of enemies who ‘contain unwanted parts of ourselves’ can allow the
nation to purge itself of many negative attributes, leaving only the good char-
acteristics. Shared images of the world and plans for action are predicated on
a shared conception of difference between one’s own group and others. As he
has described it: ‘Outsiders can then serve as objects for externalisation,
displacement and projection of intense negative feelings like dissenting
perspectives, which are present inside the group but denied.’58 Thus, a nation
that has been traditionally seen as warlike or hostile can portray itself as a
victim of aggression. A nation with a reputation for repressing its own
national minorities will claim that its own people in far-away lands are being
abused, and are in need of protection. 
A similar argument was picked up by Michael Ignatieff, who made ample
use of Sigmund Freud’s ‘narcissism of minor differences’ to analyse the
conflict in Yugoslavia. As he has explained: ‘the smaller the real difference
between two peoples, the larger it was bound to loom in their imagination . . .
Without hatred of the other, there would be no clearly defined national self to
worship and adore.’59 It would be hard to imagine a theory more diametrically
opposed to that of Smith, although I should add that Ignatieff’s rather reduc-
tionist analysis seems to negate the idea that national cultures could have any
real differences between them or any real elements of their past that might
promote national pride. 
What these theorists share generally is a view of national identity that
needs an other, an external enemy, to consolidate support for an exclusive ‘in
group’. In many ways, such a view of nationalism appears more plausible
than that of Smith. Such imagery is important, as it creates a need to belong to
the nation for protection and defence against external ‘others’ seeking to
destroy the nation. Of course, national loyalty is also derived from positive
aspects as well – national symbols, characteristics, and shared memories
worth preserving. Nevertheless, it is only when these positive aspects are
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threatened that they become truly appreciated. The instrumentality of such
national imagery is clear – demonstrating national Falls becomes the key to
organising a national movement. 
Kenneth Minogue’s analysis is particularly useful here. Minogue identi-
fies a three-stage process of nationalist awakening: ‘stirrings’ – when the
nation ‘becomes aware of itself as a nation suffering from oppression’; ‘strug-
gle’ – when the nation is sufficiently organised to fight for its independence;
and ‘consolidation’ – when the nation-state has actually been attained.60 For
Minogue, the central aspect in nationalist ‘stirrings’ is an organised reaction
against oppression. The banding together of co-nationals to rectify the wrongs
of history becomes a strong rallying cry. Clearly, the links between fear and
hatred of an external enemy and national consolidation appear to be quite
strong, according to a wide variety of theorists of nationalism. Most of these
theories expand on but also clash with Smith’s Golden Age by pointing out
that there is more to nationalism than self-love. For many of these writers,
negative threats from the outside, rather than great marvels of national
history, determine the need for national membership.
A taxonomy of Fall and persecution myths
Both George Schöpflin and Dusˇan Kecˇmanovic´ have created useful
‘taxonomies’ or classifications of Fall myths. Schöpflin has identified two
types, and Kecˇmanovic´ five. Such taxonomies aim further to analyse and
deconstruct negative imagery and its role in nationalism theory. Schöpflin’s
first type of Fall deals with ‘myths of redemption and suffering’, consisting of
‘myths of powerlessness and compensation for the powerless’ – both of which
stress the importance of status reversal. These, as he argues, turn fatalism and
passivity into virtues, while making suffering nations morally superior to their
rivals.61
The second type, ‘myths of unjust treatment’, advance the idea that
‘history is a malign and unjust actor that has singled out the community for
special, negative treatment.’62 Schöpflin has stressed the purposeful nature of
collective suffering, since it endows persecution and victimisation with
meaning. Thus, like Biblical teleology, national Redemption follows naturally
from a Fall. As he paraphrases the argument: ‘The world . . . owes those who
have suffered a special debt . . . the victims of suffering are helpless because
they suffered for the wider world and the wider world should recognise this,
thereby legitimating the group’s special worth.’63 Schöpflin has placed
Holocaust myths here, as well as myths that copy the Holocaust, appropriat-
ing its symbolism.64
Kecˇmanovic´’s myths or ‘themes’ are similar to those of Schöpflin,
although each is not mutually exclusive. ‘The theme of damage’ highlights
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how frequently the nation has been deprived, economically, legally, reli-
giously, or socially. Competition between rival groups for scarce resources
within a state naturally favours one group over another. This leads invariably
to a lower level of economic and cultural development for the oppressed group
– a common theme, argues Kecˇmanovic´, in nationalist writing.65 The next
theme deals with ‘threat’ – both from internal and external forces. Internally,
the nation is threatened by those who refuse to acknowledge the decomposi-
tion of the nation, and therefore do nothing to prevent it from crumbling.
Externally, ‘threat’ comes from outside groups who seek to undermine the
nation, by destroying its socio-economic potential, while similarly
‘deaden[ing] their national self-consciousness’.66
Thirdly, Kecˇmanovic´ has identified the theme of the ‘universal culprit’,
where ‘Nationalists perceive the members of another nationality as the source
of all evil and as responsible for all the ills that have befallen them.’67 A fourth
theme of ‘plot’ exists, where nationalists locate enemies around the world, not
just among their neighbours. Thus, international organisations, the KGB, the
Vatican, Freemasons, or some other pet bogeyman are blamed for all the ills of
the nation. Foreign and seemingly omnipotent forces are implicated in sinister
plots, creating a paranoia that stresses a sense of national uniqueness in the
face of attack from multiple sources.68 The final theme is that of ‘victim and
sacrifice’, where nationalists become ‘victims of envy, of the hegemonic and
expansionist tendencies of other people, victims of minority or majority
groups that continuously demand greater autonomy or more rights’.69 In this
final case, external forces try to destroy the nation to gain its power for them-
selves.
Kecˇmanovic´ and Schöpflin share the view that negative identification is
central to the formation of national myths – certainly as important as positive
forms of identity. Both writers argue that this type of imagery ‘proves’ to
national members that they either deserve recompense and special status
from outside, or the recognition that their own ‘self-help’ remedies are justi-
fied. Both see these types of myths as instrumental, and both advance the
importance of negative myths in reinforcing a sense of uniqueness and self-
righteousness – that what is good and noble in the nation needs to be
preserved, and can only be preserved by national unity and loyalty. 
What emerges from an overview of ‘myths of negative identification’ is
their fundamental importance within a teleological and ethical framework.
Because a ‘chosen’, ‘noble’, and ‘golden’ nation has fallen, owing to outside
influences, it deserves to be given its rightful place in the family of nations. Not
only does a nationalist understanding of history teach that a suffering nation
deserves Redemption; an understanding of teleology posits that it will eventu-
ally be redeemed, should co-nationals band together to accomplish national
objectives. In this, Minogue’s analysis provides a useful description of how
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such imagery can be instrumentalised by nationalist leaders. As has been
described earlier, a nationalist teleology is largely assumed to be at work in the
history of nations. What needs to be proved in order for that teleology to come
about are myths of the past greatness of the nation, and myths of its persecu-
tion and Fall. The construction and perpetuation of national myths is an
instrumental phenomenon, whereby elites order events according to their
view of history, creating an ethical system where right and wrong are clearly
demarcated. 
Modernism and its approach to nationalism
Since the 1960s, Modernism has been an important branch of nationalism
theory, accounting for the rise of nations as a concomitant of the industrial
revolution and the spread of literacy and the printing press. Modernists have
generally had little interest in nationalist mythology, seeing nationalism as a
solution for the problems of industrialisation and mass urbanisation, not as an
end in itself. While views on the character of nationalism are wide-ranging,
they basically share a common theme: that negative imagery (or myth) is an
insignificant factor in the development, structuring and articulation of
nationalism. For most Modernists, it is generally irrelevant what types of
national mythology have been used, what aspects of history have been re-
interpreted, or why nationalism has been chosen over some other form of
association, such as Communism or Fascism.
Ernest Gellner, for example, begins from the standpoint that there was
little intrinsic worth to nationalism, since it is ‘not the awakening of nations
to self-consciousness; it invents nations where they do not exist’.70 While he
admits that there are some ‘pre-existing differentiating marks’ that might
form part of the basis of nationalism, these are seen as secondary to the larger
process of nation-building that occurred in modernity. Such ‘marks’ are rele-
vant only in so far as every nation seems to have them in its past.71 The nature
or extent of such ‘marks’ failed to enter into Gellner’s discussion, since he
argued that ‘The cultural shreds and patches used by nationalism are often
arbitrary historical inventions. Any old shred and patch would have served as
well.’72 Thus nationalist symbols are seen as instrumental only – they could
be anything, so long as they performed a certain social and political function
– that of channelling popular support for the nationalist elite.
John Breuilly’s observations are similar in many respects. For him,
nationalism’s usefulness rests almost entirely in its ability to ‘exploit the sense
of loss modernity creates . . . provid[ing] simple concrete labels for friends and
enemies.’73 It emerges as an institutional instrument for gaining power,
useful, Breuilly posits, for opposition groups seeking to wrest control from an
established government.74 There is nothing here to suggest that nationalism
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has any intrinsic features that make it better than other forms of association,
nor that nationalism has any special types of symbolism or imagery at its
disposal. I will argue that the opposite is often true, that national leaders often
have to choose their ‘shreds and patches’ very carefully. Often, there is
nothing arbitrary about nationalist mythology at all. 
Other Modernists, such as the historian Eric Hobsbawm, have a more
ambivalent view of the role of negative imagery. Characteristically,
Hobsbawm encounters difficulty with the concept of negative identification.
For him, ethnic and national identification are divided into separate cate-
gories, and while he sees that external attacks on the ethnic group may well
help that group bind together, he does not see nationalism suffering from the
same process.75 Hobsbawm is careful not to dismiss racial and ethnic identity
outright as an aspect of nationalism. He admits that prejudice based on colour
and other physical characteristics has played an important role in politics.
Nevertheless, he adds that ‘negative ethnicity is virtually always irrelevant to
proto-nationalism . . .’.76
Hobsbawm later contradicts himself, finding that while racism itself may
not be important in developing a proto-nationalism, it becomes crucial as
nationalism becomes more widespread, and gains mass appeal. This ‘democ-
ratisation’ of nationalism, as Hobsbawm recalls, often implies an era when
‘popular nationalist, or at all events xenophobic sentiments and those of
national superiority preached by the new pseudo science of racism, became
easier to mobilise.’77 Reviewing nineteenth-century nationalism, Hobsbawm
draws a positive correlation between nationalism and out-group violence,
arguing: ‘there is no more effective way of bonding together the disparate
sections of restless peoples than to unite them against outsiders.’78 In this
approach, modernity creates the conditions for a more xenophobic and
racially based nationalism. Further, his analysis prescribes nationalism as a
potential cure for the onset of modernity, with its concomitant alienation of
various groups in society looking for some form of identity. The fear of losing
traditional ways during periods of increased urbanisation made it easier for
national elites to gain support by convincing the populace that they were
being persecuted because of their national group.79
In this way, Hobsbawm blends together some of the Modernist ideas of
Gellner and Breuilly concerning industrialisation and the importance of
urbanisation in creating a milieu wherein nationalism can come about. While
he seemingly rejects racism and negative views of out-groups at the beginning
of nationalism, he finds negative forms of nationalism to be crucial later. The
question ‘Why only later?’ is never answered, and this creates several prob-
lems. The first is that elite or proto-nationalism is somehow seen as free of
racism or negative views of the other, while there is an implication that the
masses somehow need someone to hate or fear in order to rally behind a
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nationalist leader. While ethnic groups and the masses are seen to be xeno-
phobic, the national elites are somehow above such attitudes. How and why
this is the case is not explained. 
If Hobsbawm rejects enemy images in the development of early national-
ism, Benedict Anderson has completely dismissed its importance throughout
the process of national development and ‘democratisation’. He posits that
‘nations inspire love, and often profoundly self sacrificing love,’ and goes on to
argue that while national love inspires ‘poetry, prose fiction, music and plastic
arts . . . how truly rare it is to find analogous nationalist products expressing
fear and loathing.’80 Anderson even posited that colonised people felt little
hatred for their former colonial overlords. He was astonished at ‘how insignif-
icant the element of hatred is in these expressions of national feeling’.81
However, Anderson’s select examples from South-East Asia ignore the reality
of those many nations who based at least part of their nationalism on threat
and fear. While love of the nation is an important ingredient in activating
national sentiments, Anderson’s rejection of negative imagery ignores half
the picture.
Tom Nairn’s view of nationalism differs in many respects from those of
others of the Modernist school. Adopting a more populist perspective, he sees
the involvement of the masses as the crucial step in nationalism, as well as its
source of legitimacy. As such, myths of ‘popular revolution’ or ‘national liber-
ation struggle’ form the basis of modernist national myths, making nations
appear democratic and desirable.82 Tracing its more recent history, Nairn
examines the importance of nationalism for weaker nations as an ideology
that was used, particularly in Latin America and ‘Indo-China’, as a way of
rallying people together to fight against ‘alien oppression.’83 His basic goal is
to tie modern nationalism to underdevelopment in developing countries.
Again, nationalism is a solution to economic backwardness. 
Unlike Gellner, Breuilly and Anderson, Nairn sees negative views of
foreigners and out-groups as central to emerging national consciousness. In
fact, a strong aversion to colonial powers forms the basis of nationalism, as
Nairn explains: ‘Their rulers . . . had to mobilise their societies for this histori-
cal short cut. This meant the conscious formation of a militant, inter-class
community rendered strongly (if mythically) aware of its own separate iden-
tity vis-à-vis the outside forces of domination.’84 This view completely opposes
that of Smith and Anderson. Nairn’s emphasis on ‘mobilisation’ stresses the
need for emerging twentieth-century nationalism to focus on ‘differentiae’ as
the linchpin of nationalist struggles. However, like Gellner’s ‘shreds and
patches’, the specific symbols and images of nationalism are irrelevant,
merely a cobbling together of ‘inherited ethnos, speech, folklore, [and] skin
colour’, with certain external structures of nationalism, such as a capital city,
a currency, a government, a military, and other such trappings.85 Nairn puts
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the point more succinctly in a later work, describing nationalism simply as
‘the effort by one “backward” culture and people after another to appropriate
the powers and benefits of modernity for their own use’, largely in reaction to
imperialism and colonial domination.86
Nairn’s view of nationalism as a populist movement, based on a collective
will to appropriate the structures of a ‘modern’ state, is in many ways naive.
What he presents is a utopian vision of how such states should have worked,
a view that ignores the unfortunate excesses and corruption of many nation-
alist leaders, who sometimes did more to exploit their own people than did
their former colonial masters. Also, the focus on external colonial forces as the
object of negative imagery is not easily applied to other cases. In many African
and Asian states, for instance, conflict between ethnic groups (or potential
nations) was sometimes far more severe and bloody than any struggle against
colonialism. The conflict over Jammu and Kashmir between India and
Pakistan, and bitter fighting in Angola, Somalia, and Rwanda all indicate the
dangers of internal rather than external antagonists.
In conclusion, while Modernism advances several intriguing explana-
tions for the rise of nationalism, it does little to explain why nations evolve as
they do, why certain types of myths and ideas are important while others are
not, and more importantly, why nationalism is seen to be the best instrumen-
tal method of acquiring power within the state. None of the Modernist writers
surveyed ascribe any intrinsic worth to nationalism, seeing it merely as a tool
in the struggle for power. The appeal of nationalism remains elusive. People
either become nationalists because they are confused and dislocated by indus-
trialisation and modernity, or adopt nationalism in order to create an
industrialised and modern state. Few conclusions are offered to prove or
disprove that such a view of nationalism is historically accurate. 
Critics such as Anthony Smith have rightly signalled many emerging
nationalisms that disprove the Modernist case. At the same time, he questions
how receptive people have actually been to ‘official school culture’, rightly
asking: ‘Is the sacrifice for the fatherland really a defence of an educationally
sustained high culture?’87 In most cases, important symbols and traditions,
rooted in pre-national culture, seem to be at work. Some of these traditions
may be more deeply felt than nationalists realise. Indeed, the drive to use the
past to make sense of the present opens a Pandora’s box of differing values and
interpretations of the past, resulting in struggles to see whose version of
reality will prevail. In short, Modernism fails to address the continued impor-
tance of nationalist myth and tradition. Explorations into what sort of
national myths and traditions are useful in the development of nationalism,
and how national time and history are conceived, as well as analyses of the
structure of national myths and ideas, are simply not relevant to Modernist
studies of nationalism. 
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Conclusions
A model composed of these three general varieties of myths will allow for a
systematic analysis of Serbian and Croatian nationalist myths, including how
these myths were selected, and how they were used instrumentally. Of these
three types of myths, the first type is largely assumed. Without the promise of
a status reversal, there can be no teleology in history, and the nation is
deprived of its destiny. Because it has so long been anchored in the Biblical
tradition, any group that can prove itself to be chosen, and to have suffered
national Falls, can look forward to such a change in status. 
‘Primary myths of identification’ are equally important. They create a
utopian vision of what the nation can be, making nationalists proud of their
history and traditions. While these myths help a nation understand its own
unique character and historical significance, they are less important than
‘negative myths of identification’. The reason for this stems from the impor-
tance of the Jewish example, and the creation of a post-Holocaust ethic in the
Western world, which privileges victims over aggressors. Proving one’s
Golden Age serves primarily to increase the tragic aspects of the national Fall,
thereby demonstrating a greater need for national Redemption. 
Throughout this book, priority will be given to an analysis of ‘negative
myths of identification’. While the other two types of myths will be reviewed,
these negative myths have proved the most useful in rallying people together
under a common cause, namely – the defence of the nation from external
attack. Such myths convince members of a nation that they are in danger,
should they choose not to adhere to the national traditions and prescriptions
laid forth by their leaders. As will become increasingly obvious, strong propa-
ganda campaigns, replete with Fall imagery and the fear of genocide, preceded
much of the irredentist behaviour and ‘ethnic cleansing’ that so traumatised
the Yugoslav region. Proving the guilt of the other in trying to destroy the self
became a central preoccupation of Serbian and Croatian nationalists seeking
to legitimate many of their often violent activities. 
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2Instrumentalising the Holocaust: from
universalisation to relativism
For the things we have to learn before we can do them, we learn by doing them:
e.g. men becoming builders by building and lyre-players by playing the lyre; so too
we become just by just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing
brave acts. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics)1
Where once it was said that the life of Jews would be ‘a light unto nations’ – the
bearer of universal lessons – now it is the ‘darkness unto nations’ of the death of
Jews that is said to carry universal lessons . . . Individuals from every point on the
political compass can find the lessons they wish in the Holocaust; it has become a
moral and ideological Rorschach test. (Peter Novick, The Holocaust and Collective
Memory)2
IARGUE THROUGHOUT this book that negative imagery has been a crucialbuilding-block in Serbian and Croatian national myths. These myths havebeen used to legitimate the forced shifting of borders, the ethnic cleansing
of populations, and various other violent aspects of state formation. Equally
important has been the frequent use of the Jewish Holocaust as a template for
restructuring nationalist histories. The Holocaust as the archetypal national
Fall of the twentieth century has arguably left a lasting impression on philoso-
phers and historians, as well as nationalist leaders. In this chapter, three
concepts are of importance: firstly, the universalisation (or trivialisation) of
the Holocaust as a series of general symbols and metaphors for national suffer-
ing; secondly, a debate among historians comparing the Holocaust to other
instances of genocide in the twentieth century and before; and thirdly, the
concept of ‘performativity’ – the theory that nations create forms of discourse
to advance their own histories of victimisation, even if in some cases an impar-
tial view of history might suggest other interpretations.3
During the disintegration of Yugoslavia, ‘acting’ as a victim formed a
central part of Serbian and Croatian propaganda, legitimating the violence
necessary to create expanded homelands. Seeking to justify a form of national
‘self-help’, these two countries produced a legacy of ethnic cleansing, rape,
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forced population transfers, and irredentism, as the products of their own feel-
ings of victimisation. 
Also important has been the targeting of specific enemies trying to
destroy the nation. As Branimir Anzulovic´ has remarked in his considera-
tion of genocide in Yugoslavia: ‘The modern age has added another motive
for genocide: the utopian promise of a perfect society through the elimina-
tion of the groups accused of preventing its realization.’4 Furthermore, ‘the
self-defensive “kill so that you may not be killed”’, is, again according to
Anzulovic´, never enough to mobilise one’s national group for conflict.
Rather, ‘The victim must be seen as a demon, and his killing as a universally
beneficial act.’5 Certainly the quest for racial purity is not a new one – it goes
back at least as far as the ancient Aryan invaders of the Indian subcontinent,
who introduced a tripartite system of social stratification known as the
system of varna (or ‘colours’). They adapted this system to the new condi-
tions by adding to it at the bottom end a further fourth and lowest varna, the
Shudra, in which the darker-skinned indigenous peoples could be separated
off from the lighter-skinned invaders. What has certainly changed however,
is the wide variety of means available in the modern state to achieve a racial
utopia – means that never existed before the onset of modernity. These
means allow ‘demons’ to be killed far more easily than at any other time in
history. 
An analysis of Serbian and Croatian mythologies, with direct reference to
their instrumental and often violent consequences, demonstrates some of the
practical implications of creating a self-righteous nationalism, based on myths
of Fall and Redemption. Sadly, the case of Yugoslavia provides an example of
how Jewish victimisation and national renewal unwittingly bred a host of
bastard children, seeking to manipulate and abuse the legacy of the Holocaust
to advance a variety of geopolitical agendas. 
Biblical and Jewish ethics: nationalism and Zionism
Frye’s analysis of biblical structure demarcated a clear ethical system, where
good and evil were at odds with each other, driving history forward. The idea
that there was an axiomatic link between Fall and Redemption provided an
understanding of how Jewish nationalism would structure its own aspirations
for statehood, using the legitimacy of this model to guide it through the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries. Indeed, there was little doubt that the Jews
had had a series of metaphorically linked ‘Golden Ages’ such as Frye has
described, nor was there much doubt as to the persistence of myths of Jews as
chosen, and as the elect of God. What did need to be re-created for Jews to
again situate themselves in the covenantal cycle, to once again dream of
Redemption, was proof of the continued presence of an ahistorical negative
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agency, able to bind the Jews together, able to again place them within their
historical teleology. 
For many nineteenth-century Zionists, the dangers posed by anti-
Semitism would prove of crucial importance in rallying co-nationals together
to dream of a renewed Israel. While the reality of anti-Semitism arguably
stemmed from Roman times, the term was first coined by Wilhelm Marr in
1879, and adopted into his Antisemiten-Liga.6 While anti-Semitism was artic-
ulated to denote a fear of ‘Jewish Internationalism’, implicating Jews in a
conspiracy to overthrow nation-states, Hannah Arendt has argued convinc-
ingly that some Zionists began to place it at the centre of their emerging
nationalism, along with more positive myths of divine election and Covenant.
Anti-Semitism provided the necessary means for the Jews to confront their
‘otherness’ in Europe when they found themselves outsiders in the develop-
ment of the nation-state and the industrial revolution.7
While the Jews had for centuries been the victims of religiously inspired
aggression, Arendt argued that anti-Semitism only arose as an instrumental
term when it was politically expedient to channel Jewish experiences of
victimisation towards a concrete objective, in line with Minogue’s three-stage
model.8 At first, this was simply the desire to safeguard existence, while later
it was used in promoting collective action. Thus: 
Jews concerned with the survival of their people, would, in a curious and desper-
ate misinterpretation, hit on the consoling idea that antisemitism after all might
be an excellent means for keeping the people together, so that the assumption of
eternal antisemitism would even imply an eternal guarantee of Jewish existence.
This superstition, a secularised travesty of the idea of eternity inherent in a faith
in chosenness and a Messianic hope, has been strengthened through the fact that
for many centuries the Jews experienced the Christian brand of hostility which
was indeed a powerful agent of preservation, spiritually as well as politically.9
For some Zionist thinkers, the role of anti-Semitism as a constant foil to
Jewish aspirations was to figure as a central component of nineteenth-century
Jewish national identity. Zionist writers, seeking justification for the creation
of a Jewish state, readily used both persecution myths and the covenantal
cycle to argue that such a state was both viable and historically necessary.
Theodor Herzl placed the Jewish Fall at the centre of his movement for a
national homeland. Positing that the Jews of the Diaspora constituted ‘one
people’, Herzl advocated a mass exodus from Europe, since: ‘We have
sincerely tried everything to merge with the national communities in which
we live, seeking only to preserve the faith of our fathers. It is not permitted us.’
Thus did Herzl come to adopt ‘the Jewish tragedy’ as the ‘driving force’ of
nationalism.10
The centrality of persecution myths to Zionism before the Second World
War led directly both to efforts to create a coherent Jewish ‘nation’ and to the
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channelling of productive energies towards the establishment of a homeland
in Palestine. Using anti-Semitism as a rallying call proved useful in establish-
ing a link between the historic victimisation of the Jews as an apatride people,
and their future Redemption as a rooted people on historic soil. Zionist writings
often explored deep into the ancient past, exposing a continuous and unend-
ing stream of anti-Jewish consciousness, similar to the negative force Frye
identified in Old Testament narratives. 
The Nazi Holocaust against the Jews of Europe would have devastating
effects, destroying Jewish culture and traditions in literally thousands of cities,
towns and villages, from Russia to Holland, while resulting in the death of
almost six million Jewish victims.11 For post-Holocaust Zionists, the return to
Zion would take on a new and more urgent meaning. For Zionists, the tradi-
tional Jewish status in Europe as ‘history’s orphans’ and the ‘universal
outsider’ had relegated them to the margins of humanity, making genocide
that much easier to accomplish. As Noam Penkower put it: ‘The lack of an
independent state doomed those defenceless human beings to the realisation
of Adolf Hitler’s diabolic final solution.’12 Anti-Semitism and its ugliest mani-
festation, the Holocaust, made it clear that Jews were no longer safe in the
Diaspora. While pogroms had been a constant feature of Jewish existence
since the time of the first crusades, never before had Europe’s entire Jewish
population been under threat.
For some Zionists, Israel might provide a means of somehow mitigating
the horrific effects of the Holocaust, if Jews were willing to work together to
create a state. At the very least it would give the Jews a homeland safe from
persecution, while ridding Europe’s Displaced Persons camps of some of their
inhabitants. Thus could triumphalist Zionists like Yehuda Gothelf claim hope-
fully soon after the war: 
Anti-Semitism . . . [can] serve as a force for moral renewal, and for uniting the
masses of Jews to make them struggle for their national and individual liberation
. . . Zionism is not only the outcome of Anti-Semitism; but it puts in concrete form
the longing for redemption, the national-religious yearning of the past two thou-
sand years.13
For some religious Zionists, like Yaakov Herzog, Israel would represent
the ‘immediate recompense and revival’ after the ‘greatest crime in history’,14
while for Rabbi Jung, the ‘incredible restoration of the homeland’ that
followed the Holocaust was proof not only of ‘the beginning of the emergent
redemption’, but also of the Jewish people’s ‘timeless faith in the Divine
covenant’.15 Again, the centrality of covenantal or messianic arguments was
clear – Jews had been delivered because of their faith in the teleology of
history, and their Covenant with God. 
Nevertheless, while Zionist triumphalism was the order of the day for
those who believed in the redemptive powers of Israel, other Jewish (non- or a-
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Zionist) writers concerned themselves with life outside Israel, as well as the
legacy of Hitler’s Final Solution and its impact on Western consciousness.
Those dealing with the philosophical implications of the Holocaust, that
nightmarish outcome of the Western Enlightenment and the development of
the modern nation-state, found little solace in the fact that the Jews possessed
a narrow strip of earth, threatened on all sides by countries that wanted to
drive them into the sea. If 1947 was a year to be celebrated, the 1948 ‘War of
Independence’ was a bitter struggle, where, once more, the State of Israel
almost ceased to exist. 
Universalising the Holocaust
For many, the lessons of the Holocaust were so immense that they could not
be applicable simply to the Jewish people. The death of six million in such a
systematic and barbaric manner signalled that the fundamental axioms that
underpinned Western society were fatally flawed. Philosophers and world
leaders entered the twentieth century filled with hope that peace and prosper-
ity would reign, owing to advances in technology, efficiency, and
communications. Rationalism and industrialisation were to bring greater
prosperity and well-being for everyone. With the Holocaust, such dreams
were irretrievably shattered. Some, like philosopher George Steiner, went so
far as to describe the Holocaust as a Hell on earth that for ever destroyed our
faith in the progress of civilisation. As he wrote of the death-camp system: 
L’univers concentrationnaire has no true counterpart in the secular mode. Its
analogue is Hell. The camp embodies, often down to the minutiae, the images and
chronicles of Hell in European art and thought from the twelfth to the eighteenth
centuries. It is these representations which gave to the deranged horrors of Belsen
a kind of ‘expected logic’. It is in the fantasies of the infernal, as they literally
haunt western sensibility, that we find the technology of pain without meaning,
of bestiality without end, of gratuitous terror.16
The horrors of the camps for Steiner would create a ‘post culture’, an era
characterised by malaise and a lack of utopia, where no one seemed to have
faith in Western civilisation’s promise of moral and cultural evolution. Steiner
described the creation of a ‘formidable gap in the co-ordinates of location, of
psychological recognition in the western mind’.17 The world lost its tradi-
tional sense of morality, of good and evil. It had abandoned its faith. While
some turned to Communism, which Steiner labelled ‘the modern totalitarian
state’, others simply lived in fear, waiting in terror for the re-emergence of a
‘Hell above ground’.18
As far as Steiner was concerned, Hell had now became immanent. It was
an everyday reality – a monster that could re-awaken at any moment. New
forms of ethnic, national, or other fratricidal warfare could develop at any
Instrumentalising the Holocaust: universalisation to relativism
43
2441Chapter2  16/10/02  8:03 am  Page 43
time, because our previous ideas of good and evil were destroyed – we were no
longer able to distinguish between right and wrong. But what were we to do
about this state of affairs? For Steiner, the key to the future lay in creating new
ethical poles of good and evil – a new morality. The new Devil, the new Hell,
would become associated with Hitler and the Holocaust. Good and evil in the
world would therefore be judged in relation to the Nazis. Goodness would be
defined in relation to the bad that human beings had done in the twentieth
century, not by the fanciful imaginings of theologians or engravers.19 If evil
was represented by the Nazis and their deeds, good would come to be repre-
sented by the Jews, who emerged as the archetypal victims of history. 
Steiner’s second work on the Holocaust, The Portage to San Cristobal of A.
H., allegorised the Jewish preoccupation with the Nazis, and how their lives
have changed since 1945. In a fictional dialogue between good and evil,
Steiner’s characters combed the South American jungles in the 1980s,
hunting for the still living Hitler, who continued to personify the evils of
Nazism. In this novella, the creator of Hell, the secularised Satan, was hunted
down and captured by the very people he tried to destroy decades before.
Steiner here tapped into what he believed to be the essence of post-war
Zionism, and its reliance on negative myths of persecution and Fall. His
fictional dialogue demonstrated how the other served to imbue the Jewish
nation with an identity separate from mere religious symbology or mythical
understanding. But while he echoed this Zionist argument, it was with a great
deal of irony. As Hitler was brought to trial at the end of the book, the frail and
sickly Führer seemed conscious of his ‘world historic role’ as the (re)creator of
the Jewish nation. As Steiner’s Hitler queried: 
[D]id Herzl create Israel or did I? . . . Would Palestine have become Israel, would
the Jews have come to that barren patch of the Levant, would the United States
and the Soviet Union, Stalin’s Soviet Union, have given you recognition and guar-
anteed your survival had it not been for the Holocaust? It was the Holocaust that
gave you the courage of injustice, that made you drive the Arab out of his home,
out of his field, because he was in your divinely ordered way . . . Perhaps I am the
Messiah, the true Messiah, the Sabbatai whose infamous deeds were allowed by
God in order to bring his people home . . . The Holocaust was the necessary mystery
before Israel could come into its strength.20
In this sense, negative created positive, just as for early Christians, Satan
became central to a belief in the fundamental goodness of God. Strangely,
Steiner also paralleled Hitler with a sort of Moses-like figure, who led the
Jewish people into the wilderness, so that they could find their promised land.
For Steiner, the Jews ironically needed a Hitler-like symbol of evil to live in the
modern world, because to kill him, as Friedrich Nietszche ‘killed’ God, would
destroy the cultural and ethical boundaries of the ‘post culture’. In this sense,
the creation of Hell brought about a sort of Heaven for the Jewish people. Their
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‘abstract’ nature, long a focal point in anti-Semitism, was transformed, and a
new dichotomy emerged – with a concretised Heaven and a concretised Hell.
Wilsonianism, and the belief in Redemption through the nation-state, became
the ultimate godsend for nations, while a national Hell (the Holocaust) threat-
ened rootless or fragmented nations who were unable to defend themselves.
Hitler became as essential to the morality of our ‘post cultural’ world as Satan
was to the early Christians. In this work, Hitler emerges as the latest incarna-
tion of evil threatening the Hebrew people, little different (in kind) from the
Pharaoh of Exodus, Nebuchadnezzar, and Antiochus Epiphanes, although
certainly much worse in degree.
Yet in other respects, Hitler is obviously very different from the others. He
is the only modern manifestation of evil, and he is also a Devil that the whole
world can hate. He is not just the enemy of the Jews, but also of Russians,
Americans, British, French, Yugoslavs and Poles – indeed, the list is endless.
Making Hitler the Devil means that, while he is primarily the enemy of the
Jews, he is also the enemy of many other people, and they too can potentially
claim some sense of victimhood, since he did not simply destroy the Jews – he
also destroyed Western civilisation in the process, according to Steiner. In this
sense, the lessons of the Holocaust are specifically applicable to the Jews, but
universally applicable to everyone else. Because Hitler destroyed Christian
morality, Jews have no choice but to share their Devil with the rest of the
world, as Harold Kaplan explains: ‘all men have become “jews” (with the
small “j” in Jean-François Lyotard’s usage) and must adopt that suffering at
Lodz and Warsaw as the gentiles of old adopted that of Christ. Hitler and his
followers were the anti-Christ, because, as vulgar Nietzscheans, they would
overthrow a traditional “morality of the weak” for its presumption against
nature’s law.’21
Even postmodernists have joined the fray, as Julia Kristeva and Slavoj
Zˇizˇek both engage in a species of philosemitism. Through specialised jargon,
the Jewish people are transformed into the ‘nexus’, ‘trope’, or ‘signifiers’ for
the ‘decentered, destabilized, postmodern subject in a theoretical system that
persists in defining (or “fetishizing”) them from without’. Fetishising Jewish
‘otherness’, they make it something to be embraced, something useful in
understanding the self, in the process, as Elizabeth Bellamy recalls,
‘privileg[ing] the very figure of the Diaspora Jew anti-Semitism has tradition-
ally scorned’.22
Certainly, there are many well-meaning philosophers and historians who
have sought to universalise the lessons of the Holocaust, irrespective of how
opaque their vocabulary might appear. Nevertheless, there are inherent
dangers in such an exercise, one of the chief dangers being trivialisation.
Those who attempt to universalise the Holocaust can forget that its lessons
originally applied to the Jewish people, and not the entire human race. Judy
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Chicago’s work is a typical example of how universalism can be misapplied.
For her, the Holocaust has become ‘a window into an aspect of the unarticu-
lated but universal human experience of victimization’, as well as a ‘bridge
towards the creation of “a new global community based on human shared
values”’.23 As Lawrence Langer astutely cautions, while it is laudable to try to
understand the universal implications of the Holocaust, one must also be
wary, lest its original meaning be lost in a sea of meaningless banal optimism.
In trying to extract some abstract good from the ashes of the Final Solution,
there is the real danger that Chicago and her contemporaries merely belittle
the suffering of those who lived and died in the concentration camps by trying
to apply the Holocaust’s lessons to everyone.24
The French intellectual Alain Finkielkraut has taken a position similar to
that of Langer and others, raising concerns about the universalisation and
metaphorisation of the Jewish tragedy. For him, maintaining the Jewish nature
of the Holocaust is of central importance. As part of the post-Holocaust genera-
tion, Finkielkraut has often described the tremendous moral value attached to
being Jewish after 1945, inheriting the identity of a victim without ever having
had to suffer from genocide. It is a moral legacy, passed on, generation after
generation. All Jews become heroes in a sense, because they have endured,
despite Hitler’s evil plans.25 While this was a positive aspect of his early child-
hood, this heroising of the victim becomes a worrying aspect of Jewish identity.
In coming to terms with the rise of ‘negationism’ or Holocaust denial in France,
Finkielkraut has severely criticised those who, in seeing Israel as a positive
outcome of the Holocaust, ‘mitigate the genocide by looking for meaning to its
absurdity and entertaining the notion that such an affront is reparable’.26 He
criticises Zionists such as Gothelf, Herzog, and Jung, since for these people, ‘the
existence of Israel gives a minimal justification to the genocide’.27
While Steiner raised ontological and philosophical questions about
universalising the Holocaust, Finkielkraut has spoken openly against univer-
salisation, arguing that this ‘minimal justification’ in a philosophical sense
has led to concrete problems of Holocaust revisionism. Much of Finkielkraut’s
writing deals with the lessening importance of the Holocaust as a warning,
and as a metaphor. He blames those who reduce the Holocaust to a few
symbols and ‘these few majestic words, Auschwitz, Holocaust, the Six Million’.
Such reductionism, he has argued, leads invariably to a trivialisation of the
Holocaust’s importance, while contributing to a ‘growing lapse of memory’.28
The primary problem he sees with this sort of ‘lazy’ remembrance is that
it promotes misuse, creating problems for those who are tasked with keeping
Holocaust memories alive. As he laments: ‘Used in contexts to which it does
not apply, weakened by its metaphorical use, and degraded by needless repe-
tition, the term “genocide” is wearing out and dying. The exhaustion of
meaning makes it easier for the workers for the negation to do their job.’29 The
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more the Holocaust is invoked, Finkielkraut fears, the more it is trivialised and
divorced from its original meaning. The Holocaust therefore becomes seen
simply for its instrumental uses, to give the Jews special rights because they
have suffered more than any other nation.30
While Langer is clearly critical of non-Jews who try to universalise the
Holocaust without fully grasping its meaning, Finkielkraut attacks Jewish
Zionists who have belittled the Holocaust’s significance by using Jewish suffer-
ing for political purposes. For him, the danger involved in such an exercise is
obvious. Not only can Holocaust deniers accuse the Jews of manipulating
their own genocide; other non-Jewish groups can follow the Zionist example.
Echoing Steiner’s view about the creation of a Devil-Hitler, Finkielkraut has
also offered his views on this new morality:
[U]niversal conscience formed itself anew by putting the face of Hitlerism on
absolute evil . . . Nazism is invoked almost religiously to represent civilization’s
Other; and to represent Nazism, one invokes its supreme horror, the physical
annihilation of peoples or ethnic groups denied human status . . . Satan was incar-
nated in the person of Hitler, who from then on was merely the allegory of the
demon. Nazism, the ultimate truth of oppression and the model for all abomina-
tions past and future, also became the reference for all accusatory discourse. The
event was seized, taken in, and abstracted by the Idea, and the Idea eventually
deteriorated into insult: if everyone agrees on a single definition of the enemy,
everyone is tempted to apply that image to his own opponent in order to justify the
battle he is fighting.31
For Finkielkraut, as for Steiner, Hitler has become the world’s secularised
Devil, and the Holocaust has become the world’s worst tragedy – ever. This
literally invites non-Jewish groups to apply the imagery of the Holocaust to
their own situations, since it becomes the ultimate form of national or racial
victimhood. Secularising Satan and Hell has spawned a new and dangerous
breed of discourse, which, while reducing the importance of Jewish suffering,
has allowed other groups to increase their relative power. As Finkielkraut
again explains:
Since Hitler’s time, every villain is a fascist, and every victim wears the yellow
star. There is no revolution, no revolt, no struggle, no matter how minor its object,
that fails to go rummaging through the past only to end up presenting itself in
terms of this particular period of history. Every oppressed minority from women to
Occitanians saw fit to declare its genocide, as if doing anything short of this would
render that minority uninteresting, incapable of being recognized; as if the revin-
dication of genocide were the cornerstone of the justice of the minority’s cause
and the validity of its aspirations. By using the word invented in 1944 to designate
the putting to death of entire peoples, today’s minority groups affirm their identity
and legitimate their existence . . . Antifascism had established the Jews as value: as
the gold standard of oppression, as the paradigm of the victim.32
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Here clearly is the danger of over-generalisation, a process that appears to
be all but inevitable to Finkielkraut, as well as to Steiner. What Finkielkraut is
attacking is the extent to which general myths of Fall and Redemption have
become specifically intertwined with the Jewish example. If one is to use Fall
imagery to promote nationalism, there seems now to be a stronger impulse
than every before towards using Jewish Fall imagery instead. Rather than
being a victim of ‘genocide’, one is now a victim of a ‘Holocaust’. Aggressors
become Nazis, victims become Jews. Finkielkraut is certainly not alone in
articulating this fear. As more and more non-Jewish groups have seen the
moral value of Jewish suffering, its lessons have become universalised and
incorporated into a wide variety of movements. Ronnie Landau has described
this process as ‘hijacking’, lamenting: ‘It is indeed difficult to conceive of any
subject that has been quite so regularly misunderstood, misused and misrep-
resented.’33 No doubt because of this, many Jewish historians and
philosophers, frustrated by the repetition of ‘Holocaust’, have dropped the
term in favour of the Hebrew term for desolation – ‘Shoah’.34
What emerges from a philosophical reading of the Holocaust and its after-
math is a confusion among writers on how to address the lessons of the Final
Solution. Should they be universalised, or not? For some, like Steiner, univer-
salisation is an inevitable process, one that can no longer be controlled by
Jewish intellectuals and historians. Like the suffering of Christ, it becomes part
of history and Western thought. Others, like Lyotard, Kristeva, Zˇizˇek,
Todorov, and Chicago cite the merits of universalisation. Everyone can now
live under the same moral rules and obligations, thanks to a new secularised
Devil that we can all share. If genocide is a ‘crime against humanity’, then the
human race must collectively come to terms with its consequences. Still
others, like Langer, Finkielkraut, and Landau, worry that, just as once the
Western world seemed to have forgotten Jesus’s Jewish origins as religious
anti-Semitism raged through Europe, now those challenging the uniqueness
of the Holocaust may well be twisting historical memory in order to imply
that the Jewish people themselves are somehow profiting from their own
destruction.
For good or ill, the universalisation of the Holocaust, both in a symbolic
and historic sense, has become a reality, despite those who rightly caution
against it. Throughout this study, the importance of the Holocaust as a series
of metaphors and symbols will be stressed. The imagery and vocabulary of the
Holocaust has provided a template for many social groups and nations,
seeking to articulate (by analogy) their own real or imagined experiences of
victimisation and suffering. While specific images of the Holocaust are often
stirred up to legitimate social or national projects, even a general view of one’s
nation as suffering from genocide carries tremendous moral weight.
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The comparative genocide debate and the Holocaust
Holocaust universalisation has created a new forum for non-Jewish national
and social groups in the modern world. ‘Hijacking’ the Holocaust has proven
to be an effective means of gaining attention, even if the parallels between one
group’s suffering and that of the Jews are far from obvious. A recent trend of
the 1980s and 1990s has been a two-pronged questioning of the Holocaust’s
importance and relevance. The field of ‘comparative genocide studies’ has
attempted to relativise the Holocaust by comparing it to other tragedies.
Proponents of relativism often argue that the attempted genocides of their
own groups were equal to or worse than that suffered by the Jews, while oppo-
nents, primarily composed of writers of the ‘Functionalist’ school, have
reduced the importance of other genocides (or even denied them), in an
attempt to maintain the Holocaust’s pre-eminence. As Kaplan has discussed,
succeeding generations after the Holocaust have appropriated its ethical
components ‘as their standard of measure for right and wrong, good and evil
in the growth of moral civilization’.35
Landau, in discussing the debate among historians, divides the extreme
positions between ‘Scylla’ (‘insistence on uniqueness’), and ‘Charybdis’
(‘surrender to banality’). Adopting a pure emotional approach, the ‘Scylla’
school demonises Nazism, views the lessons of the Holocaust as relevant only
for Jews, and finds all non-Jews responsible for ‘Planet Auschwitz’. Using a
dispassionate and academic approach, the ‘Charybdis’ school finds the
Holocaust ‘a mere symbol for the baseness of human nature’, rendering it infi-
nitely susceptible to analysis. Further, this school attempts to de-Judaise the
subject, submerging it in moral education, philosophy, psychology, and theol-
ogy – a process that obscures and marginalises the actual events.36 Landau’s
dichotomy is unique, as it privileges neither position, while pointing out the
dangers of each. While stressing the Holocaust’s uniqueness and importance,
he also speaks out against the ‘grotesque competition in suffering’ that has
been the inevitable result of such debates, to the extent that: ‘Mine [my suffer-
ing] is bigger than yours! Only my genocide is therefore real genocide.’37
The Holocaust as unique in the annals of comparative genocide
As Steiner, Kaplan, Finkielkraut, and others have discussed, the Holocaust is
unique from many perspectives: technologically, philosophically, numeri-
cally, and on many other levels as well. Where scholars such as Steven Katz
and Seymour Drescher have differed is in their need to downplay the atrocities
inflicted on other groups in order to assert their own theories of uniqueness.
In this sense, they become ‘comparative genocidalists’, initiating an ugly turf
war over who is relatively the worst victim.38 For Katz, asserting the
Holocaust’s uniqueness has involved downplaying, or even denying, the exis-
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tence of many other genocides, as if the mere existence of other genocides
somehow competes with the Holocaust.
In his discussion of North American indigenous peoples (or First Nations),
the Ukrainians, and the Armenians, Katz has denied these peoples the status
of having been the victims of genocide. In his example of the First Nations,
Katz has used selective statistics to ‘prove’ that most of the eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century indigenous deaths were the result of disease and accident,
not deliberate policy.39 Similarly, in his discussion of famine in Ukraine
(1932–34), Katz refuses to use the term genocide, since Stalin was not trying
to kill all Ukrainians – a highly contentious point, in the light of Robert
Conquest’s conclusion (in The Harvest of Sorrow) that more than 7 million
Ukrainians died in the disaster.40 The Armenian genocide is similarly
dismissed, since Armenians were killed for being ‘secessionists’, ‘Russian
spies’, and ‘fifth columnists’, not because they were the victims of a ‘totalistic’
ideology of hate, based on their destruction.41
In a similar vein, Seymour Drescher has dismissed any concept of a ‘black
genocide’ deriving from the Atlantic slave trade, since slaves were able to
survive, and develop ‘religion, family life . . . leisure and arts, independent
economic activities, consumption patterns . . . complex patterns of human
relationships’.42 Drescher posits that, since Blacks were ‘part of a durable
system’ in which they played a key part as ‘actors’, their experiences were in
no way similar to those of the Jews.43
Much of this type of Functionalist thinking stems from a generalised
feeling of victimisation, a view that the entire Western world bears some
measure of responsibility for the Holocaust. The Nazis are the most violent and
obvious exponents of anti-Semitism; but anyone who allowed the Holocaust
to happen shares some measure of guilt. Historians such as Daniel Goldhagen
and Richard Rubenstein are quick to accuse not only the Germans, but most
other Europeans as well, for failing to save the Jews, or at least, for not actively
combating Nazism when they had the chance. Rubenstein has argued that
‘far more Europeans objected to the methods Hitler employed to eliminate the
Jews than to his objectives’.44 For Goldhagen, the key to understanding the
Holocaust is the fact that its perpetrators ‘were overwhelmingly and most
importantly Germans’, and that while ‘hundreds of thousands of Germans
contributed to the genocide’, millions knew about it as well, yet did nothing.45
For uniqueness theorists, there are few groups unworthy of attack. Other
genocides are seen to be competing with Functionalist interpretations, rather
than complementing their research by further proving the existence of
barbarism and brutality in the world. 
An extension of this uniqueness argument concerns the uniqueness of the
State of Israel, and its right not have its government or its policies criticised,
nor certainly its existence. For some historians and philosophers, there are
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extremely close links between anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism, as, since
1947, the destiny of Israel and the Jewish people are intimately bound
together. Elie Wiesel, for example, has asserted that ‘antisemitism and anti-
Zionism are one’, implying that attacks on the Jewish nation-state constitute
attacks on the nation itself.46 As Irwin Cotler elaborated, at a conference
exploring these links:
The new antisemitism is a denial of the right of Israel, of the Jewish people, to live
as an equal member of the family of nations. What is intrinsic to each form of anti-
semitism, common to both is the notion of discrimination. It has simply passed
from the realm of discrimination against Jews as individuals to discrimination
against Jews as a collectivity, against Jewish peoplehood.47
Thus the Jewish people, according to Cotler and others, have come to
define themselves in relation to their national state, and the State emerges as
unique because its founding people, their history, and their sufferings, are
unique. However, this type of association has a direct impact on theories of the
Holocaust. If Israel is unique and moral because the Holocaust is unique and
moral, then logically, if the Holocaust is not unique and unprecedented, then
ipso facto, the raison d’être of the State of Israel comes into question. This is
precisely the crux of Finkielkraut’s argument – that Israel’s legitimacy as a
country needs to stand on its own, separate from the actions of the Israeli
government. The machinations of Ariel Sharon and others against
Palestinian civilians and suicide bombers alike should not open any doors for
Holocaust revisionists. The horrors of the Holocaust should not be used for
political ends, neither by non-Jewish groups, nor by Zionists, however benefi-
cial such politicisation might appear to be. 
Against uniqueness: multiple genocides and holocausts in history
From a more ‘Charybdis’ perspective, David Stannard has been one of the
most ferocious critics of the uniqueness thesis, which he feels has allowed the
Israeli government to conceal and condone their own ‘on-going genocidal
actions’ – certainly an extreme position, but one echoed also by some
Palestinian nationalists. Engaging in a species of conspiracy theorising, he
dismisses the uniqueness theory as ‘the hegemonic product of many years of
strenuous intellectual labor by a handful of Jewish scholars and writers who
have dedicated much if not all of their professional lives to the advancement of
this exclusivist idea’.48 As Stannard laments, anyone questioning the unique-
ness of the Holocaust is automatically labelled an anti-Semite. Stannard has
thus attacked those, like Katz and Drescher, who have lumped comparative
genocide historians with Holocaust deniers and neo-Nazis, denying other
national groups the right to articulate their own experiences of victimisa-
tion.49 Moreover, through one’s seeing the Jews as ‘chosen’, other groups
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become by definition ‘un-chosen’. Their deaths become somehow less impor-
tant, and therefore less worthy of remembrance, recognition, or
compensation.50
While his prose is sometimes distasteful, Stannard is no Holocaust denier.
Rather, he has been trying to highlight the destruction of North America’s
First Nations, and has found himself stymied in his efforts. Stannard’s
American Holocaust (1992) advanced that the average rate of depopulation in
the Americas since 1492 had been between 90 and 98 per cent, owing to a
combination of ‘firestorms of microbial pestilence and purposeful genocide’.51
Through a mixture of disease, slave labour, massacre, and forced resettle-
ment, the death toll from continual orgies of violence was fixed at roughly 100
million people, making the destruction of the American Indians ‘far and away,
the most massive act of genocide in the history of the world’.52 The lack of
recognition for these multiple genocides over five centuries is perhaps respon-
sible for Stannard’s acerbic tone, and for his own seeming ‘exclusivism’.
A similar motive informs the activities of historians such as Vahakn
Dadrian and Ian Hancock, who have been trying to situate the Armenian and
Romani genocides within the Holocaust tradition. Dadrian’s account of
Armenian history, while impeccable researched, does rely on Holocaust
comparisons to strengthen its arguments. He has argued, for example, that
the Armenian genocide was worse than the Holocaust on an individual level,
since the emphasis was not on a quick or technologically advanced form of
mass killing. Rather, it focused on ‘dying as a prolonged and agonising expe-
rience’, which involved the use of common farm implements to mutilate
bodies horribly. Unlike the Nazi genocide, which was ‘streamlined, mecha-
nised and systematic through the use of advanced technology’, and which
used ‘special cadres’, the Armenians were brutalised by local Turkish popula-
tions, who killed in whatever manner they chose.53
Ian Hancock has made a convincing case for the Romani genocide as a
primary part of the Holocaust, since the Romani were also singled out for the
Final Solution, and had proportionally more of their people killed than did the
Jews. Hancock has also claimed that the Romani genocide was worse in some
respects, since the Nazis maintained a deliberate policy of killing them from
the beginning, unlike their solutions to the ‘Jewish Question’, which at first
focused on deportation and resettlement.54 Hancock, like Dadrian, has
attacked the marginalisation of his people, and specifically the fact that
Romani were traditionally dismissed as ‘others’ in most of the Holocaust
literature, and in the Holocaust Museum in Washington DC.55
Israel Charny, the executive director of the Institute on the Holocaust and
Genocide in Jerusalem, has also raised doubts about the uniqueness thesis,
strenuously objecting to what he describes as ‘a fetishistic atmosphere in
which the masses of bodies that are not to be qualified for the definition of
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genocide are dumped into a conceptual black hole, where they are forgot-
ten’.56 This fetishising, he argues, ignores the reality of other peoples’
suffering, substituting for sympathy and compassion what has been termed
‘moral bookkeeping’.57 Still others have attacked the uniqueness thesis as
‘gerrymandering’, and ‘an intellectual sleight of hand’. A common argument
is that uniqueness theorists have picked specific aspects of the Nazi Holocaust
that distinguish it from other genocides, while ignoring important similarities
that join many different nations together as fellow sufferers.58
Generally, writers on this side of the debate are characterised by their
anger and frustration at what they feel is an unfair double standard, and a
deliberate attempt on the part of some Holocaust historians to dismiss their
sufferings, in the hope of perpetuating the uniqueness of their own experi-
ences. Unfortunately, while these writers do raise important issues about how
history should be presented, their attacks on the relative importance of the
Holocaust only marginalise them further. Rather than asserting their own
experiences as unique, they ‘piggy-back’ on the Jewish Holocaust, which can
at best succeed in making public perceptions of their suffering poor copies of
the original ‘frame of reference’. While their factual evidence is no doubt
correct, there seems to be a certain ‘anti-establishment’ rhetoric here. Jews as
the ‘establishment’ of victims are somehow obliged to accept criticism; but
when they do debate, their own perspectives are condemned. 
Reacting against what they perceive as a moral monopoly, Stannard and
Buckley are right to criticise the generalised use of the label ‘anti-Semite’. At
the same time, however, their conspiratorial tone raises questions about their
own motivations. The fact that groups need to compare themselves to the Jews
tacitly supports the uniqueness thesis, and is in many ways self-defeating.
Whether Jews as the archetypal victims of genocide are being challenged or
not, there is an acknowledgement that the status quo is clearly on the side of
uniqueness arguments. Those who attempt to downplay the Holocaust to
upgrade their own national groups do themselves no favours. They make
recognition of their own nation’s victimisation contingent on some sort of
‘mild’ Holocaust revisionism, which leaves a bitter taste in most mouths.59
On the other side, those who deny the importance of other genocides triv-
ialise and downgrade the importance of the Holocaust, demonstrating a lack
of sympathy and respect for those who have also suffered tremendous losses.
In effect, the uniqueness theorists become genocide deniers themselves – by
refusing to accept the reality of Armenian indigenous or Romani genocides,
despite a wealth of evidence. Their own denialism may well make them straw
men for Holocaust deniers, who can thereby argue that the facts underlying
historical atrocities can and should be debated – that there is more than one
interpretation, even in proven cases of genocide. However, as Deborah
Lipstadt has acutely observed in the case of the Holocaust there are some
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issues without two ‘sides’, and the concept of a ‘debate’ merely introduces the
false belief that deniers somehow have a valid case and should be heard.
Equally troubling, Functionalists deny themselves the ability to act as mentors
to other victimised groups seeking to document their own instances of oppres-
sion. Functionalism divides and condemns, alienating potential allies and
fellow genocide victims. While there is only one Holocaust, there have been
many genocides in the twentieth century, and there is merit in allowing fellow
victims to work together to achieve recognition and justice.
‘Acting’ like a victim: the Holocaust as ‘performative’
Contemporary debates over the Holocaust are at an impasse. Those disputing
for and against the ‘uniqueness’ of it remain at loggerheads, each seeming to
hit below the belt to advance their own particular theories. While interesting,
however, why is this debate important for the study of nationalism in Serbia
and Croatia? The importance here lies in understanding the uniqueness of
Holocaust in a ‘performative’ sense, in both the ways it is unique, and the
ways that it has been presented as unique. As Cynthia Weber has argued,
nothing constitutes a ‘pre-given subject’ or exists as a pre-packaged event or
entity. ‘Rather than understanding subjects as having natural identities,’ she
has argued, ‘subjects and their various identities might be thought of instead
as the effects of citational processes.’60 On the same subject, Judith Butler has
described ‘performativity’ as the ‘reiterative and citational practice by which
discourse produces the effect it names’.61
While Weber’s article concerns itself with the differences between ‘sex’
and ‘gender’ and their applicability in unpacking theories of state sovereignty,
the implications of ‘performativity’ are of broader use. The concept of ‘perfor-
mativity’ introduces the idea that maintaining the identity of a victim, or
anything else for that matter, involves a continuous practice of creating
‘discourse’. In other words, the difference between ‘being’ a victim and
portraying oneself (or ‘acting’) as a victim is sometimes difficult to discern, for
the simple reason that most people accept people, nations, and institutions
according to how they present themselves. 
A similar argument has been raised by David Campbell and William
Connolly, who posit that, in the formation of foreign policy, the state invents
its own character by ‘performing’ (generating policy) in a certain way,
thereby enacting ‘the performative constitution of stable identities’.62 By
adopting certain symbols and invoking certain types of imagery, a state
‘becomes’ what it wants to be. Its discourse shape its identity. While an activ-
ity in and of itself, such as the American-led bombing of Iraq in 1991, might
be interpreted as an aggressive act, it might not appear so during and after the
fact. If the nation ‘acts’ as a moral superpower, defending ‘innocent’ Kuwaitis
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and punishing a Hitler-like Saddam Hussein, then the reality of a rich and
powerful country attacking a relatively weak and poor country can seem to be
morally justified, even humanitarian. In describing how states control their
own reality, Campbell introduces the term ‘narrativizing’ – where a policy-
maker or nationalist leader writes a ‘story’, with an ‘ordered plot’, ‘cast of
characters’, ‘attributable motivations’, and ‘lessons for the future’.63
While much of this postmodernist jargon appears confusing, these writers
are advancing a relatively straightforward thesis. In order to understand the
contemporary significance of historical events, one has to understand how
these events have been interpreted and presented. Of course, there is more
than one way of presenting events, as we have seen through Hayden White’s
critique of historical interpretation. In examining the history of the Holocaust,
Peter Novick has argued that, while the horrors of the Final Solution and the
vast death totals are all too real, the Jewish tragedy, as we now understand it
today, was formerly largely submerged under the general war crimes of the
Nazis. It was not singled out as a separate tragedy until the 1960s and 1970s.
What mattered was the totality of Axis evil, not the specific victimisation of
the Jews. As he has written in his book on the Holocaust and collective
memory in America:
The murderous actions of the Nazi regime which killed between five and six
million European Jews were all too real. But ‘the Holocaust’, as we speak of it
today, was largely a retrospective construction, something which would not have
been recognisable to most people at the time. To speak of ‘the Holocaust’ as a
distinct entity, which Americans responded to (or failed to respond to) in various
ways, is to introduce an anachronism that stands in the way of understanding
contemporary responses.64
Novick’s project has been aimed at coming to terms with Western inac-
tion during the Holocaust, and even American Jewish inaction during a time
when millions of people were being killed for simply being Jewish. Another
goal has been to understand the changes in American responses to the
Holocaust, and why the Final Solution began as something that was not
discussed in the 1950s and 1960s, and then later evolved into a cornerstone
of Jewish identity. Novick has argued that for early American survivors, a key
goal after leaving Europe was to suppress the painful memories of the past,
submerge themselves in mainstream America, and ‘belong’. 
I would argue to an extent that the same was true of Israel, where
survivors, forging a new country, often looked forward rather than behind, as
Flora Lewis recalled in 1961: ‘People speak of the present and the future, and
only when pressed, do they turn to the past. For Israel now is a self-assured,
self-absorbed country, proud and expectant, too busy and eager for growth to
feed on the bitter herbs of tragedy.’65 For Novick, the key change in perception
occurred after the Six Day War in 1967, which reinforced Israel’s tenuous
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position in the Middle East. This was a rallying call for Jews to come together
in defence of their homeland, and from this time forward, the Holocaust
became an important part of American Jewish identity, as did a strong attach-
ment to Israel: ‘[After 1967] Popular Jewish attitudes underwent a profound
“Israelization”. The hallmark of the good Jew became the depth of his or her
commitment to Israel. Failure to fulfil religious obligations, near-total Jewish
illiteracy, even intermarriage were all permissible; lack of enthusiasm for the
Israeli cause (not to speak of public criticism of Israel) became unforgivable.’66
The war of 1967 was thus a wake-up call, proof that Israelis needed to be
constantly vigilant against their hostile Arab neighbours. At the same time,
however, the war was a victory, and the successful defence of the country
became yet another example of ‘Holocaust and Redemption’. If the creation of
Israel had been cited as a redemption, so too now would the gaining of Gaza
and Sinai from Egypt, the Golan Heights from Syria, and most importantly,
Jerusalem and the West Bank from Jordan, herald the completeness of the
State, the satisfaction of Israel’s geopolitical ambitions. According to Novick,
Israel could now afford to remember the Holocaust, because it was operating
from a position of strength. In Jacob Neuser’s words: 
The extermination of European Jewry could become the Holocaust only on 9 June
when, in the aftermath of a remarkable victory, the State of Israel celebrated the
return of the people of Israel to the ancient wall of the temple of Jerusalem. On that
day the extermination of European Jewry attained the – if not happy, then viable
– ending that served to transform events into a myth, and to endow a symbol with
a single, ineluctable meaning.67
For Novick, 1967 is a pivotal year, both for Israel and for the commemo-
ration of the Holocaust as a crucial nation-building event, once it, as Neuser
argued, became part and parcel of Jewish mythology. Yet, even earlier, I
would argue that one could see a change in perception, particularly in 1961
during the trial of Adolf Eichmann, who was the first to be charged with
‘crimes against the Jewish people’, rather than the more general ‘crimes
against humanity’. Hannah Arendt argued in 1963 that a key objective of the
Eichmann trial was to force Israelis to confront their own past, as they were in
danger of losing touch with the tragic elements of their history. However, not
only would the trial expose the horrors of the Holocaust, it would also reify the
Jewish confrontation with a ‘hostile world’, exemplified by the ‘daily incidents
on Israel’s unhappy borders’.68
The key issue here concerns how the Holocaust was commemorated.
Many Jewish intellectuals and historians, as well as other survivors, waited
for more than twenty years before confronting the horrors of their past. For
Novick, coming to terms with the Holocaust – indeed, naming it The Holocaust
– had much to do with a fear that Israel was in danger of being destroyed, and,
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even though it had defended itself, was still in constant danger. Thus he, like
Finkielkraut, suggests that the emerging importance of the Holocaust from
1967 onwards was in part a political process, to ensure that the struggles and
sufferings of those who created the State of Israel would not be in vain – that
Redemption would continue to follow the greatest Fall in Jewish history. 
It would be remiss not to mention in passing the more extreme extension
of Novick’s thesis – Norman Finkelstein’s The Holocaust Industry, which
appeared in 2000, parroting many of Novick’s themes, while padding them
out with fresh polemical assertions. Finkelstein began by taking issue with
Novick’s conclusion that the use of Holocaust imagery was ‘arbitrary’.
Rather, he contends that there have been consistent and deliberate attempts
to use Jewish suffering to justify human rights atrocities in Israel. As with
Novick, for Finkelstein 1967 is the crucial starting-point for the Holocaust
becoming a crucial part of modern Jewish identity. While before 1967 the
Final Solution was a horrible tragedy that was not often discussed, much less
invoked as a defence of Israeli interests, it later became a crucial means of
proving that Israelis were victims rather than aggressors who deserved to
have their own state in the Middle East.69
Crucially, Finkelstein argues that it was not when the Jewish people
(whom he takes to be synonymous with Israel) were in a position of weakness,
but rather when they were in a position of strength that this so-called Industry
became all-important. It was not, he maintains, designed to promote the inter-
ests of a marginal, humiliated people, but to legitimate the growing power of
a group that was already economically and politically significant: ‘Through
its [the Holocaust’s] deployment, one of the world’s most formidable military
powers, with a horrendous human rights record, has cast itself as a “victim”
state, and the most successful ethnic group in the United States has likewise
acquired victim status.’70 Through Finkelstein’s skewed interpretation, the
Holocaust Industry is a rhetorical device, a tool for manipulating world public
opinion in favour of Israel. In many respects, his theories are little different
from those of some Holocaust deniers.
What emerges from Novick’s analysis and Finkelstein’s rather vitriolic
conspiracy theory is the belief (perhaps false) that a nation can recapture the
essence of a national tragedy decades after the fact, and then use it instru-
mentally to achieve geopolitical goals. While I do not share Finkelstein’s
beliefs about the existence of an ‘Industry’, both he and Novick nevertheless
highlight a certain school of thought – that by proving one’s victimhood, one
is able to legitimate the creation (and defence) of a national homeland. As I
will later argue, the important issue here for my research is not the truth or
falsehood of these beliefs, but the fact that they were believed by both Serbian
and Croatian writers, who assiduously used such imagery in their national
writings during the wars in Yugoslavia. The belief, however false, that
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proving victimhood legitimated past or could legitimate future nation-build-
ing activities, was crucial to both national groups. In the Yugoslav case, it
became largely irrelevant whether or not this perception is true, because it
was often believed to be true.
Understanding the importance of the Jewish nationalist experience helps
us to see why other nations, (Serbs and Croats for example) have fitted their
own experiences into an ethical and teleological framework. For non-Jewish
nationalists, creating myths of Covenant, Fall, and Redemption allowed them
to situate their nation’s history within a cyclical teleological understanding of
history, while underwriting this framework with ethical arguments borrowed
from the Jewish example. It is certainly for these reasons that many national-
ism theorists, such as George Schöpflin and Dusˇan Kecˇmanovic´, have created
typologies of negative imagery in their respective studies of new nationalisms,
as a means of bringing about ‘compensation for the powerless’ and ‘a special
moral superiority for having suffered’.71
Conclusions
Elias Canetti in The Human Province was perhaps the first to lament the use of
post-Holocaust victimisation to form a base of Jewish identity. As he noted in
1945: ‘The suffering of the Jews had turned into an institution, but it outlived
itself. People don’t want to hear about it anymore.’72 Forty years later,
German Historikerstreit historian Ernst Nolte would note its continued impact
on the lives of Germans, the Nazi era ‘seem[ing] to become more alive and
powerful, not as a model but as spectre, as a past that is establishing itself as a
present, as a sword of judgement hung over the present’.73 Certainly, Nolte’s
‘sword of judgement’ has continued well past his 1980s movement, which
attempted to ‘rehabilitate’ German history by claiming (misguidedly) that
Germans were also the victims of Nazism. The horrors of the Holocaust will
continue to serve as a warning to those monitoring violence and conflict
around the world.
The central theme of this chapter has been the primary role of Fall
imagery in activating Jewish collective identity and nationalism. By placing
myths of Fall and Redemption within a Biblical teleological tradition, Zionists
argued that a universal negative historic force had been plaguing the Jews
since the beginning of recorded history, contributing to a unique Jewish iden-
tity. The Holocaust proved to many Jewish writers that their old lives in the
Diaspora were no longer possible, while introducing a secular image for Hell
that has continued to preoccupy philosophers and nationalists of all stripes. 
For many national groups, the belief (however false) that Zionists used the
Holocaust instrumentally in order either to create the State of Israel, or to
consolidate its borders, has been of particular importance. The apparent
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success of Jewish nationalists (again, however false a perception this may be)
has encouraged other national groups to adopt the symbolism, imagery, and
vocabulary of the Holocaust as a means to articulating their own nation’s past
history of victimisation. In the case of Serbia and Croatia, Holocaust imagery
and more general myths of persecution and victimisation were used by
nationalist writers to restructure their historical ‘discourse’. Such reinterpre-
tations of nationalist history allowed both sides to justify the often violent and
illegitimate forms of statecraft they were pursuing. 
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3Slobodan Milosˇevic´ and the construction of
Serbophobia
The history of Serbian lands . . . is full of instances of genocide against the Serbs
and of exoduses to which they were exposed. Processes of annihilation of the Serbs
in the most diverse and brutal ways have been continuous. Throughout their
history they have faced the fiercest forms of genocide and exoduses that have jeop-
ardised their existence, yet they have always been self-defenders of their own
existence, spirituality, culture, and democratic convictions. (SANU, ‘Declaration
Against the Genocide of the Serbian People’)1
THIS CHAPTER CHARTS the rise of Serbian nationalism, while examiningmany of the important myths that evolved as a concomitant to it. Theabove citation, from a statement by the Serbian Academy of Sciences
and Arts, encapsulates what became a dominant view of Serbian history after
1986 – a long-suffering, but heroic nation, struggling for centuries against
annihilation. I will begin by exploring elements of the Battle of Kosovo, a
battle fought between Serbian and Turkish forces on 28 June 1389, which
ultimately resulted in Serbian subjugation to five centuries of Ottoman rule.
In legend, the Battle was also a Serbian sacrifice, which elevated them to the
status of a heavenly and chosen people. This chapter begins by exploring the
legacy of this famous myth, and how it has become a template for many
Serbian portrayals of history. It is crucial to understand how this myth was
generalised and fused with Jewish imagery, in such a way that Kosovo became
the ‘Serbian Jerusalem’. Myths highlighting the glorious but tragic aspects of
Serbian history were of central importance in legitimating the dismantling of
the Yugoslav Federation, and the expansionist ambitions of Milosˇevic´ and his
colleagues.
Kosovo, and more general myths of Golden Age and Fall, were instru-
mentalised first in the case of the Kosovar Albanians, and secondly, and more
importantly, in the case of the Croats. As the conflict progressed, writers came
to identify a Serbian version of anti-Semitism – ‘Serbophobia’ – a genocidal
and expansionist strategy, supposedly used throughout history by Serbia’s
63
2441Chapter3  16/10/02  8:04 am  Page 63
enemies. Using a nationalist teleology, Serbian writers specifically targeted
the Croats as the harbingers of Serbophobia, viewing them as a truly Biblical
antagonist, which had been operating against the Serbs since the division of
the Roman Empire. This chapter reviews the nineteenth- and early twentieth-
century manifestations of Croatian ‘Serbophobia’, laying the basis for an
analysis of the Second World War, the SFRY, and the more contemporary
conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina.
Contextualising propaganda: the rise of Serbian nationalism 
It is accurate to suggest that for most of the lifetime of the SFRY Serbian
nationalism was subordinate to Communism, and did not become an impor-
tant factor until 1980. The Serbian capital Belgrade became the capital of
Yugoslavia, and Josip Broz Tito managed to repress most manifestations of
Serbian nationalism during his lifetime. A relatively high percentage of Serbs
supported Tito’s Communist system, even if they were dissatisfied with partic-
ular aspects of it. The crucial break came with Tito’s death after nearly four
decades at the helm of the country. The lack of any strong, articulate non-
nationalistic leader with Tito’s charisma, capable of exercising the same level
of control, created a power vacuum at the federal centre. This vacuum would
soon be filled by aspiring nationalists at the level of the constituent republics.
Without a Yugoslav-oriented Tito at the helm, power bases within the indi-
vidual republics became more important, while power at the Federal centre
was greatly weakened.2
The rise of Serbian nationalism was largely a reaction to events in the
autonomous province of Kosovo, a region that was traditionally seen as the
Serbian heartland, but that was also home to an Albanian majority – some 90
per cent of the population. Kosovo was the seat of the early Serbian Orthodox
Church, and was the site of some of the most important Orthodox monasteries
in Yugoslavia, such as Gracˇanica – where the remains of the famous Serbian
King Milutin (1282–1321) were interred.3 The Plain of Gazimestan at Kosovo
Polje (Field of the Blackbirds) was the scene of the Serbs’ battle against the
Ottoman Empire, making Kosovo the home of their best-loved religious
shrines, and the locus of their most famous defeat. 
Albanians, not Serbs, were the first to articulate nationalist demands after
1980. Kosovar Albanian students demonstrated at Pristinë University for
Albanian autonomy and republic status, provoking riots that led to a large
number of injured Kosovars and security forces, and nine deaths.4 The
Serbian government clamped down the following year with a state of emer-
gency; and over the next eight years almost 600,000 Kosovars, over half the
adult population, would face either arrest, interrogation, or police harass-
ment.5 In reaction to Albanian secessionism, amid fears of ‘Greater Albania’,
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the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts drew up a Memorandum in 1986 –
a long list of Serbian grievances against their treatment within the Federation.
Much of the document dealt with the ‘genocide’ of Serbs in Kosovo, and artic-
ulated the need for Serbs throughout Yugoslavia to assert themselves
collectively. The 1974 Constitution, which decentralised power in Yugoslavia
and put an end to Serbia’s control over two of its former provinces (Kosovo
and Vojvodina), was blamed for the loss of Serbian power and prestige. The
Memorandum’s architects would eventually play a prominent role in spurring
Serbian nationalism and in the dismemberment of the Federation.
Attempts by the President of the Serbian Communist Party, Ivan
Stambolic´, to deal with Kosovo’s civil unrest through constitutional revision
and consensus proved to be ineffective, and the friction between Serbs and
Albanians escalated.6 It was into this breach that an unlikely candidate
inserted himself. Slobodan Milosˇevic´, a former Belgrade banker and protégé of
Stambolic´, was in all respects a colourless Communist bureaucrat and a most
unlikely nationalist. It was he that Stambolic´ sent to Kosovo on 24 April
1987, to hear the grievances of the Kosovar Serbs, who claimed that they
were being discriminated against by the police and local government. While
his mission was to pacify the people, Milosˇevic´ did exactly the opposite after
hearing stories of Albanian police assaulting Serbian demonstrators.
Milosˇevic´’s simple phrase Niko ne sme da bije narod (No one has the right to beat
the People) would make him an instant hero for taking on the Albanian lead-
ership, while making the antagonism between Kosovar Albanian and Serb
explicit.7
Milosˇevic´ was one of the first to sense Yugoslavia’s changing fortunes,
and embraced nationalism with opportunistic fervour, correctly sensing that
a ‘turning- point’ was about to begin. While no nationalist himself, Milosˇevic´
opened the Pandora’s box that for ever changed the nature of Serbian, and by
extension Yugoslav, politics. The former American ambassador Warren
Zimmermann described Milosˇevic´ as having made a ‘Faustian pact with
nationalism’, although his ‘extraordinary coldness’ and inability to care for
anyone, even the Serbs, made his choice surprising.8 Milosˇevic´ soon ousted
his long-time mentor, Stambolic´, and, with the support of the media, took
power in December 1987. He appealed to an emerging sense of Serbian unity,
and claimed to speak for Serbs throughout Yugoslavia – a tacit warning to
other republican leaders that their boundaries would provide little protection
from Serbian intervention. Promising to end the persecution of Serbs in
Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Kosovo, he advocated a strengthening of
the Orthodox Church and a privileging of Serbian cultural and social institu-
tions, which he argued had long been repressed under Communism.9
If we review Kenneth Minogue’s three-stage process of nationalism, we
can see that Milosˇevic´ clearly articulated the ‘stirrings’ stage of Serbian
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nationalism, through the acknowledgement that Serbs were suffering in
Kosovo. The ‘struggle’ stage was soon to follow.10 Milosˇevic´ convinced his
people that a great turning-point had arrived in Serbian history. He articu-
lated what Dusˇan Kecˇmanovic´ has called the myth of ‘the right moment’.11 or
what George Schöpflin described as a ‘myth of rebirth and renewal’.12 Both
these types of myth basically advanced the same claim – that it was time for
Serbia to reassert itself under a powerful nationalist leader who could protect
its interests. Milosˇevic´ was seemingly the man for the job. While alternative
readings of Serbian nationalism existed at this time, and continued to hold
sway over some segments of the population, the increasing power of the
Kosovo myth, the decline of Communism, and the general sense of loss and
marginalisation stirred by the SANU and other organisations soon made it
increasingly difficult for other voices to be heard. 
Another important aspect of this nationalist platform was the re-
Serbianisation of Kosovo and Vojvodina, both of which possessed
autonomous status under the 1974 Constitution. The effects of this decen-
tralising constitution were soon reversed. By the beginning of 1988, overt
discrimination against the Kosovars began, as Milosˇevic´ stepped up his anti-
Albanian rhetoric, to an increasingly fired-up population. Milosˇevic´’s
nationalism was advanced in terms of an ‘Anti-Bureaucratic Revolution’ and
‘The Happening of the People’, two rather banal catchphrases that were used
to justify the re-emergence of nationalism and Milosˇevic´’s cementing of
political power. 
By February 1989 Milosˇevic´ had pushed through a series of amendments
to the Serbian constitution, eliminating the provinces’ authority to pass their
own legislation. By organising mass rallies, he was able to force the leadership
in Vojvodina to resign. By September 1990 a new constitution had fully
subordinated Vojvodina and Kosovo to central Serbian control. These two
coups quadrupled Serbia’s allotted seats in federal institutions, conferring on
the republic effective control over the outcome of all votes at the federal
level.13 Serb actions against the Albanians in Kosovo demonstrated defini-
tively the collapse of the federal system. The lesson of Kosovo was obvious –
the system was no longer strong enough, or was unwilling, to restrain
belligerent republics, and was unable to protect basic human and constitu-
tional rights.14
Milosˇevic´’s intimidation of other republics in the SFRY soon led to seces-
sionist movements around the country. The first overt move was made by the
Slovenian leader Milan Kucˇan, whose overtures for decentralisation were
violently rejected by Milosˇevic´ – who in turn threatened civil unrest and
violence. The machinations of the JNA in Slovenia also set the stage for a
showdown. Harassed by the JNA and threatened by Serbia, Slovenians pushed
for separation from the Federation. In December 1990 Slovenia declared its
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independence, which later led to a short war between Slovenian and JNA
troops that eventually resulted in an independent Slovenia.15
While Milosˇevic´ was often credited with breaking up Yugoslavia and
installing nationalism as the ruling ideology in Serbia, he certainly did not act
alone. With him were many new nationalists who proved instrumental in the
coming years. While Milosˇevic´ used nationalism as a tool to gain power, he
relied on the support of many ‘true believers’, who formed a crucial spiritual
and intellectual base. Among these, the novelist Dobrica C´osic´ was perhaps
the most famous. Formerly a Communist believer, C´osic´ wholeheartedly
embraced nationalism with the decline of Yugoslavia, and became an early
supporter of Milosˇevic´ and his government. 
While the Western press would later become obsessed with Milosˇevic´ as a
nationalist demagogue, he should be seen more as a supporter of nationalism
than its founder. Milosˇevic´’s regime provided a climate for the unrestrained
articulation of nationalist sentiments, and the wholesale revision of Serbian
history. Milosˇevic´’s overt support of the Serbian Orthodox Church was well
known. The Church joined with individual journalists, politicians, novelists,
academics and military leaders in contributing to the escalation of militant
nationalism. However, their role was more important. By acting as the
conscience of Serbia, they providing a greatly needed spiritual underpinning
for Milosˇevic´’s movement. But in order to cement political power, Serbia’s
future strongman also needed to appeal to non-nationalist parts of the popu-
lation, and promoted a ‘multi-pronged ideological strategy’, one that was
ultimately successful in uniting a great variety of seemingly mutually incom-
patible forces. As Veljo Vujacˇic´ has argued:
Analyses of the ‘Milosevic phenomenon’ which insist on only one dimension of his
appeal (typically nationalism), are bound to miss the point. On the contrary, it
was precisely the combination of simultaneous appeals to different constituencies
which helps explain Milosevic’s success. Yugoslavia, unity and Titoism for the
party orthodox and army officers, Serbia for the nationalists, reform and rehabili-
tation for the intellectuals, protection for the Kosovo Serbs, social justice for the
workers and pensioners – this was the Serbian leader’s equivalent of Lenin’s
‘bread, peace, and land’.16
Additionally, the Milosˇevic´ regime soon became adept at centralising and
controlling the media. While the media in the SFRY had operated relatively
unfettered, compared with other communist countries new legislation limited
the scope of independent reporting. New provisions under the Serbian Penal
Code, specifically Article 98, made it an offence to criticise the government or
cast doubt on the country’s leaders. Government ministries of Information
and the Interior now had a mandate to censor, delete, or change any aspect
of reporting found to be at odds with official government accounts.17 The
Slobodan Milosˇevic´ and the construction of Serbophobia
67
2441Chapter3  16/10/02  8:04 am  Page 67
government-controlled Serbian Radio-Television (RTS), soon gained a broad-
casting monopoly. The July 1991 Law on Radio and Television transferred
parliamentary powers over radio and television directly to the government.18
The Milosˇevic´ regime also did its best to limit if not destroy independent print
media, by imposing swingeing taxes while cutting supplies of newsprint and
fuel. Independent papers such as Borba, Vreme and Republika were forced to
pay four times more for newsprint than loyal government-controlled papers,
such as Vecernje novosti.19 Powerful conglomerates, such as the Politika Group
(which owned twenty publications, a radio station and a television channel)
were reduced to government appendages by 1987, giving Milosˇevic´ full power
to implement his nationalistic projects.20
While control over the media allowed the regime to determine strictly
what people understood about the government and its role in the wars that
were to follow, Milosˇevic´’s key role, once again, was as a catalyst for nation-
alism. The role of the media was assessed primarily on its ability to maintain
support for Milosˇevic´’s regime, and not necessarily for Serbian nationalism
as such. Indeed, Milosˇevic´’s role in persecuting nationalist opposition leaders
was well known, exemplified by his continuous harassment of the national-
ist author and politician Vuk Draskovic´, which included severe beatings
and several attempts on his life. Nevertheless, Milosˇevic´’s legacy was to
create a forum where such men were able to stand for election and dissemi-
nate their nationalist views to an increasingly receptive audience. His later
support of influential warlords (such as Vojislav Sˇesˇelj and Zˇeljko Razˇnatovic´
Arkan) allowed Milosˇevic´ to carry out much of the dirty work involved in
expanding the Serbian state indirectly, without relying on the official armed
forces.
The rise of numerous academic institutions and publishing houses dedi-
cated to the promotion of nationalist views proved to be of immense
importance. Among the more important promoters of the new Serbian line
(although not necessarily linked with the government) were to be found:
Velauto International, IDEA, BMG, and SANU (Serbia), the Serbian Unity
Congress, and Serbian Heritage Books (USA and Canada). Other publishing
houses, such as Minerva Press, The Book Guild, and L’Age D’Homme,21
appear to have been wittingly or unwittingly pulled into the emerging propa-
ganda war. Control over the Serbian Ministry of Information also provided an
important outlet for nationalist views. Well- and lesser-known nationalists
had access to a government-controlled forum for disseminating their nation-
alist opinions. This key ministry was responsible for the co-ordination and
consolidation of Serbian propaganda, and its influence in unifying reinterpre-
tations of Serbian history and current events should not be underestimated.
However, it was clear that, even among opposition leaders, there was surpris-
ing consistency in Serbian revisionist views and propaganda, as will become
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apparent throughout this study. Indeed, other than the non-nationalist oppo-
sition media, and curiously, Milosˇevic´’s wife Mira Markovic´, there were few
dissenting voices within Serbia.22
The remainder of this chapter explores how Serbian nationalist novelists,
politicians, journalists, and military leaders firmly anchored Serbian nation-
alism in a cyclical teleological framework, which relied heavily on myths of a
Golden Age or ‘Heavenly Serbia’, with Serbs as a chosen people or a nebesˇki
narod. Another central theme woven throughout Serbian writing was the
image of the Serbs as a long-suffering, persecuted people, often likened to the
Jews. 
‘Kosovo’ and the development of Serbian consciousness
Throughout the conflict, the myth of Kosovo was touted as a key shibboleth of
Serbian identity. Kosovo figured as the locus of a historic defeat, but also
symbolised the awakening of Serbian values and spirituality. The Kosovo
Battle was fought in the year 1389 on St Vitus’ Day (28 June). The basic story
surrounds Prince Lazar, an elected Serbian prince, who in legend was handed
an ultimatum, whereby he was either to pay homage to the Turkish Sultan
Murad I, relinquishing control of Serbian lands and taxation, or bring his
forces on to Kosovo Polje to face the Sultan’s army. Lazar was later
approached in a dream by a grey hawk (or falcon) flying from Jerusalem, and
was offered a choice: an earthly kingdom (implying victory for his forces
against the Sultan), or a heavenly kingdom (where the Serbs would be
defeated in battle).23 As one Serbian source paraphrased Lazar’s decision:
If I decide to choose the earthly kingdom, the earthly kingdom lasts only for a brief
time, but the heavenly kingdom always and for ever. Thus the Serbian Tsar chose
the heavenly kingdom rather than the kingdom of this world. Thus the holy Tsar
Lazar . . . wisely led these reason-endowed lambs to lay down their lives coura-
geously in Christ, and obtain the crown of suffering (martyrdom), so that they
might all become partakers of the glory on high.24
The details of the battle, including the identity of the actual winners and
losers, are sketchy at best. While Robert Kaplan and James Marriott both insist
that the Serbs lost decisively, Tim Judah advances that the Serbs may have
actually won the Battle – based on a variety of contemporary dispatches.
Reviewing a wealth of evidence, Noel Malcolm insists that the Battle was a
draw – neither side having clinched definitive victory.25 In the Serbian legend
of the Battle, however, there was no ambiguity – the Serbs lost, and were
thereafter subjected to five centuries of Ottoman rule. What has emerged most
prominently, however, was the heroism of the Serbs, dying so that their
nation could be elevated as a spiritual entity. Some Serbian Orthodox Church
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publications during the conflict would paint the Battle as a moral and spiritual
victory for the Serbs, the victory of the divine over the secular, the eternal over
the temporal. Like the crucifixion, the martyrdom of Lazar and the Serbian
nation raised the Serbian people and made them divine, holy, chosen, special.
The following portrayal from North America was in many ways typical:
[T]he Battle of Kosovo was, in the eyes of the world, a disastrous defeat for the
Serbs. But in the eyes of heaven and of those who understand the mystery and
meaning of the Battle of Kosovo, it was a glorious victory. It marked the day when
the Serbian people ceased to trust in the material things of the kingdom of this
world, and began to set their hope on the spiritual values of the heavenly
kingdom. It marked the day when the Serbs voluntarily had sacrificed their glori-
ous earthly kingdom and even themselves for Christ their God, so that they might
be partakers of the incomparably more glorious heavenly kingdom of Christ. 26
The Kosovo defeat became nation-defining, allowing the Serbs to tran-
scend mere mortality. As one contemporary historian wrote with disdain, the
Kosovo myth seemed like a ‘cheat’, since its ‘merges the contradictory satis-
factions of being the winner and the loser’.27 Nevertheless, Kosovo functioned
as a typical covenantal myth. There was a Fall, and a promise of Redemption,
embodying the ‘covenential culture’ described by Akenson.28 It also fulfilled
the three aspects of Hebrew nationalism described by Kohn, as it elevated the
Serbs to the status of a ‘chosen people’, gave them a ‘consciousness of national
history’, and created a form of ‘national messianism’, while similarly democ-
ratising nationalism by means of a Covenant between God and all
co-nationals.29 Like the Jews, the Serbs could regain their promised land,
through constant contemplation and ‘wholehearted mourning’. This alone
would allow ‘the seed of that distant defeat . . . to bloom into something more
wonderful than victory’.30
The nineteenth-century development of the myth through the writings of
Serbian linguist Vuk Karadzic´ transformed Lazar into a Christ-like figure –
who led the Serbian nation to holy martyrdom so that it would achieve divine
status. Furthermore, Lazar’s enemies became Judas-like traitors. The Serbian
warrior Vuk Brankovic´ would be demonised for crossing over to the Turkish
side on the eve of the battle, and came to symbolise betrayal from within, the
‘Christ killer’ who represented Serbian converts to Islam.31 This would lay the
basis for an obvious example of Kecˇmanovic´’s theory of ‘counteridentifica-
tion’ – with the projection of a variety of negative characteristics on to the
Moslems.32
The fear of traitors would also manifest itself in the Serbian national coat
of arms – depicting a cross surrounded by four S’s, which were originally fire-
lighting flints. As Biljana Vankovska argues, the first interpretation was Sama
Srbija Sebe Spasila – ‘Serbia Alone Delivered Herself’, which then changed to
Samo Sloga Srbe Spasava – ‘Only Unity Saves the Serbs’, reflecting the fear of
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internal enemies.33 Such symbols of counteridentification would be strength-
ened through the well-known epic poem ‘The Mountain Wreath’, written by
Petar Petrovic´-Njegosˇ, a prince-bishop from Montenegro. This nineteenth-
century poem glorified the exploits of one Milosˇ Obilic´, a legendary Serbian
hero from the Battle of Kosovo, supposedly responsible for the death of the
Turkish Sultan Murad I, who was killed during the battle.34 Obilic´ exemplified
how courage and great deeds could overcome national defeat, epitomising the
promise of Redemption for the Serbs, if they held true to their faith in
Orthodoxy and Serbdom.
Contemporaneous with Petrovic´-Njegosˇ was the geographer Jovan Cvijic´,
who activated the Kosovo myth as a central component of his ‘Dinaric man’ –
the traditional South Slav inhabitant. As Cvijic´ explains:
The Dinaric is consumed with a burning desire to avenge Kosovo, where he lost
his independence, and to revive the Serbian empire about which he has never
ceased to dream even in the most desperate circumstances in which a man of pure
reason would have despaired . . . This tenacity, this absolute faith in the national
ideal, is the essential fact of his history, he considers himself chosen by destiny to
accomplish the national mission . . . To kill lots of Turks is for him not only a way
of avenging his ancestors but of assuaging their pain which he shares.35
For Cvijic´, as for later interpreters, the Battle contained both positive and
negative components – the valiant Serbs against the treacherous Turks. Tens
of thousands were rallied for war in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
through the legend of Kosovo. It gave Serbs the will to fight, even in cases of
certain defeat. 
Milosˇevic´’s genius in exploiting Kosovo to his advantage was readily
apparent by 1989, when a huge rally was planned to commemorate the
600th anniversary of the Battle. As a precursor to the event, the relics of
Prince Lazar were paraded around Serbia, with full media coverage, to be
finally interred at Ravenica, Lazar’s original place of rest.36 On the plain of
Gazimestan, a vast crowd of pilgrims officially estimated at between one and
two million gathered for the celebrations. This was to be Milosˇevic´’s shining
moment, as Serbs from around the world gathered to commemorate the
renewal of Serbian culture, religion and nationalism. It was at this stage that
Milosˇevic´ was able to transform himself into a nationalist demagogue, as he
emerged triumphant from a helicopter amid cheering crowds. Orthodox
priests held aloft icons of Milosˇevic´ and Lazar, while thousands of men and
women crowded around the podium.37 Arguably, this was Milosˇevic´’s finest
hour. Secretly, however, he admitted that most of this was nothing more than
‘bullshit’.38 The spectacle was purely for the benefit of the Serbian people – to
cement his growing personal power. 
Whatever his personal beliefs, Kosovo secured Milosˇevic´’s position as both
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a political and spiritual leader of the Serbian nationalist movement. Such
rallies were designed to quell any opposition to Milosˇevic´’s rule, by co-opting
even the most virulent nationalists. By 1989, Milosˇevic´’s political control over
Serbia and Kosovo was unquestioned, as was the emergence of Serbian nation-
alism. A sharp division between nationalists and Communists appeared, with
Serbs as either loyal supporters of the regime, or potential traitors. Vuk
Brankovic´, the Serbian Judas, was seemingly lurking behind every corner.39
Throughout Serbia, Kosovo fever gripped the population. Serbian book-
stores filled their shelves with books on Kosovo, while musical artists
dedicated their works to Kosovo. Even a new perfume, ‘Miss 1389’, evoked
images of the Battle.40 In some respects, Anthony Smith was correct when he
noted the aesthetic aspects of Golden Age nationalism. Smith’s general
description of the use of Golden Age myths easily applied to the Serbs during
this time. Serbian leaders were most adept at ‘unfold[ing] a glorious past, a
golden age of saints and heroes, to give meaning to its promise of restoration
and dignity’.41 Indeed, there was much in Kosovo fever that reflected the
‘poetic spaces’ described by Smith. 
Renewal of the Serbian Orthodox Church
Alongside Kosovo, much of the revision of history involved the glorification of
Serbian Orthodoxy as a repository of nationalist expression. Orthodoxy for
Serbs had a certain purity, being ‘purely spiritual’, while ‘turned towards
Christ and the “Empire of Heaven”’.42 The rise of Serbian nationalism and the
instrumentalisation of Kosovo also brought to the fore a general feeling of
Serbian greatness. Serbia as the ‘new Byzantium’ and the Serbs as a ‘heavenly
people’ were to become increasingly popular motifs.43 Such imagery stressed
the strong Covenant that Serbs supposedly maintained with God, and rein-
forced the image of the Serbs as a holy, chosen people.
Speaking of his fellow Serbs, Metropolitan Amfilohije Radovic´ of
Montenegro preached: ‘Our destiny is to carry the cross on this blazing divide
between different worlds . . . therefore the Serbian people are also divine . . .
Our people preserves in its bosom, in its collective memory, Jerusalem’s holi-
ness.’44 Nevertheless, he warned that ‘an insane wind tries ceaselessly to
extinguish this sacred lamp’. These ‘insane winds’ were to be understood as
Catholic and Protestant countries from the West, and Islamic countries from
the east. Serbia was seemingly sandwiched in the middle of two expansionist
forces, both trying to encroach on its territory.45 Generally, the Church
promoted Kosovo as the spiritual and cultural heartland of the Serbian
people.46 The 600th anniversary of the Battle was to become a year of
commemoration for the past 500 years of ‘suffering’ under which the
Orthodox Church claimed the Serbs had suffered.47
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Coupled with the emergence of this religious-nationalist amalgam were a
spate of books and articles, propagating a patriotic view of Serbian superior-
ity. One such book, by Olga Lukovic´-Pejanovic´, was suggestively titled The
Serbs: The Oldest Nation, and claimed, among other things, that the Biblical
Garden of Eden was located in Serbia, that the Cyrillic script was invented by
Serbs, and that numerous ancient writers, such as Ovid, composed their
works in Serbian. One curious text entitled ‘Serbs – Nations Most Numerous’,
argued that Serbs were the most numerous (and therefore the most cosmo-
politan) nation in history, having inhabited India, Mesopotamia, Siberia, and
Africa. The author even claimed Alexander the Great as one of the great
Serbian heroes of the past.48
Similarly, Serbia’s minister of culture, focusing on the Serbs’ uniqueness,
concluded that the Serbs are one of five imperial peoples: ‘It is an ancient
people and one of the most Christian ones.’ According to another minister of
the Serbian government: ‘Today, many around the world dream about being
Serb . . . Be happy you belong to this people. You are eternal.’ Likewise, in
Bosnia-Hercegovina, Velibor Ostojic´, President of the Serbian Democratic
Party, proclaimed triumphantly: ‘Every nook of Serbian land and the Serbs
themselves are a heavenly wonder, and an inspiration and example to all
other peoples and countries.’49
A tradition of religious tolerance and love was to prove extremely impor-
tant in demonstrating that the Serbs were religiously and culturally unable to
be aggressors in any conflict; they could only be the victims. Kosovo allowed
for the creation of a coherent nationalist system, where political and religious
leaders worked side by side with opposition politicians, academics, and jour-
nalists to promote the cause of Serbian renewal. At this stage, such myths
were used to re-awaken the people, and could in some ways be described as
Smith’s Golden Age of nationalism, with myths of origin, descent, and a heroic
age. Certainly, Serbian leaders were taking advantage of their ‘useable past’ to
cement their power as the republic transformed itself.50
Generalising Kosovo: Serbian and Jewish connections
We have to persevere or else we are lost. It’s similar to the problem the Jews had.
Kosovo is our Jerusalem. We’d rather defend it as it is, rather than have just one
Wailing Wall. Kosovo is a place of Serbian national identity that we cannot give
away, just as Israel can’t give away Jerusalem. (Writer and musician Aleksander
Pavlovic´ in conversation with Florence Levinsohn)
Certainly a key aspect of Serbian propaganda was the belief that the nation
had reached a historic turning-point – that Serbia could now relive its glory,
while avenging the wrongs of the past. Nevertheless, while Kosovo resonated
strongly with the Serbian people, the government also saw the need to
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generalise the lessons of Kosovo, to incorporate non-Serbian and contempo-
rary symbolism into the myth, in order to justify the re-emergence of Serbia to
the outside world. The lessons had to be universalised, and brought into the
late twentieth century. For this reason, a new form of Kosovo interpretation
began, bringing Serbia into the comparative genocide debate.
In 1988, a group of eminent Serbian intellectuals formed the
Serbian–Jewish Friendship Society, headed by Klara Mandic´, in the hope of
paralleling the plight of Serbs and Jews. The formation of the Society and its
later work proved how important the Serbian notion of ‘performing’ their own
victimisation had become. Its primary goal was to strengthen contacts
between Serbia and Israel, relations that had obviously soured with the strong
anti-Zionist line advanced by Tito at the behest of his Islamic non-aligned
colleagues. Activities such as city twinning were popular, with 22 twinned
cities between Serbia and Israel, the most important being between Belgrade
and Tel Aviv, where mutual activities, from sporting events to commercial
transactions, were encouraged. Mandic´ brought the mayors of fifteen Serbian
cities to Israel during the Gulf War, while ironically, Serbia remained a
staunch ally of Iraq. Even the Serbian Crown Prince in exile, Aleksander,
visited Israel to stress the commonalities between the two cultures.51 A new
museum was also formed, to show the historic ‘Jewishness’ of Serbia. North of
Belgrade, in Zemun, the supposed ancestral home of Theodor Herzl was
restored and turned into a museum.52
The purpose of the Society was to equate Serbian suffering with that of the
Jews, allowing Serbs to enter into the comparative genocide debate. The
Society’s role was clearly not to represent Jewish interests, but rather, to court
Israeli military support, which Serbia successfully retained until 1999. In
reality, the Jewish community in Serbia was relatively small, with only 3,500
Jews in nine local communities affiliated with the Federation of Jewish
Communities of Yugoslavia, a non-nationalist representative of Jewish inter-
ests.53 The American journalist Florence Levinsohn was one of the first
American Jewish writers to compare the Kosovo Battle to the Jewish legend of
Masada, where approximately 1,000 Jewish warriors committed mass
suicide, after a losing battle with the attacking Romans some 2,000 years
ago.54 Echoing Jovan Cvijic´, Milan Bulajic´, Director of the Museum of Victims
of Genocide in Belgrade, ascribed a willingness to fight to Serbian ‘genes’,
which made them see themselves as ‘victims by destiny’. He also claimed that
‘they are the chosen people, like the Jews. They have chosen the heavenly
kingdom symbolised by Kosovo.’55 For nationalists such as Bulajic´, what it
meant to be a Serb was immutable, and rooted in the ancient past. They seem-
ingly shared much with the Jews, in terms of their willingness to fight
heroically in the face of overwhelming odds.
Such views were also evident in clerical circles. As early as 1983, a
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petition was drawn up by Serbian Orthodox bishops to protest against the
persecution of the Serbs in Kosovo. Once again, the links between Serbian and
Jewish suffering were stressed:
The Jewish people, before the menace of their annihilation and by the miracle of
the uninterrupted memory, returned to Jerusalem after 2,000 years of suffering,
against all logic of history. In a similar manner, the Serbian people have been
fighting their battle at Kosovo since 1389, in order to save the memory of its iden-
tity, to preserve the meaning of their existence against all odds.56
Zˇarko Korac´ of Belgrade University also made this link explicit, in his
study of the Serbian national revival. Here, he posited that the myth, like a
passion play, eventually became primordial, and could not be seen as mere
metaphor. The myth became central to the will to fight for a homeland. Thus:
What [Kosovo] tells the Serbs is ‘we are going to make a state again’. Just as ‘Jesus
is coming back’ so is Lazar. It means that because we opted for the kingdom of
heaven we cannot lose, and that is what people mean when they talk about Serbs
as being a ‘heavenly people’. In this way the Serbs identify themselves with the
Jews. As victims yes, but also with the idea of ‘sacred soil’. The Jews say ‘Next year
in Jerusalem’ and after 2000 years they resurrected their state. The message is
‘We are victims, but we are going to survive.’57
There can be little doubt that Serbian writers saw the merits of drawing
overt comparisons between themselves and the Jews. Serbian claims to
Kosovo were no different from Zionist claims to Israel, or so the argument
went. Serbs were a persecuted nation, as were the Jews, and both deserved to
have a national homeland. In this example of Serbian myth-making at its
finest, the process of inscription, or narrativising, was obvious. 
The first targets: myths of persecution and the Kosovar Albanians
The operationalisation of the Kosovo myth was first used against the Kosovar
Albanians, as a means of legitimating the reincorporation of this province into
an expanded Serbia. Accusations of genocide levelled against the Albanians
acted as a precursor to later accusations of genocide levelled against Croats
and Bosnian Moslems. For this reason, it is worth reviewing several aspects of
these Serbian claims, and how they constituted the first step in a Serbian
merger of Kosovo and Jewish imagery in the service of nationalism. From the
very beginning, it was clear that accusing the Albanians of genocide was the
key to legitimating Serbian territorial claims. By 1986, 60,000 Serbs had
signed a petition, along with Serbian Orthodox bishops from New Zealand,
Europe, and North America, detailing a ‘fascist genocide’ being inflicted on
Serbs and Montenegrins.58
Echoing the Jewish case, anti-Albanian propaganda focused on a long
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history of Albanian genocide in Kosovo. Numerous Serbian publications
advanced the allegation that Albanians had been killing and forcibly expelling
Serbs from the region since the arrival of the Ottoman Turks. Albanians
supposedly acted as the ‘strong arm of the Ottoman Empire’, keeping the weak
but proud Serbs in submission from 1389 onward.59 Even a relatively impar-
tial historian like Bogdan Denitch would describe how, in the ‘intervening
centuries’, Serbs were forced to flee from Kosovo, while the Turks settled the
region with Islamicised Albanians, a process ‘which today would be called
genocide’.60 Forced expulsions in the nineteenth century were similarly
claimed to have been severe, approaching a total of 150,000.61 For many
Serbian writers, the Albanians were a violent and treacherous people.
Because they had collaborated with the occupying Ottoman armies, and had
set themselves up in Kosovo in order to terrorise the Christian Serbs, they had
no claim to be a constituent nation in the region – they were ‘morally disqual-
ified’.62 It was clear that only a chosen nation, like the Serbs, deserved to be in
control.
Tito’s Yugoslavia would be reinterpreted as a time when Albanian geno-
cide continued with full fury. Dobrica C´osic´ was one of the first to reinterpret
Kosovar actions during the lifespan of Yugoslavia as an attempt to create ‘an
ethnically pure Kosovo republic . . . an Albanian state in Yugoslav territory’.63
Kosovars, not Serbs, were blamed for inventing ‘ethnic cleansing’. For others,
the long history of ‘brutal persecution’ included such activities as ‘rape and
pillage . . . the desecration of Serbian religious institutions and cemeteries,
arson and exploitation’.64 Writers blamed the Albanians for instituting a
forty-year policy of ethnic cleansing against the Serbs, in order to create a
Republic of Kosovo in the ethnically pure area.65 Others would describe an
‘open and total war’, which was leading inexorably to ‘the physical, political
and cultural genocide of the Serbian population in Kosovo and Metohije’.66 In
a large number of cases, a long and continuous history of genocide was
revealed, with the Serbs as the indigenous people of the region constantly
under attack from the alien Albanians, brought in either by Ottomans or
Communists.
Such a portrayal of Serbian–Albanian relations made Serbian reactions
in Kosovo appear as a welcome, though long-delayed, measure, designed to
correct centuries of abuse. There was little statistical information to support
these Serbian claims of genocide, nor was rape as frequent an occurrence
there as the Serbian nationalists alleged it to be. Except for several highly
publicised cases, the Kosovo average was far below that of the rest of Serbia
before the war, nor were many of the cases of harassment ever proved. What
could be proved, however was the large increase in Kosovar Albanian rela-
tive to Serbian births (27 per 1,000 for 1981–90 versus the Serb and Croat
average of 2.2). This gave rise to another type of genocide accusation, the
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notion of a demographic conspiracy to out-birth Serbs and therefore to gain
control of the province. While this style of paranoid rhetoric was never used
for Croats, nor for Bosnian Moslems, it demonstrates both the perseverance
and versatility of Serbian writers when faced with the reality that Serbs had
not been victims of genocide in any conventional sense. 
C´osic´ was one of the first to highlight the dangers of a ‘demographic
explosion’ – designed to bring about the separation of Kosovo and its joining
with Albania ‘by sheer force of numbers’.67 Some, like the political cartoonist
Milenko Mihajlovic´, blamed Tito’s government for encouraging a high birth-
rate. His works depicted throngs of Albanian babies with leering grins,
swarming out from behind Marshal Tito – the queen bee.68 Reactions of the
academic community were difficult to take seriously. Zˇivorad Igic´’s mono-
graph on what he described as a ‘demographic time bomb’ denounced the
Albanian birth-rate as ‘unique to the world’, in that their ‘reproductive
behaviour is quite unsuited to the time and space in which we live’.69 A high
birth-rate, he reasoned, constituted ‘an objective threatening of the rights of
the other nationalities’. It became part of a coherent strategy to ‘create an
ethnically clean region’, a strategy supposedly pursued by Albanian leaders for
national reasons. Poverty and a lack of education were dismissed as irrele-
vant, while ‘tribal leaders’ were blamed for forcing women to bear children, in
order to take control of Kosovo.70
The notion of a gynaecological conspiracy seemed also to be supported
by the Serbian Association of Professors and Scientists, who exposed a plot
to make Albanian women more fertile, so they could engender a ‘demo-
graphic explosion never before seen, the most potent in the world’. Claiming
that the Albanian population had risen by a factor of 50 (the increase was
actually 3.3 times from 1941 to 1981), the Association was clear that a
concerted strategy of high Albanian births constituted a form of genocide
against the Serbs.71 This idea was again introduced in a 1995 scientific
conference in Pristinë, designed to deal with the ‘negative and unacceptable
demographic movements’ in Kosovo. Their recommendations included the
settlement of some 400,000 Serbian refugees from other parts of Yugoslavia,
as well as more innocuous provisions, like the ‘adoption of a family planning
law’.72
That ethnic cleansing was eventually pursued should surprise no one.
While the conference advocated ‘family planning’ as a possible method of
reducing the Albanian population, the Serbian government appeared to have
made no effort to help them with their birth-control concerns.73 Family plan-
ning was advocated solely to reduce the percentage of Albanians relative to
Serbs. Had any such coercive measures been implemented, it might poten-
tially have been considered genocide under Article 4 of the United Nations
Genocide Convention of 1948: ‘imposing measures intended to prevent births
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within the group’. Even if Serbian propaganda were true, Kosovar Albanians
out-birthing Serbs would have been neither an instance of genocide nor a
crime against humanity under international law, nor, for that matter, under
Serbian law.
While the scientific establishment used veiled threats and ‘scientific’
studies to advance anti-Albanian policies, several writers were more direct.
The SANU academic Vesˇelin Djureticˇ, for example, rejected such complicated
and long-term projects as family planning, proposing instead the ‘repatria-
tion’ of Kosovar Albanians to Albania. The solution was to deport everyone
who was not a Serb. Serbs would then be moved into Kosovo to fill the empty
houses.74 Djureticˇ’s plan went to the heart of Serbian political and military
objectives in Kosovo. Several convoluted, but by no means universally
accepted, definitions of ‘genocide’ and ‘ethnic cleansing’ were used to justify
the forced removal of Kosovar Albanians from the region, in order to replace
them with Serbs. 
There was little truth to the claim that a demographic plot was being
hatched. An impartial Yugoslav study, conducted in 1988 to assess the situa-
tion, revealed that low education levels among females and a high
unemployment rate were the crucial contributing factors to a high birth-rate.
There was no cynical policy on the part of the Albanian leadership.75 At the
same time, there were only five inter-ethnic murders in Kosovo between 1981
and 1987. This region had the lowest crime rate in Yugoslavia.76
Nevertheless, the illusion of danger, and the theme of the ‘universal culprit’,
were common during this time.77 Accusations of persecution soon became
self-fulfilling prophecies, as the Kosova Liberation Army – largely funded by
expatriate Albanian groups – launched a bitter struggle for independence.
This only increased the level of Serbian terror in the province. By 1999, over
850,000 Kosovars had been forced to flee their homes, by a mixture of Serbian
paramilitary violence and NATO destruction. Some Serb nationalists took
their ‘self-defensive’ activities quite seriously. Given the Albanians’ crime of
genocide, the Macedonian economist Vladimir Gligorov remarked ironically,
‘the punishment seemed appropriate’.78
Contextualising Serbian nationalism in Croatia
For the Serbian government, the lessons of Kosovo were obvious. By activat-
ing the Kosovo myth, and by linking it with explicitly Jewish metaphors of
‘genocide’, the government was able to take over the province and rejoin it to
Serbia. Few Serbs openly protested against Milosˇevic´’s heavy-handed
approach to Kosovo, which he ran like a military police state. The fact that
Serbs had suffered ‘genocide’ gave him carte blanche. The links between an
aesthetic of persecution and state terror were not ignored by outside
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observers. Shkelsem Maliqi, in his study of Albanian nationalism, drew out
the links between Serbs in Kosovo and the Palestinian problem, noting the
militaristic capabilities and actions of each:
Israel used all coercive means to ‘liberate’ and ‘redeem’ Palestine as a ‘sacred land’
which had been ‘usurped’ by the Palestinians. In the same way the dominant state
machinery of the ‘unitary’ republic of Serbia decided to apply all coercive means
to the task of bringing Kosova back into the national possession of the Serbs, on
the grounds that Kosovo had been historically ‘sacred Serbian soil’, which had
been ‘usurped’ by the Albanians a couple of centuries ago.79
Maliqi posited that Serbian nationalists and militant Zionists had much in
common. As he described it: ‘the Serbs as a persecuted and historically tragic
people, the notion of the historical right to gather all Serbs within one state,
the idea of the crusade against (in this case) the Albanians as an alleged
vanguard of Islamic fundamentalism, the right to recolonise “sacred soil”, the
right to impose demographic control over the “usurpers”.’80 As an Albanian
Moslem, Maliqi had clear sympathies with both Kosovars and Palestinians,
and his denunciation of both Serbs and Israelis at one stroke is an interesting
indication of how far he felt such parallels extended. Clearly, Serbia had
entered into the ‘comparative genocide debate’, and Milosˇevic´ had success-
fully managed the takeover of Kosovo by playing on his people’s fear and
misunderstanding.
But if Serbian nationalists cut their teeth in Kosovo, their main opponents
as Yugoslavia disintegrated were the Croats. While there had been little if any
Croatian–Serbian antagonism before 1918, history would be revised to reflect
a new reality. By 1990, the Croatian leader Franjo Tudjman, following the
example of Slovenia, was trying to pull the Republic of Croatia out of the
Yugoslav Federation. Milosˇevic´ had not opposed Slovenian secession, on the
grounds that there was no Serbian minority there in need of his ‘protection’.
While fighting had broken out between Slovenian secessionist forces and the
JNA in June 1991, Milosˇevic´ had secretly assured Slovenian leaders that he
would not try to prevent their secession.81 What Silber and Little have dubbed
‘the phoney war’ ended quickly by July, after Milosˇevic´ vetoed the continued
use of force by the JNA.82 Croatia, however, was different, since its territory
contained a sizeable Serbian minority – 13 per cent of Croatia’s total popula-
tion of 4.7 million people.83 Moreover, certain regions of Croatia – Eastern
Slavonia and the eastern Krajina – were seen to be historically Serbian.
Milosˇevic´’s legitimacy as a national leader was based on uniting Serbian
populations and historic lands, and this made a confrontation with Croatia
inevitable, even if he had privately assured Tudjman and other Croatian
leaders that he had no interest in Croatian land.84 His attitude was made clear
at a secret meeting to Serbian regional leaders in March, 1991. Expressing his
Slobodan Milosˇevic´ and the construction of Serbophobia
79
2441Chapter3  16/10/02  8:04 am  Page 79
conviction that borders were made by the strong at the expense of the weak,
he argued: 
We simply consider it as a legitimate right and interest of the Serbian nation to live
in one state. This is the beginning and the end … And if we have to fight, by God
we are going to fight. I hope that they [the Croats] will not be so crazy as to fight
against us. If we do not know how to work properly or run an economy, at least
we know how to fight properly.85
As in the Kosovo case, myths proving that parts of Croatia were histori-
cally Serbian provided much-needed ammunition against Croatian secession.
Territorial claims would simultaneously be backed with moral claims to
Croatian territory, again in a fusing of Kosovo and Jewish-style myths. Such
myths would advance the claim that the Serbs had been the victims of a long
and bloody Croatian expansionist programme, aimed at destroying the
Serbian nation. In their analysis of this ‘anti-Serbian’ or ‘Serbophobic’
programme, the importance of Catholic expansionism was another important
ingredient. 
The remainder of this chapter will therefore focus on two different aspects
of Serbian propaganda: first of all, on the establishment of territorial claims
and the beginnings of Serbian nationalism within Croatia. And secondly, it
will be important to review some of the primary Serbian myths of persecution,
and how Serbs began to reinterpret their earlier historical associations with
the Croats. These sections will lay the basis for a comparison between Serbian
and Croatian reappraisals of their historical relationship up to the beginning
of the Second World War. 
Serbian territorial claims in the Krajina and Eastern Slavonia
Certainly, the Serbs had a number of highly compelling and ancient myths
that were operationalised in Kosovo to legitimate control of the province. In
the case of Croatia, the two regions claimed by Serbs had a far more ambigu-
ous lineage, and while there were arguably towns and villages with a Serbian
majority, Krajina and Eastern Slavonia were well inside historic Croatia. The
Serbian plan for annexing these two regions was made clear almost from the
beginning. Serbia desired to keep these areas within a smaller SFRY, but an
amputated ‘Croatia’ would be free to leave, once Milosˇevic´ had seized the
lion’s share of the republic for himself. Had the Serbian plan been successful,
Croatia would have been divided in two, somewhat like East and West
Pakistan, making Croatia what some ironically called a ‘so-called split in half
country’.86
By 1992, the geographer Jovan Ilic´ had set forth Serbian territorial ambi-
tions. Serbs would participate in a referendum on their separation from
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Croatia. The Republika Srpska Krajina would eventually be annexed to
Serbia, while those Serbs remaining in Croatia would be traded reciprocally
with Croats in Serbia. Remaining Serbs would be obliged to move to Eastern
Slavonia (namely Baranja, Vukovar, and Vinkovci) which would also be
annexed to Serbia. ‘At any rate,’ warned Ilic´, ‘not many Serbs should remain
in independent Croatia.’87 In historic Dubrovnik, at that time being ravaged
by JNA shelling, Ilic´ recognised that the population was predominantly
Catholic and Croat. While he accepted that ‘according to the ethnic principle
this area should belong to Croatia’, he proposed the establishment of
Dubrovnik and the surrounding area as a separate ‘political-territorial,
autonomous unit’.88 Presumably this unit would continue to be a part of the
new SFRY, most probably subject to a system of rule similar to that in Kosovo
and Vojvodina. While these annexations would unite the Serbians and their
supposedly historic territory, the key issue for Ilic´ was punishing and humili-
ating the Croats for daring to oppose Serbian nationalism. ‘The new borders
should primarily be a therapy for the treatment of ethno-psychic disorders’,
prescribed Ilic´, ‘primarily among the Croatian population.’89
As Ilic´ maintained, the Krajina, or ‘borderland’, was historically a
Western outpost, controlled by the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It was a border
established to keep the Ottoman Empire at bay, and, for this reason, large
numbers of Serbs had been settled there as soldiers during the fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries.90 Ilic´’s claim to the land was based on the fact that Serbs
had fought for the ‘West’ and therefore deserved the region as their reward.
He further cited a 1630 charter given to the inhabitants by Ferdinand II of
Austria, guaranteeing their autonomy from Croatian control, a reality that
persisted until 1881, after which time control was ceded to Croatian adminis-
tration. Ilic´’s primary argument was that the Military Frontier as a territorial
and political unit had existed outside the boundaries of Croatia for centuries.
It was never truly a part of Croatia, and was therefore entitled to exist inde-
pendently.91
Claims on the Krajina included south-eastern Dalmatia, western Srem,
Dubrovnik, and eastern Slavonia, even though there were few Serbs there
during the conflict, as a result of, ‘conversion to Catholicism, Uniating, and
Croatisation’, as well as ‘genocidal destruction’. There were even claims that
Serbs formed the majority on some of the Adriatic islands, such as Visˇ –
although writers were forced to concede that these also had been
‘Catholicized’.92 With regard to Eastern Slavonia, there was little historical
evidence that the region had been anything but Croatian for many centuries.
While there was one claim that Vukovar had been founded by the Serbs, most
propaganda directed at this region relied primarily on its proximity to Serbia,
and the fact that its people were predominantly Serbian.93
Of course, while critically examining such dubious Serbian claims, one
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should also bear in mind that Croatia was hardly as united as later national-
ists would argue. Much of Slavonia had been under direct Viennnese
administration for about three centuries (from 1578 onwards), and was only
rejoined with Croatia in 1868. Dalmatia was also joined with Croatia in the
same year, after centuries of Venetian, Hungarian, and Austrian control.
Indeed, one could argue that this region had never been under Croatian
control. This in no way legitimates Serbian claims; but, as I will argue later,
Croatian nationalists were as adept at reinterpreting history as their Serbian
counterparts.94
Moral claims: the myth of ‘Serbophobia’
While these historical claims were important as a starting-point, it was clear
that the Croats had far more claim to these lands than did the Serbs. These had
been part of Croatia for many centuries, and while there were Serbian villages
and towns, there were also considerable numbers of Croats in these regions as
well. Ilic´’s boast that ‘One cannot be the occupying power of one’s own
country!’ was typical of those used throughout the conflict as an important
justification for Serbian violence in Croatia.95 Nevertheless, while territorial
arguments were useful, the Serbs in Croatia, as in Kosovo, chose to capitalise
on myths of genocide and persecution, asserting a moral, as well as a territo-
rial right to these historic lands. As in Kosovo, Schöpflin’s ‘myths of
powerlessness and compensation for the powerless’ were used to justify
Serbian autonomy. The Serbs had supposedly fought for centuries against the
Ottoman Empire on these lands, and therefore earned the right to be free from
Croatian control.96
Ilic´ continually asserted such claims, advancing special moral rights for
the Serbian nation, ‘because it was exposed to genocidal extermination many
times’.97 His arguments were designed to resemble those of Herzl and other
nineteenth-century Zionists, positing that there could be no existence for
Serbs outside of Serbia. Of course, the Serbs never truly followed the Zionist
approach. Rather than going to their homeland, they preferred to create
exclusive ethnic enclaves wherever they lived. A bizarre process developed, of
establishing Serbian autonomous pockets throughout the region, which
would then be joined by land bridges (or corridors) to Serbia. 
An essential precondition and follow-up to Serbian machinations in the
Krajina and East Slavonia involved proving the existence of a historic nation-
alist project aimed against the Serbs. The myth of ‘Serbophobia’ (a historic
fear, hatred, and jealousy of Serbs that Serb nationalists have likened to anti-
Semitism) allowed nationalists to trace a continuous legacy of hatred and
violence against the Serbs among the Croats. The actions of the JNA and
Serbian irregular militias in Croatia could therefore be presented, both at
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home and to the outside world, as self-defensive and humanitarian – saving
the Krajina Serbs from annihilation. Coupled with a project of demonising
Croats was the rehabilitation of Serbian history, to prove that Serbs had never
harboured any ill feeling towards Croats, and had always behaved nobly in
their dealings with them. This propaganda was designed to highlight the irra-
tionality of the Croatian nationalist project, while casting the Serbs as victims
throughout history. 
The idea that Serbs were forced into the war, and that Croatia had started
the violence, were popular themes – found regularly in the media and in schol-
arly publications. While great moral strength was to be gained from the myth
of Kosovo and their parallel suffering with the Jews, an entire history of
Croatian duplicity and evil had now to be constructed. Again, this was very
much like Kecˇmanovic´’s theme of the ‘universal culprit’, or Schöpflin’s ‘myths
of unjust treatment’, where Serbs had been singled out for negative treatment
throughout history, and therefore had special moral rights to defend them-
selves from the threat of attack.98
Serbophobia became an anti-Semitism for Serbs, making them victims
throughout history. Dobrica C´osic´ could thus claim: ‘We Serbs feel today as
the Jews did in Hitler’s day. We are a people who are [considered] guilty . . .
Today, Serbophobia in Europe is a concept and an attitude with the same ideo-
logical motivation and fury as anti-Semitism had during the Nazi era.’99
C´osic´’s text also highlighted Serbian and Jewish Diasporic conceptions of iden-
tity, viewing both nations as having been doomed throughout their history to
suffer under persecution, because they lived outside their national borders.
Thus Krajina Serbs were likened to Russian and Polish Jews or other
Ashkinazim. 
The nationalist opposition leader and novelist Vuk Draskovic´ also saw the
merits of such rhetoric, arguing: ‘Israel and the Serbs live in a hellish siege
where the sworn goal is to seize and then cover with mosques or Vaticanize
the lands of Moses and the people of St. Sava [Serbia’s patron saint].’100
Clearly, many of the most prominent writers and politicians were trying hard
to push the connections between Jews and Serbs. Since the Serbian diaspora
had suffered in history, the only solution was an expanded state. While C´osic´
never operationalised a working definition of ‘Serbophobia’, its meaning was
clearly implied. There were others, however, who did elaborate on the
phenomenon. Smilja Avramov (an adviser to Milosˇevic´) overtly compared the
persecution of Serbs with that of the Jews in history: ‘The departure point for
the genocide of the Jews was anti-Semitism, and of the Serbs, Serbophobia.’101
Both movements were morally equal, according to Avramov, and each was to
be found in a variety of different countries. By Avramov’s definition,
Serbophobia was closely tied to the Catholic Church, and was operationalised
historically through the Vatican and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Croatia
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was in many respects a pawn in a much larger Catholic expansionist plan. 
For Serbs, the moment that Croatians became Catholics was the moment
they began to hate the Serbian others and their Orthodox faith. The Catholic
hatred of Orthodoxy was thus presented in history as a ‘continuity of geno-
cide’ against the Serbs, something ‘which has been carried out throughout
history and is being implemented today’.102 Like anti-Semitism, Serbophobia
could not be taken seriously if it was not ancient and primordial. Therefore, as
Avramov asserted, Catholic aggression and expansionism was part of
Croatian nationalism from the outset: 
For [one] thousand years Croats have been in full political dominance by foreign
factors, and have tried through them to achieve their own state. Croatian
Catholicism, often militant and opposed to the ecumenical spirit, gradually
absorbed all other national compounds and subordinated them to the mighty
state of Rome. Numerous Popes, in the last thousand years considered the
Orthodox Church heretic, schismatic and cursed, so they brought up Croats as its
border guardians towards the East. Rome has planted an idea in the Croatian soul,
that their land is ‘Bulwark of Christianity’ which turned them away from the
Orthodox brothers, with the aim to exterminate Serbs on the religious basis.103
Seen as nothing more than historical slaves to the Vatican and its expan-
sionist plans, the Croats were accused of being religious executioners, killing
Serbs in order to destroy all vestiges of Orthodoxy in the Balkans. Croatian
nationalism and the killing of Serbs were inseparably tied together, with
hatred of Serbs forming a crucial part of Croatian national identity. ‘Croatian
national leaders’, Avramov commented, ‘had no clear idea of national self-
determination, unless it was founded on the genocide over Serbs.’ Curiously,
however, such views did not apply to the equally Catholic Slovenians.104 For
Serbian writers, the existence of Croatian nationalism and the Catholic
Church implied ipso facto the existence of Serbophobia. The Croats were to be
bearers of a nationalism that had no intrinsic worth – except for its hatred of
the Serbian other. 
Useful as an ahistorical genocidal project was for Serbian historians,
‘Serbophobia’ had also to be historicised, to be understood as a political
phenomenon. Many traced a general form of Serbophobia from the Great
Schism in AD 395, when the Roman Empire split into eastern and western
halves. Others traced Serbophobia to much later contact with the Croats,
when Serbs were brought in to defend the Krajina against Ottoman attacks.
Croatian feudal lords and the Catholic clergy were blamed as the later instiga-
tors of it, supposedly frustrated by Serbian autonomy in the Krajina, and by
the refusal of the Serbs to convert to Catholicism. 
This type of religious-based Serbophobia had seemingly metamorphosed
by the nineteenth century into a more organised and systematised concept of
hatred. The historian Dusˇan Batakovic´ wrote profusely on the nineteenth-
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century development of Croatian and Serbian nationalism during the wars in
Croatia and Bosnia. A large number of his works were widely circulated on the
internet. Batakovic´ used comparisons of political and social systems in
Serbian and Croatia to argue in favour of Serbian tolerance and Croatian
xenophobia. He privileged Serbian eastern concepts of nationhood, and his
writings contain numerous justifications for what would later be called
‘Greater Serbia’ – the now famous Serbian strategy of empire-building in the
nineteenth century. Batakovic´ noted, and rightly, that Serbs advocated a
strong unified state in the nineteenth century as a bulwark against Bulgarian,
Russian, and Turkish expansion, and dreamed of uniting South Slavs into a
common homeland. 
Rather than condemning this process, he argued that ‘Greater Serbia’
was a positive form of fraternal unity between Serbs and Croats, who were
seen to be ‘but two branches of the same nation, which had become forcibly
divided by the foreign domination’.105 Thus outside interference and colonial-
ism were blamed for keeping these two groups apart. ‘Greater Serbia’ would be
the solution to their problems. It was, as Batakovicˇ explained, a model for a
unitary and democratic state according to the French model.106 Serbian
nation-building was supposedly a constructive, positive phenomenon.
For Batakovic´, privileging Serbian history as one of tolerance and democ-
racy was of great importance, particularly in the light of the continuous flow
of anti-Serbian writings going from Croatia to the West. These often alluded to
Serbia’s Ottoman roots and eastern practices of despotic rule and violence.
Batakovic´ elevated the ‘millet tradition’ of self-rule under the Ottoman empire
as a great boon for Orthodox nations in the Balkans, as it ‘proved itself to be a
solid base for transition to the standard European type of national integration
– the nation-state model, based on the experience of the French
Revolution’.107 Thus the Serbian evolution to ‘democracy’ was based on
European ideals, and was therefore consonant with Enlightenment values. By
contrast, he drew a sharp distinction between the desirable Serbian forms of
nationalism, and the supposedly negative and destructive Croatian forms:
Contrary to the authentically European model of integration, in the neighbourhood
of the former Ottoman provinces turned into newly established national states . . .
within the frontiers of another multinational empire, the Habsburg Monarchy, a
Central-European model of national integration arose gradually – a clerical
nationalism, mixed with feudal traditions. That model of nationalism was espe-
cially apparent in regions where the Roman-Catholic and Orthodox Church
coexisted, like Croatia, Dalmatia and Slavonia, and was coloured by an excessive
religious intolerance.108
Thus could Batakovic´ compare a Serbian ‘European’ model with its
Croatian counterpart, seemingly steeped in religious extremism and intoler-
ance. He called it simply ‘a contemporary variant of the Civitas Dei – “God’s
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state”’, which continued to rely on anachronistic interpretations of ‘feudal
“historical rights”’ – well into the nineteenth century’.109 Contrary to Serbian
nationalism, this religious-based nationalism was inimical to the ‘modern
solutions’ favoured by the Serbs, from romantic nationalism to liberalism.
Thus, one is presented with opposing Serbian and Croatian views of state- and
nation-building in the nineteenth century. Serbian nationalism was
European, democratic, tolerant, cosmopolitan, and enlightened, while Croats
were medieval, hierarchical, xenophobic, and backward. Batakovic´’s theories
are an excellent example of Kecˇmanovic´’s ‘counteridentification’,110 in which
the enemy’s history is seen to be completely opposite to one’s own. Now,
certainly one could argue that in retaining some archaic features, like speak-
ing Latin in the Diet, the Croats were indeed backward-looking to some extent.
Their national identity, faced with Magyar modernising tendencies, often
consisted of retaining traditions that had been abandoned elsewhere, leading
to the charge of backwardness. However, within the context of a civil war in
which Serbia was the primary aggressor (at least at first) Batakovic´’s
comments do seem to have overtly political dimensions, particularly when
you consider that he avoids discussing any positive aspects of Croatian nation-
alism in the nineteenth century, while similarly avoiding the many negative
aspects of Serbian history from this time. Batakovic´’s selective narrativising of
the past was sadly typical.
Within a general analysis of the period was a specific condemnation of
Croatian nationalist politicians and activists who were at the vanguard of an
anti-Serbian movement. Croatian linguist and nationalist politician Ante
Starcˇevic´ was an obvious target of Serbian writings, as the co-founder of the
nationalist ‘Croatian Party of Rights’ (with Eugen Kvaternik). Starcˇevic´ and
Kvaternik were frequently condemned for inciting Croats to commit genocide
against the Serbs, being, as one writer recalled: ‘the founders of the idea of
genocidal destruction upon Serbs in Croatia’.111 Starcˇevic´’s politicking was
also linked with the rise of right-wing nationalist Josip Frank, whose
Frankovci were later to start ‘a systematic anti-Serbian and anti-Orthodox
campaign’, which resulted in ‘pogroms, exiles . . . and the first attempt of
genocide upon the Serbian people’.112 It was clear once again that the rise of
Croatian nationalism in the nineteenth century equalled genocide.
Historically, Starcˇevic´ was known as a Croatian linguistic reformer (albeit
a Croatian nationalistic one), who standardised the Croatian language as
distinct from the Serbian. For contemporary writers, Starcˇevic´’s project was
denounced as inherently racist and xenophobic, on the assumption that his
workable common culture was intolerant and destructive of Serbian culture.
He was accused of destroying South Slavic unity, of inventing ‘an all-together
non-existent Croatian language and orthography’ – a language constructed
only to erect artificial barriers between Serbs and Croats. For some Serbian
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historians, Starcˇevic´’s programme consisted exclusively of ‘denying and
exterminating the Serbian people’ as a precondition to Croatian self-determi-
nation.113 Again, the idea of denying South Slavic unity, and denying the
existence of cultural, linguistic and historic ties between Serbs and Croats,
was presented as the first major step in Serbophobia, a step that led inexorably
to genocide.
In Starcˇevic´ Serbian writers also noted the emergence of racial theories
similar to those of the Nazi era. As Serbian politician Vasilije Krestic´ revealed:
‘The “Father of the Homeland” had developed such racial theory about the
Serbs, that it can only be compared to Hitler’s theory about the Jews.’114
Krestic´’s understanding of Croatian motivations was similar to those of his
contemporaries. His reading of Croatian history also included violent and
xenophobic plans to destroy the Serbs, in accordance with a Machiavellian
desire to take over the Krajina. Paraphrasing the Croatian position, he added
that ‘all means are permitted for the reaching of this aim, including the geno-
cidal extermination of the Serbs’.115
For Krestic´, a key indicator of Starcˇevic´’s extremism was the vocabulary
used for assimilating non-Croats: ‘Alpine Croats’ (for Slovenes); ‘Orthodox
Croats’ (for Serbs); ‘flower of the Croatian people’ (for Moslems); followed by
‘Turkish Croatia’ (for Bosnia); ‘Red Croatia’ (for Montenegro); ‘White Croatia’
(for Dalmatia); and ‘Carinthian Croatia’ (for Slovenia). Kresticˇ thus explained
the rationale behind such identifications: ‘These names had been carefully
nurtured for hundreds of years and rooted in the consciousness of the Croat
with the idea of developing in him a conviction of the greatness of Croatia and
of the numerical strength of the Croats.’116 Such vocabulary also performed
an important role in convincing the Croats that other nations were artificial
and therefore did not exist. Denying the existence of the Serbs was seen to be
crucial to their extermination.
Contrary to Serbian claims, specifically those of Krestic´, Starcˇevic´ was not
a genocidal maniac, although his theories might well have been a justification
for ‘ethnocide’. This, as Israel Charny has argued, aims at the ‘intentional
destruction of another people’, but crucially ‘[does] not necessarily include
destruction of actual lives’.117 This aside, Starcˇevic´’s original ideas were
assimilationist, not exclusivist. For him everyone was a potential Croat, and
the fact that Slovenians were ‘mountain Croats’, and Serbs ‘Orthodox Croats’
reflected his assimilatory policies. While he did see ‘Serbdom’ as an artificial
construct, it was not his desire to exterminate Serbs, but rather, to make them
into good ‘Orthodox Croats’. Starcˇevic´ was in many ways reacting against the
Illyrianism and pro-Serbianism of such Croatian liberal thinkers as Ljudevit
Gaj and Juraj Strossmayer, who argued that the great differences between
Orthodox and Catholic were artificial and manufactured. Starcˇevic´ argued
that these Croats were giving too much away for the promise of eventual
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union with the Serbs, even though he still saw a communal state as the best
alternative to the ‘Balkanisation’ of Europe.118
Certainly, we can observe many parallels between Starcˇevic´ and his
Serbian contemporary Vuk Karadzˇic´, who preached basically the same philos-
ophy from the Serbian point of view. Nevertheless, Starcˇevic´’s nationalism
does seem to have been particularly obnoxious even if it was not genocidal.
C. A. Macartney notes in his Hungary: A Short History, how ‘gross intolerance’
to the Serbs of Salvonia drove them into the arms of the new Ban, Count
Khuen-Hédérvary, in 1883, as they ‘sought his protection’, enabling the Ban
to ‘maintain what was essentially a dictatorship . . . until the end of the
century’.119 The end of Khuen-Hédérvary’s rule then culminated, according to
Krestic´, in a number of anti-Serbian riots, particularly from 1899 to 1902,
when Serbian homes and shops were destroyed in downtown Zagreb. This
violence, he argued, was stirred up by the Catholic Church in Croatia and the
Vatican, who dreamed, along with the ‘Party of Rights’, of creating a ‘Greater
Croatia’ at the expense of the Serbian populations.120
The combination of Serbophobic religious, linguistic and political
programmes was to culminate in the butchery of Serbs in the First World War,
according to many Serbian sources. This period would be consonant with
‘elements of anti-Serb genocide’, claimed one writer.121 Croatian Peasant
Party leader Stjepan Radic´ (later shot by a Montenegrin parliamentary
deputy) was specifically accused of whipping up anti-Serb hatred, which led to
Croatian massacres of Serbs in the First World War.122 Other writers described
the ‘religious warmongering’, as well as the ‘anti-Serbian demonstrations and
pogroms . . . plunder and destruction of Serbian property’, as proof of the ‘holy
war’ waged against the Serbs during the war.123
Such nineteenth- and early twentieth-century imagery was fascinating,
because it described an altogether unending period of Serbophobia, when this
was in fact a time when many Croatian academics and politicians looked to
Serbia and to the idea of Yugoslavism or Illyrianism as a positive phenome-
non. Men like Ljudevit Gaj and Bishop Juraj Strossmayer, who created the
Yugoslav Academy in Zagreb, were very much pro-Serbian. They argued that
a cultural and spiritual union with the Serbs was the best way to secure a
strong South Slavic state – wherein some measure of freedom and equality
could come about. Similarly, Ivan Mesˇtrovic´, the world-famous Croatian
sculptor and Yugoslav nationalist, pushed for Yugoslav unity, even creating a
‘Kosovo Temple’ that he exhibited as part of the Serbian, and not the Austro-
Hungarian, contribution to the Rome International Exhibition in 1912. These
and many more examples demonstrate the counterfactual nature of many
Serbian assertions. For many decades, Croatian intellectuals and writers were
at the forefront of Illyrianism, even more eager for union than their Serbian
counterparts.124
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Serbian interpretations of the first Yugoslavia
When the first Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was created in
1918, it was clear at first that all parties found the union acceptable. The
Serbs favoured it, as they saw their state expand dramatically westwards. The
Croats also favoured the arrangement, as their lands were now protected
against Italian predations after the war. Croatia had been part of the losing
side as part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. However, there were problems,
and the Yugoslav state soon became what Batakovic´ had claimed – an exten-
sion of the pre-war Serbian kingdom. While it is clear from many accounts
that Serbs dominated Yugoslavia, the official Serbian position maintained
that the country was decentralised, federal, and equal. As Batakovic´ claimed,
it was ‘an expression of the modern European spirit, manifesting itself as an
integrative idea of the liberal bourgeoisie which advocated the unity of
Yugoslav views’.125 For Batakovic´ and his contemporaries, the Kingdom was
as Western as France or Germany, which meant that it conformed to the
highest ideals possible. 
Further, King Aleksander was credited with favouring the Roman
Catholic Church over other religious denominations in Yugoslavia, handing
out generous concessions to the Croatian business community, while actively
encouraging former Austro-Hungarian army officers to integrate themselves
into the Yugoslav army.126 That such information was often counterfactual
did not matter a great deal. Serbian historians wanted to portray Serbian
history as one of tolerance and largesse. From its promising beginnings,
writers argued that the Serbian policy of ‘reconciliation and national toler-
ance’ was soon abused by the Croats, while the generosity of the Serbs ‘soon
made it possible for all opponents of the Yugoslav common state to work
unhindered’.127
Moderate writers have described the Croats’ drive for increased autonomy
as the ‘Hungarian complex’, implying that they saw the new kingdom as
another Austro-Hungarian-style system, with Serbs and Croats in a potential
power-sharing arrangement. Others were not so open-minded.128 Batakovic´,
continuing with his cultural critique of Croatia, blamed the Croats almost
entirely for the breakdown of the first Yugoslavia. The Croats, he argued, were
backward and narrow-minded, simply unable to adapt to life in a more
civilised state: ‘The Yugoslav idea could not be implemented in the undevel-
oped, predominantly agrarian society, impregnated by various feudal
traditions, religious intolerance and often a xenophobic mentality.’129
Dobrica C´osic´ would similarly blame the Croatian ‘hatred for diversity’ as a
key reason for the Kingdom’s breakdown.130 Both men were clear that the
cultural inadequacies of the Croats made the country unworkable, despite the
best efforts of Serbian leaders. Furthermore, it soon became apparent that the
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Croats never accepted Yugoslavia as a permanent solution. Rather, union was
seen as a ‘way-station’ on the road to the creation of an ‘ethnically pure and
independent “greater Croatia”’. Once again, the Serbs found themselves in the
way of another nation’s expansionist plans, and became victims at a time
when ‘Serbophobia and hatred for the Serbs’ was high.131
Such writings were designed to demonstrate the goodness and perhaps
naïveté of the Serbs, who in their kind and trusting manner established a state
for all South Slavs, only to be stabbed in the back by Croatian ethnic hatred
and chauvinism. No matter how good the Serbs were – Serbian historians
argued – interethnic harmony was impossible because of the Croatians and
their genocidal characteristics. Even the development of King Aleksander’s
royal dictatorship was justified along these lines. Croatian politicians, instead
of recognising that the Yugoslav state provided ‘a unique historical opportu-
nity for their own national emancipation’, chose instead to ‘abuse democratic
rights and parliamentary life’, exercising an ‘extreme primitivism’ which led
to the dissolution of Parliament and the imposition of a royal dictatorship, ‘as
in some European countries’.132
Royal dictatorship was often defended by the Serbs as the only solution to
a full-scale genocide of Serbs by Croats. Croatia was described as nothing less
than the locus of ‘darkness and insanity’, where ‘there reigns hatred incom-
prehensible to the civilised world’.133 Such hatred, according to Serbian
sources, was almost exclusively the product of the Roman Catholic faith, and
its general desire to supplant the Orthodox Church. Even in the creation of a
dictatorship, in a climate of almost total Serbian control over the population,
the Serbs tried to prove that they were in fact the most European and enlight-
ened, while the primitive Croats simply abused democracy and plotted
genocide. Serbian writers, owing to their undeniable skill in reinterpreting
history, would even make an age of strong Serbian control a time of Serbian
victimisation.
Revising Serbian–Croatian antagonisms from the early twentieth century
also involved conspiracy theories directed against the Vatican, which was
often portrayed as a crucial architect of Balkanisation. By 1989, the well-
known Bosnian Serb academic Milorad Ekmecˇic´ blamed the Vatican almost
exclusively for the destruction of the first Yugoslavia. Ekmecˇic´ denounced the
‘bureau of archbishops’ for destroying all Serbian attempts at Balkan unity,
and saw ‘Catholic nationalism’ as the Serb’s worst enemy throughout
history.134 He went so far as to blame the Catholic Church for encouraging the
genocide of Serbs throughout much of the twentieth century, through its
supposed desire to create a ‘Catholic Central Europe’ with its frontier on the
River Drina.135
While he offered a selection of contentious anecdotes, Ekmecˇic´ could give
little proof of his assertions. Rather than acknowledging that the Serbian
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centralised monarchy was far from perfect, or that the Croats had legitimate
grievances within Yugoslavia, it was much easier for Serbian writers to blame
the Croats, or their Catholicism, for Yugoslavia’s fragmentation. Further, by
implicating the Vatican, a much larger conspiracy could be drawn out. Not
only the Serbs, but perhaps other Orthodox countries – Greece, Bulgaria,
Romania, or Macedonia – could similarly be threatened by a Catholic expan-
sionist project. Such attacks on the Vatican constituted a tacit call for Balkan
unity, or at least Orthodox unity. During the early 1990s, this was a top
government priority. If the Ottoman Empire had swept through Serbia in the
Middle Ages on its way westward, the Vatican was seen as a Western expan-
sionist power, heading east. Sandwiched between the advancing Turks and
Catholics were the seemingly helpless Serbs, with only their legends and their
faith to sustain them.136
Conclusions
What emerges from an understanding of Serbian conceptions of Kosovar and
early Croatian history is the centrality of persecution imagery. This involves
the instrumentalisation of Kosovo and Jewish imagery to promote themes of
Islamic and Catholic expansionist projects. Creating Serbophobia allowed
Serbian writers to employ such metaphors as ‘liquidation’, ‘pogroms’,
‘purges’, ‘ethnic cleansing’ and ‘genocide’, in order to prove that they were
merely resisting expansionist plans that were centuries old. By casting
Albanian and later Croatian nationalism in an exclusivist, xenophobic, and
destructive light, certain historical patterns emerged, with clear and distinct
themes. Serbs were, like the Jews, the victims of ahistorical, dangerous forces,
seeking to enslave and destroy them. 
Further, through the use of territorial arguments, Serbian writers claimed
that, like the Jews, they were being denied their right to a homeland for all of
their people. Their lands and their liberty were being taken away from them,
and the roots of this were to be found well before the current conflict. The
early history of Serbian–Croatian relations proved crucial to the thesis that
Serbs were merely protecting themselves from a well-established pattern of
Croatian behaviour. Many of the ideas used against the Kosovar Albanians
were later instrumentalised against the Croats as well – the concepts of ethnic
intolerance, and the use of violence and genocide historically as a means of
ridding Serbian regions of their own people. Many of these themes either
anticipated, or were in reaction to Croatian propaganda, which obviously
advanced opposing contentions. Croats argued that the Serbs were in fact the
most genocidal and bloodthirsty nation in the region. This will be the subject
of the next chapter, which will allow for some useful comparisons. 
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Croatia, ‘Greater Serbianism’, and the conflict
between East and West
Christ’s remarkable principle: ‘Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do
good to them that hate you, and pray for them that use and persecute you.’ That
selfless sentiment has remained throughout history a cry of the weak, or an
expression of those who have accepted their doom . . . No matter how many exam-
ples can be found in life and history to support such renunciation, it has never
overcome the passions of hatred and the desire to dominate or to take revenge.
(Franjo Tudjman, Horrors of War)
SERBIA WAS CERTAINLY not alone in its revision of history, nor in its use ofnational mythology. The Croatian government also saw the merits ofreinterpreting history to buttress their own political objectives. Many of
Croatia’s most interesting national myths were created well before the
collapse of Yugoslavia. Franjo Tudjman’s rise to power in 1990, and the even-
tual independence of Croatia, after almost five decades of Communist
federalism, engendered a fertile climate for national myth creation.
Croatia’s national propaganda evolved within an authoritarian context,
and many of the central themes favoured by Croatian writers were similar to
those advanced by their Serbian counterparts. The spectre of ‘Greater Serbia’
– which became likened to an anti-Semitism for Croats – was remarkably
similar to Serbophobia. Many other myths appeared to be a reaction to a fear
and strong distrust of the Serbs. Several, like the ‘state right’ tradition, the
Antemurale Christianitatis, and Medjugorje, proved the existence of a civilised,
peace-loving and enlightened Croatia. Other myths advanced the claim that
the Serbs were religiously, culturally, and racially part of an Eastern and
therefore inferior civilisation, while the Croats were more Western, more
enlightened, better educated, and more democratic. 
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The beginnings of Croatian nationalism
In contrast to the rise of nationalism in Serbia, Croatian nationalism was not
a reactive phenomenon to internal events. There were no Albanians harass-
ing Croats in the ‘provinces’, and no minority within Croatia agitating for
statehood before the 1990s. Nevertheless, Croatian nationalism, like its
Serbian counterpart, was born of a sense of cultural submergence and politi-
cal domination within Yugoslavia, and a perceived threat to Croatian
language, culture, and religion. Nationalism came to the forefront in
Yugoslavia during a period of decentralisation and liberalisation in the 1960s,
when Tito was forced to tone down his hard-line policies on nationalism in
return for Western loans. This opened a window of opportunity for a new
generation of Croatian Communists, who began pushing for increased auton-
omy from the federal centre. In what became known as Maspok, activists
demanded increased national rights within the federation. They cited the fact
that Croats were under-represented in their own republic, since Serbs, who
constituted  roughly 13 per cent of the population, held 40 per cent of the
Party posts, and a higher percentage of posts in the police, the secret police,
and the JNA. Other contentious issues included the official figures for the
number of Serbian war dead during the Second World War, the alleged
economic exploitation of Croatia, and the status of Croatians in Bosnia-
Hercegovina. The main focus of Croatian grievances, however, was the
subordinate status of the Croatian language. A 1967 petition by the Croatian
Writer’s Club called for the designation of Croatian as a distinct language –
both for educational and publishing purposes.1
Afraid of having ‘1941 all over again’, Tito purged nationalist-oriented
Communists, removing reformers from the ranks between 1971 and 1972.
Some 1,600 Croatian Communists were subject to ‘political measures’,
including ejection from the party – even arrest.2 While these purges momen-
tarily suppressed domestic nationalism, nationalism continued in the
Diaspora, among Croatian expatriate groups in South America, Australia,
New Zealand, the United States, Canada, and Europe. Often well-financed and
closely co-ordinated, these groups were solidly anti-Communist, since they
had left Yugoslavia as a result of their dislike or fear of the Titoist regime. Most
of these people dreamed of one day returning home, and recreating an inde-
pendent Croatia, freed of Communist control. With Tito’s death in 1980, new
opportunities opened up for such people, and their contacts with Croatia grew
stronger. 
The Croatian nationalist movement was eventually led by the former
Communist general and historian Franjo Tudjman. Tudjman, born in 1922,
was the youngest general in Yugoslav history, and also served as Tito’s Head
Political Commissar. Tudjman was an extremely successful, high-ranking
Croatia, ‘Greater Serbianism’, and the East–West conflict
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Communist, and a true believer, before his conversion to nationalism in the
1960s. It was only in 1967 when he began to challenge the official accounts
of Croatian history during the Second World War that Tudjman was sacked
for his nationalist writings. He was jailed after the Croatian Spring in 1971
and later in the 1980s. Tudjman exploited his prison time, casting himself as
a martyr for the Croatian cause, and wrote extensively on his experiences and
his vision for Croatia. His most important works included An Endless Multitude
of Historical Truth (1977), Croatia on Trial (1981), and his most famous work,
Wastelands of Historical Reality (1987), which was substantially re-edited for
the 1996 English edition, Horrors of War. Tudjman’s writings laid the basis for
a movement to discover the truth about Croatia’s history. With his typical
egocentricity, which at times could assume messianic proportions,3 he even
conferred his own name on the movement that he claimed to have founded.
‘Tudjmanism’, as he defined it, was to be both a non-Communist nationalism
and a ‘re-examination of Croatian history’.4 Tudjman’s revisions dealt prima-
rily with the Second World War, and will be extensively discussed in the next
two chapters dealing with that period of history. 
On a practical level, Tudjman’s denunciation of Communism and his
embrace of Croatian nationalism made him highly popular among Diaspora
communities, and allowed him to raise millions of dollars for the re-emergence
of nationalism. This impressive war chest would be essential during his rise to
power in 1990. So too was the support of the émigrés themselves, such as the
former Canadian business-owner Gojko Sˇu sˇak, who later became Defence
Minister in the HDZ government. On 28 February 1989, the HDZ held its first
public meeting, bringing together Maspok intellectuals and nationalists, both
of whom advocated the increasing autonomy and liberalisation of Croatia.5
By 1990, large numbers of émigrés had been brought in for the February HDZ
Congress, mixing with Croatian and Hercegovenian nationalists.6
Tudjman’s party, with its American-designed posters and slogans,
appeared Western and progressive. He alluded to a referendum on Croatian
independence, and promised to recreate the Croatian state in all its former
glory. While the re-annexation of Kosovo and Vojvodina formed a central part
of Milosˇevic´’s election strategy it, Tudjman focused on the annexation of
Bosnia-Hercegovina, referring to the unnatural shape of Croatia as ‘an apple
with a bite taken out of it’. All this would change – he promised – once the HDZ
was in power.7 While viewed with suspicion outside Croatia, within it,
Tudjman enjoyed the same initial support as did Milosˇevic´ in Serbia. His party
gained victory in April 1990, ousting the weak reformed Communists, who
were largely taken by surprise.8 Tudjman’s electoral triumph was typical of
what Tom Nairn has termed an elite-manufactured ‘popular revolution’ or
‘national liberation struggle’.9 Whether it was Tudjman’s ‘Tudjmanism’ or
Milosˇevic´’s ‘Antibureaucratic Revolution’, the myth of popular mobilisation
Balkan holocausts?
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against colonial (or in this case Communist) oppression was integral to the
success of nationalism. Nairn also rightly identified the issue of underdevelop-
ment as a key argument in many nationalisms. Tudjman echoed the widely
held belief that, since the 1970s, most of Croatia’s tourist earnings were being
siphoned off by Belgrade. A vote for the HDZ was seemingly a vote for the end
of Communist mismanagement and economic plundering.10
Unlike Milosˇevic´, who was very much an opportunist, Tudjman was a
true believer in nationalism, and contributed to many of the nationalist myths
used before and during the wars. As a result, control over the spread of nation-
alist propaganda was centralised within the HDZ apparatus. While there were
several nationalist opposition groups, these were not co-opted into govern-
ment, and remained marginal players. The Communists had been largely
discredited by Vladimir Bakaric´’s slavish adherence to Tito during and after
the Maspok period, when nationalistic Croatian Communist Party officials,
journalists, and academics, were purged, arrested, and sometimes impris-
oned. With Communist leaders discredited by Bakaric´’s legacy, many Croats
felt that they had little choice but to seek independence through Tudjman’s
party. Other nationalist, non-Communist parties simply did not have the
HDZ’s level of funding, or its long-cultivated level of diaspora support. 
Tudjman shared much with Milosˇevic´ in terms of his hunger for power
and his desire to create a national state that he alone could effectively control.
As in Serbia, one of the first acts of government was to gain strict control of the
media. Article 17 of the 1990 Croatian Constitution granted Tudjman sweep-
ing presidential prerogatives to restrict constitutional rights ‘during a state of
war or an immediate danger to the independence and unity of the republic’,
while Article 101 allowed Tudjman to pass decrees without parliamentary
approval.11 These articles allowed for the replacement of media editors and
managers in wartime, for the punishment of journalists, and for the banning
of media for violating very strict conditions on the reporting of military affairs.
Within two months of the 1990 elections, the Croatian Radio-Television Act
was rushed through Parliament, changing the name of Radio-Televizija
Zagreb to Hrvatska Radio-Televizija (HRT), while completely submitting it to
government control.12 Thereafter, it became a 24–hour mouthpiece for the
HDZ regime.
Print media was another favoured target. HDZ faithful replaced journal-
ists and editorial staff at HINA, (formerly TanJug) the state news agency.13
Journalists of ‘mixed origin, one Croat parent, one Serb’ were denounced as
enemies of Croatia, and were summarily dismissed from their posts.
Independent papers, such as the Vjesnik Group, formerly 80 per cent privately
owned, were slowly taken over by the government.14 Vjesnik was one of the
largest media groups in Croatia, and through it the government came to
dominate the distribution and printing of newspaper and magazines.
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Magazines owned by this group were often scuttled if they ran stories contrary
to government interests; Danas, for example, had its circulation cut by 70 per
cent.15 The satirical weekly Feral Tribune was also harshly treated, with a 50
per cent sales tax in 1994, constant defamation in the government press,
public paper burnings in the streets of Zagreb, as well as the theft of thousands
of copies from newspaper kiosks. Its editors were also drafted into the army
after criticising Tudjman.16
Centralisation of the media, as in Serbia, allowed HDZ leaders to control
communication within the republic. At the same time, distinctly nationalist
views could now be co-ordinated and spread throughout the country. As in
Serbia, almost every aspect of life seemed to have become co-opted by
Tudjman’s nationalism, from the Art History Department at the University of
Zagreb to the Croatian Medical Journal. As in Serbia, the media was seen as a
means of supporting the HDZ regime while disseminating a nationalist
viewpoint favourable to the government. Organisations such as the
Croatian Heritage Foundation/Matica Hrvatska Iseljenika and the Croatian
Information Center proved of central importance in reinterpreting Croatian
history in line with government priorities. Publishing houses, such as OKC,
VIGRAM i VIDEM (Croatia), Dorrance and Company, Northern Tribune, Roy
Publishers (USA & Canada), and Fayard (France and Switzerland) also seemed
to be affiliated with Croatian nationalists or disseminated their works. 
State-controlled institutions would soon perform the same role as did
their Serbian counterparts. They would become ‘professional producers of
subjective visions of the social world’, as described by Valery Tishkov. Their
responsibility would be enormous. Croatian history would be revised and rein-
terpreted to highlight themes of Croatian goodness, chosenness, and
victimisation – while the Serbs would be thoroughly demonised.17 The editor-
in-chief of HRT during the war clearly understood his place. HRT was to be the
‘Cathedral of the Croatian spirit’, with a duty, not to report events accurately
as they happened, but rather, ‘to frankly support the defence of Croat ethnic
and historical space’.18 For a supposedly democratic, post-Communist
country, these were not auspicious beginnings.
While Milosˇevic´ preferred designer suits, Tudjman revelled in his love of
decorative Titoesque uniforms, replete with gold braid and large multi-
coloured sashes. He even invented the garish costumes worn by members of
his newly established presidential guard. Tudjman’s own role in history was
the subject of a Croatian-funded documentary film entitled ‘Tudjman –
Croatian George Washington’, featuring highlights from his life, interviews,
and the narration of the actor Martin Sheen.19 This documentary, aired in
Croatia in August 1997, portrayed Tudjman as a champion of democracy and
a martyr for the Croatian nation.20 Newspaper articles also praised him as the
Croatian ‘Moses’ – leading his nation away from the ‘golden calf’ of Titoism
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that they had falsely worshipped before. Like the Serbs, Croats saw their
country as the promised land, for which they had to struggle, since: ‘Every day
is an exodus from Egypt.’21 By controlling the media and almost every aspect
of communication within Croatia, the HDZ government under Tudjman was
able to cement nationalist power virtually unopposed. 
Contextualising the war in Croatia
While Serbian nationalism was seen first as a reaction to Kosovar Albanian
demands for autonomy, Croatian nationalism was very much reliant on the
threat posed by Milosˇevic´’s own expansionist strategies. While Tudjman
consistently argued that the Croatian Serbs were unjustified in their actions
against the Croatian state, it often seemed that he was deliberately trying to
provoke Serbian anger and resentment. His 1990 Constitution, for example,
conspicuously omitted Serbs as a constituent nation within the new country.
While it was stated that ‘the members of other nations and national minori-
ties, who are her citizens, will be guaranteed equal status with citizens of
Croatian nationality’, the Serbs were not mentioned by name – an oversight
that soon played into the hands of Serbian nationalists. On a practical level, it
became obvious that jobs, property rights, and even residence status depended
on having Croatian citizenship, which was not an automatic right for non-
Croats. A series of exams was required to obtain citizenship, requiring
knowledge, but also approval, of a highly nationalistic interpretation of
Croatian culture and history.22
This situation deteriorated further, as the police, universities, and most
government bureaucracies began purging Serbs from their ranks. The resur-
rection of the Sˇahovica, the chequer-board coat of arms from medieval Croatia,
and the Kuna as the new currency also exacerbated tensions – these symbols
were starkly similar to those used during the Second World War. Tudjman’s
habit of renaming Croatian streets in honour of great nationalist heroes of the
past, many of whom possessed dubious credentials, cast doubt on his own
political views. And another problem was the influx of many former
Ustasˇa collaborators and their families from the diaspora. The rise of extreme
nationalism became a worrying phenomenon.
These aspects of the new regime led to the development of two Serbian
nationalist parties within Croatia. Dobrica C´osic´ encouraged Jovan Raskovic´
and Jovan Opasˇic´ to found the Serbian Democratic Party in 1990, as a means
of promoting Serbian national rights.23 A more militant nationalist party, the
Democratic Union of Knin, was also founded in 1990, by the dentist Milan
Babic´. Both groups soon merged at the behest of C´osic´ and Milosˇevic´; but the
differences between the two groups soon became obvious. The more moderate
Raskovic´ supported Croatian sovereignty, but advocated negotiating for
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autonomy and national rights within an independent Croatia. By contrast,
Babic´ demanded complete autonomy for the Serbs in Croatia, and was
prepared to back up his demands through armed conflict. Raskovic´’s negotia-
tions with Tudjman only gave Babic´ the time he needed to increase his
stockpile of weapons, while allowing him to create the ‘Association of Serb
Municipalities’ – a nascent Serbian assembly that formed the nucleus of the
eventual Republic of Serpska Krajina.24
By 1990, with Serbia’s backing, the Krajina Serbs became increasingly
militant. Babic´’s list of demands included an autonomous police force and the
right not to fly the Croatian flag in the Krajina. When these were rejected by
the Croats, a ‘state of war’ was soon declared over Radio Knin. Open fighting
broke out in April, and a referendum on Serbian independence was called for
17 April. The so-called ‘log revolution’ was one of the most memorable events
at the start of the conflict. Armed Croatian Serbs blocked roads to prevent the
Croatian police from intervening in the vote – a vote that of course resulted in
a call for Serbian secession.25
Between February and June 1991 the rebellion escalated, as Croatian
Serbs battled Croatian security forces with home-made weapons. Militia units
from Serbia were soon brought in at the behest of Milosˇevic´, such as Arkan’s
‘Tigers’ and Sˇesˇelj’s ‘White Eagles’, both of which were trained and funded by
the Serbian Ministry of the Interior. The situation became more dramatic as
JNA tanks intervened, under the pretext of protecting Serbian minority rights
– they claimed to be acting as ‘peacekeepers’.26 In the midst of this conflict, the
Serbian government formally recognised the ‘Serbian Autonomous Province
of Krajina’, a move that was to have lasting political and military conse-
quences.27
Croatian leaders also contributed to the volatility of the situation. Defence
Minister Gojko Sˇusˇak and a handful of paramilitaries fired several rockets into
Borovo Selo, a Serbian suburb of Vukovar – seemingly to provoke conflict.
Hostilities escalated, as Croatian policemen were killed by local Serbs in retal-
iation for the rocket bombings.28 This rocket attack further justified the JNA’s
‘peacekeeping’ initiatives, and by September 1991, Serbian and JNA forces
controlled almost one-third of the Croatian territory. The role of the JNA had
by this point switched from defence of the Yugoslav constitution to supporting
the remaining republics in Yugoslavia, namely Serbia and Montenegro. Their
shelling of Vukovar (the last Croatian stronghold in eastern Slavonia) in
October 1991 was dramatic proof of this. The JNA also began its wanton
attack on Dubrovnik in the same month.29
It was very much within this climate of fear and mistrust that militant
Croatian propaganda entered the mainstream. While Tudjman, like his coun-
terpart in Serbia, had assumed almost complete control over political and
media power within the state, he had yet to operationalise it fully. While the
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Serbs were the first to engage in full-scale attack, Tudjman was instrumental
in provoking conflict. His narrow-minded exclusive interpretations of
Croatian history denied Serbs the cultural and political rights (and privileges)
they had enjoyed in the SFRY. Further, by rejecting many of Raskovic´’s paci-
fist and arguably reasonable demands, he legitimated the rise of Babic´ and his
more violent nationalist cohorts.30
It was clear that Sˇusˇak and his colleagues had deliberately provoked
Serbian military aggression in Vukovar. Tudjman would also be blamed, first
for ordering the shelling, and then for refusing to send military aid to relieve
the beleaguered Croatian defenders, who were being heavily bombarded.
Tudjman used the siege of Vukovar to gain maximum political credibility. He
was able to claim that Croats were the victims of Serbian terror – what Gow
and Tisley have rightly termed a ‘victim strategy’. It is clear that Tudjman’s
government, rather than sending arms and troops to end the 86-day siege,
preferred to use the political capital to be gained by Vukovar’s destruction,
which led to the charge that ‘Tudjman manipulated its position, rather than
defending it’.31 It was clear that nationalists were promoting a form of
‘counteridentification’ – creating a sense of national cohesion and support
for Tudjman though a fear of external attack.32 Certainly, Tudjman was able
to capitalise on Vukovar, ensuring Croatia’s perceived position as victim
rather than aggressor during the conflict. This view would continue, even
during Tudjman’s forays into Bosnia-Hercegovina, when he chose to attack
another republic rather than take back Croatian territory held by the
Serbs.33
It was in this context of war that a wholesale reappraisal of Croatian
history came about – one that would involve many diverse sectors of the
community. Like the Serbs, the Croats argued that they had been the victims
of expansionist powers throughout their history. Further, a long and horrific
history of Serbian imperialism and danger was created, so that the contempo-
rary crop of Serbian nationalists would not be seen as a cabal of power-hungry
opportunists, but rather as representatives of a typical, age-old Serbian strat-
egy of expansion and repression. Croatian–Serbian relations had to be
uprooted and decontextualised, and then recontextualised, in the light of new
evidence and new historical revisionist arguments. This process was identical
to that used by the Serbs, and was similar to Northrop Frye’s understanding of
positive and negative agencies within Biblical teleology. With some careful
manipulation, Milosˇevic´ could represent, to the Croats, what the Pharaoh of
Exodus or Nebuchadnezzar represented to the ancient Hebrews – a symbol of
evil and Fall. 
By clearly presenting themselves to the outside world as victims of Serbian
genocide, Croatians hoped to court Western recognition and aid, both of
which would prove vital for their self-defence. Such imagery would also play
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into their hands during Croatian machinations in Bosnia. Myths of persecu-
tion and victimisation laid the basis for other forms of mythology – myths
proving that Croatia had every right to exist as a separate state, and then
myths dealing with the separateness of almost every aspect of national iden-
tity, from culture, religion and language, to racial, linguistic and
psychological traits. Once the evils of Greater Serbia had been proved, the
great differences between Croats and Serbs were repeatedly stressed. 
Croatia confronts ‘Greater Serbia’
Croatian nationalism was often less triumphalist or self-exalting than the
Serbian variety. The proliferation of books, articles, documentaries, and
conference papers dealt mainly with the fear of Serbian aggression – portray-
ing Croatia as the helpless victim of Serbian expansionism. It is therefore
appropriate to begin a discussion of Croatian myths with the concept of
‘Greater Serbia’, a Serbian nationalist project from the nineteenth century
aimed primarily at empire-building in the Balkans. Without understanding
Croatian perceptions of Greater Serbia, it is difficult to contextualise other
forms of Croatian writing, which have largely justified the existence of the
Croatian nation in its present borders. It is also difficult to understand how
and why Croatian writers have devoted so much effort to myths of differentia-
tion between Croats and Serbs, at cultural, sociological, geographical,
psychological, racial and linguistic levels. Greater Serbia for Croats was tanta-
mount to genocide – Serbian expansion implied ipso facto a reduction of
Croatian territory, ethnic cleansing, and the death of Croatian civilians. 
As in the Serbian case, historical amnesia was important to many
Croatian writers. The differences between Serbs and Croats were not only to
have proved irreconcilable, but more importantly, to have always existed.
History was reinterpreted to prove that under no circumstances had Serbs and
Croats ever chosen to co-operate. Serbs would figure as Kecˇmanovic´’s
‘universal culprit’, or perhaps more accurately as a pseudospecies, completely
different from the Croats in absolutely every respect.34 Their sole ambition
throughout history, as understood by Croatian historians, was to expand their
state, while destroying any nations that stood in their path. 
The origins of Greater Serbia stemmed from before the Ottoman conquest
of the Balkans, and were specifically tied to the ‘Great Medieval Serbian State’
under Tsar Dusˇan in the fourteenth century. This state was one of the largest
in the Balkans, and its dismantling after 1389, some Croatian writers
contended, established a template for later Serbian territorial aspirations.35
The recreation of Dusˇan’s state was linked directly to the efforts of the Serbian
Orthodox Church. Serbian writers were always quick to denounce
Catholicism, and the Croats were little different in their portrayals of
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Orthodoxy. For many, the Church was ‘religiously exclusivist’, with objectives
said to include ‘destruction of all members of other nations and faiths, the
stealing of possessions and conquering of territories all resulting in religious,
national, and political exclusivism and intolerance’.36
While Serbian writers accused nineteenth-century Croats of trying to
expand their state under the Vatican’s wing, Croats portrayed this century as
the culmination of the ‘Greater Serbian’ ideal, as the Serbs engaged in wars of
conquest to recreate Dusˇan’s state. As one writer put it: 
The syndrome of Serbian warped notions of heroism, all-Serbian unity, racial
domination and megalomaniacal claims of ownership of other people’s territories
is so powerful that Serbians themselves believe in this lie, let alone the insuffi-
ciently informed world public. This gave them sufficient time to commit a great
number of crimes from their bloody palette in order to paint the picture of the
conquering invasion of South-eastern Europe.37
Serbs, from the beginning of the nineteenth century, would stand accused
of bloodshed and hatred, based on their need to recreate their former kingdom.
Croatian writers compiled anthologies of Serbian writings from the nine-
teenth century, citing a variety of documents to prove that Serbia had a long
history of antagonising its neighbours. ‘Of all the parties in the war today’,
three pro-Croatian French writers concluded during the conflict in Bosnia,
‘Serbia is the one that has provided the oldest doctrinal arsenal, and hence the
most elaborate and moral and intellectual justifications.’38 Every stratum of
Serbian society, it seemed, was actively engaged in this national project. As
they wrote of the history of Serbian ideas: 
[S]ince the beginning of the 19th century, Serbian writers, clergy, military men
and politicians have talked of a Greater Serbia, a ‘homogenous and pure Serbia’
while exalting violence, as well as introducing the term ‘ethnic cleansing’
(ciscenje). There more than anywhere, the origins of patriotism can be found in the
fight against Ottoman occupation, which was twisted by nationalism; the unnat-
ural ‘Yugoslav’ idea was steeped in an imperialism tainted with racism.39
Largely a presentation and ‘analysis’ of Serbian national writings, this
anthology began with documents from 1807, positing that the Serbian love of
genocide had ancient roots, with Serbian writings being little more than
‘reference texts for a school of hate’. In many respects, their approach differed
very little from that of Serbian historians, who constantly linked Croatian
nationalism with genocide. Echoing these types of Serbian argument, the
authors stressed that ‘the conceptualisation and application of “ethnic cleans-
ing” is an indispensable means of realising the Greater Serbian project’ – thus
again linking Serbian nationalism and genocide together.40
Such anecdotal writings accompanied reviews of pivotal events in Serbian
history, reviews designed to prove the genocidal nature of the Serbs. The first
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concerned a rebellion against Ottoman rule in 1807, when the Serbs suppos-
edly ‘cleansed Belgrade’, ‘slaughtering Turks’, raping children, and banishing
the Jews. This was to be the first instance of what the authors termed ‘ethno-
cide and culturocide’, a concerted attempt to erase Turkish and Islamic
influence in Serbia.41 Less biased historians have more accurately seen this as
a period of rebellion against Ottoman rule, a rebellion that was not always
successful owing to the great power politics between the Ottomans, Russians,
French and Austrians.42 Later periods of history were similarly derided. Serbs
were accused of using ethnic cleansing as part of a wartime strategy through-
out the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, during the 1878 struggle for
independence, and the 1912 and 1913 Balkan Wars.43 Again, it was stressed
that Serbian nationalism equalled genocide, and that Serbian state-building
was consonant with atrocities of the worst description.
As an ideology, Greater Serbia came into its own in the middle of the nine-
teenth century, when a series of Greater Serbia political plans were hatched.
The first and most famous of these was the ‘Nacˇertanije’ or ‘Outline’, written
in 1844 by the Serbian government minister Ilija Garasˇanin. The ‘Outline’
was a basic plan for expanding the Serbian empire to include most of Dusˇan’s
former kingdom. Very much the work of a utopian dreamer, it included claims
to Bosnia-Hercegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania, parts of Bulgaria,
and Croatia. Equally famous was Vuk Karadzic´’s ‘Serbs All and Everywhere’
(1849), which used a linguistic definition of nationalism (similar to that of
Starcˇevic´), to posit that Croats and Slovenians were in fact Serbs, who all
spoke the same Serbian language. This, as well, was seen to be a justification
for the assimilation of non-Serbian nations – particularly the Croats.44 One
historian went to far as to suggest that Karadzic´’s policies were little different
from those of the Nazis, fifty years before Hitler’s birth: ‘This is quite similar to
what the Hitlerites did in Nazi Germany. To deny the actual existence of a
certain race is a subliminal way of dehumanizing it – the first step in a planned
and systematic genocide. This type of rhetoric was also evident with
anti-Semitism, which is the paragon of a planned and systematic genocide.’45
This is an obvious example of the Manichaean morality that pervaded
Croatian and Serbian nationalism. Both sides ignored the real similarities of
Starcˇevic´’s and Karadzic´’s national programmes, which were both bent on
uniting the South Slavs against colonial oppression.
The mid-nineteenth century is consistently presented as the time when
the Croats first became a primary target of Serbian aggression. The first
anti-Croatian demonstration took place in Belgrade in 1892, followed by riots
in Knin and in other regions. Supposedly, there was a concerted Serbian
attempt to assimilate the Croats into some form of Serbian nationalism, laying
the basis for the eventual annexation of Croatia itself.46 Other historians
would advance the ‘Pasic´ Plan’, created by the former Prime Minister Nikola
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Pasic´, as another example of Serbian expansionist goals. According to Branko
Miletic´, this plan became the most important political document in Serbia,
‘nothing short of a blueprint for a Serb-dominated empire stretching from
Thessaloniki to Trieste’.47 It was also to be a tool by which ‘genocide in the
Balkans has been honed, fashioned, and recently perfected’.48
The beginning of Peter Karad-ord-evic´’s Serbian kingdom in 1903 was
often portrayed as another era of Greater Serbian assertiveness. Politicians
such as Nikola Stojanovic´ were also accused of whipping up genocidal hyste-
ria among the Serbs. His 1902 article ‘To Extermination: Ours or Yours’ has
long been cited as a blueprint for ethnic cleansing and genocide, applying a
Social Darwinist model of the world (survival of the fittest race) to under-
standing how Serbs should best approach various non-Serbian groups,
including Moslems and Croats.49 Soon after the publication of Stojanovic´’s
article, Serbian nationalists, supposedly inspired by his document, began ‘an
organised extermination of Croatians and other non-Serbian nations in
1903,’ the result being that ‘Croatians were victims on their own land from
1903 to 1941.’50 The beginning of the twentieth century was presented as a
time when the Serbs profited by the weakness of the Austro-Hungarian
Empire to persecute Croats in their own land: 
From 1906 to 1909, Croatians were forced to endure fear in all villages [in] which
they resided together with Serbians. Their houses were burned and crops
destroyed. There were numerous cases of beatings along with wounding [of] both
Croatians and Serbians who did not accept the aggressive Greater-Serbian poli-
tics. There were a number of Croatian political leaders who were murdered.51
Serbs were also blamed for genocidal acts against the Albanians, the
Bosnians and the Macedonians during the First Balkan War in 1912.
Supposedly inspired by the ‘Nacˇertanije’, Serbs ‘set entire villages on fire,
killing civilians in the most barbaric fashion using knives, axes and dull
wooden mallets’.52 A coherent picture of the Serbs emerges from a reading of
Croatian historical descriptions, as bloody, treacherous, cold, calculating,
ruthless, greedy, and expansionist. Not all Serbian methods, however, were so
public and brutal. For Croatian writers, the rise of Serbian secret societies was
also a crucial part of their plan to control the Balkans. Groups like the
‘Cˇetniks’, the ‘Black Hand’, the ‘Slovenian South’, ‘Serbian Defence’ and
‘National Defence’ were all accused of undermining Croatian sovereignty,
while continuing the genocidal policies of ‘Greater Serbia’. King Peter,
through the ‘Black Hand’, was blamed for the assassination of Archduke
Ferdinand in 1914, and by extension, for provoking the First World War.53
Summarising what lessons could be learned from a review of Serbian
history, the director of the Croatian Information Center, Ante Beljo, in the
introduction to one of many anthologies of Serbian nationalist documents,
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would note the following: ‘Trying to hide their true motives from the eyes of
the world with a series of historic and demographic falsifications, today’s
proponents of Greater Serbian ambitions are only continuing the promotion of
an idea that has been smouldering with various degrees of intensity for over a
century.’54 Such an attitude removed any sense of individual responsibility
from the equation during the 1990s. The Serbs were merely acting according
to an age-old predetermined plan, as if they somehow had no choice, as if
history had been leading up to that moment for over a century. Milosˇevic´ was
therefore not operating from opportunism or self-interest, but was simply
continuing a traditional Serbian pattern of behaviour. 
Documents from this era of Serbian history were extremely popular with
Croatian academics. Without much difficulty, various jingoistic writings from
a wide variety of sources could be collated together according to their dates of
publication. A noted Croatian glossator would then offer contemporary
comments about what each document ‘meant’ about the war in Croatia, well
over a century after it was written. The whole purpose of such an exercise was
to demonstrate that, very much like a form of Biblical evil, Serbian expan-
sionism and bloodlust was timeless and had no sell-by date. 
The key to understanding the Serbian ‘genocidal’ mind lay in reading
edited volumes such as Beljo’s Greater Serbia: From Ideology to Aggression,
Separovic´’s Documenta Croatica, or Grmek, Gjidara, and Simac’s influential, Le
nettoyage ethnique: Documents historiques sur une idéologie serbe, all of which
were meant to tell the ‘truth’ about Serbian contemporary events from a selec-
tive reading of history. Such anthologies were meant to inform the reader
about what the Croats were about to get themselves into in 1918, when they
committed the tragic error of entering into political association with the Serbs
for the first time in history. Like some sort of Shakespearean tragedy, the
outside world was meant to understand the Croats’ fatal flaw (that they did
not know how evil the Serbs were), and then wince with pain every time
something went wrong. 
Unfortunately, most of these nineteenth-century documents did not actu-
ally describe a blueprint for genocide at all. For example, Stojanovic´’s ‘To
Extermination: Ours or Yours’ said little about exterminating anyone. The
glossating aside, a review of the selected passages of Stojanovic´’s work, even
when reprinted in a Croatian anthology, offered little to indicate that all
Croats were at risk of being annihilated. He certainly and worryingly argued
that ‘Croats have neither a separate language, nor unified customs, nor a fully
unified lifestyle’, making it clear that ‘this cannot be a distinct or separate
nation’.55 However, while his writings were extremely patronising,
Stojanovic´ advocated Croatia’s union with Serbia, to allow Croatia to secure
‘economic, political and cultural independence, and freedom from German
encroachment’.56 Stojanovic´, it seems, was trying to rally his perceived
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co-nationals together against an external threat, rather than advocating
Croatian physical annihilation.
Croatian perceptions of the first Yugoslavia
For Croatian writers, the general public were supposed to view the situation in
Yugoslavia during the early 1990s as a tragedy – the Serbs having no choice
but to be genocidal tyrants, the Croats with no choice but to play the victim
and try to defend themselves against attack. However, by most accounts, the
first year of the new Kingdom was relatively positive, and there was a reason-
ably high level of support for the state. It was, after all, a preferable situation
to annexation by Italy or continued colonial domination by Austria-
Hungary.57
Nevertheless, as history was revised, the reality of Croatian motivations
and reactions at that time was left by the wayside. Royalist Yugoslavia
became the first time that Serbs and Croats were united politically and
economically in a joint state. But it was also seen by Croats as the first real
instance of Serbian dominance over Croats, the first time when Croats were
truly confronted with Greater Serbia.58 In practice, this would mean a time
when ‘Serbian chauvinism transformed itself into virulent anti-Croatianism,
culminating in acts of terror and violence.’ This period was described as one of
‘symbiosis’, when ‘the theories and ideas of nineteenth-century pro-Greater
Serbianism were welded with twentieth-century fascist imperialism and
Chetnik terrorism’. Yugoslavia therefore gave ‘Greater Serbia’ not only a
framework, but ‘limbs as well’, ‘limbs with which it struck at the hearts of all
non-Serbs in royalist Yugoslavia’.59 Such imagery, consciously or not, evoked
images of some sort of B-movie monster, a black and white Serbia festooned
with claws and rubber arms, attacking Croatia – an innocent young maid
who could do nothing except valiantly fight back against her aggressor. 
Miroslav Krlezˇa also promoted the view that the state was cruel, racist,
and despotic. In Ten Bloody Years, Krlezˇa argued that the state was founded on
‘blood and violence’, and provoked instant rebellion by the Croats against the
regime, resulting in brutal massacres in Zagreb. Police open fired on crowds
demanding an independent Croatia, killing 100 people – these subsequently
became immortalised as the ‘December victims’.60 Further, we hear that the
Serbian army treated Croatia as ‘if it were enemy territory’, and actively
suppressed Croatian nationalism, imprisoning political leaders while using
the Ministry of Internal Affairs to quell opposition.61 Such ideas clearly refuted
Serbian claims that the Kingdom had been an egalitarian, peaceful and demo-
cratic country, constructed according to a European model.
However, the horrors of the Serbian kingdom were evident not only in
Croatia – according to Croatian accounts. The first genocide in Bosnia, some
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argued, was not in 1992–93, but back in 1918 and 1919, when Serbian-
controlled Yugoslavia instigated a series of agricultural reforms in Bosnia.
One academic described these reforms as ‘genocide against Bosniacs’, when
some 1.2 million hectares of land were confiscated from wealthy Bosnian
families, without adequate compensation. In this account, ‘homelessness’ and
‘genocide’ amounted to the same thing.62 This ‘genocide’ (or land redistribu-
tion) was designed to allow some 200,000 Serbian families to ‘colonise’
Bosnia, thereby destroying the demographic balance of the region. The Serbs
were further accused of implementing a ‘death march’ in 1919, where
50,000 Bosnian peasants were forced to leave their homes, over 1,000 of
whom were killed by ‘Serbian terrorists’. During this time, the author reveals:
‘a long colony of victims walked to numerous camps in Kosovo and Sandzak,
where they were transported to Turkey and settled in Anatolia’.63 The
imagery created here bears a stark resemblance to the genocide of the
Armenians by the Turks, when the Armenians were also forced to abandon
their homes on a long ‘death march’. 
Certainly there was land reform during this time, which led to the confis-
cation of Bosnian property. However, such policies were designed to help the
general population, not to commit genocide against the Moslems. While
feudalism had been abandoned by the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1848, the
vestiges of the Ottoman sharecropping tradition nevertheless continued in
Bosnia, Macedonia, Kosovo, and Vojvodina. Some 7,000 Bosnian landlords,
representing 0.5 per cent of the population, controlled some 85,000 families
of feudal serfs, both Moslem and Christian. These serfs were tied to the land,
and in addition to labour service, were forced to pay excessive proportions of
their produce, often one-eighth of the total. As Phyllis Auty describes, agri-
cultural modernisation and the improvement of peasant life would have been
impossible without land reform.64 While it is certainly true that Serbs received
land in Bosnia-Hercegovina, John Lampe argues that the majority of these
feudal farmers were in fact Serbs, who had been working the land for a very
long time. He also fixes their number at 113,000, not 200,000, and states
that while Serbs received the bulk of the appropriated land in Bosnia, they did
represent 42 per cent of the population at that time. Jozo Tomasevich, the
leading authority on the 1919 land reforms, is clear that this redistribution
was ‘a political and socio-economic necessity’.65 There is nothing to suggest in
any of these accounts that a policy of genocide was pursued. 
In general, Croatian writers conveyed the impression that Yugoslavia
was nothing more than Serbian-dominated anarchy, where every non-
Serbian group was stripped of its rights and lived in terror. According to one
account, Serbian Cˇetniks ran wild throughout the kingdom, and, inspired by
their desire to create a Greater Serbia ‘killed people, beat them, threatened
them, and burned their houses’. At the same time, the assassination of
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Croatian Peasant Party leader Stjepan Radic´ and four other deputies was a
further indication of Serbian malevolence and Croatian weakness. But if this
situation was not bad enough, King Aleksander’s royal dictatorship (1929)
was seen as significantly worse, as a time when ‘the lives of non-Serbian
people had no value’.66 The disbanding of political parties and the re-division
of the country into Banovina would coincide with further political intrigue,
mass arrests and bloodshed. This era is generally portrayed as one of torture,
police repression, and the liquidation of non-Serbian opposition leaders – the
Communists in particular.67 In short, the Croatian decision to join Yugoslavia
was a complete disaster, resulting in Serbian domination and persecution.
The republication of Henri Pozzi’s Black Hand Over Europe by the Croatian
Information Center provided a link between this period and the more contem-
porary crisis. Ante Beljo was clear about the book’s purpose in the
introduction: ‘The contemporeneity of Pozzi’s work derives from the concord
of present and past historical manifestations and circumstances . . . a grave
warning to all those who still, like their predecessors underestimate the
Balkan precedent.’68 He would further claim: ‘The methods and philosophy of
the Black Hand [secret society] can be recognised in many of the present
actions of Serbian politicians and generals.’69 Again, Beljo referred to the
timeless, even ahistorical, nature of Serbian nationalism. Serbs were the
same, no matter who they were, or which century they lived in. A Serb, it
appeared, could be nothing more than a bloodthirsty expansionist nationalist.
This is why an understanding of the past was supposedly crucial in under-
standing later developments. As in the Bible, nothing changed.
Because of the timeless quality of Serbian nationalism, ‘Greater Serbia’
seemingly meant the same thing to Vuk Draskovic´ as it would have meant to
Jovan Cvijic´, or Vuk Karadzic´. Former Tudjman adviser Slaven Letica,
expanding upon the timeless qualities of ‘Greater Serbia’, would describe it as
a ‘transhistorical phenomenon’, ‘frozen and suppressed into the subcon-
scious’ – an evil waiting to reappear at an opportune moment.70 As Letica
describes the phenomenon in rather heavy-handed jargon:
The moment these SUBSTITUTES (Yugoslavism etc.) begin to wear out, become
routine or fail, the Greater-Serbian and All-Serbian assertions re-emerge. They
experience renaissance, new political and intellectual articulations; again they
draw large-scale political attention; they become the basis for new-old All-Serbian
populist ideologies and movements . . . this represents a dull easily predictable and
unavoidable historical repetition . . . its goal is to conquer and its means are to
dominate and to exercise force.71
Letica’s statement was consonant with the general view of the Serbs as
genocidal empire-builders, bent not only on enslaving other nations, but on
liquidating them as well. The fear of Greater Serbia would thus become
the most important Croatian myth of persecution, a myth of Serbia as an
Croatia, ‘Greater Serbianism’, and the East–West conflict
113
2441Chapter4  16/10/02  8:04 am  Page 113
ahistorical negative force with a national project based solely on hatred of
other nations. If the Hebrews needed the Philistines, the Egyptians, and the
Romans to rally their people together, the Croats needed only one negative
agency – the Serbs, and only the Serbs, would suffice. After such portrayals of
Serbian–Croatian relationships throughout history, there could be no doubt
in the 1990s that Serbs were simply following their familiar pattern of geno-
cide, while the Croats were following their familiar pattern of playing the
victim. Such an appraisal of Serbian history allowed Croatian nationalists to
obfuscate the many embarrassing decades of philoserbianism in Croatia. Early
attempts at Yugoslavism and Illyrianism were excised from the history books,
while any arguments that Starcˇevic´ had advanced more or less the same view
as Karadzic´ were summarily ignored. 
That Serbs and Croats basically saw each other’s history as a mirror
image of their own should come as no surprise. A great deal of debate occurred
between these two nations during the war, in newspapers, magazines, and
most importantly, on the internet. The use of the world wide web as a medium
of communication opened many new avenues for propagandists. While it is
both expensive and difficult to print and circulate propaganda in large quan-
tities, it was relatively cheap and easy to scan and paste Serbian and Croatian
propaganda on a variety of websites. Those who agreed with the government
position benefited from links on official sites. This allowed for a continuous
stream of new information and publications, designed to rebut arguments
advanced by the other side. This new medium of expression allowed for the
spread of a great deal of information within a very short time.
Croatian state right and the Antemurale Christianitatis
In reaction to the idea of ‘Greater Serbia’ and its expansionist and seemingly
genocidal political project, the Croats were keen to stress their own myths of
nationhood and uniqueness, myths that ran counter to the ‘genocidal’ ambi-
tions of the Serbs. One of the primary myths of identification was that of the
‘state right’ tradition, the myth of continuous Croatian statehood for the past
thousand years. This was designed to prove that Croats had a historic right to
exist as an autonomous nation within their current borders. That the 1990
Constitution described the new state as the realisation of ‘the thousand year
dream of the Croatian People’ certainly attested to the centrality of this millen-
nial myth.72
The myth of continuous Croatian statehood stemmed from two very early
Croatian institutions: the Banus (the chief executive), and the Sabor (or
people’s assembly), both of which emerged from the seventh-century ruling
traditions of the Croats. These institutions were ratified by a Pacta Conventa
with Hungary in 1102, when Croats accepted the indirect rule of the
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Hungarian king. An elected Ban, or Duke, was to be the representative of the
Hungarian empire – a man portrayed as a positive symbol of ‘heroism, faith-
fulness, protection for the common people and love of country’.73 This
tradition of ‘State Right’ was coupled with the advent of Western European
feudalism and the rise of an aristocratic hierarchy, both of which intimated
that Croatian legislative traditions were heavily influenced by the West. 
Numerous writers thus argued for such a continuous state, even during
the Austro-Hungarian period, when Croatia was ruled directly from Vienna
and Budapest. Even then, Croatian historians argued that the country had
‘preserved the characteristics of its constitutional statehood’.74 Many
Croatian historians posited that the Pacta, coupled with the later guarantee of
free elections from the Habsburgs in 1527, gave clear proof of the continua-
tion of Croatian sovereignty.75 Such myths proved of central importance after
1990, as Croatia justified its right to existence as an independent nation on
historical grounds. 
This glorious millennium-long period of Croatian history, the continuous
state, was said to have been destroyed precisely with the rise of the Kingdom
of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, in 1918. As one early historian wrote: ‘The
“Yugoslav” period of Croat history is definitely the darkest and most humili-
ating . . . for the first time in 13 centuries the institutions of the BANUS and
SABOR were completely abolished.’76 Thus this lengthy period of Croatian
‘state right’ was effectively ended in the twentieth century, as the Serbs and
their genocidal Greater Serbian project swept through the Balkans and
destroyed indigenous cultures. Once again, the image of a peaceful, demo-
cratic, and Western state destroyed by the genocidal Serbs was presented as
proof of the dramatic reversal of fortune the Croats had suffered after their
contact with the Serbs.
This thousand-year myth very much resembled Anthony Smith’s view of
the Golden Age. It was indeed designed to ‘unfold a glorious past’, while
demonstrating to Croats that their traditions were ancient and noble.77
Nevertheless, it had more in common with George Schöpflin’s ‘myths of elec-
tion’, where the Croatian nation had somehow been ‘chosen’ by God or
history because of its great and heroic qualities. While this was not a myth of
Covenant in any sense, the fact that the Croatian nation still existed after a
thousand years and still retained a form of autonomy implied that it was supe-
rior to its neighbours, and had withstood the test of time.78 There is no doubt
that the myth of ‘state right’ gave Croats a sense of moral and cultural superi-
ority, since their nation had outlasted most others in history – supposedly
without being conquered.
At the same time, the fact that the millennial dream died in 1918
contained the seeds of tragedy. Like the myth of Kosovo, the loss of Croatian
statehood plunged the Croats into a terrible Fall. Unlike what happened in the
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myth of Kosovo, however, the nation had not been elevated to holy or chosen
status. It thus fell to Tudjman and his colleagues to resurrect the Croatian
nation and bring about its independence. Such myths were therefore a reflec-
tion of a Smithian Golden Age in one respect; but this Golden Age was set up
in order to present a historical tragedy, in order to introduce the Fall myth
that was its inevitable concomitant. As such, we are confronted once more
with the tragic nature of Croatian nationalism. Their proud state tradition
was for ever destroyed by the Serbs in the first Yugoslavia. 
In many ways, such myths disguised much of the reality of that time.
True, Croatia had some autonomy in Austria-Hungary, in that the Nagodba
allowed the Croats to retain the Ban as President. They also had their Sabor,
their Supreme Court, and their Domobrani or Home Guard, and Croatian was
kept as the language of government, administration, and education.
However, autonomy ended there. The Hungarian Prime Minister had the
power to appoint and remove Bans at will without consulting the Croats, and
55 per cent of Croatian revenues were allocated to the joint treasury of the
Hungarian lands, leaving just 45 per cent for domestic use. Furthermore,
during the nineteenth century both the Medjimurje region and Rijeka were
annexed by Hungary.79
Additionally, while some Croatian writers portrayed the Serbs as the
worst villains during the First World War, Austria-Hungary was certainly not
an innocent bystander in the region. They stood accused of operating concen-
tration camps in Bosnia-Hercegovina during this time, and, as Louis
Adamovic´ describes, imprisoned over 40,000 South Slavs, including ‘a great
many Orthodox priests and teachers and students and intellectuals, Catholic
as well as Orthodox’. Of these, he claims that 10,000 died of diseases
contracted in these prisons, while another 5,000 were shot.80 After the War,
the Croats could have taken advantage of Wilsonianism and gone it alone. Of
course, there was a serious risk that Italy would invade and occupy the
country, particularly the Istrian Peninsula, which it had always claimed.
Caught between Italian invasion and South Slavic unity, most Croats chose to
see where decades of Illyrianism and Yugoslavism could take them.
The civilisational divide between East and West
Like the Serbs with their Kosovo myth, the Croats advanced their own myths
of historical courage and power. Another aspect of ‘state right’ was the myth
of the Antemurale Christianitatis, the notion that Croatia was the easternmost
rampart of Christian Europe, and was the sole defender of the West against the
East. While the Serbs had also used similar imagery, suggesting that
Orthodoxy was the West’s defence against Islam, the Croatian interpretation
saw all former Ottoman colonies as eastern, with Orthodoxy itself as an
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eastern religion. Clearly, this moved the eastern border to the Krajina region,
within Croatian territory. Writers were quick to cite Croatia’s 1,200-year
history of suffering, humiliation and sacrifice in defence of Western
Christendom. 
Very much like the Serbs, the Croats saw themselves as a peace-loving
and spiritual people, who had never attacked others outside their borders.81
Croats were to be a noble and benevolent nation because of their Roman
Catholic faith. As legend has it, the Pope sent priests to baptise the Croats in
the third century. After this time, the Croats supposedly made a ‘covenant’
with the Pope, and seemingly with God as well, that in return for living at
peace with their neighbours, and never making wars with foreign countries,
they would receive both God and ‘Peter the disciple of Christ’s’ protection
against attack.82 This was very much a myth of Covenant and divine election.
Croats had supposedly chosen to become a peace-loving nation, and because
of this choice, they were protected from on high.
Croatian historians drew a sharp line between the Catholic world, and the
Orthodox world further to the east, tracing Serbian–Croatian antagonism to
the effective division of the Roman empire into Eastern and Western Empires
in the fourth century AD.83 For contemporary historians, the division of the
Roman Empire created an unfathomable gulf between the two nations – who
stood on opposite sides of the great divide between East and West. They also
traced the same fundamental line of division in later periods of history, and in
particular, to the Great Schism of 1054 that divided the Christian Church
between adherents of Greek Orthodoxy and of Roman Catholicism. According
to Croatian historians, this would further create a civilisational split between
‘two different civilizations and cultures, that is eastern and western spheres’.
The River Drina was often portrayed as the real dividing line between these
two groups, ‘figuratively called the border of the two worlds’.84
Such imagery would later be expanded to include the period of Ottoman
rule, seen also as the beginnings of ‘Greater Serbia’ and the rise of the Serbian
Church. Within these five centuries of Ottoman rule, Serbs supposedly learnt
their cruelty and despotism, while becoming further separated culturally from
the Croats. That Serbs and Croats had been culturally distinct for centuries
made Croatia’s decision to seek independence all the more reasonable. That
the Serbs were eastern and therefore somehow civilisationally inferior to the
Croats made it seem natural that the latter would gravitate towards Western
Europe. Themes such as this were rife during the war in Croatia. Most
academics referred to such a division, and Tudjman truly believed that a divid-
ing line existed. As he claimed in one speech: ‘Croats belong to a different
culture, a different civilisation from Serbs. Croats are part of western Europe,
part of the Mediterranean tradition. Long before Shakespeare and Molière, our
writers were translated into European languages. The Serbs belong to the
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east. They are eastern peoples, like the Turks and the Albanians. They belong
to the Byzantine culture.’85
If Tudjman was not Serbophobic, then he was most certainly
‘Balkanophobic’. For him, as for many Croats, the idea of Croatia as part of the
Balkans was inimical to all their past traditions and values. As he commented
in one interview: ‘Based on its geopolitical position, its fourteen-centuries-
long history, civilization and culture, Croatia belongs to the central European
and Mediterranean circle in Europe. Our political links with the Balkans
between 1918 and 1990 were just a short episode in the Croatian history and
we are determined not to repeat that episode ever again!’86 He later argued
that, geographically, Croatia had always been a part of central Europe, and
was culturally a part of this region, except for the ‘recent past’ when ‘balka-
nism has constantly subordinated the Croatian State territory to an Asiatic
form of government’.87 In other words, Croatia’s history placed it within the
Western world, while Serbia was part of the Eastern or ‘Asiatic’ world. Any
association between these two cultures was purely a historical anomaly.
Croatia’s reinterpretation of history also implied rejecting the Balkans
itself, a project that found expression in a conference entitled ‘South-eastern
Europe in the 20th Century’, whose organisers stressed categorically that
Croatia was not a Balkan country, but rather, a part of ‘South-eastern
Europe’. For the conference organisers: ‘being a part of the Balkans means
being a part of the backward part of Europe’.88 Croats, despite the ravages of
war, still had hope for the future: that once their independence was assured,
they would somehow be able to become symbolically part of a different world.
Certainly, no Croatians wanted to be associated with the Serbs, who were seen
as nothing better than ‘Vandals’ and ‘Asian hordes.’89 The use of such
Orientalism with reference to the Serbs shows clearly that culturally, or ‘civil-
isationally’, Serbs did not belong in Croatia, as members of a different
‘civilisation’. Further, their place was across the Drina, in Serbia. Through
their religious and cultural separation after the Great Schism, Serbs seemingly
became a pseudospecies. They came to represent all that was opposite to
Croatian identity. 
This idea of East versus West proved to be of fundamental importance in
defining Croatian self-identity. So too was the geography of the region, the
liminal quality of Croatia’s landmass, the last rampart of the West in the East.
The Croatian geographer Zalijka Corak expanded upon the Antemurale myth,
using a social geographer’s eye to understand Croatia’s history:
The very shape of Croatia, the way it looks now is a dramatic sign that its existence
has been endangered. It represents a kind of visual unrest which should also be
removed as an error . . . A country the shape of which is not the product of a long
and authentic historical process cannot assess the paradigm of historical space
that Croatia represents. But Croatia’s shape is at the same time a shape of
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resistance. By standing for centuries on the military border of the western world,
Croatia is now fighting for a world which can only survive if this historical space
survives.90
Here, Corak conveyed the image of a Croatia protecting the West from a
barbarous East, with the Serbs trying to invade Europe, in a manner reminis-
cent of the Ottoman invasion, against which the Antemurale was first
established. As she further depicted the scenario: ‘This is an attack by the last
of the barbarians coming from their darkness to the lights of Mediterranean,
to Rome. Those barbarians who would like to think of themselves as being the
successors of Byzantium or what is more, as Byzantines themselves . . . Their
conduct is Eastern and different in the sense of different ethics.’91 Again, the
picture of Croatia standing on the border between East and West was a power-
ful image. It portrayed a sense of heroic struggle, as well as an image of
vulnerability, both of which would prove to be positive in Croatia’s bid for
Western support. 
Such imagery reflected more traditional Western views of the Ottoman
Empire, reminiscent perhaps of James Marriot’s 1918 description of the
Ottoman provinces as ‘an alien substance, embedded in the living flesh of
Europe, akin to the European family neither in creed, race, language, in social
customs, nor in political aptitudes and traditions’. 92 It may also have reflected
more recent views, such as Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilisations argu-
ment (1993), where ‘Civilisations’ (his term for a religious-cultural amalgam)
became the repository for an individual’s primary identification, and the
nodal point of conflict. 93
Huntington’s conclusion that ‘[p]olitical boundaries increasingly are
redrawn to coincide with cultural ones; ethnic, religious and civilisational’
certainly worked to the advantage of Croatian writers, who argued that
Yugoslavia was an artificial joining of different civilisations, a project surely
doomed to failure. In fact, the Croatian argument that the collapse of
Yugoslavia was ‘natural’ became less controversial as the conflict evolved.
Yugoslavia, described as a ‘cleft country’ by Huntington, contained ‘major
groups from two or more civilisations’, who posited: “We are different peoples
and belong in different places.”’ This alone was sufficient cause for break-up,
according to Huntington: ‘The force of repulsion drives them apart and they
gravitate towards civilisational magnets in other societies.’94 Theories, both
old and new, of the naturalness of a civilisational divide played well into the
hands of Croatian secessionists, attempting to justify pulling Croatia out of a
union with the Serbs that had been more or less peaceful since 1945. The
instrumentalisation of such theories allowed nationalists to paint the conflict
as an age-old primordial battle between good and evil – yet another aspect in
a multifaceted arsenal of myths and legends.
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The myth of Medjugorje
Another aspect of Croatian writing was to stress the chosen or holy elements
of the Croatian nation. Catholicism had to be relevant not only historically; it
now had to be used to demonstrate the inherent cultural superiority of the
nation. While the Serbs had Kosovo, the Croats had no great symbolic defeats
that could elevate them to divine status. While there was much currency to be
gained from the ‘state right’ and Antemurale myths, Croatian writers added a
religious aspect to their nationalism. They needed a myth able to compete
with the Battle of Kosovo, a Battle that had so fired the imagination of
Croatian artists and politicians such as Ivan Mesˇtrovic´, Juraj Stross mayer,
and Ljudevit Gaj.
It was precisely for this reason that the myth of Medjugorje was opera-
tionalised as part of the Croatian rhetorical arsenal. Describing the apparition
of the Virgin Mary to a group of small children in Medjugorje, Hercegovina, in
1981, the myth could not have been better timed. Medjugorje soon became an
enduring symbol of the cultural divide between East and West, while creating
a tourist haven and pilgrimage site for European Catholics, a new competitor
for Assisi and Lourdes.95 Tudjman was perhaps the first to instrumentalise
Medjugorje, at a peace conference there in May 1993, when he invoked the
miracle in support of the Bosnian Croats. ‘The Madonna’s appearance’, he
maintained, heralded ‘the re-awakening of the Croatian nation’, a statement
that demonstrated his belief that the Croats had been granted the Virgin
Mary’s favour.96 This statement was extremely controversial, considering
that Tudjman was speaking not in Croatia, but in Bosnia, a new country with
internationally recognised borders.
Medjugorje would later become the subject of sociological reflection.
Stjepan Mesˇtrovic´, Slaven Letica, and Miroslav Goreta successfully opera-
tionalised it in the service of the Croatian cause. For these authors, it was no
accident that ‘the dividing line between East and west runs roughly along the
present day border between Croatia and Serbia, which is known as the Krajina
region’.97 The mythical aspect of it, at least for Mesˇtrovic´, lay in the fact that
‘Medjugorje itself symbolises a growing rupture between Eastern and Western
culture.’98 In other words, the region itself, situated on a border between East
and West, began to carry its own special significance. Firstly, it offered Croats
their own divinity, since Mary appeared to them, and not the Serbs. And
secondly it also gave them a form of chosenness or divine status preferable to
that of the Kosovo myth. As its chroniclers mused aloud: ‘it is intriguing that
the central message at Medjugorje was “peace”, whereas Kosovo was revived
by the Serbs as a shrine to their military glory’.99
Of course, comparisons between shrines to ‘peace’ and ‘war’ were no
coincidence. For the authors, the Virgin Mary’s appearance constituted
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lasting proof that right was on the side of the Croatians. Medjugorje became
‘the Fatima of our times’, symbolising ‘the yearnings of Slovenia and Croatia
in the west for greater pluralism and democracy versus the Serbian leanings
in the East for fascist-like nationalism and monolithic political systems’.100
This analogy was further drawn out. The Croats now became part of a
‘mother-centred culture’,101 with a passive character orientation, a caring,
nurturing identity, in contrast to the ‘father-dominated’ Serbs, who were
generally more warlike and destructive.102 The central aspect of the myth was
the goodness of Catholicism, which rendered the Croats more civilised, more
peace-loving, and more enlightened. As the authors explained: 
[T]he moral message given by the Madonna from Medjugorje to Poland, seems to
be softer: peace, compromise, pluralism. One has to explain Eastern European and
former Soviet machismo, totalitarianism and terror in the context of a virgin
based cultural system. Mary seems to represent the other side of the authoritarian,
father dominated [Serbian] Slavic mindset uncovered by [sociologist Dinko]
Tomasevic´. The female side [Croatian] represents the ‘higher’ softer, more
civilised aspects of Slavic culture.103
Thus Medjugorje would become a symbol for the geography, religion and
cultural traditions of Croatia, while Catholicism would promote a ‘universal-
ist cultural base’ which was ‘recognisably Western’.104 Such theories were
directly opposed to those of Batakovic´ and his Serbian colleagues. Medjugorje
became a useful way of creating a modern myth of chosenness, perhaps to
counterbalance the strong influence of Kosovo on the Serbs. At the same time,
the linkages were clear – Serbs had to stay on their side of the civilisational
divide – they did not belong in Croatia. Some writers went so far as to suggest
that the Serbs were in league with Satan in their desire to destroy
Medjugorje.105
Medjugorje performed several crucial functions in Croatian nationalism.
Firstly, it elevated Croatian Catholicism to a chosen and superior religion, and
Croatians themselves to the rank of superior nation. While it was not Kosovo,
it proved to Croats that they too could be part of the divine elect, as evidenced
by the Virgin’s appearance. It also demonstrated that a Covenant existed
between the Croats and the divine. We see here the use of Schöpflin’s ‘myth of
election’: the Croats received this revelation because of their unique qualities
as an ancient and peace-loving people, and because they were the innocent
victims of Serbian aggression. 
Secondly, the myth became a symbol of Westernness, proving that the
Croats belonged in Western or (at least) Central Europe, and maintained tradi-
tions and ideals that differed significantly from those of the Serbs. Because
they had suffered for so long in Yugoslavia under Serbian domination, the
Virgin Mary appeared to give them hope in the midst of hardship. Thirdly,
Medjugorje endorsed Tudjman’s nationalist regime. The Virgin’s appearance
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demonstrated that right was on the side of the Croats, while Serbia was clearly
the satanic aggressor. Certainly, Medjugorje was useful in an instrumental
sense. It gave the Croats a sense of religious pride, and restored to them a great
deal of hope, first of all in 1981, when the Virgin Mary supposedly first
appeared, and then throughout the remainder of the crisis. 
The different racial origins of the Serbs
Even these aspects of differentiation were not enough to stress the opposing
psychological, sociological, and civilisational differences between Serbs and
Croats. Yet another theme was to be introduced – that of different racial
origins. That both groups were descended from South Slavic tribes was
regarded as well established by most impartial historians. However, a number
of Croatian writers attempted to debunk the myth of South Slavic unity,
arguing that Serbs and Croats were racially distinct, and should never have
entered into any political or social institutions together. 
Ivo Banac reflected a typical Croatian view at this time, charting the
origin of the Croats (and their name as well) to an ‘Iranian group’ that was
somehow assimilated by Slavic populations, sometime before their settlement
in the western portions of the Balkan Peninsula.106 By contrast, Banac posited
that the origins of the Serbs were more dubious. He claimed that most of these
were ‘Orthodox Balkan Vlachs’, who moved to Croatia and Bosnia during the
Ottoman era.107 Banac, while an eminent historian and no friend of
Tudjman’s national regime, nevertheless reflected a typical Croatian theme –
that Serbs were racially or ethnically different from Croats. However, few
scholars agreed on where Croats and Serbs actually came from, even if there
was a consensus that they did not share similar origins. 
In 1995, a team of Croatian scholars also tried to prove that Croatia’s
ancestors were Aryans who came from Persia. Ethnographers, positing that
the word Hrvat derived from the ancient Persian word Hu-Urvat, undertook
the largest archaeological project in Croatian history in search of the Croats’
ancient Iranian origins. The project received warm support from Tudjman.108
Another Tudjman-sponsored project, featuring Nedjeljko Kujundzic´, presi-
dent of the Croatian Academy of Educational Sciences at Zagreb University,
traced the Croats to early Celtic tribes, while describing the Serbs as descen-
dants of the nomadic Sarmatians.109
By contrast, another theory held that the Croats were the only true
Slavs, having been in the Balkan region at least four hundred years before the
Serbs. This formed the central thesis of the Zagreb University historian
Trpimir Macan’s summary of Croatian history. Macan cited as proof two
Greek tablets from the second century AD containing the words, Horathos
and Horuathos, from whence derived the name Hrvat (Croat). Claiming that
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Serbs were descendants of a different set of tribes altogether, Macan posited
that the Serbs were not Slavic, but Vlach and Gypsy Romanised shepherds.110
For right-wing radicals on the streets of Zagreb, however, there was no
doubt that Serbs were Arabs, as was evidenced by their square fingers. The
Croats, meanwhile, were of another race, since their fingers were more
rounded.111
Another aspect of this racial differentiation concerned Croatian territorial
rights. While, generally, Croats and Serbs were presented as having different
racial origins, Serbs within Croatia’s borders were further differentiated. The
Krajina Serbs were to be separated ethnically from the rest of the Serbian
population. In line with Macan’s theories, Pavlicˇevic´ claimed that Krajina
Serbs were ‘non-Slavic Vlachs of Greek-orthodox religion’, who supposedly
settled as farmers in Croatia in the sixteenth century.112 The theory held that
these Vlachs were converted to Serbian Orthodoxy and thus ‘became’ Serbs in
the nineteenth century, owing to the machinations of the Orthodox Church,
who ‘transform[ed] the non-Slav, Orthodox Vlachs into aggressive, national,
conscious Serbs’, a group that later formed ‘Little Vlaska’ in Pakrac in 1876,
and began a conspiracy to ‘liquidate all Croatian Catholics’.113 The fact that
the Vlachs could be converted supposedly encouraged Serbian leaders to try a
form of ethnic cleansing in the nineteenth century, by Serbianising
non-Serbian lands near Serbia, and then joining these lands with the
expanded Serbian state. If such theories were to be believed, then most Krajina
and Slavonian Serbs would have been inauthentic national members whose
families were Serbianised only a century ago.
What emerges from a review of these attempts at racial differentiation are
two key arguments. The first advanced that the Croats were racially distinct
from and somehow ethnically superior to the Serbs, owing to their Iranian,
Slavic, or Celtic origin, depending on which scholarly work you chose to
believe. This acted to dismiss any Serbian claims that Serbs and Croats
belonged together at any time in their history. At the same time, the fact that
‘Krajina’ Serbs and ‘Serbian’ Serbs were of different racial origins proved, at
least to Croats, that the first group could not even claim the national rights
that ‘real’ Serbs might have possessed. Thus a double onus was created for the
Krajina Serbs. Not only did they have to prove that their land was in fact
Serbian; they also had to prove that they were actually Serbs. 
In other cases, the medical profession concluded their own studies in
support of the Croatian cause. In 1995, Ivica Kostovic´, dean of the medical
school in Zagreb, released the findings of the Croatian Institute for Brain
Research, which stated conclusively that, while ‘it can not seriously be
claimed that there are differences between brains of Serbs and Croats . . . differ-
ences in outward forms, skulls can be established’. As he further wrote: ‘These
anthropological differences are evident especially at the racial level . . . but
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hardly any conclusions about differences at the level of brain functioning can
be drawn from them.’114
The re-emergence of the pseudo-science of phrenology was one of the
more unusual aspects of Croatian propaganda. Kostovic´’s theories, as well as
those of Croatian archaeologists, historians, and sociologists, were highly
suspect and unrealistic. The notion that Serbs and Croats were somehow
different races who had, by some miracle, lived side by side and avoided inter-
marrying during their many centuries of association defied all logic. The large
number of so-called ‘mixed marriages’ and births at the present day invali-
dates any such arguments. 
Much of this rhetoric about East and West was wishful thinking on the
part of Croatian politicians. Perhaps they could not give their people democ-
racy, imported consumer goods, or a decent standard of living. Perhaps they
could not even give their people an entire country with stable borders.
However, they did have the ability to make their people feel ‘Western’, that
they had somehow symbolically left Yugoslavia, Communism, and the East
behind, simply by ‘otherising’ it, as people in ‘real’ Western countries had
done. In a sense, Croatian leaders were encouraging their people to ‘perform’
in a difference sense. They promised their people that if they began ‘acting’
Western, then sooner or later they would ‘become’ Western. The best way to
be Western, of course, was cut off all associations with the ‘Eastern’ Serbs.
It was a comforting thought that, when Croatia did become part of the
West, all their troubles with Serbia would recede into the ancient past.
However, Tudjman and his colleagues were never able to give the Croats more
than the illusion of ‘Westernness’, and they were not terribly successful at this
either. Slavenka Drakulic´ rightly observed in Cafe Europa that ‘Europe is not a
mother who owes something to her long-neglected children; neither is she a
princess one has to court. She is not a knight sent to free us, nor an apple or a
cake to be enjoyed; she is not a silk dress, nor the magic word “democ-
racy”.’115 Croatians could continue to worship Europe – but this did not mean
that Croatia would ever actually be European in the ways they would have
desired simply by distancing themselves from the Serbs.
Conclusions
In reinterpreting their history, the Croatian side shared much with the Serbs.
Each was obsessed with self-perception. Each side wanted to see themselves as
lovable and heroic victims of history. Each tried to elevate the nation to divine
and chosen status, through a series of covenantal myths, myths of election,
and myths of Redemption and suffering. Historical claims to the land, myths
of Croatian Westernness, and myths of cultural and linguistic uniqueness
were used to advance the thesis that Croats were more enlightened, peace-
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loving, and generally more civilised than the Serbs. Many of these themes
mirrored similar ones in Serbian writings, particularly those of Batakovic´.
Both Croats and Serbs tried to portray the other side as more intolerant,
racist, xenophobic, greedy, bloodthirsty, expansionist, and genocidal. The
Croats projected every possible negative trait on to their Serbian pseu-
dospecies. Serbs were seen to represent the worst aspects of Eastern
civilisation, in a racial, psychological, and sociological sense – making it clear
that the Serbs were responsible for the war in which Croatian found herself
after 1991. The contrast between the warlike Kosovo myth and the peaceful
Medjugorje myth provided just one example of the phenomenon. While there
were fewer comparisons between Croats and Jews than between Serbs and
Jews, it was clear that Croatian writers had prepared a coherent interpretation
of history that ignored decades of co-operation between Serbs and Croats, and
chose instead to highlight the negative aspects of their association. 
Another characteristic shared by both Serbs and Croats was the frequent
use of the internet to disseminate nationalist propaganda. Vast networks
connected literally thousands of different sites together, many with complete
online books, journals, and magazines, which could be downloaded free of
charge. Most nationalist publications available as hard copies could similarly
be found floating in ‘cyberspace’. Many books and journals that were avail-
able only as hard copies in the first two years of the conflict were duly scanned
and uploaded into various government websites, with all the scanning
mistakes intact. The use of this new medium made many of the historical
debates between these two sides extremely vibrant and dynamic. 
An interesting aspect of Croatian propaganda was how the focus of
attack shifted after 1991. Before Serbia became a threat to Croatian auton-
omy, Croatian nationalists had little interest in Serbian leaders or Serbian
history. Their only true enemies were the Communists, who were solidly in
control of the SFRY. It was only after Serbian machinations in eastern
Slavonia and the Krajina that any coherent study of Serbian history seems
to have taken place. It was only at this time that a Serbian history of evil was
truly brought to the forefront. 
A long tradition of attacking Communism and Tito as the worst possible
enemies of Croatia changed after 1991, when the Serbs, not the Communists
generally, became the new source of evil. This issue of propaganda shifting
will be explored in the next three chapters. What emerges from a detailed
overview of myths of Croatian history before the Second World War is the
historical evolution of Serbian hatred against the Croats. What begins as a
general condemnation of eastern barbarity, due to the Great Schism, becomes
more politicised in the nineteenth century, with the creation of a coherent
Serbian nationalist project. While this project is initially aimed at destroying
various nations, among whom the Croats are only one of the victims, their
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association with the Serbs in the first Yugoslavia transforms them into the
prime target of Serbian aggression. 
In each historical period, Croatia’s relationship with Serbia grows more
intimate, and therefore more threatening. The concept of evolving hatred is
extremely important in both the Serbian and Croatian cases, and will
certainly become more obvious in the chapters dealing with the Second World
War. For both sides, an understanding of early history established a pattern of
behaviour for the enemy nation, a pattern of violence that would only escalate
during the twentieth century, seemingly culminating in the 1990s in the
worst genocide that either side had seen in its history.
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132
5
Masking the past: the Second World War and
the Balkan Historikerstreit
A very considerable part of the Croatian political elite, supported by the Catholic
hierarchy and Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac himself, supported this national and
religious intolerance, and strongly supported policies of clericalism and racism,
marked by mass killings, forced conversions and the deportation of the Serbian
Orthodox population as well the slaughter of the Jews and Gypsies. (Dusˇan
Batakovic´, ‘The National Integration of the Serbs and Croats’)
An intriguing part of the propaganda campaign has been an attempt to equate the
supposed victimization of present-day Serbs with that of the Holocaust Jews. In
promoting the image of Serbian spiritual kinship with the Jews as fellow victims,
Belgrade has concealed Serb willingness to collaborate with the Nazis in the exter-
mination of Serbia’s Jews. (Philip Cohen, Serbia’s Secret War)
THROUGHOUT THE SERBIAN–CROATIAN conflict, the comparative genocidedebate was of particular importance. For both countries, the success ofnationalist regimes depended on their ability to present national history
as one of righteous struggle against persecution. For both Serbs and Croats, the
revision of the history of the Second World War provided a wealth of myths of
heroism and persecution. Continual portrayals of enemies as either Cˇetniks or
Ustasˇa, as well as constant references to Second World War atrocities as
precursors of events in the 1990s, demonstrated the centrality of German and
Italian occupation to contemporary conceptions of national identity. The
preceding two chapters examined how pre-twentieth-century history was
important for nationalists in both countries. Nevertheless, the national expan-
sion and genocide, bloodshed and mayhem of these earlier times would pale in
comparison with those of the Second World War. This was to be the apogee of
the Serbian–Croatian conflict, four years when each side supposedly
unleashed full-scale genocidal terror against the other.
Thus descriptions of perpetrators and victims in the Second World War
became incredibly important. Links would be drawn between atrocities
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during the 1940s and those after 1990. David Campbell’s theory of the
‘deconstruction of historical teleologies’ provides a useful method of under-
standing how certain narratives, or views of history, have been created.
Campbell’s ‘deconstruction’, in the context of Yugoslavia, allows us to analyse
how hatred of the other has been the product of current generations of
academics and politicians, working to create the illusion of an inevitable
conflict, what Campbell terms ‘historical fatalism’. For Campbell, a ‘decon-
structive reading’ allows for the proposition that, ‘the conflict is constituted in
the present, and that “history” is a resource in the contemporary struggle’.1
Peter Novick has also identified this process in his understanding of ‘collective
memory’, arguing that present concerns, and not just the ‘past working its
will on the present’, determine what aspects of history will be used by histori-
ans and when.2 In other words, history responds to present needs – there are
no eternal immutable laws that govern how the process operates.
Contrary to Anthony Smith’s position, however, history as a resource was
not used as a means to relive a Golden Age, but rather to revise and exagger-
ate the horrors of the past (in this case the Second World War). History could
then be placed within a teleological framework, similar to that described by
Frye, Tudor, and others. Every negative aspect of the War was re-examined,
revised and re-presented to the people, and a clear dichotomy was created
between the righteous and suffering self, who resisted Nazism and saved Jews,
and the genocidal Nazi-like enemy nation. Such a view of the Second World
War made Tito’s SFRY appear as a historical anomaly, with the 1991 war
figuring as the normal state of affairs between Serbs and Croats. Milica Bakic´-
Hayden, in her analysis of ‘nesting orientalisms’, took issue with the idea that
Serbian and Croatian antagonisms were primordial and deeply rooted in
history. As she explained:
The explanatory slogan ‘ancient hatreds’ of the South Slavic peoples . . . is but a
rhetorical screen obscuring the modernity of conflict based on contested notions
of state, nation, national identity, and sovereignty . . . all Serbs are identified with
Chetniks, all Croats with Ustashas and all Muslims with Islamic fundamentalists,
or fascist collaborators. By evoking one of the lowest aspects of their historical
association and ignoring the significance of their other interactions and integra-
tions (most notably 45 years of post World War II experience), each group
perpetuates not only disparaging rhetoric but destructive modes of association.3
Such a view was advanced by both sides, who argued that the contempo-
rary conflict was merely the latest instalment in an ongoing story of genocide
and terror, of which the Second World War was one of the most violent
episodes. Michael Ignatieff’s use of Sigmund Freud’s ‘narcissism of minor
differences’ is thus an accurate description of how each side magnified the
evils of the others in an attempt to whitewash their own crimes. As he put it:
‘Nationalist politicians on both sides have used the narcissism of minor differ-
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ences and turned it into a monstrous fable according to which their own side
appears as blameless victims, the other side as genocidal killers. All Croats
become Ustashe assassins, all Serbs become Chetnik beasts.’4
A short overview of the Second World War
The Second World War was an era of devastation for both Serbs and Croats.
The Germans invaded on 5 April 1941, supported by Italian, Hungarian and
Bulgarian forces.5 The Germans and Italians and their allies took control of
the country within two weeks, soon establishing puppet states in both Serbia
and Croatia. In Serbia, the Germans launched Operation Punishment, which
razed Belgrade to the ground and resulted in 17,000 civilian deaths. Soon
after the Yugoslav government fled, General Milan Nedic´, Yugoslavia’s
former minister of war, formed a ‘Government of National Salvation’.6 In
Croatia, the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) was formed under Ante
Pavelic´, the leader of an Italian-trained insurgency group, the Ustasˇa. While
Serbs generally remained loyal to King Aleksander and the Yugoslav govern-
ment in exile, many Croats saw the NDH as their liberation from over two
decades of Serbian control. This initial support soon dampened, as Croatia was
forced to cede most of Dalmatia to Italy, and northern Slovenia to Germany
under the Treaty of Rome. While Bosnia-Hercegovina was joined to the NDH
in compensation, many nationalists felt betrayed by a reduction in their terri-
tory.7 As well, many Ustasˇa officers and soldiers were poorly trained, and
Pavelic´’s distinct lack of charisma and inability to hold mass rallies reduced
his exposure among the population. Nevertheless, the lack of credible resist-
ance was also noticeable. Both the Croatian Peasants Party and the Catholic
Church remained largely passive.8
At the same time, a degree of support for the regime existed, and large
numbers of Croats did join the Ustasˇa and the more popular Domobran. While
Croat writers have downplayed Ustasˇa crimes, the scale of the atrocities was
immense. Large numbers of Serbs, Jews, Gypsies, Communists, and Croatians
hostile to the regime were interned in concentration camps, while countless
others were massacred in towns and villages. In contrast with the German
camps in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Serbia, in Croation camps the Ustasˇa
were directly involved in the administration and in the orchestration of the
killings. In addition, some 200,000 Serbs were forcibly converted to
Catholicism.9
In Serbia, the Nedic´ regime enjoyed some support. By 1942, Nedic´’s
Serbian State Guard numbered 13,400 men, who worked closely with the
3,600 men in Dimitrije Ljotic´’s fascist Zbor movement.10 More famous
however were the Cˇetniks – Serbian royalist irregulars who pledged to restore
the monarchy. While the Cˇetniks of General Drazˇa Mihailovic´ were committed
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to ousting the Germans, the smaller Cˇetnik group of Kosta Pecˇanac broke
early with Mihailovic´, and openly collaborated with the Germans.11 If the
Cˇetniks were officially supported by the Allies at the beginning of the war,
their reluctance to engage the Germans, for fear of reprisals, and their violent
conflicts with Communist forces eventually lost them Allied favour.
Hampered by indiscipline and acts of cruelty, which included rapes and
looting, they were eventually reviled by most non-Serbs. Alienating potential
support among Croats and Moslems, they committed massacres in Bosnia-
Hercegovina and Croatia, making them as hated as the Ustasˇa.12 Mihailovic´’s
anti-Communism, coupled with massacres carried out in his name, eventu-
ally led to his capture, show trial, and execution in 1946. 
In short, the wartime records of some groups of Serbs and Croats were
dubious, which allowed later historians to cast doubt on the conduct of each
nation during the Second World War. Some groups had collaborated with the
occupiers, some had committed massacres of civilian populations. At the same
time, each side did participate in the Communist Partisan resistance move-
ment, which greatly increased in popularity as German defeat became certain.
Nevertheless, there were clear qualitative differences between the Allied-
backed Cˇetnik monarchists and their small-scale massacres, and the
Nazi-backed Ustasˇa with their Croatian-run concentration camps. The work
of Serbian and Croatian propagandists involved rehabilitating the role of one’s
own side, while demonising the wartime activities of the other. Thus the other
was described as an enthusiastic and active collaborator with the Nazis, an
instigator of genocidal aggression against other nations, and a keen supporter
of the Holocaust against the Jews. Here, active Nazi collaborators were seen to
be as bad as the Nazis themselves, while being a victim of these two groups
made one morally equal to the Jews. 
Rehabilitating the NDH: conflicting perceptions among the Croats
One of the earliest aspects of Croatian nationalism revolved around rehabili-
tating the NDH. Croatian Diaspora accounts tended to be pro-Ustasˇa, while
maintaining an ambiguous view of the German occupation. More official
accounts in the 1990s, by contrast, downplayed the importance of the NDH
and its crimes, and sought to reduce the importance of its support during the
war. It was portrayed simply as a reaction against Serbian genocidal ambi-
tions. Earlier writings, such as those of the Croatian Liberation Movement in
Argentina, exonerated the Ustasˇa regime by stressing the resistance nature of
the movement. Pavelic´ became merely the ‘founder and representative of the
revolutionary Liberation Movement of the Croatian people.’13 Such writings
favourably compared the Ustasˇa to earlier French and American revolution-
ary movements, with their main goals consisting of defending Croatia against
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Serbian aggression and against international Communism. There was no
doubt in the minds of early Croatian writers that the NDH represented the
outcome of a long historical process, and was warmly welcomed by Croats,
‘with unprecedented enthusiasm, spontaneously and unanimously’, as one
account had it.14
These early accounts also vindicated the persecution of Serbs and the
Orthodox Church, claiming that its influence had to be curbed, since it was ‘a
centre of propaganda and activity of Serbian chauvinism, Serbian imperial-
ism, and hostility against the Croatian people.’15 Ustasˇa actions emerged as
‘self-defensive’, protecting Croats and their property, even if massacres of
Serbs were the inevitable result. While this type of thinking was largely
confined to earlier accounts, among later writers Vladimir Mrkoci would also
proclaim the self-defensive nature of the Ustasˇa’s activities. He rejected the
charge that Ustasˇism could be fascistic, since ‘the fundamental requirement
for fascism’, the state, did not exist during the Ustasˇa’s formation. That
Pavelic´ and his cohorts were sponsored and equipped by Fascist Italy seemed
irrelevant to this analysis. As with earlier writers, Mrkoci operated from the
perspective that the Ustasˇa was fundamentally a defensive organisation,
‘created as a reaction to Serb terror, to fascism implemented by Serbs through
fascist organizations of Chetniks’.16
It fell to other émigré writers, such as Ivo Omercˇanin, to highlight the
differences between the Ustasˇa and the Nazis – and there were supposedly
many of these. Omercˇanin maintained that, while Croats approved of their
independent state, which gave them more autonomy and freed them from
Serbian domination, they still chafed under Nazi rule.17 Thus the author drew
a sharp distinction between support for an independent state, and support for
Nazism, two institutions that were fundamentally different. In support of this,
Omercˇanin traced the origins of a pro-Allied Croatian ‘putsch’, which was
supposed to have begun in early 1943, featuring such notable Ustasˇa officials
as Interior Minister Mladen Lorkovic´, and Ante Vokic´, Minister for Home
Defence.18
The reason it failed, Omercˇanin revealed, was because of American poli-
ticking, and a reluctance to land Allied troops in Dalmatia to support an
indigenous Croatian rebellion. However, he noted that the putsch did succeed
internally, since civil and military authorities were ready to depose the
government and work with the Allies for a democratic independent Croatia.19
Omercˇanin was clearly trying to vindicate the Ustasˇa position, using anec-
dotal evidence to prove that the leading lights of the movement were also
anti-fascist. For Omercˇanin, the former Ustasˇa chargé d’affairs in Berlin, this
putsch may have been a useful means of legitimating his role in the govern-
ment. The putsch argument was also advanced by Ante Beljo, although it is
clear from a reading of his description (although he doesn’t specifically claim
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this) that any putsch would have been largely opportunistic, since the Italians
had just surrendered, and the Ustasˇa were expecting ‘the landing of Allied
troops on the Croatian Adriatic coast’.20
Generally, early Diaspora accounts promoted the Ustasˇa as a genuine
nationalist and revolutionary movement, one that was pro-independence and
anti-Nazi. Such views became rife after 1990, when many revisionists moved
back to Croatia. The existence of émigré magazines such as NDH, edited by a
former Ustasˇa official and the son-in-law of Ante Pavelic´, was in part a result
of Tudjman’s reliance on Diaspora Croats and their financial contributions.21
NDH was notable for its continuation of Croatian Liberation Movement
themes – the ‘truth’ about the Second World War, as well as poems and arti-
cles eulogising Ante Pavelic´ and the Ustasˇa. The Partisans were often the
subject of attack, and were denounced as ‘Yugoslav criminals’ and ‘Serb and
Croat scum’.22
Such magazines accompanied a spate of revisionist books, which sought
to clear the Ustasˇa’s bad name, giving a human face to those who were inte-
grally involved in the regime. One troubling manifestation was the
publication of the memoirs of Ivo Rojnica, the former Ustasˇa administrator for
Dubrovnik, later decorated by Tudjman. Rojnica’s own skewed understand-
ing of history was obvious. He argued that 250,000 Serbs were expelled to
Serbia from Ustasˇa-controlled Croatia, and were therefore not killed, while
claiming that only 420 Serbs were forcibly converted to Catholicism.23
Another troubling memoir, by Eugen Dido Kvaternik, was reprinted in 1995
with financial support from the Croatian Ministry for Science and
Technology. Kvaternik, a founder of the Croatian death-camp system,
produced a work notable only for its descriptions of ‘courtly life’ in Pavelic´’s
inner circle, while omitting any reference to the atrocities committed by the
regime.24 The main thrust of these Diaspora accounts was that the NDH was
both a revolutionary and a popular nationalist movement that was
suppressed by the Communists. The atrocities committed by the regime were
rarely discussed, while many of the worst war criminals were whitewashed as
heroes who only wanted to create an independent homeland. 
The political climate in Croatia clearly provided for the emergence of such
militant and revisionist views. Tudjman did little to discourage them, nor
could he. Most of his campaign contributions, and the money needed to
finance the war, came from Diaspora Croats, among whom such views were
not uncommon. Nevertheless, Tudjman also had Western support to consider,
and for this reason government propaganda dealing with the NDH was
markedly different from that of the CLM or NDH magazine. Officially, support
for the NDH was seen to be largely a reaction to Serbian atrocities in royalist
Yugoslavia, ‘the prison-house of nations’. As was indicated in the last chapter,
the first Yugoslavia was condemned as an instrument of Serbian domination.
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Croatian support for the NDH was therefore anti-Serbian, rather than pro-
German or pro-Italian.25 Such writings supported the self-defensive nature of
the NDH, but denied that the Ustasˇa were either revolutionary or popular.
Tudjman’s own writings, for example, advance Vladko Macˇek’s Croatian
Peasants Party as the prime focus of Croatian loyalty. This ‘middle of the road’
party, Tudjman maintained, had the advantage of being ‘[p]olitically equidis-
tant from both Pavelic´’s Ustasˇism and Tito’s revolutionary movement’.26
A similar view was taken by Philip J. Cohen in his controversial pro-
Croatian revision of Serbian history, Serbia’s Secret War. Cohen described a
level of support as low as 2 per cent for the Ustasˇa regime, which he credited
to a general dislike of their ‘notorious brutality’.27 He dismissed claims that
the Croats supported the regime positing that the 312,000-strong Croatian
Home Guard were ‘notoriously unreliable as collaborators’, possessing ‘poor
morale’ and an unwillingness to fight that eventually led them to defect to the
Partisans.28
In reviewing Croatian interpretations of the NDH, we find two conflicting
forms of propaganda. One is overtly pro-Ustasˇa, while the other is cautiously
against it, but puts more effort into minimising its importance than into
condemning it. This paradoxical strategy is best explained by the division of
loyalties under which the Tudjman regime laboured. First, it had financial
and moral obligations to the Diaspora Croats, and thus a vindication of
wartime Croatia and a denial of Ustasˇa atrocities were integral to external
support for the war effort. At the same time, Tudjman faced heavy criticism
from the international community for his revisionism. The solution lay in
downplaying the Croats’ support for the NDH, while making a clear distinc-
tion between wanting independence and being pro-Nazi. The NDH as a haven
from Serbian genocide was another popular argument. To maintain power,
Tudjman pursued a complicated balancing act, trying to please both the
Croatian people and also highly critical Western governments. 
Serbian views of the Ustasˇa and Cˇetniks
Serbian historians were also preoccupied with the Second World War. While
the demonisation of Croatians and Moslems was essential, so too was the
vindication of Cˇetnik history. Any ambiguous alliances with the Germans or
Italians were excised from history books, leaving a picture of the Cˇetniks as
righteous freedom fighters, engaged in a liberation struggle against the Nazis.
Novels were often a favourite means of reinterpreting history. They could be
emotive, convincing, and non-threatening at the same time. Momir
Krsmanovic´’s The Blood-Stained Hands of Islam was designed to promote a
Serbian view of The Second World War to an English-speaking audience. The
author, an eastern Bosnian, was heralded as one of the new breed of Serbian
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writers, and his previous work, The Drina Runs Red with Blood, was a best-
seller. This book promised an insider’s account of the Cˇetniks and their
national struggle, motivated by ‘the desire to save the Serbian nation and
wage an honourable struggle for justice, truth and the right of that nation to
a place under the sun’.29 This was set against the ‘vengeful and blood-thirsty
Turks and Catholics of Croatia and Bosnia’.30
Much of this book was set predictably in the Krajina, the scene of count-
less battles between Ustasˇa and Cˇetnik forces. Krsmanovic´ arguably aimed to
vindicate Serbia’s position in the 1990s by demonstrating how the Croatian
Serbs had spent most of the twentieth century defending themselves from the
threat of genocide. Important also was nostalgia for Royalist Yugoslavia.
Books such as this featured graphic descriptions of Ustasˇa ethnic cleansing
operations, as well as torture, rape, and other atrocities. One description of an
Ustasˇa rape of two Serbian women, followed by the cutting off of their breasts
and the slitting of their throats, was typical.31 Curiously, the Ustasˇa
commanders were given names such as Stipe and Franjo, obvious references
to contemporary Croatian politicians. Others, presumably Moslem Ustasˇa,
were called Alija and Ibrahim. Novels such as this advanced a series of pro-
Serbian myths, similar to Schöpflin’s ‘myths of redemption and suffering’, and
‘myths of powerlessness and compensation for the powerless’, where the Serbs
were primarily the victims of the Second World War, and had thus earned
their right to an autonomous republic in Bosnia.32
Novelists like Krsmanovic´ inflated the level of Croatian collaboration,
describing how 80 per cent of the Croatian and Moslem male population joined
the Ustasˇa against the Serbs – a statistic that is historically untenable.33 This
new generation of novelists also attempted to rehabilitate Milan Nedic´, casting
him as a martyr for Serbia, who collaborated with the Nazis in order to minimise
German atrocities against the Serbs. Thus his collaboration was dismissed as
‘efforts to preserve his people during the harsh enemy occupation’.34
Similar views were to be found in Slobodan Selenic´’s 1989 Timor mortis,
dealing with the Ustasˇa massacres of Serbs during the Second World War.
This author repeated a common pattern in Serbian writing – that Croatian
aggression stretched far back into the remote past. Like those of Krsmanovic´,
his descriptions of Croatian atrocities were extremely graphic.35 Similarly,
Marjorie Radulovic´’s Rage of the Serbs, historically situated in the Second
World War, attempted to vindicate Serbian history. She praised the heroism
and righteousness of the Cˇetniks, their love of justice, their universal support
amongst the Serbian people, and their single-minded devotion to freeing their
country from Nazism. At the same time, Tito’s Partisans were condemned as
Ustasˇa collaborators, while the Ustasˇa were dehumanised as genocidal
beasts.36
Vuk Draskovic´’s Noz also dwelt on similar themes, namely the genocide of
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Serbs by Ustasˇa, which he placed at well over one million people. His work
described the legacy of the death-camps in Croatia, how two-thirds of all
Serbian families had lost relatives to the Ustasˇa, and how many more were
sentenced to lengthy prison terms under the Communists for trying to keep
the memory of their tragedy alive. Second World War massacres become a
‘Calvary’ for the Serbian people. Draskovic´ also attacked the Croats for their
revisionism, arguing generally: ‘those who hide a crime have the intention to
commit it anew’.37
Of course, with this renewed interest in the Cˇetniks came a glorification
and ‘performance’ of their actions as well. Cˇetnik hats, uniforms, and flags
became popular fashion accessories, especially among paramilitary units
fighting in Croatia and Bosnia. Arkan caused a sensation when he attired
himself in full Cˇetnik regalia during his 1995 wedding. His wife, the well-
known turbofolk singer Cˇecˇa, was dressed as the ‘Maid of Kosovo’ (Kosovka
djevojka), the Mary Magdalen-esque figure who nursed Serbian soldiers as
they lay dying on the battlefield.38 As with Kosovo fever, Cˇetnik kitsch was to
be found everywhere. Various journals, including Duga, Pogledi, and Srpska
Recˇ, worked actively to rehabilitate the Cˇetniks. Warlords like Vojislav S˘esˇelj
encouraged their followers to destroy anything bearing Tito’s name, while
calling for the re-establishment of the monarchy.39 As in Croatia, wartime
collaborators were rehabilitated. Dimitrije Ljotic´ was exonerated in a series of
articles published in Pogledi, while the Partisans and the Cˇetniks were
condemned for inciting German wrath against the population.40 Such writ-
ings performed a similar function to those in Croatia – they stressed the
self-defensive nature of Serbian actions in the war, even presenting obvious
collaborators as protectors of the Serbs against the Germans. The Second
World War’s participants were glorified as either great heroes, liberators, or
defenders. 
Croatian views of the Cˇetniks
For Croatian historians, the ambiguous nature of Cˇetnik history had been a
worrying phenomenon. Presented equally in historical accounts as heroes
and collaborators, the Cˇetniks still enjoyed a better reputation than the
Ustasˇa. An important objective of Croatian propaganda was portraying the
Cˇetniks as genocidal aggressors, who were every bit as evil, if not worse,
than Croatia’s Fascists.41 The basic argument was as follows: the Cˇetniks had
little interest in liberating the country from the Germans and Italians.
Rather, the Second World War was merely a backdrop for the continuing
expansion of Greater Serbia, which was to include almost 90 per cent of
NDH territory. For this reason, Cˇetnik goals were obvious: ‘the destruction of
the NDH and cleansing of the Croatian and Muslim population from these
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territories in order to annex them to Greater Serbia’.42
Philip Cohen’s analysis was little different, seeing ‘terror and genocide’ as
the Cˇetniks’ main instruments in their quest for ‘the expansion of Serbia and
the assimilation or elimination of non-Serb populations’.43 As he further elab-
orated: ‘Like the Nazis, who believed that all Germans must live within one
large, ethnically pure, German state, the Chetniks believed that all Serbs must
live in one large, ethnically pure, Serbian state.’44 That the Cˇetniks might be
seeking revenge for atrocities committed in the NDH was simply not discussed.
Rather, the Cˇetniks were presented as genocidal fanatics, who were trying to
exterminate the Croats in order to build their super-state. For them, the war
and the occupation of their country did nothing to change their expansionist
strategies, which were timeless, and infinitely flexible, since the Cˇetniks could
seemingly side with both the Germans and the Allies at the same time, Nedic´
‘manoeuvr[ing] politically with Berlin to secure the creation of Greater Serbia
under German patronage’, while the Cˇetniks were preparing for the day when
they would ‘seize power after the Germans were ousted . . . by the Allies’.45
The Cˇetniks were also accused of formulating a plan for genocide before
the establishment of the Ustasˇa death-camp system. The Cˇetnik commander
Stevan Moljevic´’s ‘Homogeneous Serbia’, yet another essay on Greater Serbia,
was frequently cited to balance out atrocity accusations levelled at the Croats.
Drazˇa Mihailovic´’s ‘Instructions’ of December 1941 were also advanced as
proof that the Cˇetniks were using the war as a means of creating an ‘ethnically
cleansed’ Greater Serbia. For Croatian writers, Mihailovic´ was little more than
a genocidal lunatic, and his sole ambition was to drive Croats, Moslems, and
other non-Serbians from Bosnia-Hercegovina. The Cˇetnik claim to be staging
an uprising against the occupying powers was cited as the ‘formal reason’ for
fighting. Of course, the true reason was bringing about an ethnically cleansed
Greater Serbia, through ‘Chetnik terror and genocidal crimes’.46 The descrip-
tions of Cˇetnik crimes were often extremely graphic, mirroring the Serbs’ use
of such imagery: 
Physical destruction took the form of massacres, hangings, decapitation, burning,
throwing victims into pits and killing them with various objects. Victims were in
most cases tortured before being killed . . . rape of Muslim and Croatian women
and girls so as to nationally and religiously degrade them. There were two espe-
cially significant forms of indirect Chetnik crimes. These were robbery and forced
conversion of Catholics and Muslims into the Serbian Orthodox faith . . . The
forced conversion to the Serbian Orthodox faith aimed at further degrading the
victims and destroying that deepest of ties to the Croatian or Muslim nationality.47
Croatian writers also stressed the enormous size of the Cˇetnik movement.
A large Cˇetnik membership was often contrasted with a small Ustasˇa member-
ship – the implication being that Serbs were more genocidal than Croats. One
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Croatian historian claimed that some 300 Cˇetnik organisations existed in
Bosnia, with another 200 in Croatia by 1941. These organisations were
supposedly famous for their terror and barbarity, as well as their penchant for
murdering large numbers of Croats and Muslims.48 Croat historians also
presented Mihailovic´ as a dangerous manipulator with direct communication
with all his units in the field. This was a highly contested assumption, since
many Cˇetnik groups operated in isolation, with a great deal of decentralisation
of authority, and many were not even in radio communication with each
other. However, what was important in the context of war was to prove that
the Cˇetniks were a unified cohesive force, all bent on the genocide of the Croats
and the Moslems. Loosely co-ordinated bands of mercenaries did not present
the same level of threat. At worst, such people could be likened to the Turks
slaughtering the Armenians, but not the Nazis and their well-oiled apparatus. 
Another popular argument held that the Cˇetniks had openly collaborated
with the Italians and Germans, in order to exterminate Croats on NDH terri-
tory. Supposedly, Italian and German forces supplied the Cˇetniks with
weapons, food, clothing, and even local currency when they agreed to exter-
minate Croatian and Moslems on behalf of the occupiers.49 Such claims seem
to have been exaggerated by Croatian historians, who paradoxically argued
that Cˇetnik unofficial collaboration was somehow worse than the official
highly publicised Ustasˇa variety. Tim Judah has argued that, by 1943, both
the Cˇetniks and the Partisans had commenced dialogue with the Germans,
each seeking an alliance against the other. As was clear from wartime
accounts, the Cˇetniks were willing to side with the Germans if it could mean
the destruction of the Partisans. While these negotiations ultimately failed,
owing to a lack of German interest, the Cˇetniks were willing to collaborate, to
increase their strength against Partisan forces. It is also clear that in
Montenegro they did accept help from the Italians during the Italian surren-
der in 1943. However, it is highly misleading to suggest that Cˇetniks
throughout the war collaborated with the Germans and Italians in order to
carry out the genocide of Croats and Moslems.50
For Croatian writers, the attempted genocide of Croats and Moslems justi-
fied their presence in Ustasˇa and Domobran units. These two groups were
forced to defend themselves against ‘Cˇetnik-Communist units’, which were
formed in the forests in Bosnia-Hercegovina. In this way, they were not guilty
of collaboration, since they were merely reacting to the Serbs, who, ‘following
the example of their Vlach ancestors, began to exterminate the Croat and
Muslim population of the Bihac region in horrible and mercyless [sic]
massacres’.51 Further, Pavelic´’s crimes were excused on the basis that he was
merely countering ‘Cˇetnik terrorists with terror of their own’, which in any
case was not as ruthless as that of the Serbs in Serbia, where ‘the persecution
of Jews was even more thorough’.52
Balkan holocausts?
142
2441Chapter5  16/10/02  8:05 am  Page 142
In sum, what emerges from a reading of Croatian perceptions of the
Second World War is the reactive nature of Croatian activities. For these
writers, the Serbian Cˇetniks seemingly had the upper hand throughout
Bosnia-Hercegovina, and were busy instigating a genocide of Croats and
Moslems. The problem, of course, was that it was the Ustasˇa who were (offi-
cially, at the very least) in control of Bosnia-Hercegovina, not the Cˇetniks. It
was the Ustasˇa who had the power of the state behind them, as well as Italian
and German support. Nevertheless, this view of the Cˇetniks as unrestrained
genocidal killers seemingly rang true for the Croatian public. 
Tudjman himself used the concept of a genocidal Cˇetnik movement to
generalise Serbian guilt. He suggested that ‘Macˇek’s middle-of-the-road
Croatian Peasant party was to remain the chief political force opposed to the
revolutionary NOP on Croatian soil, just as Mihailovic´’s Cˇetnik movement was
in Serbia.’53 While these two movements were likened in terms of support,
morally they were far apart, according to Tudjman, who placed the Cˇetniks on
a par morally and philosophically with the Ustasˇa, not the CPP. Tudjman’s
later development of this argument made his position more obvious: 
Both the Ustasˇa and Cˇetnik movements were equally the expression of mutually
opposing ideas concerning nation and state and of the programs for their imple-
mentation, both stemming from the judgement that coexistence in a common
state was impossible. This means that Dr. A. Pavelic´ and General D. Mihailovic´, in
the circumstances of the Second World War, found themselves as the forefront of
nationally exclusive and irreconcilable movements, which sought equally to
exploit those circumstances for the realization of their respective national
programs.54
Thus Cˇetnik and Ustasˇa were paralleled, in terms of their level of atroci-
ties, their ideology, their modus operandi, and their aims during the war.55
Croatian writers ignored the fact that one was a Nazi-backed, Italian-trained
terrorist group, and the other, a Royalist, Allied-backed, anti-German and
anti-Communist resistance movement. Tudjman implied that, because most
Serbs supported a genocidal movement with an expansionist political project,
all Serbs were tarred with the Cˇetnik legacy, and, by implication, with a legacy
of genocide. At the same time, since Croats were mainly CCP supporters, their
culpability was significantly reduced. 
Anti-Semitism in Croatia: Stepinac and the people
How Jews were treated in Yugoslavia during the Second World War became
another subject of heated debate. If each side was legitimately to claim to be
the victims of genocide, of the type experienced by the Jews, then their own
relationship with the Jews was crucial. For both Serbs and Croats, Jewish
history during the war needed to be carefully revised, to highlight only the
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positive aspects of their historical relationship. Similarly, the other had to be
presented as anti-Semitic collaborators who had participated actively in the
Final Solution. Both sides eagerly embarked on this exercise, and were not
ashamed to manipulate Jewish leaders in the process.
Croatian writers pursued a dual strategy of touting their own love of Jews,
while condemning the Serbs for their complicity in the Holocaust. One aspect
of Croatian revisionism was the wholesale rehabilitation of Archbishop
Alojzije Stepinac, head of the Roman Catholic Church in Croatia during the
war. Croats devoted a great deal of energy to proving that Stepinac was a great
friend of the Jews, and inspired most Croats to help them during the war. Of
course, Stepinac, like most of the cast of characters in the region, had some
rather dubious credentials. As Archbishop of Zagreb, Stepinac officiated at the
Te Deum that gave thanks for the foundation of the Ustasˇa state.56 At first,
Stepinac appeared to have been no different from the many Croats who had
had great expectations of the regime. However, his enthusiasm soured greatly
as the war dragged on and the atrocities of the Ustasˇa came to light. He is
generally painted as a naive and idealistic man, who, while hating the horrors
of war, saw Pavelic´ as a hero and saviour of his people.57
While he refused to denounce the regime officially, there is evidence that
Stepinac did help some Jews – aiding children to escape to Palestine, and
donating food and money to Jews in hiding.58 What emerged was the portrait
of a man sitting on the fence, symbolically supporting the NDH, and condemn-
ing Ustasˇa crimes as far as he could without incurring danger to his person,
while secretly easing his conscience with private acts of piety and kindness.
Nevertheless, while he seemingly helped some of the Jews, he expressed little
remorse over the forced conversions of an estimated 200,000 Serbs, often at
gunpoint.59 Accused of collaboration by the Partisans, Stepinac stood trial in
September 1946.60 He was subsequently sentenced to 16 years imprison-
ment, served five years, and then returned to his native village, where he died
in 1960.61
Stepinac, despite his wartime record, was completely rehabilitated by
Croatian historians. His supposed love of the Jews was cited as proof of
Croatian philosemitism during the Second World War. One writer noted how
70 Croats received ‘The Certificate of Honour’ and ‘The Medal of the
Righteous’ from Yad Vashem in Jerusalem, as proof of Croatian goodwill
during the war, similarly noting how, as early as 1936, Stepinac supported
Austrian and German Jews by founding ‘Action to help refugees’ and
‘Croatian Caritas’ (1938). 62 Stepinac was also credited with saving 60
inmates of the Jewish Old People’s Home in Zagreb, preserving the private
library of the Zagreb Chief Rabbi Miroslav Shalom Freiberger at his request,
and publicly condemning the destruction of Zagreb’s main synagogue in
1941.63
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Stepinac’s usefulness as a symbol of Croatian tolerance was not lost on
Franjo Tudjman. In one lengthy defence of Stepinac, Tudjman dismissed the
accusations against him as having ‘even less of a foundation than does the
Jasenovac distortion’.64 He later emphasised that Pope John Paul II’s visit to
Croatia, and Stepinac’s beatification by the Vatican, completely exonerated
Croatia of any wrongdoing during the Second World War. Stepinac, it
seemed, had become the symbol of Croatia’s wartime relationship with the
Jews. As Tudjman’s logic impelled him to explain: 
With the beatification, the Holy Father and the Vatican sided with this Croatia
and Croatian people against attempts to accuse the whole Croatian people of
genocide and fascism. The Holy Father, the Vatican, and the Catholicism, all said
that Stepinac was not a criminal, as was not the Croatian people. That is a contri-
bution to the truth about the Croatian people in WW II and the truth about the
contemporary Croatia.65
The Vatican’s support for Stepinac was extremely important, further
proving that he was a friend of the Jews, as well as a Croatian martyr against
both Nazism and Communism, and Tudjman cleverly manipulated Stepinac’s
rehabilitation to clean the Croatian wartime record. However, his portrayal of
Stepinac’s beatification is not entirely in keeping with the facts, and seems to
be more wishful thinking than anything else. Stepinac was appointed
Cardinal primarily for his resistance to Communism, and for his condemna-
tion of Partisan attacks on Catholic clergy after the war. By the end of 1945,
an estimated 273 priests had been killed by the Partisans, while countless
more had been arrested, or had gone ‘missing’. Stepinac was targeted by the
Communist authorities only after his condemnation, and he stood trial a year
later for collaboration with the NDH regime.66 Tudjman’s claim of ‘innocence’
is thus highly misleading. Generally, Croats described Stepinac as an outspo-
ken critic of the Nazis and a ‘friend of the Jews’, because of his wartime efforts
to save them. The tarring of Stepinac, one writer posited, was done solely to
deflect attention from the dishonourable conduct of the Serbian Orthodox
Church.67
Stepinac became useful as a leader who constantly stood up to the Ustasˇa,
offering passive spiritual resistance. In Croatian writings, such resistance was
often contrasted to the role of the Serbian Orthodox Church, which was
described as bent on persecuting Jews and promoting Greater Serbia, which
was condemned as a ‘racist ideology’.68 So too was Serbian literary culture
condemned. Ljubica Stefan’s From Fairy Tale to Holocaust was a typical
example of this type of thinking, tracing the ancient roots of Serbian anti-
Semitism. A large section of her work was devoted to reviewing various
anti-Semitic folk tales, assembled by Vuk Karadzic´ in 1853. One featured
work was the ‘The Yids’ (Civuti), the story of Hansel and Gretel, notable for the
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fact that the ‘wicked witch’ was a Jewish woman. In Stefan’s account of them,
these folk tales encouraged Serbs to see the Jewish people as those who ‘chased
after the gentile children with knives and forks to eat them, which presents the
Jews as cannibals.’69 Certainly as interesting as the tales themselves is Stefan’s
belief that Serbian anti-Semitism could be traced from nineteenth-century
fairy tales to the political traditions of Greater Serbia, and then into the twen-
tieth century, where Serbia was ‘the most trustworthy ally of the Third
Reich’.70
While the Serbs were under direct military occupation, with strict curfews
and a particularly brutal police force, Stefan argued that the Serbs had an
independent, autonomous state, complete with ‘a government, organised
ministries, independent governments in cities and villages, its own army
equipped by the Germans.’71 The Serbs were able to gain such autonomy,
asserted Stefan, because of their long tradition of anti-Semitism, and their
eagerness to participate in the Final Solution. She also argued that the
Orthodox Church was instrumental in the genocide of the Jews, since they
functioned as ‘a sort of a political party and even racist’, while they ‘totally
neglected pastoral and spiritual work’.72
This form of ‘counteridentification’ was crucial during the 1990s, as it
showed the continuation, once again, of an age-old Serbian hatred of all
things non-Serb, and a desire to expand the Serbian state – and destroy every-
thing in its path. Thus, for Stefan, and for many others, the Jews and the
Croats were fellow victims of Serbian aggression during the Second World
War. More often than not, Croatian claims of Serbian anti-Semitism were
exaggerated. While it was clear that the Serbian puppet government and
certain Orthodox officials such as Bishop Nikolaj Velimirovic´ maintained anti-
Semitic views (in Velimirovic´’s case from the Second World War well into the
1990s),73 there is little to support the idea that the Serbs actively and enthu-
siastically aided in the Holocaust. Serbs had little autonomy within Serbia
during the war; this was a country occupied by German troops. Even Philip
Cohen, after his lengthy attack on the Serbs, was forced to admit that ‘it is
indisputable that the executioners of Serbia’s Jews were German army person-
nel or regular police. However, the role of the Serbs as active collaborators in
the destruction of the Jews has remained under-explored in Holocaust litera-
ture.’74 While their role may perhaps underexplored, Cohen was unable to
argue convincingly that anti-Semitism was an important aspect of Serbian
nationalism during the Second World War – important enough at least to
have inspired an active role in the Holocaust.
That a large number of Serbs joined the Partisans and the Cˇetniks does
indicate that there was little support for the Nedic´ regime. Futhermore, it
seems that there was little love lost between Germans and Serbs. Germans
considered the Serbs to be treacherous and dangerous, remembering the
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heavy losses they sustained at Serbian hands during the First World War.75
Christopher Browning’s analysis of the German occupation of Serbia suggests
that support for the Nedic´ regime was much lower than the level alleged by
the Croats.76 While the Serbian Orthodox Church promoted anti-Semitism to
some extent, this did not translate into overt support for the genocide of
Yugoslavia’s Jews. 
Serbian views of collaboration and anti-Semitism
For the Serbs, connections between the suffering of Serbs and Jews during the
Second World War were extremely important – anti-Semitism and
Serbophobia were continually compared, as proof that the Serbs were also the
victims of genocide. For many Serbs, the Second World War was a time when
Serbia was close to being wiped out, as Germans ‘committed wide scale
murders, burning of entire villages, raided and bombed cities’.77 Jews and
Serbs would be symbolically linked, as one writer revealed, for espousing the
same values: ‘The Jewish-Serbian-Capitalist-Democratic front had to disap-
pear forever from the world . . . Jews and Serbs were struck with the same
dagger.’78 Dobrica C´osic´ went so far as to assert that the genocide of the Serbs
was worse than that of the Jews, in terms of its methods and bestiality.79
Exaggeration aside, the Serbs did indeed suffer heavy losses during the Second
World War, although it was never on the level suggested by contemporary
historians. 
As with the Croats, the myth of philosemitism was extremely important
for the Serbs, who saw themselves, along with the Jews, as fellow victims of
Nazi aggression. Laza Kostic´’s The Serbs and the Jews (1988) advanced the view
that Serbia was one of the few countries that was free of anti-Semitism during
the war. Describing himself as ‘a fanatical friend of the Jews in general and of
the Serbian ones in particular’, Kostic´ claimed that Serbs were always the best
friends of the Jews throughout history: 
The Serbs are one of the rare peoples in the world who have lived with the Jews in
peace and love throughout the whole history of their settlement in our lands . . .
The Serbs never persecuted the Jews, never carried out any demonstrations
against them. Not one anti-Semitic text has ever appeared in the press, and hatred
against them was not spread orally either . . . There was no more tolerant country
towards the Jews. Considerably later, many other countries copied the so-called
‘emancipation of the Jews’ from the Serbs.80
This general view was important in vindicating the Serbian role in the
Second World War. Kostic´ even made the suggestion that Nedic´ had in no
way collaborated with the Nazis in the Holocaust of the Jews. While the Nedic´
regime worked under the Nazis, they refused to ‘contemplate participation in
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[any] aspect of the extermination of the Jews by the Germans’ – so Kostic´
claimed.81
Of course, with daily accusations from the Croatian side that the Serbs
were the worst anti-Semites the world had ever seen, the Serbs countered
with invective of their own. Mirroring Croatian arguments, Serbian writers
alleged that Croatia was neck-deep in anti-Semitism. In Serbian eyes, one of
the worst offenders was Alojzije Stepinac, who was presented as an active
collaborator and figurehead for Catholic complicity in the genocide of the
Serbs and the Jews. Certainly the most vocal critic of Stepinac’s rehabilita-
tion was Milan Bulajic´, who denounced Stepinac as an enthusiastic NDH
supporter.82 His voluntary loyalty oath to Ante Pavelic´ and his position as
Ustasˇa army chaplain made him ‘the spiritual father of the Ustasˇi
Independent State of Croatia’ – a crucial moral prop for the regime.83 His
support of the NDH and denouncing of Yugoslavia also proved that he was
a ‘fanatical opponent’ of the ‘Masonic-Jewish state’ – a rather strange
moniker for Serbia.84
Many of Bulajic´’s efforts were directed towards debunking the myth of
Stepinac’s philosemitism. He argued that while Stepinac saved individual
Jews, these were Jews in mixed marriages with Catholics, or those who had
converted to Catholicism to escape death. He argued that Stepinac was only
against the racialisation of anti-Semitism. Those Jews who converted to
Catholicism could be saved, whereas those who did not could still be
condemned to death.85 The claim that Stepinac saved 200 Jewish orphans
was rebutted by the fact that as soon as Stepinac petitioned the Vatican to save
them, the Ustasˇa rounded them up and sent them to Jasenovac. ‘This’, Bulajic´
argued, was ‘the historical truth of this “humanitarian action”.’86 The case of
Miroslav Shalom Freiberger’s library was also seen as cancelled out by the fact
that Freiberger was later captured by the Ustasˇa secret police and sent to a
German death-camp. 
At the same time, Bulajic´ denounced Stepinac for exercising a double
standard: if converting Jews were saved, converting Gypsies were not. ‘The
Catholic Church in Croatia didn’t care too much about them’, was his conclu-
sion.87 Bulajic´ argued generally that while Stepinac made a show of his
philosemitism after the war, his wartime actions came to nothing, since most
of the people he supposedly tried to save were eventually killed, implying that
these demonstrations of philosemitism were merely for show, concealing the
ugly truth of his own anti-Semitism. 
Alongside Stepinac, the Catholic Church was often portrayed as a genoci-
dal collaborator with the Nazis. Historians such as Dusˇan Batakovic´ derided
the Church for ‘their own brand of religious exclusionism, intolerance, and a
militant proselytizing’, which formed part of a Church-driven policy to bring
about a religiously and racially pure Croatia.88 ‘A very considerable part of
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the Croatian political elite,’ Batakovic´ concluded, ‘supported by the Catholic
hierarchy and Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac himself, supported this national
and religious intolerance, and strongly supported policies of clericalism and
racism, marked by mass killings, forced conversions and the deportation of the
Serbian Orthodox population as well the slaughter of the Jews and Gypsies.’89
For Batakovic´, Church leaders were queuing up to commit genocide against
the Serbian and Jewish populations in Croatia.
Other historians would use similar imagery, describing how the Ustasˇa
state was ‘soundly and joyously received by the majority of the Croatian
people’, and how the Catholic Church, and Stepinac in particular, were ‘the
most loyal [of] Hitler’s collaborator[s]’.90 Other writers were in no doubt that
the Vatican had been a keen advocate of genocide, with Church officials incit-
ing Croats from their pulpits to wage ‘“holy” war for the cause of a pure and
independent Croatia’.91 Serbs commonly portrayed Stepinac as the spiritual
leader of an enthusiastic gang of genocidal clergy, only too eager to swear alle-
giance to Pavelic´’s regime, in order to begin killing Serbs, Jews, and
Communists. If Stepinac’s goodness allowed Tudjman to portray the Croatian
nation as righteous and good, Stepinac’s collaboration tarred all Croats as
genocidal killers. Nevertheless, while there was evidence that some priests
had participated in atrocities, Stepinac’s record seems clear, in so far as he
never sanctioned violence or racial hatred. Those Catholic priests who actu-
ally helped the Serbs were never mentioned, nor were the many Serbian
Orthodox priests who lent their support to the Cˇetnik massacres during the
Second World War. 
Serbian sources maintained that over 80 per cent of Croatia’s Jews were
killed during the Ustasˇa period, only a few surviving by ‘sheer accident’. The
killing of Jews was ascribed to a uniquely Ustasˇi approach, spearheaded by
Andrija Artukovic´, the NDH Minister of the Interior, who devastated the
14,000-strong Jewish community in Bosnia-Hercegovina, leaving only 2,000
survivors. Artukovic´’s hatred of the Jews was often linked with a fear of
International Communism and capitalism, both of which threatened to
swamp Croatia, and the Croatian nation.92 According to other Serbian
sources, the Ustasˇa regime killed 30,000 of Croatia’s Jews during the war, as
well as a majority of the Gypsy community, estimated before the war to have
comprised between 40,000 and 100,000 people.93 The divergence between
these figures is striking. It seems that no one was certain exactly how many
Jews there were in Croatia – either before the war, or after.
Throughout the 1990s, the use of graphic, lugubrious imagery was an
important prerequisite of Serbian propaganda. The more graphic the details,
the more horrific the crimes of the Croats would appear to be, and by exten-
sion, the more important it would be to stop another Croatian genocide.
Among the favoured themes was the slaughter of innocent children, proof
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that the Croats were truly depraved. One description from Never Again was
typical of Serbian fare: 
Infants were shot in their cribs, babies were foisted on bayonettes, slaughtered
with knives, razors and axes, burned in their homes, in brickyards and in the
Jasenovac crematorium, boiled in soap melting cauldrons, bound together and
thrown into rivers and wells, thrown alive into caves and grottoes, asphyxiated in
cyanide and poisoned with caustic soda, killed through hunger, thirst and expo-
sure . . .94
This typical account conveyed the savagery of the Ustasˇa, trying to
destroy the future of the Serbian nation. ‘The foundations of the Ustasˇi state,’
the authors of this work concluded, ‘were laid on the slaughter of children.’95
Graphic portrayals of a war on children highlighted the depravity of the
Ustasˇa, but also demonstrated the extreme suffering of the Serbs, who had
been robbed of the future of their nation. 
Constantly mentioned in Serbian literature was the famous encounter
between the journalist Curzio Malaparte and Ante Pavelic´, during which
Malaparte was proudly shown a basket containing what he believed to be
Dalmatian oysters, only to be told by a triumphant Pavelic´ that these were
forty pounds of Serbian eyeballs – a gift from ‘loyal Ustasˇas’. This account,
described in Malaparte’s Kaputt (1946), was one of the favourite pieces of
imagism used by the Serbs to describe the irrationality and brutality of the
NDH. The only intrinsic value possessed by a Serb, it seemed, was his eyes.96
Such descriptions of Ustasˇa terror aimed at completely dehumanising the
Croats, imparting the idea that they were nothing more than sadistic, blood-
thirsty killers. While a certain percentage of Serbs and Croats did run wild
during four years of war, these few psychopaths did not reflect the motivations
and actions of the vast majority of the population. At the same time, it was
curious that the Serbs sought to invent a variety of anti-Vatican, anti-
Stepinac, anti-Ustasˇa stories, when there were many documented facts about
the Second World War that were far more damning. Take for example Mark
Aarons and John Loftus’s Ratlines, which factually analysed the role of the
Vatican in helping escaping Nazi war criminals. Through the Intermarium,
the Vatican controlled the largest Nazi-smuggling organisation of its kind in
Europe after the war, run in part by the Croatian priest Krunoslav Stefano
Draganovic´.97 The Intermarium even helped Pavelic´ to escape to Italy, where
the Vatican allowed him to live in one of the Pope’s summer homes, safe from
the British and the Yugoslavs.98 While this in no way validates the Serbian
position, it is curious that Serbs chose to invent and distort history, when
using well-established facts would have served their cause more effectively.
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The myth of Partisan participation
Another important aspect of Second World War revisionism was the myth of
Partisan membership. Each side tried to prove that their nation initiated anti-
fascist resistance, and was therefore on the winning side. This was of central
importance, because it proved that no one actually collaborated with the
Nazis and their puppet states. Each side now became an innocent victim of
fascism, instead of collaborators with it. Each side could also claim to have
created and founded Tito’s Yugoslavia, only to be later betrayed for their
national sacrifices – becoming martyrs when they were ‘discriminated’
against in the SFRY. 
The Serbs certainly took Partisan membership seriously. The historian
Velimir Ivetic´’s lengthy monograph examined the annual ratio of Serbs and
Croats in each Partisan detachment in Croatia, arguing that the Serbs were
the most important resistance force in the region. A summary of his findings
included the following: ‘that the participation of the Serbs from Croatia in the
common struggle against the occupier and his lackeys was enormous’; ‘that
the Serbs had the “role of initiator” of the uprising’; and, ‘that the Serbs helped
the rising up of the Croatian people against the occupier’.99 The Croats only
constituted a majority, Ivetic´ claimed, when defeat was certain. While the
Croats were represented as cynical opportunists, Serbs were credited with
extending a hand of brotherly friendship to their erstwhile enemies at the
war’s end. Ever able to forgive and forget, the Serbs supposedly helped their
killers join the Partisans.100
Similar arguments have been raised by other Serbian writers, one arguing
that: ‘persecuted Serbs swelled the ranks of Drazˇa Mihailovic´’s Cˇetniks but
even more so of Tito’s Partisans’.101 Others concluded: ‘The Serbian and
Montenegrin people are today among those freedom-loving peoples which
share the feeling of pride with the world because of their undeniable contribu-
tion to the defeat of the greatest evil of this century.’102 The Ministry of
Information similarly claimed that the Serbs were ‘freedom loving, democratic
and antifascist . . . [by their struggles against] the Croatian genocidal govern-
ment and the Nazi disintegration of Yugoslavia’.103 Still others described how
Tito was forced to move his headquarters to Belgrade from Zagreb, after the
‘enthusiasm with which the German occupiers were greeted in Zagreb in
1941’. Here, the ‘rebellious energies’ of the Serbs in Serbia, Montenegro and
in other Serbian areas were not only ‘a primary source of the anti-Fascist
struggle, but also a condition for CPY survival’.104
It was crucially important to present Serbs as the liberators of Yugoslavia,
and the greatest opponents of Fascism. While Partisan participation in the
Second World War enhanced Serbian claims to be anti-genocidal in the
contemporary conflict, a high Partisan membership also tied in with the
Serbian theme of sacrifice. Serbs had supposedly given their all to create
The Second World War and the Balkan Historikerstreit
151
2441Chapter5  16/10/02  8:05 am  Page 151
Yugoslavia, and had a legitimate claim to be the inheritors of what remained
of the country – rump-Yugoslavia. Such claims also countered Tudjman’s
assertions that every Serb had been a Cˇetnik. While few Serbs were willing to
admit that the Cˇetniks had committed any atrocities during the war, it was a
much better strategy to focus on membership of the Partisans – a less morally
ambiguous movement.
The Croats advanced similar arguments, positing that they were both the
first and the largest ethnic group in the Partisan resistance. While this ran
counter to Tudjman’s thesis that most Croats supported the CPP, it accom-
plished the same objective – proving that Croats were not wholesale
collaborators. Croatian writers argued that the majority of the Croatian popu-
lation both ‘supported and actively participated’ in Tito’s Partisan
movement.105 Others described how the ‘the first rebellion in Europe against
the [N]azi and fascist occupation’ was led by the Croats, who formed the first
Partisan unit near Sisak in June 1941. Included in one account was a list of
Croatian notables such as the poet Vladimir Nazor and ‘the democratically
oriented’ Communist leader Andrija Hebrang, as well as descriptions of how
the Croatian-based Partisans (ZAVNOH) held more liberated territory than
Tito’s pan-Yugoslav council (AVNOJ).106
Others, while admitting that Serbs at some points formed the majority in
the Partisans, dismissed their commitment to the cause, since ‘the Serbs were
primarily escaping from persecution, while the Croats chose the antifascist
side because of their personal beliefs and with the idea of preserving the iden-
tity of their state through a war of liberation’.107 Ironically, while some Serbs
may have been opportunistic in trying to save their lives, they were certainly
morally superior to those Croats who were killing them. Cohen (in an inter-
view with a Croatian newspaper) similarly posited that the Serbs were the
main collaborators in the Second World War, claiming that 70 per cent of
Croats but only 11 per cent of Serbs were antifascist. Further, any Cˇetniks who
converted to the Partisan cause supposedly did so only to transform the
Communists into a ‘new tool for “Greater Serbia”’.108
Relatively unbiased historians have described the predominance of Serbs
among the members of the NDH who joined the Partisans, largely in reaction
to the Ustasˇa atrocities; and thus there is some truth to the Serbian claim of
numerical dominance.109 This does not, however, negate the strong partici-
pation of Croats in the Partisans, nor does it detract from the massacres
committed by Serbian Cˇetniks during this time. For both sides, it became clear
that high Partisan numbers were but one more aspect of a growing revision-
ist conflict, with each side arguing the opposite of the other. Both sides
claimed to have been the key to the anti-fascist liberation of the country,
allowing both similarly to claim that their people had been against the C˘etniks
and Ustasˇa all along.
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Conclusions
In general, Serb and Croat arguments apropos the Second World War were
almost identical. Each argued in favour of their own philosemitism, victimisa-
tion, and heroism, while denouncing the others for their treachery,
anti-Semitism, collaboration, and genocide. The recent revisions of history
from both sides suggest uneasiness about the legacies of the past. They also
suggest a need to vindicate one’s own history, excising any negative historical
patterns that one might find, while at the same time continuing to identify a
coherent pattern of genocidal hatred and destruction on the part of one’s
perceived enemy.
What emerged was a blurring of the lines between acting and being, as
well as a blurring of the concepts of self and other. In both cases, each side
could rightly claim victims who were killed in the style of the Cˇetniks or
Ustasˇa, but each side was also guilty of having adopted the symbols and trap-
pings of this earlier period. Resurrected Cˇetnik and Ustasˇa units battled each
other once again, proving for many that the war was very much cast as a
continuation of an earlier conflict. Why Arkan wore full Cˇetnik regalia to
marry his ‘maid of Kosovo’ was as difficult to understand as why Dobroslav
Paraga’s renewed Party of Rights and the HOS regiments in Bosnia-
Hercegovina sported Ustasˇa insignia and used the old Nazi salute. In the cities,
Serbs in Belgrade could easily purchase Cˇetnik hats and T-shirts, while in
Zagreb, the Poglavnik’s portrait was prominently displayed over swimming
pools and in restaurants. 
However, the complexity of events can be broken down fairly simply –
each side attempted to revise and excuse the atrocities their side had commit-
ted, and part of that process involved donning their former nationalist dress,
and adopting old symbols to prove that they were not ashamed of their past
history. Demonisation of the other required the inflation of the other side’s
atrocities, and a denunciation of the enemy side’s parallel process of rehabili-
tating their own past. Thus, the work of neither side should be studied in
isolation, as has been done by both Serbs and Croats, but rather, events should
be seen as a series of related actions in an escalating crisis. 
The concept of ‘performativity’ is thus extremely important here. What
began as groups ‘playing’ Ustasˇa and Cˇetnik soon evolved into neo-Ustasˇa and
neo-Cˇetnik units, complete with traditional weaponry, uniforms, salutes, and
styles of killing. What began as a vindication of one’s own national past
became first a blurring, and then a desecration of it. Paradoxically, each side,
in the name of historical revisionism, set out to burn, loot, shell, and commit
the same barbarous acts, acts that they refused to admit their predecessors
had done. By re-enacting the past crimes of which their grandfathers stood
accused, they ironically tarnished their own national past. Curiously, while
each side blamed the other, there is no doubt that the escalation could not
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have begun if only one side had chosen to adopt a historic role. Each side
advanced almost identical arguments, countering each other fact by fact,
point by point. Without the participation of historians, politicians and jour-
nalists from both sides, no debate would have been possible.
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6
Comparing genocides: ‘numbers games’ and
‘holocausts’ at Jasenovac and Bleiburg
What will our children say about us when they read about the Balkan Holocaust
in their history books? (Stjepan Mesˇtrovic´ et al., The Road from Paradise)
Chapter 5 outlined some of the principal myths of victimisation and perse-
cution stemming from the wartime activities of the Serbs and Croats. By
invoking images of historic genocide and persecution, both sides portrayed
their actions in the 1990s as defensive only – a reaction to either
‘Serbophobia’ or ‘Greater Serbia’. This chapter reviews two of the most
important persecution myths emerging from the Second World War.
Revising the history of the Ustasˇa-run death-camp at Jasenovac was a useful
means of casting Serbs as the victims of a ‘Holocaust’ by Croats. On the
Croatian side, the massacre at Bleiburg (Austria) by Communist forces (or
Serb-led Communists, as the case might be) in 1945 was also likened to the
Holocaust. In both cases, the other side was accused of committing genocide,
using either the mask of Nazi or Communist domination to justify their
atrocities. 
Of central importance was a ‘game of numbers’, or Ronnie Landau’s
‘grotesque competition in suffering’.1 Like the works of Stannard, Dadrian,
Hancock, and others reviewed in the comparative genocide debate, Serbs and
Croats used the Jews as the litmus test for historical suffering, while also
trading genocide stories with each other. By inflating their own numbers of
dead, and reducing the numbers of enemy dead, they conducted their own
comparative genocide debate within Yugoslavia. Both Jasenovac and Bleiburg
became emblematic of national suffering and Fall during the Second World
War. Following a victim-centred strategy, both sides advanced negative
myths of identification, arguing that they alone had suffered a ‘Holocaust’
during the war, which was repeating itself in the 1990s. 
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The ‘numbers game’ at Jasenovac
During the Communist era and afterwards, the Ustasˇa death-camp at
Jasenovac became the most potent twentieth-century symbol of the victimisa-
tion of Serbs. It figured as the scene of an attempt at their genocide – some
would even refer to it as a Serbian Holocaust. Certainly this former brick-
factory was the locus of many horrible massacres, and many thousands lost
their lives at the hands of the Ustasˇa. The controversial issue was not the exis-
tence of the camp, but rather, how many Serbs actually died there. 
The major problem of Jasenovac history lies in fixing the number of dead.
This continues to be politically charged. Claiming that 50,000 died puts one
on the Croatian side, while claiming a larger number (one million or more) is
more in line with Serbian thinking. Sadly, there is little consensus on the total
number of dead, or, indeed, what percentage of the victims were Serbs.
Historians, using a variety of statistics, often arrived at startling different
figures: Denitch less than 100,000; Vulliamy around 600,000; Sˇtitkovac
‘hundreds of thousands’; Dragnich: total in NDH 500,000–700,000; Hall
750,000; Glenny 200,000; Ridley 330,000; and the United States Holocaust
Memorial Museum (300,000–400,000).2 This extreme range of estimates
may have resulted from a confusion between the number of dead at Jasenovac
and the total number of Serbs killed in Yugoslavia as a whole. Dragnich, Hall,
and Vulliamy’s numbers, for example, could either be interpretations of
Serbian-based totals for Jasenovac, or Croatian-based totals for all Serbs killed
in the NDH. 
Serbian and Croatian writers would later provoke much of this confu-
sion. However, the original statistics were themselves confusing, as they
stemmed from the Yugoslav Communists’ own manipulation of war-casualty
figures. The figure of 1,706,000 was presented at the International
Reparations Commission in 1946 without any documentation to prove its
veracity. In 1947, a second-year mathematics student named Vledeta
Vucˇkovic´ was ordered to ‘compute “a significant number” of war victims’,
and duly arrived at a figure of 1.7 million victims. This included not only
war-related deaths, but also projected future demographic losses as a result
of the war – including unborn children.3 The motives behind such a strategy
were clear – the Yugoslav Communists wanted to gain the maximum possi-
ble value of war reparations from Germany after their long and bloody
conflict. While this financial motive was significant, a symbolic motive was
also important. Communist Yugoslavia would rely on a series of myths of
‘anti-Fascist liberation’ to buttress its legitimacy. A high number of deaths
allowed the Partisans to cast themselves as martyrs to Fascism, while creat-
ing an axiomatic link between nationalism and genocide. Nationalism would
be an evil associated with racism, extermination, and death-camps, while
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the future would lie in a multiethnic, peaceful Communist society. 
Early attempts to assess the number of dead impartially after the first post-
war census in 1951 yielded new statistical results. The Americans Paul Myers
and Arthur Campbell fixed the total numbers of dead in Yugoslavia (for all
nations) at 1.067 million people, a number significantly lower than the offi-
cial estimate.4 Later analyses in the 1980s by the Montenegrin Serb Bogoljub
Kocˇovic´, and the Croat Vladimir Zˇerjavic´ arrived at similar totals – 1.014
million and 1.027 million respectively. Within this number, Kocˇovic´ posited a
Serbian total of 487,000 deaths, while Zˇerjavic´ published a slightly higher
number (530,000).5 With regard to the numbers of Serbs killed at Jasenovac,
both Kocˇovic´ and Zˇerjavic´ arrived at a figure of 83,000 deaths – each using
different statistical methods. 
While Zˇerjavic´ seems to have been drawn into the Croatian propaganda
war against the Serbs, his numbers appeared to be reasonably impartial, with
incredibly detailed descriptions of the number of ‘skeletons per square meter’
calculated over the total surface area of mass graves.6 The figure of 83,000
can, of course, never be proved conclusively, and a belief in any estimate
requires a great deal of trust in the researcher, and in his or her motives. This
explains the huge variance in estimates between impartial historians, who
simply do not know whom to believe, and have no means of verifying any
conclusions. As the wars in Croatia, and then in Bosnia-Hercegovina, esca-
lated more and more statistical surveys from each side made the Jasenovac
total even more difficult to determine.
Jasenovac and the Serbian ‘holocaust’ 
For many Serbs, maintaining a high number of Jasenovac deaths was
absolutely central to their national self-identity. A high number proved that
they had suffered from a Croat-inspired genocide during the Second World
War. Jasenovac attested to the genocidal possibilities of the Croatian nation,
proving their willingness to annihilate the Serbs in the past and in the present.
A high number also made the Serbs one of the primary victims of the Second
World War, rather than an aggressor. The Serbian Unity Congress, for
example, claimed Jasenovac as ‘the third largest concentration camp of the
WW II occupied Europe’, a common theme in Serbian writing, which
advanced a clear case for a Serbian ‘holocaust’.7 The Serbian Ministry of
Information also saw Jasenovac as a Serbian ‘holocaust’ – a holocaust that
acted as a precursor to Croatian and Bosnian Moslem aggression fifty years
later.8
Predictably, the Serbian Orthodox Church also took a leading role in
propagating the Jasenovac myth, denouncing the Croats for their part in the
genocide of the Serbs. As Patriarch Paul asserted at the beginning of the war:
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Nothing can be worse than Jasenovac, where during four years of war, 700,000
people were killed . . . Jasenovac is the scene of the most important horrors
committed against the Serbs, the place of . . . their annihilation, their extermina-
tion, their execution, their torture, where they suffered under a blood lust, the like
of which could not be paralleled by the antichrist himself . . . This is the new cruci-
fixion of Christ. This is the sin of sins.9
Such imagery of a violent, annihilatory Croatian other proved central in
motivating the Serbs to ‘defend’ the Serbian minorities who were seen to be
victims of a renewed Croatian aggression in 1991. It was not only Jasenovac,
but also the covering up of the genocide after 1945 that captured the imagi-
nation of Serbian writers. Slobodan Kljakic´’s Conspiracy of Silence, for
example, traced a Communist conspiracy to lower the number of Serbian dead
in the Second World War, a project propelled by the Vatican and the Croats.
He blamed Croatian authorities for bulldozing Jasenovac to the ground in the
1950s, supposedly ‘on orders from authorities in Zagreb’.10 Croatian
Communist leaders, such as Stevo Krajacˇic´ and Andrija Hebrang, received the
lion’s share of the blame for trying to resurrect Croatian nationalism by
suppressing negative aspects of Croatian history.11
As well as being an outspoken critic of Stepinac, Milan Bulajic´ became
famous during the 1990s for his Goldhagen-esque theorising on the Jasenovac
camps. He blamed everyone in Croatia, from the ‘paramilitary formations of
the Croat Peasant Party’ – the so-called ‘Guardians’ – to the Catholic Church,
which supposedly wanted to establish a Catholic state in the Balkans. For
Bulajic´, the motivations of the Croats and the Vatican never changed. As in the
nineteenth century, these two groups still wanted to destroy the Orthodox
Church, in order to expand Roman Catholicism in the Balkans.12
On the basis of various reports Bulajic´ drew up his own estimates of
Serbian war-related deaths: 1,467,000 (through direct war losses), and a
further 390,000–440,000 deaths (300,000–350,000 in refugee camps;
50,000 quislings; 40,000 Jews). In total, he charted the deaths of 1,850,000
Serbs, a figure surpassing even the Communist estimate, which had referred
to all national groups, not just the Serbs.13 He also famously accused the
Croats of shelling the Jasenovac memorial, ‘the largest Serbian underground
town’ – in an effort to erase the legacy of the past. That the shelling was later
proven by the Croats to be false was not discussed.14 Bulajic´ also attacked
Franjo Tudjman’s very low estimate of the numbers of dead, as expressed in
Horrors of War:
All that this book says leaves no room for surprise because it is a deplorable confir-
mation that the Ustasha clerico-nationalism has not been fully uprooted and the
result of the failure to de-nazify the Independent State of Croatia which committed
the crime of genocide against the Orthodox Serbs, Jews and Gypsies, and the
pro-Yugoslav Croats.15
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Bulajic´ was one of Tudjman’s greatest critics in the Jasenovac debate.16
He was quick to condemn ‘Tudjmanism’ as ‘a mixture of radical Croatian
chauvinism and clericalism, which is a certain form of clerical Nazism’.17 His
opinion of Tudjman himself was no less virulent. Bulajic´ often focused on the
specifically ‘Catholic’ nature of Jasenovac, questioning why so many Church
officials seemed to be in charge. The camp’s commandant, ‘Friar Satan’, was
attacked along with other priests, such as Friar Zvoniko Brekalo, who was
simultaneously attached to the Jasenovac camp while being affiliated to the
Vatican representative in Croatia. His supposed penchant for torturing and
liquidating prisoners while engaging in ‘orgies and immoral life’ with his
fellow priests was graphically described, and likewise the sadism, mass
murder, and ‘whoring’ of Friars Anzelmo Cˇulina, and Zvonko Lipovac.18
Bulajic´’s view that Jasenovac was a specifically ‘Catholic’ death camp articu-
lated the strong links between Catholicism and genocide. By extension,
Jasenovac was not simply the product of Croatian nationalism, or a gener-
alised hatred of Serbs: it was a religiously inspired exercise.
While the issue of genocidal priests was not a common theme in Serbian
writing, the numbers of Serbs killed at Jasenovac was a frequent subject of
scholarly debate. As with more impartial accounts, no Serbian writer seemed
exactly sure how many people died at Jasenovac or in Yugoslavia during the
War. Jovan Ilic´’s total was 700,000, with Serbs ‘the most numerous victims by
far’.19 Svetozar -Durd-evic´’s number was the same, as were the totals of
Patriarch Paul and Dusˇan Batakovic´.20 Bozˇidar Zecˇevic´ put the numbers killed
at over 1,000,000.21 Radoje Kontic´ added: ‘We are proud to note that with
1,706,000 killed citizens, Yugoslavia ranks third by the number of victims in
the Second World War.’22 Paul Pavlovich also endorsed 1.7 million, describing
how ‘mostly Serb lives’ were brutally ended, ‘and by the Croat hand for the
most part’. 23 Petar Damjanov also put the number at 1,700,000 victims,
claiming that every ninth Yugoslav was killed.24 Vojislav Stojanovic´, president
of the Serbian Association of University Teachers and Scientists, placed the
number of Serbs killed during their ‘genocide’ at over 2,000,000, which he
posited was, ‘in terms of suffering’, no less important than the fate of Jews in
occupied Europe.25 Similarly, Serbian General Velimir Terzic´ arrived at a total
of ‘over one million’, while Vuk Draskovic´ advanced a figure of 1,500,000
Serbs for the whole of Croatia during the war.26 While these Serbian numbers
differed by more than one million people, the totals were certainly much higher
than those advanced by impartial observers.
Revisionist novels and scholarly works were also designed to maintain or
increase the Communist estimate of Serbian deaths. Some of these include
Strahinja Kurdulija’s Serbs on Their Own Land (1993)27 and Lazo Kostich’s The
Holocaust in the Independent State of Croatia (1981), reprinted by the Serbian
government.28 Such books, as well as shorter surveys by Serbian academics,
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perpetuated the story of a high number of deaths, continuing the theme that
Serbs were victims of are of the worst genocides in the Second World War,
with only the Jews and the Russians ahead of them. These high numbers were
advanced to prove Ustasˇa evil during the war. They were also designed to
reduce the level of Serbian guilt and complicity. Dusˇan Batakovic´ gave
perhaps the most honest reason why promoting a figure of 700,000 was
central to the Serbian cause, writing: 
[T]he number of Serbian victims has, over numerous decades become the object of
political manipulation, because in reducing the dimensions of the Serbian
Holocaust, it will either be discounted completed or minimised and placed in the
ranks of vengeance done to Moslems in Oriental Bosnia and the mass shooting of
those Ustasha who were captured at the end of the war.29
Batakovic´ was quite right. If Serbs could not maintain the high number of
deaths, then they too could be accused of being genocidal killers. His oblique
references to the ethnic cleansing of Moslems by the Cˇetniks and the massacre
of Ustasˇa at Bleiburg demonstrated an awareness that each group had a
symbolic ‘holocaust’ of its own. It was therefore the responsibility of the
Serbian historian to ensure that his own nation’s genocide received top
billing. Jovan Ilic´, for similar reasons, described the Serbs’ ‘additional right to
self-determination and uniting’ because of their exposure to ‘genocidal exter-
mination many times’.30 For both Batakovic´ and Ilic´, it was crucial that
Serbian historians did their utmost to advance Serbian claims, since histori-
ans on the other side would be doing precisely the same thing for their own
claims.
Because so much of the conflict was rooted in perceptions of past victimi-
sations and the need for ‘self-defence’, such writing proved essential in
maintaining a high level of morale within Serbia. As the hardest-hit victims of
the Second World War, they had an obligation to ‘defend’ their brothers in the
Krajina, in Eastern Slavonia, and in Bosnia-Hercegovina. The myth of
Jasenovac was similar to Schöpflin’s ‘myths of redemption and suffering’,
where Serbs had a moral right to create an expanded Serbian state after 1990,
in order to prevent another genocide from occurring. 31 It was also similar to
Kecˇmanovic´’s myth of the ‘universal culprit’.32 The Croats, and their cynical
master, the Vatican, had been continuously trying to push the Serbs out of the
Balkans. Jasenovac would be yet another example of this phenomenon.
Jasenovac, the Croatians, and the ‘black legend’
Long preoccupied with the high official numbers of Serbian dead in the SFRY,
Croatian nationalists had been trying for decades to reduce the significance of
Jasenovac. As was pointed out in Chapter 1, Tudjman had been writing on the
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issue since the mid-1960s, and in his efforts to combat the official statistics
with statistics of his own he was consistently denounced and punished for his
efforts.33 A watershed therefore occurred in 1990, when at last, with the
creation of an independent Croatian state, the government was now able
publicly to open the debate, to ask that long awaited question: ‘How many
Serbs actually died at Jasenovac?’ While few impartial historians would deny
that the Communist figures were much too high (and likewise those for the
Serbs), Croatian estimates were almost always extremely low. 
For the Croatian side, it was vital to downplay the importance of
Jasenovac, to prove that the death-camp was insignificant by the standards of
the Second World War. This performed several important functions. The first
was to minimise the historic guilt of Croatia in the war, by denouncing
Serbian accusations as part of an insidious propaganda campaign. This was
meant to restore the prestige of the Croatian wartime record, while exonerat-
ing the NDH. Secondly, low numbers allowed Croatian writers to counter
their Serbian ‘victims’ with their own ‘Holocaust’ at Bleiburg, thus balancing
or neutralising atrocities in the comparative genocide debate. Thirdly, reduc-
ing the numbers of Jasenovac dead made liars and schemers of the Serbs. They
were merely trying to cover up their own sinister wartime record by accusing
innocents of exaggerated crimes.
Tudjman played a starring role in this debate. He had aroused much
controversy over his Second World War revisionist writings and his founding
of ‘Tudjmanism’ as a means of re-examining and interpreting Croatian
history. One of his primary aims was to resurrect Croatian national pride, after
it had suffered from what he termed the ‘black legend of the historical guilt of
the entire Croatian nation’.34 This guilt was clearly attributed to the statisti-
cally high number of Jasenovac deaths, which Tudjman interpreted as a
Serbian plot to suppress Croatian nationalism. It is worth quoting his expla-
nation in full: 
There is also the systematic creation of the black legend of historical guilt of the
entire Croatian nation. For if the dimensions of the Ustasha crime are stretched to
hundreds of thousands and even millions of victims, and if, by contrast, there are
no commensurate crimes on the opposite side, then the responsibility for the
crimes does not fall upon a mere handful of Pavelic’s fanatical followers, blinded
by vengeful impulses, but on the entire Croatian nation. From this point, it follows
logically that . . . Croatianness can be equated with Ustashism which is branded as
worse than Fascism or Nazism.35
The purpose of this ‘black legend’ was to maintain Serbian domination in
Yugoslavia. For Tudjman, there was a direct correlation between the exis-
tence of the ‘Jasenovac distortion’ and Serbian control. This ‘distortion’, he
claimed, kept ‘Croatianness in shackles’, while ‘instigat[ing] Serbdom against
Croatianness’.36 This contributed to his larger thesis – that the Serbs had been
Balkan holocausts?
166
2441Chapter6  16/10/02  8:05 am  Page 166
oppressing and persecuting the Croats since 1945. They had manipulated a
false sense of Croatian guilt to humble and humiliate them. This was to be a
time of ‘watershed’, as described by Kecˇmanovic´: a time had at last arrived
when Croatia could break free of its shackles – the TRUTH could now be
revealed.
Tudjman’s theories were controversial. Using various statistics, he
arrived at a total of 50,000 killed overall, not just Serbs, and not just at
Jasenovac – but for all of the Ustasˇa camps in Croatia.37 He estimated that
between 30,000 and 40,000 inmates had died at Jasenovac, and he listed
them as ‘Gypsies, Jews and Serbs, and even Croatians’ – reversing the conven-
tional order of deaths to imply that more Gypsies and Jews were killed than
Serbs.38 Satiated with his own statistics, Tudjman concluded: ‘the fabled
numbers of hundreds of thousands of slayings at Jasenovac are utter
nonsense’.39 While Bulajic´ argued that the Jasenovac numbers were too low,
and blamed the Vatican, Tudjman lashed out at the Serbian Orthodox
Church, accusing them of inflating the numbers in order to divide Serbs and
Croats, while rehabilitating the Nedic´ regime.40
While a statistical analysis of Jasenovac deaths was important,
‘Tudjmanism’ also consisted of more general historical revisionism. Though
the account in which they were embessed was somewhat conspiratorial and
melodramatic, Tudjman’s Jasenovac numbers were not unduly controversial
when compared to other revisionist numbers. More problematic was his appli-
cation of ‘Tudjmanism’ to other periods of history, as part of a larger project to
relativise the Ustasˇa genocide. A section of his book was devoted to violence,
traced back for as long as humanity ‘has been aware of its own existence’.
Genocide also had an ancient pedigree, having existed ‘since the dawn of our
primitive prehistory’.41 History according to Tudjman was a never-ending
series of violent conflicts and wars, beginning with Old Testament history,
when ‘violence, hatred, crime, and revenge are inseparable components in the
life of man’.42
Almost unbelievably for a head of state, Tudjman launched a series of
poorly aimed attacks on the Jews. He argued that the Jews had invented ethnic
cleansing, as part of their Covenant with God. ‘Israel’, he claimed, ‘in both
aggressive and defensive wars, acted as the executor of the will of God in
history, which induced religious fervour and military heroism, but also merci-
lessness.’43 The Hebrew God was one who ‘demands utter annihilation; that
is, complete destruction of the enemy, both of living beings and material
goods.’44 While there may well have been a certain ‘mercilessness’ in early
Hebrew battles, Tudjman covered much more controversial ground when he
applied these historical ‘lessons’ to his understanding of the twentieth
century. Of the Holocaust, he famously wrote: ‘The estimated loss of up to 6
million dead is founded too much on emotional, biased testimony and on
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exaggerated data in the post-war reckonings of war crimes and squaring of
accounts with the defeated.’45 He also accused the Jews of committing geno-
cide against the Palestinians in 1947, remarking: ‘After everything that it had
suffered in history, particularly because of the monstrous suffering in the
Second World War, the Jewish people would in a very short time initiate such
a brutal and genocidal policy towards the Palestinians people that it has
rightly been named as “Judeo-Nazism”.’46
The 1996 edition of Horrors of War was a substantially revised edition
from Tudjman’s original Wilderness of Historical Reality, published in 1987.
While his new edition had undergone much editing to make it palatable to a
Western market, it nevertheless retained many of its more controversial
elements. If these revisionist arguments were not enough to raise questions
about Tudjman’s motivations, he also sought to reduce the culpability of
Ustasˇa death-camp administrators. He claimed that the inmates’ administra-
tion at Jasenovac was entirely composed of Jewish capos, who were blamed for
stealing gold and other valuables from the Gypsies. Theft, he claimed, and not
racism, was the reason why the Jews were executed by the Ustasˇa.47 What
emerged from Tudjman’s extreme moral relativism was the intrinsic unim-
portance of Jasenovac and indeed the Holocaust in world history. 
While almost universally condemned for his revisionism, Tudjman
pressed ahead with his plans to rehabilitate Croatian history. Because both
the Holocaust and Jasenovac were reduced in importance and significance,
Tudjman advocated converting Jasenovac into a memorial park, to commem-
orate ‘All Croatian war victims’.48 This plan was unveiled during his ‘State of
the Croatian State and Nation Address’ in 1995. Tudjman planned to have
both the ‘victims of Communism’ and the ‘victims of fascism’ buried at
Jasenovac side by side. There were even plans to reinter Ante Pavelic´ at
Jasenovac, before Tudjman met with a storm of criticism. He later credited his
idea to Spain’s former fascist leader General Franco, and his plan for a chapel
in Toledo to commemorate both sides who had died in the Spanish Civil War.
Worryingly, Tudjman stated glowingly on one occasion: ‘In the figure of
Franco, Spain found someone who had the courage and wisdom to say that
Spanish Communists and Spanish Falangists equally fought for Spain, but
under separate flags. The same was happening in Croatia.’49 Tudjman failed
to mention, however, that such magnanimous behaviour only developed after
Franco’s more partisan view of history had been assured. Franco’s Spain
proliferated with massive public war memorials which were distinctly anti-
Communist. That he should have developed some ‘courage and wisdom’ later
in life provided little solace for those who had suffered at his hands during the
1930s and after.
Tudjman’s writings might have been influenced by the Historikerstreit,
and the debate over the normalisation of German history. Nevertheless, Ernst
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Nolte and his colleagues did not minimise Nazi crimes, nor did they endeavour
to rehabilitate Adolf Hitler. Tudjman’s agenda was qualitatively different. But
while his views on Jasenovac were highly publicised, his was neither the first
nor the last word on the subject. The literature is extensive, and was devised
in part to counter the huge estimates advanced by Belgrade academics and the
Orthodox Church. Croatian writers blamed the Serbian Orthodox Church and
Tito’s government for inflating the number of war dead, the latter in order to
promote Serbian interests, and the former in order to subdue the Croats while
gaining larger war reparations from Germany.
For some Croatian historians, Zˇerjavic´’s statistics formed the basis of
analysis, while Kocˇovic´’s were ignored. Josip Pecˇaric´, for example, supported
Zˇerjavic´’s arguments, but blamed the Serbs in particular for manipulating the
figures. The Orthodox Church and the Serbian intelligentsia, he argued, were
guilty of raising the number of dead, in order to obscure Serbian collaboration
with the Germans, since they ‘believed that it was possible to achieve Great
Serbian ambitions within Hitler’s system’.50 He also posited that such high
numbers were designed to incite the Serbs of Croatia to revolt against the
government.
Other high profile writers proposed other statistics in their stead, follow-
ing Tudjman’s lead. Ante Beljo, in Genocide in Yugoslavia (1985), contributed
to the revisionist movement, claiming: ‘The very fact that the killings which
are attributed to the Croats range from one hundred thousand to one million
seven hundred thousand are a fabrication.’51 He also cited Tudjman’s belief
that the Ustasˇa state was created primarily as an attempt to quell the ‘hege-
monic tyranny over the Croatian people in Yugoslavia under the
monarchy’.52 Echoing Tudjman’s earlier numbers, Beljo appears to support a
total of 50,000 people killed at Jasenovac, quoting Ivan Supek to the effect
that the victims were ‘leftist Croats, followed by some Serbs, Gypsies and Jews,
but mainly Communists’.53 The figure of 50,000 was also echoed by Grmek,
Gjidara, and Simac, in their anti-Serbian anthology. Their numbers included
18,000 Jews, as well as some Gypsies and Croatians, leaving little space for
Serbian deaths.54 Other writers put the total number of dead from concentra-
tion camps at 215,000, with only 79,000 Serbian casualties for all camps.55
Like Tudjman, Croatian academics substantially reduced the number of
Serbian deaths, arguing that the Serbs had falsified their own victimisation in
order to humble and humiliate Croatia.
Both sides, it appears, manipulated the number of Jasenovac deaths to
achieve specific nationalist goals. For the Croats, a low number exonerated
the nation from its ‘black legend’, proving that the Croats were persecuted and
mistreated during the Titoist period by the Serbs, who manipulated Jasenovac
to portray themselves falsely as martyrs. By reducing the number of dead,
Croatian writers debunked the myth of a genocidal Croatian nation.56 From
Comparing genocides: ‘holocausts’ at Jasenovac and Bleiburg
169
2441Chapter6  16/10/02  8:05 am  Page 169
the obverse perspective, a continued high number of deaths strengthened
Serbian claims that they were the victims of a ‘holocaust’ during the Second
World War. While one will never know the true number of deaths at
Jasenovac, the politics and manipulations involved in such a cynical
‘numbers game’ give valuable insight once again into the narcissism of minor
differences that so characterised Serbian and Croatian academe. While rela-
tively impartial surveys did exist, both sides chose to ignore these, instead
arguing that their unrealistic high or low numbers were accurate. In such a
case, the performative aspect of these revisions was clear – each side tried to
play the victim, to cast themselves as martyrs, having suffered not only from
genocide, but also a concerted effort by the enemy to cover up the TRUTH.
Bleiburg: the Croatian ‘holocaust’
For Croats, the massacre of Croatian, Slovenian and Serbian collaborators by
Tito’s Partisans was rich in imagery. It symbolised Croatian repression in the
Second World War, and later during the Communist period. That Croats were
forbidden to discuss it, let alone debate the numbers killed during Tito’s life-
time, made it a sort of ‘underground’ secret, which had to be discussed
carefully with trusted friends. The facts of the story can be substantiated,
although the number of deaths is, again, difficult to establish with certainty.
Towards the end of the Second World War, large numbers of Croatian Ustasˇa
officials and soldiers, together with Croatian Domobrani, Slovenian White
Guards, and Serbian Zbor, along with their families, retreated north, making
their way to the Austrian border, where they hoped to escape Partisan
reprisals. On 16 May, they encountered approximately 150 British troops. On
condition that they be interned outside Yugoslavia, a large number of soldiers,
administrators, and civilians surrendered to the British. Bluffed by the British
commander, they were packed into trains and rolled back into Yugoslavia,
where they were massacred by Partisan forces.57 Bleiburg became the scene of
British treachery, and the symbol for the mass murder of wartime collabora-
tors (namely: Croats) by the Partisans.
As with Jasenovac, establishing the numbers of dead was central to the
debate over whether or not Bleiburg constituted a Croatian ‘Holocaust’. By
contrast with Jasenovac, however, most impartial historians converged on
much lower numbers of dead, suggesting that Bleiburg was by no means as
significant as the largest death-camp in Yugoslavia. For example, Judah put
the numbers killed at between 20,000 and 40,000,58 Anzulovic´ at 50,000,59
Jelavich at between 40,000 and 100,000, ‘including civilians’,60 and Tanner,
at somewhere between the 200,000 suggested by ‘Croatian nationalists’ and
the 30,000 suggested by ‘others’.61
Jasper Ridley attempts a more precise figure, although there is no way of
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knowing for sure. He described how 200,000 members of anti-Partisan forces,
Slovenian White Guards, Croatian Ustasˇas and Domobrani, and Serbian Zbor,
succeeded in reaching Austria after the war.62 Of these, he noted that the
Allies agreed to surrender 23,000 to the Partisans between 24 and 29 May –
a mixture of Slovenians, Serbians, and Croatians. Reports from the time,
according to Ridley, indicate that not all the 23,000 were killed. Supposedly,
most of the young boys were saved, since Colonel Penezic´, the chief of Tito’s
political police in Serbia, felt that the youth could still be ‘cherished and re-
educated to be good and useful Communists’.63 Ridley gives a range of
between 20,000 and 23,000 killed, a high number of deaths that would indi-
cate a horrific massacre. This also squares well with the early references to the
massacre in Milovan Djilas’s Wartime (1977), wherein he confirmed that the
British handed over the escaping collaborators to the Partisans, who then
subsequently massacred them. Djilas confirmed the numbers killed, mention-
ing between 20,000 and 30,000 people: ‘Chetniks, the Ustashi, [and] the
Slovenian Home guards’. There is no denying the severity of the massacre
either, which Djilas described as ‘senseless acts of wrathful retribution’, and
‘sheer frenzy’.64
Obviously there was little mention of the massacre officially, and Djilas’s
dissident account was one of the few descriptions of it, although he failed to
mention it by name. Of course, it is certainly possible that both Ridley and
Djilas are mistaken in their lower totals, but the truth of the matter is that no
one will ever know how many died at Bleiburg and other Communist- inspired
post-war massacres. Information about Bleiburg was obviously suppressed
during the lifetime of the SFRY, in keeping with much of Titoist policy
surrounding the Partisans’ actions during wartime. The ‘underground’
nature of this knowledge arguably gave it a certain cachet during the
Communist era. Everybody knew about it – but no one could discuss it
publicly. Nevertheless, irrespective of its suppression, Bleiburg has fared as
well as the history of any other Second World War massacre. The main
problem for Croats, however, was not simply that Bleiburg had not been
adequately discussed, but that, seen in relation to the horrors of Jasenovac, it
was non-existent. 
Inflating the numbers of dead at Bleiburg had several layers of signifi-
cance. Firstly, it gave the Croats their own massacre at the hands of Serbs
and/or Communists, which allowed them to counter the Serbs’ Jasenovac
genocide with one of their own. Secondly, it allowed Croats to distance them-
selves from the Serbs and the Communist regime that had carried out the
massacres. They could portray Croatia as an unwilling participant in the
SFRY, more a prisoner than a constituent nation. Thirdly, by suffering such a
massacre, the Croats underwent their own ‘way of the Cross’, as it was
frequently dubbed in Croatian writings. The sins of the Ustasˇa could be
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cleansed by their martyrdom at Bleiburg, vindicating both the Croatian
nation and the NDH.
Croats and the numbers game
There is little convergence among Croatian writers on the actual numbers of
dead. Some, like Vladimir Zˇerjavic´, cited a low number of between
54,500–65,000 (45,000–55,000 Croatians and Moslems, 1,500 – 2,000
Serbian and Montenegrin Cˇetniks, and about 8,000 Slovenian Belogardists),
one that balanced out his low figure for Jasenovac.65 Josip Sˇentija described
one massacre of between 30,000 and 40,000 Croats, and then argued that
‘several times that number’ were killed at Bleiburg, ‘and also along the roads
in north-west Slovenia’.66 Another article contended that ‘more than
100,000 Croatian civilians and soldiers were executed’.67 While high, these
numbers suggest a conscientious effort to advance realistic numbers.
More radical writers, however, would follow the Serbian example with
the Jasenovac statistics, and inflate the numbers of dead. C. Michael
McAdams, for example, posited a range from 100,000 to 250,000.68 Ivo
Omercˇanin arrived at a figure of ‘500,000 Catholic and Muslim Croats’.69
Stjepan Hefer’s numbers were roughly the same: 150,000 soldiers and
300,000 civilians.70 Putting the total killed at 400,000, Mislav Jezic´
described how soldiers and civilians fled to Austria, ‘out of fear of the
greater-Serbian and communist terror’.71 Ante Beljo’s theories about what he
terms the ‘Croatian Holocaust’ were equally contentious, in that he repro-
duced, and seemed to advance, the argument of the Diaspora journal Nova
Hrvatska that those killed at Bleiburg were slaughtered at a rate of 15,000 per
day, a figure that made Bleiburg ‘worse than Auschwitz’, where only 6,000
were supposedly killed each day.72 He would also reproduce George Prpic´’s
1973 research, which described Bleiburg as ‘the bloodiest orgy in Balkan
history … result[ing] in the death and exodus of over one million men, women,
and children’, although he had earlier referred to a more realistic figure of
‘tens of thousands of Croatian lives’, which he blamed the Communists for
taking.73 Much of his research and the lengthy reproductions of other
research in his book stemmed from the belief that ‘Throughout history there
is probably no nation which has suffered as much, which has had as many
victims and which was at the same time labelled criminal as the Croatian
nation is.’ 74
The only high-ranking detractor of the Bleiburg myth was Franjo
Tudjman, who placed the number of dead at ‘some 35,000 to 40,000
people’. He even criticised Beljo’s figures, as well as those of other noted revi-
sionists.75 Tudjman’s motives behind this are unclear, particularly since a
proportion of Beljo’s work was based on Tudjman’s earlier writings. Perhaps
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Tudjman was trying to distance himself from the whole debate. He seemed
anxious during the war to have the number of Jasenovac and Bleiburg
deaths be the same – his figure of 50,000 was used for both. Similarly, the
fact that he was a former Partisan general (and thus a long-term supporter
of the regime) may also have contributed to his reluctance to inflate the
numbers any further.
Motives and participants in Bleiburg
In general, the high numbers of dead and the rate of killings ensured that
Bleiburg was seen as no ordinary massacre, but one that could be compared
numerically with the Holocaust. This was of course only part of the story;
equally important were the identities of the participants and their motiva-
tions. Some writers, like McAdams, seemed to accuse the British and
Americans of initiating the massacres. He described a ‘march of death’ where
Croatian soldiers and government officials were forced out of Zagreb at
gunpoint by the Allied Expeditionary Forces. An exodus supposedly began in
May 1945, with 200,000 civilians and 200,000 soldiers, all of whom were
apparently led to Bleiburg by the Allies, and then handed over to the
Communists for execution. As McAdams wrote: ‘Some were shot at the
border, while others joined the infamous death march which took them
deeper into the new People’s Republic for liquidation.’76
While the Allies were sometimes blamed, other revisionist historians
manipulated the story of Bleiburg to transform it into a massacre of Croats by
Serbs. One of Philip Cohen’s more controversial arguments was that Serbian
Communists, not just Communists in general, had carried out the Bleiburg
massacres. Beginning with a dismissal of Serbian Partisans as opportunists,
former collaborators and fascist killers, he went on to articulate his main
argument: 
It was only after the withdrawal of the Germans and the overthrow of the Nedic´
regime by advancing Soviet forces and their Partisan allies in October, 1944, that
the Serbs in Serbia began to join the Partisans in large numbers. These new
Partisans included tens of thousands of former Nazi collaborators responding to
Tito’s promise of amnesty, as well as to the call of the Serbian king-in-exile – reluc-
tantly and under British pressure – for Serbian Chetniks to join British forces.77
Here, the Croats were presented as indigenous resisters, while the Serbs
joined merely to save themselves. Cohen used this idea of the opportunist
Serbs to explain the Bleiburg massacre ‘of repatriated Croats and Slovenes,
and even a number of Chetniks’.78 While Cohen noted Tito’s strategy of ‘insti-
tuting state terror to ensure the Communists’ post-war monopoly of power’,
he also cited the more important reason why Bleiburg took place. This was to
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allow for ‘a Serb-driven blood letting’ – to help cement Serbia’s loyalty to
Tito’s movement.79 In Cohen’s analysis, the massacres had little to do with
Tito’s exacting revenge, and much more to do with Serb-driven malice, which
even membership in the Partisans could not erase.80
One can thus isolate several layers to the Bleiburg story. At one level, the
massacre was likened to the Holocaust, in terms of the numbers of people
killed, and the rate of killing. This allowed for a general myth of victimisation
– that the Croats had suffered, like the Jews, because of Bleiburg. At another
level, not only were the Partisans to blame, but rather, the Serbian-led
Partisans, who were in fact genocidal Cˇetniks, using Communism as a screen
for Greater Serbian aggression. Thus the Croats, who suffered a holocaust at
the hands of genocidal Serbs, were likened to the Jews. In this way, a conflict
between fascist collaborators and vengeful Communists became a battle
between victimised Croats and genocidal Serbs. 
Cohen was clear that the Bleiburg massacre was Serbian-led. Because of
Bleiburg, they succeeded in dominating the SFRY and controlling it until its
collapse. Further, Cohen accused Tito of allowing high-ranking Serbian
collaborators to continue to oppress Croats and Slovenes in the SFRY. It is
worth quoting his conclusion in full: 
These events [the Bleiburg massacre] led to Serb numerical domination of
Yugoslavia’s Communist Party and provided the window of opportunity for a
substantial core of Serbian Nazi collaborators to attain influential positions in the
postwar Yugoslav government. Although some of the most prominent Serbian
pro-Axis collaborators were condemned and punished after the war, Tito never-
theless allowed a significant degree of historical revisionism by Serbian apologists
rather than risk offending this much needed constituency.81
Here too the Serbs were seen at the core of a Yugoslavia that figured
merely as another instrument of Serbian domination. Needless to say, many
of Cohen’s conclusions were virtually impossible to prove. In the case of
Bleiburg, he is unable to identify the actual soldiers who carried out the
massacres, nor is he able to present any real proof that these Partisans were in
fact Serbian.
Bleiburg as a Ustasˇa ‘sacrifice’
Croatian arguments supported the belief that the Croats were victims of a
Serb-inspired holocaust, one that Serbs used instrumentally to gain control of
the second Yugoslavia. But Bleiburg also performed another important role –
that of vindication. Terms such as ‘holocaust’, ‘march of death’, ‘exodus’ and
‘genocide’ were used with the specific intent of rehabilitating the Ustasˇa.
Ustasˇa war criminals were ‘magically’ transformed into innocent victims of
Serbian aggression. They were not killed as collaborators, but as Croatian
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patriots who wanted an independent homeland. This rehabilitation proved
central to the Bleiburg project, particularly for those, like Beljo, who funda-
mentally believed that Croatians had never done anything in their history
that they should be ashamed of, since: ‘[t]hroughout history we have never
conquered, plundered or exploited other nations’, a belief little different from
Draskovic´’s contention that ‘Serbs cannot hate.’82
Academics, such as Josip Sˇentija, elaborated on this rehabilitation. Using
such metaphors as ‘march of death’ and ‘way of the cross’, Sˇentija seems to
suggest that the Croats redeemed themselves for the Ustasˇa period by dying in
mass numbers at the hands of the Communists. They may have been misled,
but their sacrifice somehow purified the entire Croatian nation of its sins.83
Such imagery was indeed fascinating, as it reflected many of the themes raised
in the Serbian myth of Kosovo, primarily the aestheticisation of the victim,
and the ideal of being morally victorious in defeat. Rather than being massa-
cred by the Partisans, these soldiers seemingly gave their lives in defence of
Croatia. Bleiburg thus became a ‘myth of election’ in its own right, in that it
transformed Nazi collaborators into patriots, making Croats victims in the
Second World War, rather than aggressors.
The official perpetuation of this form of amnesia regarding Ustasˇa crimes
took shape most recently on 15 May 1997, when the Croatian government
organised a holy mass at Bleiburg, to commemorate the 52nd anniversary of
the tragedy. The mass brought 1,000 pilgrims to Austria, at which time
Dubravko Jelcˇic´, the representative of the chair of the Croatian Assembly
(Sabor), described Bleiburg as ‘one of the greatest tragedies in [the] history of
the Croatian people’, marking, ‘a new kind of slavery await[ing] Croatia’
(clearly a reference to a ‘Serb-dominated’ Yugoslavia). Continuing the process
of rehabilitating the Ustasˇas, he painted them as patriots rather than fascists:
‘[T]he issue is about Croats who fanatically believed in a Croatian state, not
about an ideology – red or black – that was not even apparent.’ This type of
revisionism glossed over the very real atrocities committed by Croats during
the war. It is also a way of discrediting Yugoslavia, for, as Jelcˇic´ was keen to
add: ‘All that is founded on evil collapses, and that is why Yugoslavia is
forevermore our past and Croatia our awakened future .’84
The chair of the Croatian Assembly, Vlatko Pavletic´, took Bleiburg a step
further, and universalised the massacre, arguing that it had become nothing
less than ‘the generic term for the suffering of Croats’. Further, he maintained
that the struggle against fascism and Nazism had been supported by the entire
Croatian population – another instance of an extreme form of revisionism that
ran counter to historical fact. Other controversial theories included the
contention that ‘Croats were the first antifascists in Europe and the world’ and
that ‘the majority of NDH military units fought against fascism’. These state-
ments were revisionist in the extreme.85 By this time, a form of collective
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amnesia had taken hold of many HDZ officials. By acting out or performing
their role as martyred victims, Croatian nationalist leaders convinced them-
selves and their fellow Croats that Croatia had nothing to be ashamed of. The
slate had now been wiped clean. 
Pavletic´’s attempt to universalise the lessons of Bleiburg is another fasci-
nating aspect of this particular myth. As with the universalisation of the
Holocaust, Bleiburg was supposedly sufficiently significant to become a
symbol for Croatia as a whole. Bleiburg made victims of the Croatian fascists,
while once again demonising the Serbs for their age-old plans to construct a
‘Greater Serbia’ in the Balkans. Whether they were Cˇetniks or Communists,
the lesson was clear – a Serb was always a Serb, and would continue to hate
Croatians, no matter what ideology he or she followed. At the same time
Bleiburg encapsulated the antagonism between the Croatian self and the
Serbian-dominated Communist others in the SFRY. Because Bleiburg was
covered up, and the Serbs supposedly dominated Yugoslavia, the Croatian
‘holocaust’ continued for another forty-five years after the Second World
War. This made Croatian involvement in the SFRY seem unnatural, which
again buttressed their decision to leave the Federation. 
Ubiquitous throughout the conflict has been nationalist kitsch; Bleiburg
has fared no differently. The New Zealand artist Suzanne Brooks-Pincˇevic´
recently produced a series of paintings on the ‘Bleiburg Tragedy’, which she
dedicated to ‘the Croatian cause’. The paintings and her subsequent book
gave an overview of ‘Croatia’s violent rebirth’. Typically, the book covered the
links between the Second World War ‘genocide’ against the Croats by the
Serbs and Communists, and the ‘complicity’ of Britain in mass murder. It
further promised to ‘slash open the fabric of silence that has shrouded the
truth of Croatia’s past’. In the end the reader was confronted with ‘a century
of genocide’ committed by the Serbs against the Croats.86 While Croatian
writers had been obsessed with Bleiburg for many decades, the innovation
after 1990 was the targeting of Serbs as the prime culprit in the massacre.
Krunoslav Draginovic´ (one of the Croatian founders of the ‘Ratlines’) wrote
an exposé of the massacre in 1955, citing a figure of between
100,000–140,000 soldiers and civilians killed. He even used Biblical imagery
such as ‘Calvary’ and the ‘way of the cross’ to describe the forced marches and
the positioning of mass graves.87 The difference between old and new lay in
Bleiburg’s executioners. In Draginovic´’s account, Tito and the Communists
were clearly the instigators of the massacres. His own attempts to smuggle
Nazi leaders like Klaus Barbie out of Europe certainly attested to his hatred of
Communism. Nevertheless, leaving aside Draginovic´’s political motives, the
Serbs are not even mentioned. The same holds true for Beljo’s Genocide in
Yugoslavia (1985), which attempted to engage with the Communist regime
and its atrocities. Beljo’s sixth chapter entitled ‘The Bleiburg Tragedy Isn’t
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Over’, accuses the Yugoslav government, in particular the UBDa (‘Uprava
drzavne bezbednosti’, in English ‘The Department for State Security’), of a
wide variety of atrocious crimes throughout the world against certain
members of Diaspora Croatian communities.88 Generally, until Milosˇevic´,
there was simply no need to highlight any form of Serbian aggression, even for
the future director of the Matica Hrvatska.
There is an obvious problem with the high numbers for Bleiburg – they
conflicted with the equally common claims of Croatian historians that few
Croats supported the NDH, that defection was high, and that most Croats were
part of the Partisan movement. Two clear contradictions emerge here. First of
all, if it was indeed so easy for the Cˇetniks to join up with the Partisans during
Tito’s quest for volunteers, why did the Ustasˇa and the Domobran not do the
same? And also, if the Croats were the vanguard of Partisan resistance, why
were they not able to stop the massacres? Indeed, if they claim to have been
the majority, it is almost certain that the massacre, no matter how large, must
have involved many Croatian Partisans, which makes perfect sense, since
they too would have an axe to grind against their fellow nationals who had
collaborated. This logical conundrum can be simply explained by the fact that
Croatian historians were attempting to cover all bases. They want to be
victims of a ‘holocaust’, the leaders in anti-Fascist resistance, the founders of
the SFRY, and conscientious objectors to the NDH regime. 
Conclusions
As this chapter indicates, the legacy of the Second World War continued to be
of paramount importance during the recent war in Croatia and the later war
in Bosnia-Hercegovina. High among Serbian and Croatian concerns was the
extent to which they were the victims of the Second World War. By proving
their own victimisation at the hands of Croatian enemy, Serbs portrayed their
machinations in Croatia as self-defensive, preventing a ‘repeated genocide’ of
Serbs. Similarly, for Croats, the massacre at Bleiburg demonstrated a pattern
of Serbian genocidal aggression, followed by scheming, cover-ups and politi-
cal dominance. Clearly, being a victim of a ‘holocaust’ carried tremendous
moral and political weight, and each side was anxious to use such imagery to
its fullest extent. As Finkielkraut, Landau and others have noted, the univer-
salisation of the Holocaust has allowed for the borrowing of its symbols in the
service of social and political movements. 
The issue of performativity is of central importance in understanding the
Jasenovac and Bleiburg revisions. By casting themselves as victims of geno-
cide in in Second World War, both sides were able to play the victim in the
1990s, arguing that contemporary events were a repeat of the past.
Kecˇmanovic´’s negative myths, those of ‘damage’, ‘plot’, ‘universal culprit’,
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and ‘counteridentification’, were commonly used by both sides to highlight
the strong differences between the two sides and their respective roles in the
Second World War. The reinterpretation of Serbian and Croatian history was
extremely important. If actions in the 1990s were to be extensions of those in
the 1940s it was imperative to prove that these earlier actions were horrific
and genocidal. Each side, by proving its own ‘holocaust’ was able to convince
its own people that they needed to defend themselves against the renewed
horrors of genocide. At the same time, recalling the Second World War
allowed both sides to deny the reality of Serbian–Croatian co-operation during
the SFRY, leading to the view that its break-up was both inevitable and
natural. 
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7Tito’s Yugoslavia and after: Communism,
post-Communism, and the war in Croatia
Not only is the Yugoslav reality as twisted as the tunnels that held the Minotaur,
but the observer keeps coming face to face with himself, seeing his own image
spring out from what he thinks are the events of history, unable to separate
projection from observation, fact from reflection, self from other. (E. A. Hammel in
The Yugoslav Labyrinth)
After the Second World War and the devastation caused by German and
Italian invasion, the Yugoslav peoples had the task of rebuilding their society
after it had been torn apart by occupation and fratricidal warfare. The legends
surrounding Tito’s Communist Partisans and their war of liberation are well
known, immortalised in such works as Milovan Djilas’ Wartime, Fitzroy
Maclean’s The Heretic, and Frank Lindsay’s Beacons in the Night. However, as
has been seen in the preceding two chapters, contemporary Serbian and
Croatian reinterpretations of this period were often negative. The Croatian
myth of Bleiburg maintained that the foundations of Tito’s Yugoslavia were
constructed on the genocide of Croatian soldiers. For the Serbs, Tito was little
more than an ethnic Croat with a grudge against Yugoslavia’s largest and
most powerful nation. Both sides presented the lifetime of the SFRY as an era
when national identity was suppressed under a barrage of Communist propa-
ganda. National symbols were replaced with ‘Brotherhood and Unity’ and
Tito’s own cult of personality. In Tito’s Yugoslavia, ethnic hatreds seemingly
smouldered below the surface, manifesting themselves in bizarre and often
contradictory ways.
The first part of this chapter explores Serbian and Croatian nationalist
interpretations of the Yugoslav period, during its rise, its decline, and finally,
its Fall. The second examines how propagandists succeeded in making direct
connections between past eras of persecution and the contemporary wars of
the 1990s. For both sides, the past was nothing more than a template for the
present and the future. Past patterns of behaviour, values, morals, paradigms,
and ideologies directly determined national goals and priorities in the 1990s.
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National leaders were seen as little more than the latest exponents of age-old
ideologies and national strategies. The theme of the ‘universal culprit’ was
advanced throughout the conflict. 
Milosˇevic´ became a nineteenth-century Greater Serbian politician, with a
bit of Adolf Hitler thrown in for good measure. Tudjman was nothing less than
the reincarnation of Ante Pavelic´. The Second World War was being re-
enacted in Serbia and Croatia, and all decisions would be calculated on an
analysis of the past, not on a realistic assessment of contemporary events.
Propagandists seemingly lived in the past; but this was a past that was clev-
erly manufactured. Milosˇevic´’s huge rallies and religious processions, and
Tudjman’s elaborate uniforms and ubiquitous memorials, turned parts of
Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Hercegovina into giant surreal nationalist theme
parks.
Set against a conflict of Biblical proportions, participants in the contem-
porary conflict were presented as actors in a drama, performing according to
well-rehearsed nationalist patterns of behaviour. The originality behind such
revisionism lay in the fatalism attached to events as they transpired. Everyone
saw their actions as responses, rather than as individual initiatives. Leaders
claimed that they were responding to historic injustices, rather than actively
creating something new. They also portrayed nationalism as a movement to
correct the injustices of the past, rather than advancing a utopian project or a
grand vision of the future.
The Communist era: 1945–90
In coming to terms with the Communist period, there was certainly much to
criticise. Tito’s dictatorial rule relied on a corrupt base of power, and a person-
ality cult of messianic proportions. The country was burdened by
overcentralisation, massive foreign debt, and a powerful secret police force
that cracked down on any internal dissent. Many saw Communism as an arti-
ficially imposed Russian system, forced on the people by Tito and Stalin – an
attempt to destroy indigenous nationalisms. One might even add that, in the
Partisans’ expulsion of Yugoslavia’s German minorities after 1945, they were
promoting the ideals of ethnic cleansing that would become a key facet of
nationalism in Bosnia-Hercegovina five decades later. Banac argues that
there were more than 513,000 Germans in the 1921 census, most of whom
were descendants of German colonists brought in by the Habsburgs in the
eighteenth century. Most of these people were forced out after the Partisans
gained control of the country.1
Despite these detractions, Yugoslavia was arguably the freest country in
Eastern Europe, the most open to the West, and certainly one of the richest
and most cosmopolitan in the Balkans. While most of the wealth was concen-
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trated in Slovenia and Croatia, Yugoslavia’s economy did come close to
rivalling that of Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic.
Additionally, Tito was genuinely popular with his people, despite his egoma-
nia and corruption (or perhaps in part because of them). In many ways, he
held the country together, and was more successful as a leader than his other
Balkan counterparts – Nikolai Ceausescu, Todor Zhivkov, and Enver Hoxha.
The positive aspects of Communism in Yugoslavia were obvious – a high
standard of living, the freedom to travel and work abroad, and a strong sense
of patriotism. Yugoslavia was a founder of the Non-Aligned Movement, and
played an important geopolitical role as a symbolic bridge between East and
West, Capitalism and Communism. When nationalism rose to the forefront in
the 1980s, there was little attempt actually to bring about a post-Communist
society, such as was marginally achieved in Hungary, Poland, and the Czech
and Slovak Republics. The Yugoslav successor states, like their Balkan neigh-
bours, did not fully dismantle Communism as a system of government – many
of the authoritarian structures and values remained. Little attempt was made
to criticise the legacy of Communism itself, or to attack the rampant corrup-
tion, the rising foreign debts, or any of the other stark realities of the system.
Both Tudjman and Milosˇevic´ appreciated the extent of the power a
Communist dictator could enjoy, and they were not about to relinquish the
many advantages that leadership afforded in the old system.
When Serbian and Croatian nationalists criticised the Titoist era, the
national question loomed large, out of proportion with more important issues.
Yugoslavia was condemned because it inhibited nationalism, because it
allowed ‘enemy’ national groups to gain power and control events. Tito was
not condemned for being dictatorial or corrupt, but rather, for being
controlled by either the Serbs or the Croats – for giving away too much of
one’s own nation’s historic possessions to another national group.
Communism was seen as a catalyst enabling the enemy nation to gain power
and influence. It was not condemned as a failed system, but as an instrument
– infinitely subject to manipulation. Thus there was never any real attempt to
purge Communism from the country as such: only to correct the national
imbalances of the system. 
While Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia saw Communism as a crime
committed against all citizens, Serbian and Croatian nationalists painted
federal Communism as the root of their problems, an evil that was selectively
deployed against specific national groups, not against the country as a whole.
Milosˇevic´’s solution was to recentralise the SFRY; Tudjman’s was to pull
Croatia out of it. By separating Communism and Federalism, Serb and Croat
leaders managed to retain most aspects of the Communist system intact.
While purged of non-nationals, most of the key ministries remained the same.
Rigid control over state enterprises, the media and other aspects of life
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remained. Both Tudjman and Milosˇevic´ were keen to carve out their own Tito-
esque cults of personality, Milosˇevic´ as a reincarnation of Prince Lazar,
Tudjman with his gold-braided uniforms as a ready-made Tito-for-Croats. 
This separation of Communism and Federalism was all-important, as it
allowed nationalists to demonise certain aspects of Titoist Yugoslavia, while
preserving others. There was no doubt that Tito’s Communism had improved
the state considerably, and very much brought Yugoslavia, technologically
and industrially, into the twentieth century. It was not the generation of
wealth or industry that was attacked, but the balance between the different
national groups – who got what, and how much. Even when the Communist
government was attacked for persecuting the people (the use of police harass-
ment, or imprisonment on the prison island Goli Otok), persecution was not
seen as part of the system, but was blamed on nationalists manipulating the
system against members of other nations. When Communism was attacked,
the variant (not necessarily the structure) was condemned. Serbs were
constantly blamed for trying to over-centralise or Stalinise the system. Croats
were blamed for wanting decentralisation, while hoarding all the profits of
tourism for themselves. Such issues demonstrated the system’s failure to
restrain nationalism, not the system’s failure itself.
Serbian views of Tito’s Yugoslavia
Arguably, Serbian writers had generally supported the Communist regime in
Yugoslavia. Certainly, the execution of Drazˇa Mihailovic´, the purges of Cˇetnik
sympathisers, the decentralising 1974 constitution, and other anti-Serbian
aspects of the regime raised troubling questions about Serbia’s place in the
SFRY. Nevertheless, while Tito was alive, there seemed to be a high level of
support for the regime and its policies. An obvious example of this was the
1969 election, when Serbs were offered the choice between reformers and
hard-line candidates. While the rest of the country chose reform-oriented
newcomers, Serbs overwhelmingly supported the old guard.2
Nevertheless, by 1986 Serbian writers had turned on the system, as
Yugoslavia began to fall apart. Danko Popovic´’s celebrated Knjiga o Milutinu
(The Book About Milutin) became an instant best-seller in 1986, promoting the
thesis that Serbs had made a ‘fatal error’ in liberating their Slavic ‘brothers’
during the Second World War, and then another in once more engaging in
political union with them. Milutin’s sayings were printed on placards during
nationalist demonstrations; even group recitation during public gatherings
was not unknown.3 Dobrica C´osic´’s work reflected similar themes: that Tito’s
Yugoslavia had reduced Serbia to a mere Communist province without
history, culture, or national identity. In The Sinner and The Outcast, C´osic´
derided the federal system for suppressing Serbian identity and nationalism.
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Moscow and the Comintern, he posited, had installed an ‘anti-Serbian’
Communist regime in Yugoslavia.4 He would later add:
In the course of the four decades of Titoist tyranny, the Serbian people suffered
from a veritable de-historification. Serbian identity and historical, spiritual,
economic and political integrity were systematically demolished. The symbols and
the fruits of the war of liberation belonging to the Serbian people were denigrated
and falsified, while confiscating our magnificent Middle Age, shortening our
history . . . the entire history of the Serbian people was reduced to the history of the
socialist movement, while the history of the communist party itself was reduced to
the era of Tito.5
Themes of an anti-Serbian Communism would eventually find their way
into the 1986 SANU Memorandum. Among the Communists’ damnable
offences was their explicit support of anti-Yugoslav secessionist movements in
1925. The fact that there was no Serbian Communist Party organisation until
1945 was also seen to indicate a consistent anti-Serbian bias.6 While one
cannot deny the veracity of the events in question, it is clear that Tito’s early
movement was aimed at destroying a repressive, nationalist monarchy,
according to his own Communist beliefs. Any Croatian or Slovenian national
convictions were most certainly of secondary importance. 
Other Serbian views included the theory that the Serbs had been continu-
ously exploited economically. The Memorandum claimed that the Communists
had reduced the economic potential of Serbia in favour of Slovenia and
Croatia. Serbia was forced to support undeveloped regions, while selling its
natural resources at subsidised prices to the developed republics. For the
Memorandum’s authors, this came as no surprise, given that the ‘Croat’ Tito
and the ‘Slovene’ Kardelj were the key officials behind such economic poli-
cies.7 Thus, Serbia was seen to have been simultaneously exploited, both by
the richer republics of Croatia and Slovenia, and by poorer republics, such as
Kosovo and Macedonia. Rather than attack the massive foreign debts, the
corruption and the wholesale neglect of the economy by Tito and his Partisan
clique, known affectionately at the ‘Club of 1941’, Serbian writers chose to
focus on what they perceived to be the deliberate and conscious impoverish-
ment of Serbia. In reality, Serbia’s poverty was an indirect result of much
larger problems. 
Administrative versus natural borders
As has been discussed in earlier chapters, a key issue during the war in Croatia
was the legitimacy of borders. Because the borders of all federal republics were
put in place by Tito and the Djilas Commission, Serbian writers argued that
these borders were purely artificial, the result of Croatian machinations to
reduce the size of historic Serbia. For some of the more powerful Serbian insti-
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tutions, like the Serbian Association of University Teachers, Tito’s Croatian
background was blamed for the supposed increase in Croatia’s size after 1945,
and Serbia’s shrinking. For such associations, Tito had created nothing less
than a ‘Greater Croatia’ during the lifetime of the SFRY.8 Others similarly
denounced the borders as ‘political improvisation’, denying that they had any
historic basis.9
For Serbian writers, the implications were very clear. The Serbs alone
were targeted by ‘Croat Josip Broz Tito’.10 While the other nations, such as the
Slovenes, Croats, Bosnian Moslems, and Macedonians were granted their own
national republics, one-third of Serbs were forced to live outside Serbia. It was
Tito’s ethnic identity that was all-important for the Serbs. He had purposely
weakened them, the largest and most important nation in Yugoslavia, with
some 40 per cent of the population. Because of his ethnicity, and the fact that
the borders had been created to favour Croatia, Serbian writers argued that
there was a serious divergence between the borders of nations and the borders
of republics. The result was a clear denial of Croatia’s right to leave Yugoslavia
with its borders intact. Any secession without negotiations on new borders
was considered to be illegal: hence the need for the JNA.
The most common view of the conflict was promoted by various Serbian
‘constitutional’ and ‘federalism’ experts, who claimed to be analysing the
break-up of Yugoslavia according to the prescriptions of international law.
Milosˇevic´’s contribution to the breakdown of the Federation was always
avoided. Rather, a highly legalistic interpretation of developments would
conveniently gloss over Serbian politicking. Serbian writers often blamed the
war in Croatia on what was termed ‘the unilateral and illegal secession’ of
Slovenia and Croatia from Yugoslavia. They further blamed the international
community, primarily Germany and the Vatican, for recognising Slovenia,
Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina, turning their ‘administrative’ borders into
international borders when minority rights were still hanging in the balance.
The problem for such writers was that ‘almost 3 million Serbs’ lived in these
newly independent republics, and were now cut off from their fellow Serbs.11
Croatia was therefore accused of several things – of leaving Yugoslavia
without consulting the other republics, and of deliberately endangering the
lives of Serbian minorities living there. The claim of the supposed ‘illegality’ of
Croatian actions was hypocritical at best, when compared with Milosˇevic´’s
own manipulation of borders and boundaries. Nevertheless, such accusations
followed logically from accusations that Tito had deliberately conspired with
Croatian and Slovenian Communists to reduce the power of his ‘enemy’ –
Serbia. Because of this situation, the Serbs were now justified, from a purely
legalistic viewpoint, in having their own referendum on the independence of
the Krajina, ‘since their ancestors settled these territories more than 500
years ago’.12 While the Croats were denounced for not upholding the demo-
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cratic will of the Serbs, they were also condemned as hypocrites for expecting
the Yugoslav government to honour their own referendum on sovereignty. 
As Slobodan Samardzic´ argued, the ‘illegal’ secession of Croatia and
Slovenia destroyed the basic ‘constitutional corpus of “acquired rights”’ that
had been present in the Federation. Within the SFRY, Croatian Serbs had
special rights as a constitutive people, a status that disappeared once Croatia
became independent. From a purely legalistic and constitutional standpoint,
Samardzic´ justified the war in Croatia. Serbs, he posited, had to protect them-
selves against the ‘ethnic homogenization’ of the country, which was making
Croatian Serbs ‘minorities against their will’.13 This view that Croatian Serbs
were being forced to leave Yugoslavia was a key argument in promoting the
Krajina referendum. Using a variety of persuasive technical and legal argu-
ments, Samardzic´ tried to gloss over the reality of what was happening in
Croatia at that time. Paramilitary forces and the JNA, both encouraged by
Milosˇevic´, were in control of one-third of Croatian territory in 1994 when his
article was written. Clearly, there was much more at stake than Serbs worried
about a change in their ‘constitutional status’.
The difference between the borders of federal units and the borders of
states was a theme constantly reiterated by Serbian academics. Serbs were
quick to argue that ‘only nations can secede from Yugoslavia, and not territo-
ries of republics’.14 One Ministry of Information spokesperson thus described
Croatia’s manipulation of international law, in order to ‘seize another nation
and another territory and to lend legal force to such an act’ – clearly some-
thing the Serbs disputed.15 The main argument was simple – Tito had never
intended to allow individual republics to secede. He saw republican borders as
administrative only.
Croatian nationalists obviously had a contrary view of the situation. They
commonly argued that Croatia’s borders were not administrative, but ethnic
and cultural. Serbian arguments were refuted by Croatian geographers, who
described their borders as ‘among the oldest in Europe’. A survey by the geog-
raphers Ivan Crkvencˇic´ and Mladen Klemencˇic´ maintained that there had
been only a 10 per cent change in Croatia’s borders in the twentieth century
– a loss of Croatian territory after 1918, owing to the success of ‘Greater
Serbia’.16 Other writers traced the historic origin of Croatia’s borders, which
were defined during war against the Ottomans in the seventeenth and eigh-
teenth centuries, and had remained more or less unchanged since that time.17
Croatian writers also managed to defend the minority issue, since Croatia,
with 80 per cent of its people being ‘Croat’, had the same degree of homo-
geneity as Spain or Great Britain, allowing these writers to allege that:
‘Croatia presents a common European phenomenon.’18 Still others pointed
out that while 24 per cent of Serbs lived outside Serbia, some 22 per cent of
Croats lived outside Croatia. Since Croatia ‘had never demanded the annexa-
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tion of those areas of other republics’, the Serbs were obliged to accept their
minority status.19 The problem, of course, was that neither Spain nor Great
Britain saw themselves as a homeland for one people only, while both have
extended provisions for regional minorities. There were no ethnic nationalist
dictators in those countries, preaching intolerance against their minority
groups. At the time these books were written, Croatia had not yet attacked
Bosnia-Hercegovina, but this too would soon change, as Croatia pledged itself
to defending its own people in Bosnia. It would then do exactly what it accused
the Serbs of doing – demand the annexation of territory in other republics.
The 1974 constitution and genocide
In 1974, an ailing Tito decided to reform the constitution of Yugoslavia. He
wanted to ensure that the Federation continued in some form after his death.
However, the new constitution was a highly contentious development. It
greatly decentralised the SFRY, granting autonomy to Kosovo and Vojvodina,
while reducing many of the administrative and financial functions controlled
by the federal government. The constitution also established an unwieldy
rotating presidency, with a seven-member presidium. One presidium repre-
sentative from each republic after another would take a turn at running the
country. Croatian nationalist writers, in reviewing the constitution, had little
to complain about, as it practically gave each republic the status of a separate
state, including such attributes as the inviolability of borders. Thus Croats
used this decentralising document to argue that their separation from
Yugoslavia was perfectly justified and legal.20
The Serbs, by contrast, saw the constitution as the root of many of their
problems. It reduced their control over Kosovo and Vojvodina, while signifi-
cantly hampering the power of the federal centre to make decisions for the
Federation. It also reduced the power of the federal government to guarantee
Serbian minority rights in other republics. Without centralised power, Serbs
worried that they would suffer discrimination outside Serbia. Kosovo was a
particularly important thorn in Serbia’s side. Their loss of control here seemed
to reflect the age-old Serbian catastrophist maxim: ‘Winners in war, losers in
peace’. Journalists blamed the constitution for creating Serbian minorities in
Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Kosovo. For many Serbs, the creation of
minorities in autonomous republics was the first stage in a campaign of geno-
cide.21 With its many lurid photos and graphic descriptions, The Uprooting, by
Bozˇidar Zˇecˇevic´, was one of many publications that denounced Tito’s manip-
ulation of Kosovo to humiliate the Serbs. Rather than contributing to Serbian
greatness, Kosovo was used as an instrument to reduce Serbian power.
Zˇecˇevic´ attacked the ‘treacherous’ Yugoslav Communists for working with
Kosovar Albanian separatists to create a ‘Greater Albania’ in Kosovo.22
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Encouraging Albanian nationalism was presumably a way of weakening the
Serbs – supposedly a central goal of the Communist regime.
Tito was also accused of ethnically cleansing Serbs during his four
decades of rule. Examples of this line of argumentation were analysed in
Chapter 3. What began as a fear of persecution in Kosovo spread to Croatia
and Bosnia-Hercegovina. As the Serbian Unity Congress described the
process: ‘Tito’s favourite method of punishing the Serbs, whom he hated
personally and discriminated against officially, was to allow the Croats and
Muslims to rid their territories of Serbs by depriving them of their political,
cultural, religious, and human rights.’ Included here was a list of the number
of Serbs ‘ethnically cleansed’ during Tito’s rule: 121,376 from Croatia, and
205,542 from Bosnia-Herzegovina, making a grand total of 326,918.23 The
SUC neglected to explain how these numbers were calculated.
The 1974 constitution was thus at the root of Yugoslavia’s many ills.
Samardzic´ noted how it weakened the federal state, devolving power to the
increasingly authoritarian republics. Decentralisation, and not Milosˇevic´’s
attempts to over-centralise the country, was blamed for the ‘internal disinte-
gration’ of Yugoslavia in the 1980s. If anything, Milosˇevic´ was credited with
trying to re-establish ‘the integrational link between the federal units’, to
prevent the ‘anarchoid form’ that it had taken after 1974.24 Again, blaming
Tito’s legacy for the breakdown of Yugoslavia deflected criticism away from
Milosˇevic´’s obvious attempts to hijack the federal system. 
Genocidal Croats: Croatian nationalism in the SFRY
Structurally, the SFRY seemingly went against Serbian interests. However,
Tito was not the only one responsible for Serbia’s weakened status. Two
Croatian Communist officials were often cited in Serbian literature as enemies
of the Serbian nation – Ivan ‘Stevo’ Krajacˇic´ and Andrija Hebrang. Hebrang
was often condemned as a Croatian nationalist with influential connections,
who tried to manipulate Tito into reducing Serbian power. In reality, Hebrang
was one of Tito’s most bitter rivals. As one of the most powerful Partisan
leaders in Croatia, he tried unsuccessfully to advance Croatian interests at the
Federal level, arguing that Croatia’s borders had been clipped by the Djilas
Commission. He also argued against the unfair exchange rates imposed on
Croatia after 1945, while similarly condemning the many show trials set up
to punish supposed collaborators. Hebrang was never a serious threat to
Serbian interests, since he was demoted several times after 1945, and was
eventually placed under house arrest in 1948.25
Krajacˇic´ was seemingly a more dangerous and shadowy figure. Krajacˇic´
was not a typical Croatian Communist; he was also the main resident repre-
sentative of the Fourth Soviet Intelligence Service, and was cast as a sinister
Communism, post-Communism, and the war in Croatia
191
2441Chapter7  16/10/02  8:06 am  Page 191
puppet-master, with powerful contacts in Moscow. He was supposedly so
powerful that even Tito was afraid of him. For Serbian historians, Krajacˇic´
was a useful scapegoat for why the system went wrong, for why the Serbs
were victims in Yugoslavia. He, and not Tito, was blamed for persecuting
Serbs during the bloody Communist purges after the Second World War. He
was even blamed for founding the infamous prison camp at Goli Otok, as a
means of punishing Serbs and Montenegrins, who constituted ‘the over-
whelming majority of those detained and carefully watched over’.26
Krajacˇic´ was presented as a cynical Croatian nationalist with incredible
personal power. He would later be blamed for the fall of the Serbian
Communist leader Aleksander Rankovic´, having supposedly engineered his
downfall in order to carry out increased decentralisation, a plan of benefit only
to Croatia, since ‘the virus of Croatian nationalism kept smouldering in
him’.27 His supposed nickname – ‘The Conducator of Separatism’ – was
derived from his advocacy of Croatian separatism, as well as his dictatorial
qualities, which made him similar to Romania’s own ‘Conducator’ – Nikolai
Ceausescu. Krajacˇic´ was also accused of being a supporter of the Ustasˇa, and
a keen advocate of genocide as a means of dealing with the Serbs. He suppos-
edly commented at the opening of the Jasenovac memorial in 1966: ‘Here we
killed too few of you!’, a statement for which he was purportedly forced to
resign as President of the Croatian Parliament.28
The Krajacˇic´ conspiracy had some rather obvious motives. By the mid-
1980s, Serbian historians had begun the process of rehabilitating Rankovic´,
who had been stripped of his powers in 1966. Rankovic´ founded Yugoslavia’s
secret police – the State Security Administration (the Uprava Drzˇavne
Bezbednosti, or UBDa) – and served as Minister of the Interior during
Yugoslavia’s most oppressive period after the Second World War. He was
often portrayed in Croatian writing as a die-hard Serbian nationalist who
abused his powers to advance Serbian interests. It was clear that Rankovic´
was a keen advocate of centralisation, and was seen to be the natural succes-
sor to Tito once he died or retired. His fall from grace was therefore a serious
blow to Serbian prestige, and to those who cherished the idea that a Serb could
have ruled Yugoslavia – if it were not for Croatian back-room dealings.29
A primary reason why Rankovic´ was stripped of his position was his
persecution of the Kosovar Albanian population. Police repression in the
province, and several staged show trials of supposed ‘Albanian spies’ at
Prizren in 1956, greatly increased the friction between Serbs and Croats.
While Rankovic´ was seen as a man who could keep the Kosovars in their
place, he also provoked Kosovar anger and desires for separatism. While some
Serbs saw him as a hero, whose demise ushered in Albanian nationalism, the
reverse was probably true.30 It was also certain that Rankovic´, and not
Krajacˇic´, had established Goli Otok, where Tito sent some 7,000 people.
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Rumours that he was bugging Tito’s telephones did not help matters either,
nor did accusations that he was behind assassination attempts on the Slovene
Communist leader Edvard Kardelj in 1959.31 Ultimately, the quest for a suit-
able scapegoat to take the blame for Rankovic´’s activities was never very
successful. For one thing, everyone knew who Rankovic´ was, whereas no one
had ever heard of Krajacˇic´. Whether he was as all-powerful as some Serbs
suggest, or simply another long forgotten Communist official, is still open to
dispute. 
Croatian perceptions of the SFRY
Like their Serbian counterparts, the Croats presented Yugoslavia as an era of
persecution and repression. Their national spirit was choked under the
rigours of Titoist Communism, their nationalist leaders were driven into exile,
and Croatia’s most acclaimed writers and scholars were imprisoned. While
earlier Croatian Diaspora accounts often focused on the horrors of Tito’s
regime, later accounts during the 1990s blamed the Serbs, and not Tito, for
destroying the system. Attacks on Communist tyranny were soon replaced
with even more vitriolic attacks on Serbian treachery and greed. In an attempt
to justify their separation from the SFRY, Croatian nationalists insisted that
Serbian dominance remained the central focus in Tito’s political project. They
argued that since Belgrade was the political, financial, military, judicial, and
administrative capital of the SFRY, the Serbs had naturally been privileged.
Any form of centralisation – even the Slovenian ideologue Edvard Kardelj’s
‘Yugoslav consciousness’ – was therefore dismissed as an attempt at greater
Serbianisation. 
Croatian writers often argued that the federal system in the SFRY was
identical to that imposed on the Croats in the first Yugoslavia. Yugoslav
Communism was described as a ‘disguised Greater Serbia’.32 More graphically
and colourfully, Communist Yugoslavia metamorphosed into ‘a resurrected
ghost of the expansionist, hegemonistic, unitaristic and centralist state of the
old Yugoslavia type, this time in a more horrible form enabled by the
centralised, monolithic political power of the Communist Party’.33 For this
writer, as for many others, the SFRY was simply ‘a new artificial Greater
Serbian nation concealed under the name of Yugoslavia’, entrenched ‘behind
the facade of pretended socialism.’34 Others argued that the entire govern-
ment bureaucracy, federal government officials, the army, and the diplomatic
corps were completely dominated by Serbs.35 Thus Yugoslavia never truly
existed. It was a pseudo-Communist state controlled by Serbian nationalists,
who manipulated Tito into reducing Croatian power. In this process of revi-
sion, aspects of Communist life that were present in all Communist countries,
such as a one-party state and a powerful police force, were blamed on Serbian
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domination. Rather than being seen as typically Communist, they were char-
acteristics of Greater Serbia. 
For Croatian historians, Serbs were presented as a highly privileged
national group in Yugoslav society. Their language, culture, and political
customs became the cornerstone of the state, while Serbs similarly maintained
numerical dominance in most of the key ministries, the police forces, and the
military. Other aspects of control, such as economic exploitation, were often
described in terms of a core–periphery relationship. Echoing Nairn’s theories,
Croatian writers saw nationalism as a solution to their problems of underde-
velopment. Kecˇmanovic´’s ‘theme of damage’, with its emphasis on economic,
cultural, and social decline – due to decades of Serbian domination – was a
theme constantly invoked.36 At every level, Croats argued that the Serbs were
in full control of the SFRY. This became a useful justification for why it was
time for them to leave, and why the Serbs were clearly the aggressors.
Serbian economic domination
A reason for attacking the federal system was Serbian economic exploitation.
While Tito’s government had channelled hundreds of millions of dollars into
a world-class tourist industry in Croatia, a portion of this tourist revenue had
to be paid to the federal centre. While the tourist industry had been established
in order to increase Yugoslavia’s foreign currency reserves, a strategy aimed
to help the entire Federation, not just Croatia, Croatian writers painted this as
an example of economic exploitation. A typical argument held that for
seventy years ‘Croatia was exploited and drained’, and had no control over
where her money was going, and why. Croats argued that Croatia and
Slovenia funded some 50 per cent of the Yugoslav federal budget – the loss of
this income having been a crucial reason for Serbia’s invasion after 1991.37
While a sense of economic exploitation was justified to an extent, the oft-
quoted figure of 50 per cent was deliberately misleading. Croatia brought in
some 50 per cent of foreign exchange earnings during the 1960s and 1970s,
but did not fund 50 per cent of the federal budget. While Croatians did
contribute considerably to the Yugoslav economy, and certainly paid a dispro-
portionate share of the federal budget relative to their population size, their
exploitation was not as high as that alleged during the break-up.38
One of the better-known documents alleging various levels of Serbian
exploitation – economic and otherwise – was Miroslav Brandt’s
Antimemorandum, written five years after the SANU Memorandum was leaked
to the press. Brandt’s whinging style perfectly mirrored the intent of the SANU
original. Brandt echoed several common themes – that the Serbs controlled
the military, the political system, and the economy. For too long, Croats had
suffered from ‘Greater Serbian centralisation’.39 Independence was the solu-
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tion to all Croatia’s economic difficulties. Brandt reinterpreted many of the
ideas found in Milovan Djilas’ New Class, wherein Djilas had attacked the
massive power of the Communist bureaucracy during the 1950s. He argued
that Yugoslavia had become more inegalitarian since the Partisan revolution.
As he described it, a ‘new class’ had been formed, which administered and
controlled the economy, distributed everything, and consequently enjoyed
the fruits of production.40
Predictably, Brandt reasoned that Djilas’s ‘new class’ was dominated by
the Serbs – who had milked the system for all it was worth. He argued that the
great majority of Yugoslav millionaires were Serbian ‘rich profiteers’, who
benefited from other nations in Yugoslavia by supposedly confiscating other
people’s property, and then exploiting it for their own gain. For Brandt, the
Serbs were the only true ‘plutocrats’.41 By contrast, the Croats constituted an
exploited class and nation rolled into one. ‘Croatia is,’ Brandt asserted, ‘a thor-
oughly oppressed country enslaved, plundered, pauperized, brought down to
the verge of existence, forced to massive emigration of its population seeking
a way to survive, exposed to national liquidation under a military and police
regime or occupation.’42 Serbs were described simultaneously as bourgeois
overlords, colonial oppressors, Bolshevik dictators, and Fascists. 
For many Croats, Communism had been an utter failure – Tito’s
‘pretended socialism’ had done nothing to eliminate the economic exploita-
tion by the Serbian/Bourgeois Class/Nation over the Croatian/Proletarian/
Peasant Class/Nation. Concocting his own type of Hegelian dialectic, Brandt
managed to merge class and nation to demonstrate how Greater Serbia
continued to dominate Croatia in every respect during the Communist era.
Brandt represented a typical view of Croatia’s exploitation within
Yugoslavia. The view that the Serbs controlled everything from Belgrade
was common, as was the argument that the Serbian occupation of Croatia
was an attempt to regain control of Croatia’s economy. Perhaps it attests to
the ‘reasonableness’ of certain Croatian economists that they were willing to
see only an economic motive for Serbian aggression, while dismissing the
‘irrationality’ of nationalism.
The Serbian character explained
Perhaps the most thorough, and at the same time the most insidious exami-
nation of the conflict between Serbs and Croats in Yugoslavia was the product
of three sociologists. As with their analysis of Medjugorje, Mesˇtrovic´, Letica,
and Goreta used a sociological model to come to terms with the ‘social char-
acter’ of the Serbs, something similar to primordial characteristics or acting as
a ‘substitute for biological instinct’.43 For the authors, being ‘Dinaric’ in the
Cvijic´-ian sense implied being both ‘predatory’ and ‘barbaric’ – containing the
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seeds of ‘totalitarianism’.44 Much of their work seemed to be little more than a
rhetorical window-dressing for a fairly simple thesis: Serbs were warlike and
aggressive by nature, lazy and Eastern, while Croats were democratic, peace-
loving, and Western. As such, their forced union within Yugoslavia led to
Serbian dominance and violence, while the Croats were exploited and
victimised. Most of their sociological metaphors and historical studies, while
interesting, had little or no bearing on the reality of events in Yugoslavia. 
One such example was an examination of Alexis de Tocqueville’s study of
the American Civil War. The United States became an analogy for Communist
Yugoslavia, described as ‘the sometimes unhappy union of two distinct and
opposing cultures’, composed of the ‘Southern aristocrat’ and the Northerner.
The Southerner was described as a ‘domestic dictator from infancy . . . a
haughty and hasty man, irascible, violent, ardent in his desires, impatient of
obstacles . . . fond of grandeur, luxury and renown, of gaiety, pleasure, and
above all, of idleness’.45 This was in marked contrast to Northerners, who
were ‘educated, talented, and family-oriented citizens . . . the best elements of
order and morality’.46 It was not difficult to see where this analogy was going:
two opposing cultures, one backwards, lazy and despotic, the other, hard-
working, educated, and moral. The combination of these two groups in a
single state created a sociological ‘clash of civilisations’. For the three authors,
the American analogy played out well in Yugoslavia, since the Balkans
‘exhibit[s] more extremely the opposition between barbaric and peaceable
traits that is found all over the world’.47 The disintegration of Yugoslavia was
clearly blamed on the Serbs, who, living on a lower level of civilisation, could
not help but dominate and abuse the helpless Croats. For example: 
[I]t is well known in Yugoslavia that Serbs and Montenegrins adhere to a sort of
cult of the warrior. They have continually dominated the police and armed forces.
They habitually own guns and engage in hunting as part of a machismo set of
values. Within Yugoslavia, they are known for being stubborn, irascible, and
emotionally unstable. It is interesting that many of these same traits can still be
found ascribed to male residents of the southern United States, in comparison with
males in the North.48
Mesˇtrovic´ et al.’s dubious sociology supported the contention that Serbian
actions were a result of a primordial and unchanging social character. The
only solution was separation. There was an evident paradox in using this
particular study of de Tocqueville. In the case of the American Civil War, the
Southerners declared independence and separated, with the support of
various outside powers. The North refused to allow the South to leave, waging
war rather than having the country split apart. Ironically, the Serbs arguably
had more in common with the North than the South, since they too were
supposedly fighting a war against separatism, with a federal army to keep
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their ‘union’ intact. While these authors’ attempts at analogy were somewhat
confused and inaccurate, the suggestion that the Serbs were somehow more
warlike, lazy, exploitative and generally inferior, struck a chord with many
readers.49 Such theories maintained that Communist Yugoslavia was an
untenable construction, completely controlled by Serbs, who dominated
every aspect of life. Both the break-up of the federation and the war that
followed were natural outcomes of a Serbian psychology, which was seem-
ingly fundamentally different to that of the Croats.
Linguistic repression in Yugoslavia
The status of the Croatian language during the lifetime of the SFRY was an
extremely important consideration.50 Since the time of Ljudevit Gaj and Ante
Starcˇevic´, a separate Croatian language was one of the key hallmarks of
national identity. Tito was roundly condemned for outlawing the use of the
‘Croatian’ language, imposing instead the Serbo-Croatian language, with
Occidental (Croatian) and Oriental (Serbian) variants. A joint language was
seen as an important aspect of Tito’s ‘Brotherhood and Unity’, and was central
to repressing manifestations of Croatian nationalism. Linguistic reform was a
key demand of nationalist politicians during the Maspok movement in the
1970s. The demand for a separate Croatian language was largely responsible
for the 1971 ‘Croat Spring’, during which the famed Croatian novelist
Miroslav Krlezˇa led a group of 130 leading Croatian academics on a crusade
to designate ‘Croatian’ as a separate language for education and literature.
The Serbian Communist Party followed suit with a demand for reciprocal
rights to a Serbian language for their people living within Croatia.51
For Croats, the Serbo-Croatian language was little more than a ‘political
tool’ that had been used throughout the history of Yugoslavia to homogenise
different peoples into a single nation. Even when Tito was alive, Croats had
rejected the Novi Sad Agreement and pushed for their own language. With
Tito’s death, and the rise of nationalism, the Croatian language once more
became a crucial issue in Croatian identity. Moreover, the Serbo-Croatian
language became symbolic of Serbian cultural dominance and Croatian
weakness. As one historian argued: ‘The only reason that “Serbo-Croatian”
existed and the only reason it has been forced upon unwilling populations
were the politics of an artificial Yugoslavia united by force against the will of
the majority of its population.’52
After independence, Croatian writers and linguists were able to reclaim
‘Croatian’ as their own distinct and unique national language. This was an
extremely important ‘turning-point’, or ‘watershed’, in Croatian history,
when Croats at last had the freedom to re-create a national language. For
many Croats, there had once been a linguistic Golden Age in need of rediscov-
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ery. At some stage, there was a pure, authentic and unadulterated Croatian
language waiting to be dusted off, polished, and shined, after decades of being
covered with Serbian and Communist dirt and tarnish. The well-known
Croatian writer Slobodan Novak commented on the new ‘purity’ of Croatia by
proclaiming triumphantly: 
Croatia is cleansing itself of Yugo-unitarist and Great-Serb rubbish which had
been spread all over it for a whole century. Croatia is simply restored to its origi-
nal form and returning to its true self. If today it has to make painful incisions in
its language, history, scholarship and even the names of its towns and streets, that
only shows the extent to which it was contaminated and how polluted were all
facets of its life and all segments of its corpus.53
For Novak, as for many others, one of the most painful legacies of
Communism was the loss of the national language. Once they had their
language back, the Croatian soul could once more be found. But what exactly
was the language to look like? Various dictionaries soon appeared on the
scene. Stjepan Brodnjak’s Razlkovni Rjecnik (Separate Dictionary) featured
35,000 entries, composed mainly of technical terms and archaisms. 
The zeal to ‘de-Serbianise’ the language led to revisions of distinctly
‘Croatian’ texts. Jasna Baresic´’s 1994 Croatian language reader Dobro Dosli
had to be cleansed of ‘Serbianisms’ by other Croatian linguists on a daily basis,
since new ‘impurities’ were constantly being identified. Even Miroslav Krlezˇa,
the ‘martyr’ for the Croatian language, had his works translated from ‘Serbo-
Croat’ for new school textbooks. Eager advocates of a pure ‘Croatian’
introduced a bill before the Croatian Sabor, proposing fines and prison terms
for those who used words of ‘foreign’ origin.54
In many cases, an entirely new language was being created. While some
sort of linguistic Golden Age was the aim of the policy, most of the new words
had no historical origin. What seemed to matter more was differentiating
‘Croatian’ from ‘Serbian’. More extreme voices, such as the writers at NDH
magazine, proposed going even further than Starcˇevic´ to create a completely
different national language. Advocating the ‘Croatian “korienski” orthogra-
phy’, one journalist argued that the adoption of a new dialect would be the
only way to create an authentic Croatian language. Nevertheless, it was clear
that such a language would be neither historically ‘pure’ nor accurate. This,
apparently, was not particularly important. As the author explained: ‘Only
the renewal and rebirth of the unique character of the Croatian language and
“korienski” orthography (because that way Croatian and Serb languages
would become mutually unintelligible) can destroy Serb appetite for Croatian
lands and free us from fear of violent “unification” of parts of Croatia with
Serbia.’55 Creating their own Babel would allow Croats to be safe from Serbian
attacks:
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[T]he loss of mutual intelligibility of Croatian and Serb languages is the best guar-
antee that Croatia will never again join some Yugo-associations which could lead
to the renewal of the common state with the Serbs, because our languages,
cultures, and religions would be different. Since [Serbs and Croats belong to] two
different civilizations there can be no coexistence for us. Let us work hard, with
love, and learn the Croatian language cleansed of all non-Croatian traces which
had been imposed by force on it, and renew its Croatian character.56
That the ‘Croatian character’ to which the author referred would be unin-
telligible to the vast majority of Croats themselves seemed to matter little.
What mattered was not how useful the new language might be as a tool for
communication, but its separate status. In general, the differences between
‘Serbian’, ‘Croatian’, and ‘Bosnian’ were dialectical, and were matters of
regionalism, not nationality. Within Croatia itself, Istrians, Dalmatians, and
those living around Zagreb all spoke with different dialects, which could, with
little effort, be transformed into other ‘national’ languages. The linguist Celia
Hawksworth, in her language training guide to the now defunct ‘Serbo-
Croat’, taught both the Serbian and Croatian variants of what she certainly
saw as a common language. As she wrote somewhat ironically:
This book introduces the version of the language known to its speakers as
‘Croatian’, but if you learn this version you will be understood by all the other
peoples listed above, who call their version of the language ‘Bosnian’ or ‘Serbian’
respectively. One way of looking at this complex situation is that it is extraordi-
narily cost-effective: if you learn one language you will find that you
automatically know three or four!57
While this process of linguistic revisionism appeared to be revolutionary
during the early 1990s, it was clear by 1995 how farcical it truly was. During
the Dayton Accord negotiations between the Serbs, the Croats, and the
Bosnian Moslems, participants had the choice of simultaneous translation
into ‘Serbian’, ‘Croatian’, and ‘Bosnian’. However, while there were three
separate channels from which to select, there was only one translator for all
three. In short, the language was identical, and none of the three parties
seemed to care. For them it was the principle, not the language, that
mattered.58
Now certainly many nations have produced their own standardised
language, based on one specific variant, and of course not everyone can speak
it. In France, on the eve of its Revolution, 50 per cent of the population did not
speak French at all, and only 12–13 per cent spoke the Parisian variant that
would eventually become the standard form. When Italy began its unification
process in 1861, scarcely 2.5 per cent of the population used standard Italian
for everyday communication.59 Thus, even the korienski orthography might
be historically defensible. What needs to be addressed in the Croatian case is
not simply a nation’s right to re-create its language, but the motivations
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behind it. Linguistic re-creation in Croatia was a means of creating artificial
divisions between Serbs and Croats in the state. It was specifically designed to
exclude non-Croats from the national ethos during a time of warfare and
violence. Like all examples of linguistic standardisation, the reformulation of
Croatian was of necessity exclusivist, a process designed to suppress regional
variations and deny people the right to communicate on their own terms with
one another. 
The rise of Serbian and Croatian nationalism: interpretations
The demonisation of the Communist period was extremely important for both
sides, as both were seeking to justify why Yugoslavia had to be abandoned in
its former shape and structure. Serbs and Croats used history as a resource, as
a tool for explaining events during and after the war in Croatia, while inscript-
ing narratives of victimisation and persecution. While benign theories of
economic exploitation and Tito’s border machinations were cited by academ-
ics, the great bulk of the wartime propaganda focused on the fear of genocide.
Ronnie Landau’s ‘grotesque competition in suffering’ had begun. Historical
patterns of hatred and genocidal aggression had been identified for almost
every historical period. All that remained was to apply the horrors of the past
to understanding war in the 1990s. 
For Serbian writers, the fear of a renewed genocide, comparable to the
Ustasˇa genocide in the Second World War was a central feature of their prop-
aganda. This became the key justification for the rise of Serbian nationalism
in Croatia and the JNA’s later invasion of what was recognised as a sovereign
country. From the first day of Tudjman’s presidency, Croatian Serbs argued
that the HDZ was trying to remove all Serbian power in the republic. The HDZ
government was purging Serbs from almost every aspect of Croatian life,
using what was described as an ‘ethnical broom’, to remove Serbs from the
government bureaucracies, the police, the judiciary, the mass media, and the
school system. Even blue-collar workers were supposedly purged.60 Serbian
historians presented Tudjman’s regime as nothing more than the rehabilita-
tion and restoration of the NDH.61 The first Croatian constitution was often
cited as proof that the HDZ was trying to assimilate Croatian Serbs, by denying
them their national rights. This seemingly indicated that a new genocide was
beginning.62
A common theme among Serbian historians and politicians was that the
Serbs had merely reacted to the Croatian threat – they had only defended
themselves. The assassination in July 1991 of Osijek’s moderate police chief,
Josip Reichl-Kir, by Croatian extremists was constantly cited as the first act of
aggression in the Croatian conflict. Reichl-Kir had been negotiating with
Serbian irregulars at the time, and was seemingly killed for trying to promote
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peace instead of war.63 The death of Reichl-Kir certainly demonstrated the
duplicity of the Croatian government; but it was not the first act of violence,
since by this point the ‘log revolution’ was well under way. Croatian Serbs had
already begun blocking off roads and assaulting Croatian police forces.
Nevertheless, Reichl-Kir came to symbolise how the HDZ regime was willing
to kill off its own people, should they try to negotiate with Serbs. The Serbian
Krajina politician Mile Dakic´ soon denounced the HDZ for their ‘fascist state
policy and kalashnikov democracy’.64 The view that an independent Croatia
was forced on the Serbs at gunpoint was widespread.
A constant level of Croatian aggression against Serbs was a necessary
theme in the latter’s self-representation as victims of genocide. Dismissing
claims that the HDZ administration was democratically elected, Serbian
sources argued that a multi-party system did not guarantee democracy.
‘Hitler,’ according to one historian, was a good example of another populist
who manipulated democracy, since he ‘came to power in Germany within the
framework of a multi-party mechanism but subsequently became a great
dictator, aggressor and criminal.’65 While the writer was clearly referring to
Tudjman, the irony was, of course, that Milosˇevic´ had risen to power in an
identical fashion, and was little different from his Croatian counterpart.
Nevertheless, Serbian writers worked tirelessly to debunk the myth of
Croatian democracy, and specifically the Western belief at that time that
Croatia had become an open, Westernised, post-Communist country.
By the time JNA tanks rolled into Eastern Slavonia in July 1991, it was
clear that the Army no longer represented the interests of Yugoslavia, but had
become an instrument of Serbian power.66 While the JNA was simply trying
to enlarge the Serbian state, the Serbs claimed that they were coming as
‘peace-keepers’, to prevent a genocide of Serbs. Humanitarian arguments
would be used throughout the conflict to legitimize the invasion and occupa-
tion of Croatia. In justifying military intervention, Serbs often compared
Croatian leaders to Nazis and fascist aggressors, re-hoisting Second World
War flags while instigating continuous ‘pogroms’ of the Serbian population.67
The Serbian Ministry of Information also portrayed the Tudjman regime
as neo-fascistic, making vague allusions to Aaron and Loftus’s book Ratlines,
with its description of the Vatican smuggling networks for Nazi war criminals.
This time, however, the ‘rat channels’ were reversed, and instead of smug-
gling war criminals out of Europe, war criminals were now being smuggled
back in – to Croatia. The strategy of welcoming back these former Ustasˇa was
to be the precursor to a renewed Serbian genocide – a genocide that was to be
identical to that of some fifty years before.68 Dobrica C´osic´ also saw Tudjman’s
regime as an emerging Nazi dictatorship. He had this to say in a published
collection of his wartime essays: 
We see in Croatia, many aspects of a Nazi resurrection. This state is governed by a
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totalitarian and chauvinistic regime, which has abolished the elementary civil
and national rights of the Serbs by simply erasing them from its Constitution. This
provoked a Serbian insurrection in Croatia, those who justly fear a new program
of extermination, the same as the one during the Second World War to which they
fell victim.69
Because of their historical victimisation, C´osic´ had no difficulty in believ-
ing that a second genocide was on the way, necessitating a ‘defensive war’
against Croatian attacks.70 Other Serbian writers urged Croatian Serbs not to
surrender any weapons to the Croatian police, since politics there had blos-
somed into ‘mass chauvinist hysteria’.71 In justifying the ‘log revolution’, and
other memorable moments in Krajina Serb history, links were drawn between
the surprise night inspections for weapons carried out by the Ustasˇa in 1941
and a similar strategy of disarming mixed Serbian and Croatian units, suppos-
edly instigated by the new Ministry of the Interior in 1991. This time,
however, the Serbs had learned from their mistakes. Since the Ustasˇa had
slaughtered large numbers of unarmed Serbs after disarming them, Serbs had
learned this lesson of the past, and had refused to surrender their weapons.72
These Serbian warnings were sometimes supported by graphic evidence.
Always interested in theatrics, the Krajina Serbs organised the exhumation of
a Serbian mass grave from the Second World War. Serbian journalists were
invited to photograph the bones of those who had been massacred by the
Ustasˇa, providing a strong imagistic appeal to the Serbian nation to defend
their ‘brothers’ against the threat of repeated genocide.73 Dragutin Brcˇin’s
glossy and disturbing book of bodies supposedly mutilated at the hands of the
Croats in 1991 was another example of a picture saying a thousand words.
Brcˇin’s views of the Croats echoed Kecˇmanovic´’s theory of pseudospeciation.
Because the Serbs were seen as a ‘lower species’, they were being targeted
with biological and physical extermination ‘for the third time this century –
for the second time from the Ustashas in the last 50 years’. Brc´in also spread
the story of one ‘Ustashi war criminal’ who wore a necklace made of the
fingers of Serbian children.74 While this was originally an ancient Hindu
myth, it seemed to have travelled far by the 1990s.
There is little doubt that many Serbs thought the threat of annihilation
was real. Serbs in Croatia by 1991 began to complain of an ‘ethnic tax’ that
they alone had to pay to the government.75 Croatian Serb authorities
complained of a ‘formal brand’ devised by the Croatian government to sepa-
rate the Serbs from the rest of the population. As one writer reported, each
Serb in Croatia was given the number 3 as the eighth figure of his personal
identity number. This, as the Serbian Krajina President Goran Hadzic´
remarked, ‘is nothing else for us than the David’s star, our race label’.76
Included in the general theme of Croatian genocide of Serbs were testimonials
of those who had suffered in Croatian ‘concentration camps’ during the early
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part of the war. The journalist Nikola Marinovic´, searching for the Croatian
version of the 1942 Wannsee Conference, traced the Croatian ‘Final Solution’
to a small cabal of HDZ leaders and representatives from Slavonia. These men
supposedly met in early 1991 to form an organisation bent on ‘the extermi-
nation of Serbs from western Srem and Eastern Slavonija’. According to
Marinovic´, this group of HDZ officials ‘started “everything” in all Croatia’.
They deliberately planned and executed the genocide of Serbs, through a
three-pronged strategy – replacing prominent Serbs, harassing the entire
Serbian population, and then liquidating them.77
Marinovic´ included a number of quotations from the initial meeting,
unfortunately without indicating how he managed to get them. Either this
was some form of dramatic licence, or Marinovic´ was perched below the
window through which the end of Serbdom was being contemplated. How
he could have acquired such information is not explained; but, for some
readers, detailed explanations would not have been necessary. Whatever the
book’s original purpose , it soon became part of a justification for the Serbian
military actions that followed. Therefore it came as no surprise that the
primary objects of Serbian attacks were the places where the Serbs were
supposedly tortured and murdered by the Croats as a result of this key
meeting. Thus, Poljane and Marino, villages near Pakrac, were noted as sites
of mass atrocities, as were Kip, near Daruvar, and Moscenica and Cesko,
near Sisak.78 Similar atrocities were recounted for Vukovar, one of the first
cities that fell to the Serbs. Here, Marinovic´ described the ‘hair-raising
savagery’ of the manager of the Vukovar Hospital, Vesna Bosanac, who
earned the title of the ‘Vukovar Mengele’ after supposedly threatening one
Serbian patient by putting a gun to his head, and then threatening to slit his
throat, and then placing a bomb in his bed. Another patient was described
as being beaten and then urinated on at a hospital near Pakrac. Other
horrors, such as torture, euthanasia, the general denial of medical treatment
to Serbian soldiers, and even murder of the wounded were also described
here.79
Each region was seen as the venue for terrible atrocities committed by the
Croatian National Guard, proving that the Serbs had had no choice but to
shell the towns where these atrocities were supposedly taking place. Such
descriptions instilled the notion that the new Croatian institutions, such as
the police and even the medical services, were Serbophobic, and therefore part
of a genocidal conspiracy. Certainly some of the testimonials were true. Serbs
were beaten and mistreated. But what was significant for this book was why
certain regions were selected, and what they signified. According to the Serbs’
own accounts, a form of defensive ethnic cleansing had to take place to avoid
a repetition of the Second World War.
The Orthodox Church also contributed to the increasing paranoia.
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Spiritual Genocide (1994) outlined a continuous desecration of Serbian
churches, claiming that more than 400 had been destroyed since 1941,
leading the author to describe a ‘total spiritual genocide’, which continued
from the time of the NDH, through the Communist era, to the conflict in the
1990s.80 This work featured detailed descriptions of large numbers of bombed
out churches, as well as photographs, drawing a link between the Second
World War destruction of churches and their destruction in the 1990s. To
stress the similarities between events in 1994 and 1941, Second World War
photographs were mixed with more recent ones, all in grainy black and white
– blurring the distinction between historic and contemporary atrocities. 
The purpose behind this onslaught of subjective and emotive propaganda
was clear – it buttressed Serbian arguments that the war was forced on the
Serbian people. The Serbian Orthodox Church and its parishioners had been
brought to the ‘verge of annihilation’.81 That this work appeared in 1994,
after countless attacks on the Serbs in the international press for their destruc-
tion of Catholic churches and mosques, was no coincidence. Obviously
Serbian churches were destroyed; but such one-sided portrayals were mirror
images of Croatian publications. This even extended to a contest on a city-by-
city basis between Serbian and Croatian propagandists, to see which national
group had been the most victimised. Thus Croats published photographs and
descriptions of the destruction of Catholic churches in Vukovar and Mostar,
and the Serbs responded in kind with Orthodox ruins in the same cities.82
‘Operation storm’
One of the most tragic aspects of the war in Croatia was Milosˇevic´’s cynical
handling of the Croatian Serbs after they were no longer useful to him.
Seemingly abandoning his dream of creating a Greater Serbia, Milosˇevic´
repackaged himself as a peacemaker in 1995, bringing the Bosnian Serbs to
the negotiating table to sign the Dayton Accords. It was also the year that he
abandoned the Croatian Serbs in Eastern Slavonia and Knin, and left the
playing-field open for a Croatian offensive. With the way clear, the American
negotiator Richard Holbrooke encouraged Tudjman to take control of the
Serbian Krajina and Serbian-controlled north-western Bosnia.83 In late April
1995, the Croats launched an attack on western Slavonia, and within 36
hours managed to take back the region, which had been violently taken by
Serbian forces at the beginning of the conflict.84 By the summer, much of the
Serbian population in the former Srpska Krajina had fled, leaving towns and
villages deserted. 
By July, Tudjman had amassed an army of over 200,000 troops, ready to
sweep into the Krajina. After calling for the surrender of the Serbian Krajina
government and the handover of weapons, Tudjman launched ‘Operation
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Storm’ on 4 August. While the Serbs had 40,000 troops and 400 tanks, they
were no match for Croatian forces, who managed to seize Knin after only two
days of fighting. The whole region fell in just 84 hours, as Serbs fled for their
lives.85 While it was clear that Milosˇevic´ had left the Croatian Serbs to their
fate, Serbian propagandists continued to advance the dangers of a Croatian
genocide of Serbs. At this stage, the same arguments as before were used to
highlight the consequences of Tudjman’s conquest. While Milosˇevic´ had little
interest in reoccupying Croatia, the propaganda machine continued to
advance the same arguments. 
The Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts soon reacted to the Croatian
offensive, issuing a Memorandum to alert the public to the renewed dangers of
genocide that lay ahead. SANU urged the Serbian government to mobilise
without delay, since the Serbs were facing ‘extinction and the obliteration of
all traces of their existence in these lands’.86 Once again, the spectre of
Croatian fascist terror was reiterated, but SANU was at this stage trying to
push the Serbian government to act. They claimed that some 300,000 Serbs
had already been ‘forcibly expelled’ from Croatia, even before ‘Operation
Storm’ had begun, and they urged the Serbian government to act against a
‘repeated genocide’.87 Svetozar -Durd-evic´ cited the ‘speed at which the
inhuman and uncivilized method of Croatization of the Krajina has been
carried out’ as proof of the ‘vandal destruction and annihilation of all the
traces and symbols of Serbian life, culture and spirituality in the region’.
Franjo Tudjman, he argued, was only pursuing the same fascist policies that
the NDH regime had followed some fifty years earlier. Serbs had to be killed,
since they continued to be the main obstacle to Croatian expansionism in the
Balkans.88
The Serbian Ministry of Information joined the fray, describing the offen-
sive as ‘the final solution to the Serbian question’, while stressing the links
between Croatian actions in 1941 and 1995. They too condemned Tudjman
for wanting to create ‘a pure Croatian state’, through ‘pure Croatism’ in the
Balkans. The Americans were also drawn into this ‘Blitzkreig’. Having
perfected their killing skills in Desert Storm they were looking for a small
‘Balkan Storm’.89 The Serbian Unity Congress also played their part, noting:
The current civil and religious war in the former Yugoslavia is but the resumption
of the 1941–1945 civil war in which the Croatian Fascists, collaborators of the
Nazi regime, and Muslim religious extremists murdered between 600,000 and
1,200,000 Serbs. The issues are the same, the battlefields are the same, even the
flags and army insignia are the same.90
By 1995–96, this type of imagery was increasingly common. It was
almost impossible to find descriptions of the war in Croatia that did not refer
explicitly to the links between the 1940s and the 1990s. Serbs were once
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again fighting against annihilation. It occurred to few of the participants that
this was not a repeat of the past. Rather, it was as if they had actually gone
back in time, and were reliving the struggles of their parents and grandpar-
ents. The motto ‘Never Again’ was constantly invoked by the Krajina Serbs, as
proof that they were like the Jews during the Holocaust, ready to defend them-
selves against annihilation.91 Sadly, however, it was not Tudjman, but
Milosˇevic´ who had sold them out. This time, the Croats were only taking
advantage of an opportunity that had been given to them by the Serbian pres-
ident.
Contemporary fears of the Catholic Church
Accusations of Vatican and Croatian Catholic complicity in genocide were
popular in Serbian historical revisions. Their involvement in genocide was
traced from the nineteenth century through to the first Yugoslavia, the
Second World War, and into the Communist era. Such a pattern of Catholic
‘Serbophobia’ was also applied to an understanding of the war in Croatia
during the 1990s. A popular fear among propagandists was that Serbs were
being forcibly converted to Catholicism, as they had been during the 1940s.
In 1995, the Serbian Ministry of Information claimed that the Croats had
converted 11,000 Serbian children to Catholicism in just two and a half years.
Another 14,000 Serbian children, some 90 per cent of the total in Croatia,
were supposedly forced to enrol in Catholic schools – by implication they too
were in the initial stages of assimilation. This ‘plot’ was revealed by Orthodox
Church sources, who posited that the true intent behind this policy was not
simply educational. Rather: ‘Once they convert to Catholicism, the former
Orthodox people will automatically become members of the Croatian nation,
because Catholicism and Croatian nationality are equated in Croatia.’92
The overall Croatian plan, as a government official from Novi Sad main-
tained, aimed at converting 700,000 Serbs in Croatia to Catholicism, making
them first ‘Croatian Serbs’, then ‘Orthodox Croats’, and then finally ‘pure
Croats’, after their language, alphabet, Church and other symbols of their
‘authentic and centuries old Serbian identity’ had been destroyed.93 Such
writing demonstrated how fragile many officials thought Serbian identity
truly was, and how easy it would be for the Catholic Church to destroy the
Serbian nation, now that Croatia was independent. Needless to say, such
theories were not backed up with the names of any of the schools actually
involved, nor was there any type of documentation cited to support such accu-
sations. 
There were of course other more direct attacks on the Vatican itself,
dealing with specific aspects of the war in Croatia and later in Bosnia. During
the 1995 NATO air-strikes on Bosnian Serb military positions, the Vatican,
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and not the Germans or the Americans, was accused of genocide. One
University of Belgrade professor was clear that the prime culprits behind the
attack were the Pope and his followers, as during earlier times:
[E]ncouragement came from Vatican clericalists pursuing the centuries-old goal
of establishing the world Catholic multinational empire . . . Pope John Paul II
developed the doctrines of ‘limited sovereignty’, of ‘humanitarian military inter-
vention’ and of ‘disarming the aggressor’. The head of the Catholic Christian
Church supported the idea of ‘bombs for peace’. The peace that can be brought by
bombs is the peace of extermination of Serbs in Croatia and B&H. For those who
survive there is conversion to Catholicism or expulsion to the ‘Belgrade Pashaluk’,
the territory that will remain to Serbia after Kosovo-Metohija and Vojvodina are
again taken out of its jurisdiction.94
The imagery was curious. The Pope himself was charged with trying to
exterminate the Bosnian Serbs, as part of an imperial project that could only
be compared to the machinations of the old Holy Roman Empire during the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The idea that Serbs would be left with a
small territory around Belgrade (‘Pashaluk’ referring to the old Ottoman
regional divisions of Serbia) certainly exaggerated the extent of the bombing
campaign, a campaign that never entered Serbia proper. Accusing the Pope of
genocide was not overly controversial in Serbian circles, where Vatican plots
to destroy the nation had seemingly existed since the Great Schism.
In general, Serbian propaganda disguised the reality of Serbian aggres-
sion in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina. While the Serbs claimed only to be
defending Serbs against annihilation, the Croatian government never
advanced any deliberate policies to kill its Serbian population systematically.
While the Serbian community was clearly demarcated and singled out in the
new state, and while there was discrimination, xenophobia did not lead to
genocide. 
Croatian views of the war in Croatia
In many ways, Croatian propaganda mirrored that of the Serbs. The war in
Croatia was traced to the age-old project of Greater Serbia, and numerous
links between past and present were joined together. In understanding
Serbian aggression, Croatian writers divided up their understanding of
events into three separate categories. The first dealt with the Serbs as Nazis,
seeking territorial expansion, or Lebensraum. Like the Czechs or the Poles,
Croatia was doomed to be colonised, then enslaved. A second argument
compared Greater Serbian style empire-building to the Holocaust. In the
second argument, the Serbs had no real economic motivations for invading
Croatia. Rather, their general hatred of the Croats drove them to round up
and kill as many people as possible. The third argument relied on the work
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of Croatian psychiatrists. Serbs were analysed as a group, and their pathol-
ogy was blamed for the war in Croatia. Both mentally and civilisationally
inferior to the Croats, Serbian hatred, envy, and resentment towards them
for having abandoned Yugoslavia were responsible for the Serb decision to
invade.
Such a line of reasoning evolved into predictions of what would happen if
the Serbs managed successfully to invade and occupy Croatia. Miroslav
Brandt was perhaps the most vocal on what a reassertion of Serbian control
would mean. ‘Non-Serbian peoples,’ he predicted, ‘would be slaves, a subju-
gated mob, expected and doomed to extinction as separate national entities in
the future, their land, area for colonisation and a target to exploit, brought to
the level of provinces working for the benefit of a new giant, super-wealthy
and carefree state centre of Belgrade.’95 Brandt was particularly clear on what
the Croats were fighting against by defending the Krajina and Eastern
Slavonia from Serbian predations: 
These regions are simply resisting the annihilation of their particular national
cultures, the persistent proven widely organised and continuous decades-long
activities of the Greater-Serbian plutocratic oligarchy to primarily deprive the
Croatian people of their own language, to impose upon them the Serbian
language, to suppress Croatian literature and other forms of Croatian culture, to
wipe out the Croatian national awareness, to destroy and prevent Croats from
learning their own history and to crush their dignity, to annihilate their faith, to
impoverish them, and by a discriminatory economic policy to drive the Croats
away from their own millennium-long ethnic homeland and then systematically
colonise these regions with Serbian nationals.96
Brandt’s theme of economic exploitation was common. Bozˇe C´ovic´ also
blamed Serbia’s economic motives for the conflict. The Serbs were trying to
compensate for their underdevelopment by exploiting the riches of Croatia.
Since the Serbian economy was inefficient, burdened by losses and debts, and
thus unable to ‘stimulate its own creative potential’, it needed Croatia as a
colony to dominate and exploit.97 Like Brandt, C´ovic´ similarly argued that
both Serbia and Montenegro, starved of resources, were keen to exploit
Croatia, to enable the flow of riches from the periphery to the core.98 C´ovic´
was evidently no dependency theorist, and this aspect of his analysis soon
gave way to analogies between Serbian economic exploitation and Nazi
expansionist plans during the 1930s: 
Serbia needs new lebensraum and new economic resources (on the ethnically
cleansed i.e. completely Serbian, territory) given that ‘Greater Serbia’ with only
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia and the amputated parts of Croatia
would find itself in the company of complete undeveloped areas . . . It is a question
of lebensraum and the concept of ‘blood and soil’ which ensure the new nation-
building ambitions of ‘Greater Serbia’. The problem of ethnic cleansing should be
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stressed here, i.e. firstly forcing Croats and all other ethnic groups to flee, so that
only the Serbs remain, and secondly settling Serbian colonists in the emptied
areas.99
There was little evidence to support the claim that Serbs were trying to
colonise all of Croatia, and, as I have argued earlier, they could have pushed
further had they so desired, had not both leaders been committed to the
annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Nevertheless, the fears of economic
exploitation were justifiable, given the fact that when these documents were
written Serbian irregulars had been continually looting Croatian and Bosnian
homes. At the same time, the use of the term Lebensraum served as a rebuttal
to Serbian accusations that Tudjman and his government were composed of
neo-Ustasˇa criminals. Accusing the Serbs of trying to exploit and dominate
Croatia also covered up the very real machinations of the Croats in Bosnia-
Hercegovina. While they accused the Serbs of expanding their territory and
colonising a region that was not theirs, the Croats were doing the same thing.
These themes were extremely common.
The long-awaited evil – Greater Serbia
The second key argument delved much deeper into the past, exposing many
long-term Serbian plans for the invasion of Croatia – plans that were purport-
edly hatched well before Hitler and the Third Reich. In C´ovic´’s view, the war
in Croatia was ‘the bloody finale of the long-prepared Greater Serbian plan of
conquest’, supposedly the culmination of two hundred years of planning.100
Hitler’s speech to the Reichstag in 1939 was often invoked – one that
famously justified the invasion of Poland as a defensive measure to protect
Poland’s German minority.101 The Serbian conspiracy, according to C´ovic´,
consisted of claiming victimhood as a means of justifying territorial expan-
sion: 
The notion of victim and victimization is extended to the evaluation of conditions
in which the Serbs live in non-Serbian regions and [are] used for political action
whenever a privilege is at stake. In recent years this myth has served to justify and
promulgate the political thesis that all Serbs must live in one state. It is a screen
for military aggression against Croatia and the realization of the Greater Serbia
scheme.102
Ironically, C´ovic´ did exactly what he accused the Serbs of doing them-
selves – invoking myths of persecution and holocaust in order to legitimate
‘self-defensive’ measures against the ‘enemy’. C´ovic´ seems to have been in no
doubt that his own side was completely innocent and trustworthy, while the
Serbs were evil and expansionist. While the regimes in Serbia and Croatia
were surprisingly similar, writers like C´ovic´ continued to argue that Serbian
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violence in the 1990s far surpassed anything that had happened during the
Second World War, a statement that was to an extent correct, but served to
masked the reality of this many-sided conflict.103
For many Croatian historians, the myth of Greater Serbia was all-
consuming. The basis of Serbian national identity was territorial
expansionism. Like some form of plague, the bloodlust to create a Greater
Serbia could lie dormant for decades, before being unleashed on unsuspecting
neighbours. Branko Miletic´ therefore asked somewhat conspiratorially:
‘What drives the docile Serb peasant to rape, butcher and incinerate his peace-
ful Muslim or Croat neighbor?’ The answer was of course: ‘The double-edged
theory of Greater Serbianism.’ Greater Serbianism was supposedly ‘double-
edged’ because it was worse than either fascism or Communism, since it made
co-nationals feel ‘politically and culturally threatened’, and ‘emboldened’ at
the same time.104 Like C´ovic´, Miletic´ saw how Serbian leaders had used the
rhetoric of victimisation to mobilise their people for war. In his tally of the
costs of this ideology, Miletic´ concluded: 
Greater Serbianism has cost the lives of some 600,000 Croatians, 400,000
Muslims, 100,000 Albanians, and countless others this century, not to mention
non-conformist Serbs, and even people not from the Balkans. It has ethnically
cleansed some five million inhabitants since 1900, wounded, maimed and impris-
oned over two million, and caused hundreds of billions of dollars worth of material
damage.105
What Miletic´ offered was a complete picture of Serbian violence in the
twentieth century. Each period of history was seen to be tragically the same;
Serbs promoting Greater Serbia while killing hundreds of thousands of people.
How exactly the author tallied these figures is not explained, nor would this
have been particularly important. What was curious about these analyses of
Serbian nationalism was how their assumption of the role of the victim was
discussed. This was seen to be a purely Serbian strategy, not something that
the Croats would ever have thought to employ. 
Serbian Nazis and collective psychosis
It was certainly clear that Croatia was under serious threat by the beginning
of 1991. As has been pointed out earlier, one-third of Croatia was occupied by
this time, and the future of the country remained uncertain. It was in this
climate of fear that mountains of seemingly spontaneous anti-Serbian propa-
ganda began pouring out of Croatia. Certainly much of this was genuine, and
there is no reason to doubt that most of these people truly believed, for good
reason, that their country was in serious trouble. However, while Croatia was
seemingly unable to defend herself against the Serbs, Tudjman and Milosˇevic´
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were already making plans together to carve up Bosnia-Hercegovina. That
Croatia had enough soldiers, equipment and weapons to maintain a defensive
war and an offensive war indicates that they were doing much better than
they publicly admitted. As I pointed out earlier, Tudjman could well have
liberated his country, had he not had wanted to push into Bosnia-
Hercegovina.
As the war progressed, it became clear that Croatia’s position was far
stronger than people realised. While a climate of fear was created and
certainly existed, it is doubtful that the Serbs could ever have taken all of
Croatia. It is also doubtful that they wanted to. Nevertheless, the emphasis
during this time was on rallying the people together, to project to the outside
world an image of unity in the face of hardship. For this reason, much of what
emerged from Croatia used images of the Second World War to make sense of
the tragedy. Rather than appearing as the victims of one aggressive war, while
simultaneously waging another in Bosnia, Croatian writers, architects, histo-
rians, and other academics strove to portray themselves as victims of
genocide. 
It seems that almost all facets of academic life in Croatia became subordi-
nated to the war effort. Even such seemingly apolitical departments as Art
History at Zagreb University contributed to the advancement of a victim posi-
tion. In a picture book on the destruction of Croatia’s ancient buildings and
monuments, the editor described the ‘culturocide’ of the Croatian people,
where Serbs were deliberately destroying ancient symbols of the past in order
to ‘annihilate . . . the consciousness of our existence in time and space’.106
Much of this project aimed to demonstrate that Croatia was part of Europe.
This ‘European’ identity was crucial throughout the war. Croats used it to
court Western aid, but also, more importantly, to give some form of hope to
the people who were suffering through the war. What was important was that
a ‘European’ country was being destroyed by an Eastern power.
Croatian scientists at the prestigious Ruder Bosˇkovic´ Institute also
became embroiled in the conflict, after they realised that ‘total destruction’
was immanent. Most of this work involved contacting outside scientific agen-
cies through a variety of connections in order to sway world opinion in favour
of Croatia. These scientists sent more than 9,000 letters and petitions abroad,
and many met with favourable responses.107 Many scientists expressed a
typical Croatian view of the war as a conflict between, ‘two different types of
people’, concluding that, ‘Western catholics and Byzantine orthodoxes simply
do not belong together’. Everything was reduced to an ‘ethnic clash’ between
the, ‘democratically oriented West . . . and the bolshevik East’.108
This was coupled with accusations of Serbian genocidal ambition.
American institutions from the Fulbright Commission to the White House
were subjected to intense public relations efforts. A vigorous e-mail campaign
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was also launched, to counter the ‘Goebbelsian campaign of lies’, which had
‘enslaved the Albanians in Kosovo’. One of the stock e-mails also contained
numerous references to ‘Great Serbian totalitarianism’ and Serb attempts to
impose themselves as a ‘master race’ over other nations in the Balkans.109
That much of the scientific community was involved in this massive public
relations effort demonstrated the extent to which Croats were convinced of the
genocidal threat of the Serbs. The whole nation, it seemed, was mobilised for
war. 
Other groups, such as the Association of Architects of Mostar, contributed
their photographs of the ‘urban genocide against Mostar’.110 For the authors,
Mostar constituted a bridge between East and West, one that was destroyed by
the Serbs, for ever sealing the fate of their relations with the Croats. Serbs here
were accused of trying to ‘exterminate the Croat and Moslem being’ by laying
waste to a town that figured as a religious and cultural crossroads.111 There is
no doubt that the Serbs destroyed at least half the major buildings in the town.
Certainly there was much barbarity in the attack on Mostar – the Serbs shelled
nine out of ten of Mostar’s bridges. Nevertheless, the Croats (not the Serbs)
destroyed the famous Stari Most, or Old Bridge, which still lies in pieces. Still
others combined a variety of formats to develop an image of Serbian aggres-
sion. -Dord-e Obradovic´’s Suffering of Dubrovnik was a strange mixture of
historical novel (set during the siege), glossy before-and-after pictures, and
children’s drawings of the war.112
A still more interesting aspect of the war was the co-option of the psychi-
atric profession. Several psychiatrists quickly abandoned their
professionalism, along with many of the well-established rules of psychiatry,
to defend their country against Serbian genocide. Wartime writing was
intended to prove that Serbs had actually internalised their civilisational
differences in many psychologically nuanced ways. Trained medical profes-
sionals were encouraged to buttress the work of Croatian propagandists with
psychiatric jargon. That such theories were published in the prestigious
Croatian Medical Journal ensured maximum credibility. Breaking perhaps the
first and most important rule of psychiatry, trying to understand the individ-
ual before making a diagnosis, Eduard Klain, in his article, ‘Yugoslavia as a
Group’, isolated certain Serbian group traits in order come to terms with the
war in Croatia. Through the use of psychiatric language, he concluded: 
The Serbs are burdened with an inferiority complex compared to the peoples of the
western part of Yugoslavia, for they are conscious that they are on a lower level of
civilisation. They try to get rid of that feeling by means of various defence mecha-
nisms, such as negation, projections, denial and destruction. The Serbs are
inclined to regress to a schizoparanoid position and exhibit an archaic type of
aggression which can explain the torturing of the wounded and massacring dead
bodies.113
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How all Serbs could exhibit the same traits was not explained, nor was it
clear why and how the Serbs were civilisationally inferior. While Klain’s theo-
ries may well have been useful for analysing many of the more sadistic Serbian
war criminals, he proposed his analysis for all Serbs, not a select group. The
psychiatrist Viktor Gruden similarly used the vocabulary of his profession.
The Serbs were identified as being in a ‘vicious circle of frustration aggression’
compounded with a ‘collective paranoia’. The Serbian ‘disintegrated self’ was
blamed for their ‘their tendency to massacre the Croats’, over which they
seemingly had no choice. Much of this aggression had to do with the
Easternness, and therefore the inferiority, of the Serbs. There was no doubt in
Gruden’s mind that:
[T]he Serbs envy them [the Croats] and because they [the Serbs] are inferior . . .
The Croats are not only a biological being (like the Serbs) but a psychological one
as well. The Serbs also feel guilty, therefore their only reaction is a tendency to
destroy the source of frustration, hence the source of destruction and the impulse
to demolish everything that is related to the Croats.’114
In other words, the Croats were more Western, more enlightened, more
open, and more democratic – the Serbs were merely trying to destroy what
they could never hope to be.
The Serbs were similarly diagnosed (collectively) as suffering from a
‘paranoiac collective unconsciousness’, and a ‘malignant ethnocentrism’.
The war in Croatia was thus broken down into a conflict between a ‘paranoic
political culture’ and a ‘narcissistic political culture’, the former (Serbian)
seemingly the result of a demented political mind. The latter (Croatian) was
denoted as peaceful and ‘on a higher level of civilisation’. Further conclusions
that ‘Serbs are militant and primitive, a nation of death and necrophilia, wild
barbarians, the greatest vultures of political victories, descendants of Turkish
bastardism [and] disturbing factors in Croatia’, were rounded off with the
lamentation: ‘unhappy is the nation that has Serbs as its neighbours’.115
Generally, the first rule of psychiatry is to approach each subject as an
individual, not as part of a collective. Under standard medical definitions, it is
simply impossible to diagnose a ‘group’ as one would an individual. Only indi-
viduals can be defined as having psychiatric disorders under the DSM-III
classification system – the standard system for understanding and classifying
mental illnesses. While individuals may be influenced by membership in a
collective, no two individuals possess an identical psychology. One is only able
to comprehend the psychology of an individual after many hours of patient
study and interview sessions. To lump a group of diverse individuals into a
racial category, treat them as a individual and study them accordingly was
truly an entirely pointless endeavour. From a psychiatric perspective it was
sloppy and unprofessional. From a political standpoint, however, it made
perfect sense. Psychiatrists, like artists, academics, and politicians, were all
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seemingly under attack from genocidal Serbs, and therefore had to use all
means at their disposal to counter the threat.
Conclusions
Representations of the past proved to be absolutely crucial to understanding
and justifying Serbian and Croatian nationalism during the war in Croatia.
Each side claimed to be a victim of the other, both during the Communist
period, and after, as the Federation disintegrated. While references to earlier
periods of history were important, the Second World War provided the most
important stock of metaphors and ideas. Of central importance throughout
the conflict was the idea that actions during the war were merely a continua-
tion of the past. Both sides were accused of acting or performing as their
parents and grandparents had earlier in the twentieth century. Serbian
actions were merely a continuation of a desire to create a Greater Serbia, while
Croats were simply trying to resurrect the NDH. In both cases, genocide was
presented as the inevitable result. 
In reviewing the main arguments of both sides, a strong performative
aspect was evident. Each side portrayed themselves as victims, and eventu-
ally, by manipulating public opinion within their own countries, succeeded in
creating an aura of victimhood by constantly reiterating this perceived
reality, a process identified by both Weber and Butler.116 Campbell’s definition
of ‘narrativizing’ could also be found here. Serbian and Croatian writers
both tried to create the types of ‘stories’ Campbell identified, with an ‘ordered
plot’, a ‘cast of characters’, ‘attributable motivations’, and ‘lessons for the
future’.117 In both cases, a past history of victimisation and genocide was
purposefully manufactured and presented to a receptive audience. In both
cases, these ‘stories’ proved to be absolutely essential in creating and support-
ing war. 
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‘Greater Serbia’ and ‘Greater Croatia’: the
Moslem question in Bosnia-Hercegovina
We live in the borderland between two worlds, on the border between nations,
within everybody’s reach, always someone’s scapegoat. Against us the waves of
history break, as if against a cliff. (Mesˇa Selimovisˇ: Dervish and Death)1
I can see that the situation is far more complicated and more difficult than other
problems I have seen, even Cambodia. It is the peculiar three-sided nature of the
struggle here that makes it so difficult. Everyone says that most people do not
want this to happen. Yet it does. Everybody says it must stop. Yet it doesn’t.
(Richard Holbrooke: To End a War)2
WHILE THIS STUDY has focused on the continuous and vitriolic debateover history and current events pursued by Serbian and Croatianpoliticians, historians, and journalists, another aspect of the war of
words and images deserves special consideration. The debate over Bosnia-
Hercegovina was of immense importance throughout the crisis. Both
Milosˇevic´ and Tudjman, together with their nationalist supporters, dreamed
of creating their respective ‘Greater Serbias’ and ‘Greater Croatias’. In the
Bosnian crisis, Serbs and Croats often worked together, and, as early as 1991,
Milosˇevic´ and Tudjman had carved up Bosnia on paper. At a diplomatic cock-
tail party with Western leaders in London, Tudjman was the first to boast of
his geopolitical ambitions, famously drawing a detailed map on a napkin.3 In
Bosnia, the Moslems were seen as the primary threat to the creating of larger
national states. Serbian and Croatian machinations, including the production
of propaganda, thus followed very similar strategies. 
Incorporating chunks of Bosnia-Hercegovina into Croatia and Serbia
became central to the legitimacy of both governments, who had pledged to
unite Diaspora nationals throughout the region. In line with a cyclical view of
history, Serbian and Croatian leaders argued that many of the Falls suffered
by their peoples could be rectified once the size and power of the nation-state
had been expanded. Then, and only then, could all co-nationals be safe from
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the threat of genocide. Such political ends were buttressed by distinctly mili-
tary objectives. For Croatia, the addition of Bosnian and Hercegovinian lands
would have substantially reduced its eastern border with Serbia, creating an
important buffer zone between Dalmatia and Serbia proper. The Serbs likewise
saw the merits of incorporating this geo-strategic region into their smaller
rump-Yugoslavia, giving them a much larger common border with Croatia.
Each regime thus had political and military objectives in mind, which made
the annexation of Bosnian territory paramount. 
However, both nations had had historic claims to Bosnia-Hercegovina –
Milosˇevic´ and Tudjman were hardly original. In 1908, Jovan Cvijic´ produced
‘The Annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Serb Issue’, claiming this
territory as the ‘central region and core’ of an imagined expanded Serbian
state. Similarly, Stjepan Radic´, a short time after, published his own study:
‘The Live Croatian Rights to Bosnia-Herzegovina’, arguing that Bosnia had
only flourished when Austria-Hungary had been in control. Thus, logically,
Croatia could and should claim the region for itself, as the only agent capable
of insuring ‘peace, legal order and progress’. The fact that Bosnia-
Hercegovina was surrounded on three sides by Croatia, and thus formed
(echoing Cvijic´) ‘the core of the old Croatian state’, only sweetened the argu-
ment.4 However, while some contemporary claims reflected the older musings
of Cvijic´ and Radic´, much of the discourse would be entirely new. 
Primordial and constructed nations: the case of the Bosnian Moslems
Myths of victimisation and persecution were of central importance in legiti-
mating the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina, a war that today evokes images of
mass rape, torture, indiscriminate killing, and ‘collection centres’ – purport-
edly the first functional concentration camps in Europe since the Second
World War. In delineating the use of such propaganda, it will be useful to
focus on several specific themes:
1 Firstly, the idea of Moslems as either ethnic Croats or Serbs; and Moslem
nationalism as invented or constructed;
2 Secondly, the notion that Bosnia-Hercegovina had historically been
either Serbian or Croatian; 
3 Thirdly, that claims to Moslem national identity and autonomy concealed
an Islamic conspiracy to take over Europe. 
While the third theme will be discussed later, it is useful to understand the first
one clearly. To summarise this argument: while the Moslems of Bosnia had
been forced to convert to Islam, certain linguistic and cultural attributes still
marked them as either Serb or Croat. Bosnian Moslems were seen to be
members of one religious community, while at the same time belonging to an
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altogether different ethnic group. Because of these highly contested ethnic
and historical ‘facts’, Serbian and Croatian leaders both argued that Moslems
were Fallen members of their own nation, who had been forced to abandon
their true identity after Ottoman invasion. Military leaders argued that they
were simply ‘liberating’ parts of their ethnic homeland that had long been
submerged under foreign rule, while ‘freeing’ Moslems from their artificial
attachments. 
Such arguments were possible only because Moslem identity was not
taken seriously by either side. While both Serbs and Croats shared a view of
their nations as having precise racial and national origins, complete with
national myths and legends, Bosnian Moslem nationalism de-emphasised
ethnicity, preferring to focus on shared cultural practices, social traditions,
common experiences, and religious faith. Such forms of collective identity
were condemned as weaker and therefore illegitimate when compared with
more ‘concrete’ nationalist assertions. While Serbs and Croats saw themselves
as primordial nations, the Moslem nation was denounced as constructed, an
artificial creation fabricated by the Moslems and Josip Broz Tito. 
One major debate over the status of the Moslems, carried out in the
summer of 1990 in the Sarajevo daily Oslobodenje, concluded that while the
Serbs and Croats were ‘natural’ nations, based on ‘unambiguous and
common ethnic origin’, Moslem identity was based on ‘psychological identifi-
cation’, subject to self-observation. They were therefore seen as an ‘invented
nation’ – not to be considered relevant in the more important dispute between
‘natural’ Serbs and Croats.5 Thus the Croatian writer Vladimir Mrkoci could
argue a year after the Dayton Accords that the division of Bosnia was perfectly
understandable, ‘a process that appeared with the absence of external force, a
natural, although belated process, of national enlightenment and unification,
because Bosnia-Hercegovina is one of the last national knots of Europe that
will sooner or later have to be untied to the end’. Multicultural Bosnia, at least
for this author, was nothing more than a ‘meaningless phrase’.6 For Serbian
and Croatian policy-makers, invented nations had no real histories, and could
not claim to have ever been chosen, divine, or even to have suffered a Fall.
Fortunately, outside powers did not see the importance of such distinctions.7
The ‘naturalness’ of Serbian and Croatian claims to territory was privi-
leged over the artificial and constructed nature of Moslem identity. Gone was
the narcissism of minor differences, and the myths of ‘counteridentification’,
as Serbs and Croats worked towards a common goal. Since the Moslems were
not an ethnic nation, they logically belonged to another ethnic group. Serbs
would thus claim the Moslems as their own, and Croats would do the same.
The idealised presentation of a multicultural, tolerant Bosnia-Hercegovina,
long favoured in Titoist Yugoslavia, was summarily rejected. While Serbs
constituted some 31.1 per cent of the population and the Croats some 17.3 per
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cent, the Moslems (43.7 per cent) could now be operationalised as a group of
ethnic ‘undecideds’. Their population would provide an ethnic ‘swing vote’ –
badly needed by both sides in their attempts to expand national boundaries.8
The key problem of course, was that Serbs, Croats and Moslems were found
throughout the republic – there were few homogeneous enclaves. According
to the 1991 census, Serbs could be found in 94.5 per cent of the republic’s
territory, Moslems in 94 per cent, and Croats in 70 per cent. Clearly, any
carve-up would be messy and dangerous.9
Serbian and Croatian reactions to the Bosnian Moslems presented clear
examples of how a cyclical view of time was represented. Moslems had aban-
doned their ‘true’ identity; they represented the historic Fall of both the Serb
and Croat nations. Now, with the disintegration of Yugoslavia, both groups
had a golden opportunity to right the wrongs of history, to join former
national lands and people to an enlarged national state. Kecˇmanovic´’s themes
of ‘watershed’ and ‘turning-point’ are useful here.10 Both of these types of
myth suggest a change in the historical destiny of the nation, when the nation
is at last able to correct the injustices of the past. In this case, the historic injus-
tice was the conversion of Serbs, or Croats, to Islam, and the loss of these
people and their lands.
Denouncing constructed nationalism and Islam
While their nationalism was publicly denounced, Bosnian Moslems did
consider themselves to be a defined national group. While they were willing to
share power with Serbs and Croats within the country, they had no intention
of being incorporated into an expanded Serbian or Croatian state. When Alija
Izetbegovic´ formed his Party of Democratic Action (SDA) in May 1990, it
became clear to Serbian and Croatian leaders that the Moslems would not be
so easily assimilated, or relinquish their desire to preserve a multinational,
multiconfessional republic. While appealing to Moslems with its green
banners and crescents, the official policy of the SDA was the preservation of a
tolerant and unitary Bosnia, with national and religious rights for all.11 Most
of the SDA’s actions, as well as the uncontroversial Bosnian flag (with its
Kotromanic´ fleur-de-lis from the medieval period) seemed to support this
claim.12
Nevertheless, the presence of a Moslem ruling party, even one committed
to multiculturalism, was anathema to Serbian and Croatian interests, who in
turn, formed their own nationalist parties. The Serbian Democratic Party
(SDS) was founded two months after the SDA. Radovan Karadzic´, long a
favourite of Dobrica C´osic´, was seen as the best man to represent the Serbian
cause. Similarly, a Bosnian branch of the Croatian HDZ was formed under
Stjepan Kljuic´. This party would initially support the Bosnian government,
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but then later seek to undermine it.13 Events in 1991 were to prove crucial to
later developments. By April, Serbs had established a regional Bosanska
Krajina parliament at Banja Luka. By July, the SDS had announced their
boycott of the Bosnian Parliament, amid denunciations of Izetbegovic´’s rule.
They reacted particularly harshly to Izetbegovic´’s call for a referendum on the
future status of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Soon after the Bosnian referendum in
August, four autonomous Serbian units had sprung up in the republic.
Walking out of the Bosnian Parliament in October, the Bosnian Serbs held
their own referendum in November, which resulted in near-unanimous
support for separation from Bosnia-Hercegovina and union with the SFRY.14
At the same time, the Croatian side were also working towards their
autonomy. Only one day after the results of the Bosnian Serb referendum, the
Croats established a Posavina community of eight units, forming an
autonomous area in northern Bosnia. This was followed scarcely a week later
by the formation of Herceg-Bosna (with 18 units) in western Hercegovina. In
retaliation, the SDS in December announced the creation of the Serbian
Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina. In the same month, the Croats founded the
Republic of Herceg-Bosna.15 It was clear that both Serbs and Croats were
preparing for the eventual dismemberment of the Bosnian republic.
Nationalist myths were operationalised within this context of ethnic polarisa-
tion – myths that spoke of ancient national territory and peoples legitimated
the creation of ethnic enclaves. Myths were also necessary to justify the pres-
ence of the JNA and a wide range of paramilitary groups, such as the Tigers
and White Eagles (Serbian), and Autumn Rain and the Croatian Defence
Forces-HOS (Croatian). The violent seizing of territory necessitated a barrage
of propaganda, to prove that the Bosnian Moslems had somehow brought the
horrors of ethnic cleansing on themselves.
The Moslems as ‘fallen’ Serbs: ethnic and territorial dimensions
Of extreme importance in the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina was the legitimisa-
tion of land-grabbing activities, as well as some of the more insalubrious acts
of Serbian statecraft: rape, ethnic cleansing, looting, and physical destruction.
Serbian propagandists advanced two key arguments during this time: that
Bosnian Moslems were ethnically Serbian, and that Bosnian territory was part
of ancient Serbia. 
Serbian geographer Jovan Ilic´’s geopolitical plans for Bosnia-Hercegovina
had, by 1992, taken into account the agreements reached between Milosˇevic´
and Tudjman. His strategy for the dismemberment of the republic thus exuded
a tinge of ‘impartiality’, whereby both nationalist regimes would receive their
proper reward. Western Hercegovina and part of Posavina were to be annexed
to Croatia, with Eastern Hercegovina joined with Montenegro. Serbia would
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then take all of Bosnia, as well as the Neretva Valley and Mostar, which would
be joined with it. In this early stage of the conflict, Ilic´ remained convinced
that the Moslems would be quite happy under Serbian rule, since ‘As regards
psychic construction, Muslims and Serbs are much closer to each other than
Muslims and Croats.’ This tune may well have changed when Izetbegovic´
decided to take Bosnia-Hercegovina in its entirety out of the Federation.16
Often, official Serbian propaganda focused on Serbia’s historic claim to
the republic in its entirety, deriving much of its support from the supposed
ethnic identity of the people. Owing to either persecution or opportunism,
Serbs held that their own people had converted to Islam in mass numbers
during the Ottoman occupation. The Serbian Ministry of Information, for
example, concluded that ‘most of today’s Bosnian Moslems are descended
from Serbs’, declaring Bosnian Moslems to be ‘Serbs of Moslem faith’.17 The
Serbian government blamed Communism for the spread of an ‘artificial’
Moslem identity. Further, since Communism was itself a major suppresser of
authentic forms of nationalism, it was clear that Moslem ‘nationality’ was
simply a political tool, nothing more.18
One could also trace the rule of historic Serbian kings to prove the case,
and for some, Bosnia-Hercegovina had always been a part of Serbia, from the
rule of Serbian king Chaslav in 927 until 1918.19 Most Serbian historians
pointed to the long history of a Serbian majority in the region, positing that
Serbian values and culture had influenced the region’s character and tradi-
tions. In reviewing the history of Bosnia-Hercegovina, Dusˇan Batakovic´
described how large portions of the republic were populated by Serbs. As he
explained: ‘Bosnian and Herzegovinian rulers, themselves of Serbian origin,
were naturally drawn to Serbian civilization and culture as it unfolded in
neighbouring Serbia, irrespective of whether they professed the Roman
Catholic, the Orthodox or the Dualist faith.’20 Part of Batakovic´’s claim, as it
was for many others, was that Serbian nationality could be ascertained by a
variety of features, including linguistic criteria, which betrayed an uncon-
scious or primordial Serbian identity. Such views were common. One
historian concluded: ‘The Moslem power brokers and the oppressed common
people spoke the same Serbian language’, while another writer claimed hope-
fully: ‘[One could find] Serbs as polytheists as Serbian Orthodox, as Bogomils,
therefore they remained Serbs even as Moslems, their ethnic character is also
their language.’21 Serbian archaeologists employed other forms of historical
evidence. The use of the Cyrillic script on tombstones, rather than the
‘Croatian’ Glagolitic script, also proved that Bosnia’s ancient inhabitants had
been Serbs.22
Moslems were denied the luxury of a separate ethnic, national, and reli-
gious identity. Further, Serbian writers advanced dubious linguistic and
historical ‘proof’ that the Serbs had a right to most of the land in Bosnia-
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Hercegovina. In practice, Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladic´ used such ideas
to legitimate his army’s conduct, explaining in one interview, ‘I have not
conquered anything in this war. I only liberated that which was always
Serbian, although I am far from liberating all that really is Serbian.’23 Militia
leaders, such as the warlord Vojislav Sˇesˇelj, advanced similar theories, claim-
ing that Bosnian Moslems were ‘Islamicized Serbs’, while many ‘so-called
Croats’ were in fact ‘Catholic Serbs’.24 Again, the theme of the ‘watershed’
was important here. While, for centuries, Moslem ‘Serbs’ had been submerged
under a variety of despotic empires and false identities, the Serbs were now
coming back to free their own ethnic brothers from centuries of misguided
loyalty. This was seen to be a great era in Serbian history.
Converting ethnic Serbs from Islam to Orthodoxy became a top priority
for the Bosnian Serb political leadership. Moslems would also have the
‘opportunity’ to abandon their constructed identity, embracing their
‘natural’ ethnicity – that of Serbdom. In one domestic radio broadcast,
Radovan Karadzic´ urged Bosnian Moslems to abandon Islam, claiming hope-
fully that ‘many Moslems who are well educated and sensible are being
baptized and are becoming Christian in Europe as a way of reacting against
fundamentalism and the introduction of militant Islam into Bosnia . . . it is
clear that we must cross the Rubicon since we are dealing with exceptional
people in whom the memory of their Serbian origin is alive’.25 On another
occasion, he had argued: ‘the Croats and Moslems, in falsifying history, in
using our literature and our culture have created the bases for their future
states, on lands which are ethnically and historically Serb’.26 The implica-
tions were clear. The Serbs were going to liberate the Moslems whether they
liked it or not.
Of central importance was the argument that Serbs were improving the
lives of the Bosnian Moslems. Their nationalism was somehow positive,
because it was freeing Moslem ‘Serbs’ from a false identity and religion, while
allowing them to become more Western and more civilised. Images of a return
to historic soil and national liberation justified the irredentist ambitions of
Serbs in Bosnia and Serbia. The need to convert the Moslems was based on the
dangerous assumption that Moslem national identity was irrelevant in a
blood-based ethnic conflict. While a fraternal discourse was promoted offi-
cially, Serbian forces were busy shelling villages and committing ethnic
cleansing against their former ‘brothers’. 
Bosnian Moslems and their Croatian heritage
Many of the primordial themes found in Serbian writings were, not surpris-
ingly, echoed in the Croatian media. Croats also had historic claims to
Bosnia-Hercegovina, and, like the Serbs, saw the Moslems as part of their
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nation. In some respects, the Croatian claim seemed to be stronger, as
evidenced by the willingness of Moslems and Croats to enter into coalitions
and military alliances. Nevertheless, while alliances existed, demographic
balance was often the primary consideration. After all, there were more than
twice as many Serbs as there were Croats in the region. This explains why the
Croats were so keen to forge strategic alliances with the Moslems. During key
periods, demographics also informed Moslem decisions. 
The idea that Croats and Bosnian Moslems were of the same ethnic stock
was certainly not new, nor was the portrayal of Moslems as fallen Croats.
Such ideas were common during the nineteenth century, and were exploited
during the Second World War, when Ustasˇa propaganda described
Catholicism and Islam as the two founding religions of the NDH. Such
imagery allowed Croatian forces to justify the takeover of Bosnian Moslem
lands in the 1900s. Like the Serbs, Croatian propagandists held that one could
not commit ‘ethnic cleansing’ against one’s own nation. The first stirring of
this idea after the Second World War came from the Nobel laureate Ivo
Andric´, perhaps the first in Tito’s Yugoslavia to describe the Bosnian Moslems
as part of the Croatian nation. ‘Having fallen to Islam,’ he claimed, Croatian
Bosnia ‘lost the possibility of fulfilling its natural role of participating in the
cultural development of Christian Europe. Instead, Bosnia became a mighty
fortress against the Christian West.’27 This theme of the fallen Croat nation
was to re-emerge with Tudjman’s regime in Croatia. 
Earlier writers, such as Abdulaf Dizdarevic´, had also asserted this claim,
employing a mixture of racial and linguistic criteria to dismiss Moslem nation-
alism: ‘The uniformity of the physical features of our Croatian nation which,
along with its language is one of the dominant characteristics of the same
racial group ... They preserved [the Croatian] language in its purest form and
as a dialect of clear and undeniable Croatian origin.’28 The presence of these
national traits constituted proof, as it did for the Serbs, that the Moslems were
co-nationals. Dizdarevic´’s dramatic description of the Fall of the Croats to
Islam is worth reviewing:
The religious wars that broke out when foreign religions mixed in with our
common ancestral Slavic paganism, raged in the midst of our nation for centuries,
destroying its most powerful forces, erased that unique national image which
reflected the uniformity of national traditions . . . The historical moment of
converting to Islam was without a doubt the most decisive moment in the history
of the Croatian nation . . . Thus began the long era in the history of Bosnia, cut off
from its mother country . . . Never in history was there such a case of injustice as
this one. It oppressed a handful of people who, it seems, were condemned by God
himself to bathe in the blood of their own children.29
Thus Moslems were long-suffering Croats, desperately in need of ‘redis-
covering’ their true ethnicity. Paul Tvrtkovic´, who claims linear descent from
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the medieval King Tvrtko, similarly saw Bosnian Moslems as ‘Islamicised
Croats’. Like Andric´ and Dizdarevic´, he asserted that Moslems had no choice
in the matter: they were ‘by ethnic origin, predominantly Croatian, whether
one likes it or not’.30 Tvrtkovic´ also argued that ‘Croat Catholics and Moslems’
were ethnically identical, and thus of the same nation, while the Serbs were
ethnically different.31
Mirroring Serbian views, Tvrtkovic´ charted the renewal of Croatian
consciousness among the Moslems after the occupation of Bosnia-
Hercegovina by the Austro-Hungarians in 1878. It was during this time, he
claimed, that Moslems once again became proud of their Croatian origin. It
was also during ‘apocalyptic moments’, presumably times when both nations
feared the onslaught of ‘Greater Serbia’, that a common ‘Croat–Moslem
consciousness’ was expressed.32 In this way, a seemingly natural and lengthy
history of Croatian–Moslem alliances was drawn out. Paradoxically, this
argument did not imply that the Bosnian Moslems should be treated with
respect. Rather, it proved that, since Moslems had historically sided with
Croats, they had an obligation to do so during the 1990s, whether or not it
was in their own best interest. 
Using a mixture of historical facts, Croatian writers used history in very
much the same way as their Serbian counterparts, drawing out racial and
linguistic similarities between Moslems and Croats. Because of their conver-
sion to Islam, Moslems were forced to fight against their ethnic brothers, a
situation that could now be reversed once Croatia was able to ‘liberate’
Bosnia-Hercegovina. Again, the same theme of ‘watershed’ was reiterated. In
what could almost be a paraphrase of Karadzic´’s views, Tudjman claimed
with pride, after his troops took control of the Hercegovina in September
1995: ‘Croatia accepts the task of Europeanisation of Bosnian Moslems at the
behest of the Western European powers.’33
Bosnia-Hercegovina as a Croatian land
Like the Serbs, Croatian politicians and intellectuals employed historic argu-
ments to buttress their claims to Bosnian territory. Since Moslems were ethnic
Croats, it was uncontroversial to suggest that Bosnia-Hercegovina was
Croatian. Tudjman included the Moslems in his 1991 affirmation of Croatian
sovereignty, hinting that ‘territorial adjustments’ to existing borders might
eventually be required, since ‘Croatia and Bosnia constitute a geographical
and political unity and have always formed a joint state in history.’34 Defence
Minister Sˇusˇak was similarly lucid on the status of Bosnia-Hercegovina in one
1996 interview: ‘[F]or me Bosnia-Hercegovina is also the state of Croatian
people and for me it is Croatia. For a Bosniak it can be Bosnia, and for a Serb
whatever, but according to its constitution it is also the state of Croatian
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people and as such I consider it to be my homeland.’35 Father Batakovic´, vice
president of the Bosnian HDZ, also described Bosnia as ‘an old Croat land’, as
opposed to ‘an old Serb land’.36 Unsurprisingly, none of these political leaders
saw Bosnia as an autonomous region that deserved to be left on its own.
Annexing Bosnia was also a popular theme in academic circles. Even
before the breakdown of Yugoslavia, Ante Beljo had described Bosnia-
Hercegovina as an integral part of ‘Croatian ethnic territory’, with both
republics constituting ‘an entity historically, culturally, linguistically, and
economically’.37 Tvrtkovic´ also contrasted the ‘artificial’ borders between
the two countries with the ‘natural’ linkages between Hercegovina and
Dalmatia and south-western Bosnia with Croatia.38 Other academics
contributed to the war effort by inventing spurious statistics to buttress these
irredentist claims. Sime Dodan’s unambiguously titled book, Bosnia and
Hercegovina: A Croatian Land, claimed that 95 per cent of Moslems and 30 per
cent of Serbians were ethnically Croat, using the somewhat speculative
argument that all surnames ending in ‘-an’ were of Iranian origin, and were
therefore Croatian.39
Even glossy Croatian travel books printed by the government included
photographs of Sarajevo and other Bosnian cities. Ante Cˇuvalo’s Croatia and
the Croatians described Croatia’s eastern border as being Serbia, Kosovo and
Montenegro. As was stated in the introduction: ‘further reference to the
Croatians and Croatia in this book encompasses the territory of today’s
Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina’. To this end, the
territory of this ‘joint’ state was added together, as was the population.40 Such
tourist books aimed at attracting foreign visitors were meant to familiarise
travellers with the idea of Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia being the same
state, and expressed clear designs on the region well before the war had even
begun. Before a single shot had been fired, libraries throughout the world
received free copies of Cˇuvalo’s book, attesting to the indivisibility of these two
separate countries.41
Analysing Serbian and Croatian arguments
Conflicting national claims are often difficult to deconstruct. Historical revi-
sionism is always a mixture of fact and interpretation, relying on a highly
biased interpretation of historical reality. At various times in history, parts of
Bosnia-Hercegovina’s territory were under Serbian and Croatian rule, thus
making it impossible to assert that Bosnia was either Croatian or Serbian.
Bosnia proper was under Serbian rule from the mid-tenth century to the end
of the eleventh, although while the ‘Serbs’ ruled Bosnia they controlled very
little of what today is considered Serbia. However, their control over
Hercegovina, today a Croatian stronghold, was more extensive. Bosnia proper
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was more closely linked to Croatia for much of its history, notably during the
medieval period.42
The first time the region was united was under King Stephen II
Kotromanic´ in 1326. His national identity was perhaps ‘ambiguous’ by the
standards of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as he was born
Orthodox, but converted to Catholicism in 1340.43 King Tvrtko, the heir and
nephew of Stephen II (crowned in 1367), was, according to Noel Malcolm,
both a Catholic and a descendant of the Serbian Nemanjic´ dynasty, leading to
claims that he was both a historic Serbian and Croatian leader. Steven
Runciman, by contrast, argued that Trvtko was ‘Orthodox by conviction and
a friend of the Patarenes [the heretical church of Bosnia] from policy’.44 There
was a similar confusion over later figures. The ethnic identity of one sixteenth
century vizier in the Sultan’s court, Mehmed Pasˇa Sokolovic´, was hotly
contested. Paul Tvrtkovic´ claimed him for the Croats, while Radovan
Simardzic´ asserted his Serbian origin.45 These are but three of many examples
of how different aspects of history – religious affiliation versus lineage – were
used to assert competing claims. 
While it is true that much of Bosnia-Hercegovina had once been ruled by
‘Serbian’ rulers and ‘Croatian’ rulers, these rulers had little sense of national-
ism or ethnic identity. It seems, from a reading of Runciman at least, that from
the mid-twelfth century until the Ottoman conquest in the fifteenth century
many of the local Slavonic rulers of Bosnia and Hercegovina attempted to
maintain some form of independence by playing off the West (Hungary,
Austria-Hungary) against the East (Byzantium for a short while, followed by
Serbia). The only real constant in this pattern of shifting alliances between the
Catholic West and the Orthodox East appears to have been a steady alliance
with the dualist ‘Bosnian Church’, a distinct religious organisation, which
existed until the fifteenth century. Thus, making exclusive claims to such
figures as Tvrtko or Sokolovic´ for one’s own national history is deliberately
misleading. Such attempts to impose a twentieth-century re-interpretation of
mediaeval history were obviously at variance with the facts, as was the rather
futile project of insisting that Bosnia-Hercegovina’s early populations could
themselves be neatly divided into Serb and Croat.46 Bosnia-Hercegovina had
been subject to Turkish, French, German, Austrian, Italian, and Hungarian
administration. Historic rule, even if provable, in no way constituted a justifi-
cation for invasion in the late twentieth century. 
Another aspect of Bosnian history that Serbs, Croats, and Moslems co-
opted was the rise and fall of the ‘Bosnian Church’. Moslems were the first to
identify themselves as the descendants of Bosnian Church members, claiming
that they converted en masse to Islam, and had therefore never been Orthodox
or Catholic (and by extension, neither Serb nor Croat).47 Some historians, like
Runciman, have also insisted that such conversions were often the result of a
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distinct hatred of ‘the arrogant Hungarians and the greedy Dalmatians and
their Latin church and culture’. In this sense, those who converted did so as a
means of asserting their own religious and cultural autonomy – they were not
the hapless pawns that later Serb and Croat ideologues would make them out
to be. Rather, such people may well have made a positive pro-active choice in
order to bring a better future for themselves, taking up, as Runciman further
describes it, ‘a new faith that was sufficiently sympathetic and that brought
great material advantages’. Predictably, both Serbs and Croats proclaimed the
Bosnian Church as merely an offshoot of their own faith. Croatian writers,
such as Leo Petrovic´ and Jaroslav Sˇidak, argued that the Bosnian Church was
a heretical Catholic monastic order. Serbian writers, such as Bozˇidar
Petranovic´, argued that the Bosnian Church was an offshoot of the Orthodox
Church.48 Needless to say, there was little convincing evidence given for such
assertions, which seem to fly in the face of historical reality.
Problematically for nationalists, there was simply no standardised
‘national’ consciousness before the nineteenth century, and therefore no
means of accurately identifying an authentic Serbian or Croatian ‘ethnic’
consciousness. In many ways, Tito’s Moslem nationality was no more artifi-
cial than the arbitrary division of the Slavs into Serb and Croat. John Fine has
suggested that, owing to the weakness of Church authority, there were many
cases of multiple conversions, to Islam from either Orthodoxy or Catholicism,
Catholicism to Orthodoxy, and Orthodoxy to Catholicism.49 Tone Bringa has
described numerous families who tried to ‘cover all bases’ – where one brother
would be Orthodox or Catholic, the other Moslem.50
It is clear from historical accounts that the Islamic faith espoused in
Bosnia-Hercegovina was rather liberal, what the historian Peter Sugar has
described as a ‘variety of European or rather Balkan folk-Islam’, which
included baptism, icons to prevent mental illness and other non-Moslem
characteristics. As he explained: ‘There were mountaineers who called them-
selves Constantin in front of Christians and Sulayman in front of Moslems.
The dead would be given a service by the Orthodox Church and a subsequent
burial in a Moslem cemetery. The religious boundaries were easily and
frequently transgressed.’51 That one-third of the contemporary Sarajevo
population were in ‘mixed’ marriages cements the fact that, even in the twen-
tieth century, religion was not seen as an exclusive category.52 Clearly, the
notion that Bosnian Moslems were simply ethnic Croats or ethnic Serbs was
untenable. There was no proof that any of Bosnia’s three national groups had
any strong sense of exclusive national identity before the nineteenth century,
nor, more importantly, that these groups were static and unchanging.
Moreover, Moslems would not have been the only ones with a loose interpre-
tation of ‘national’ labels. Many ‘Serbs’ and ‘Croats’ may well have changed
their own labels as different political masters dominated the region. Becoming
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Catholic (and therefore ‘Croat’) would certainly have had its advantages
during the four decades when Austria-Hungary controlled Bosnia, while clas-
sifying oneself as Orthodox (and therefore ‘Serb’) would have been a useful
means of self-preservation during the earlier Ottoman era. Orthodoxy at this
time was interpreted as a far weaker and less threatening force than
Catholicism – the religion of the Ottomans’ Western enemies. Thus, national
identity in Bosnia, as elsewhere, can also be interpreted as a political choice,
not one derived from any ethnic absolutes or a sense of primordial identity.
The Moslems as ‘traitors’: the Islamic conspiracy theory
Contrary to Serbian and Croatian desires, Bosnian Moslems had their own
sense of identity, their own political parties, and their own military forces to
back up their autonomy. It became apparent throughout the conflict that
another form of propaganda would be needed to legitimate military interven-
tion in the region. Another soon emerged. If the Moslems rejected their ‘true’
ethnicity, and continued to promote their own form of identity, it followed
logically that they had betrayed their Croatian or Serbian brothers. They had
betrayed the nation because of their adherence to Islam. The theme of the
Bosnian Moslems as traitors became influential in nationalist circles early on
in the conflict. Islam was caricatured as a fundamentalist, exclusivist and
thoroughly dangerous religion, bent on the destruction of ethnic nations in
the Balkans. 
Serbs and Croats would portray themselves as victims of an Islamic
conspiracy. Rather than attacking a relatively defenceless minority group,
they were defending Europe against the onslaught of an Islamic invasion,
comparable only to the Ottoman invasion some five centuries before. Here,
Kecˇmanovic´’s ‘plot’ theme was often cited, as Serbs and Croats argued that
outside powers were going to use the Bosnian Moslems as an ‘Islamic
Springboard’, to penetrate into the heart of Europe. Serbs and Croats were
saving their own nations from assimilation and potential genocide, while
reliving their historic role – defending the Antemurale Christianitatis against a
renewed Ottoman invasion. 
Serbs and the ‘Moslem traitors’ in Bosnia-Hercegovina
The theory of Moslems as ‘fallen Serbs’ was often mixed with a view of the
Moslems as traitors to the Serbian nation. Kosovo, as indicated earlier, had
elevated the Serbs to the status of a divine and chosen nation, while reducing
the Moslems or ‘Turks’ to the status of ‘Christ killers’. Serbs who converted to
Islam were seen to have renounced their chosen status, embracing the reli-
gion and culture of the invader. Converts were likened to Vuk Brankovic´, and
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were seen to constitute the worst of Serbia’s enemies. While certain propa-
ganda focused on the need to ‘save’ the Moslems, another more virulent strain
called for the Serbs to ‘save’ themselves and the Western world from Islamic
invasion. Of course, anti-Moslem rhetoric had been popular in Serbia for
many centuries. Karadzic´’s popularisation of the Kosovo myth, Cvijic´’s
‘Dinaric Man’, and Njegosˇ’s ‘Mountain Wreath’ were but three early examples
of anti-Moslem, anti-Turkish writings that were popular in nineteenth-
century Serbia.
Anti-Moslem rhetoric was extensively used in Serbian literature during
the 1990s. Miroljub Jevtic´, an Islamic specialist at Belgrade University,
argued unequivocally that:
Those who accepted Islam accepted the conquerors de facto as their brothers, and
the crimes of the latter are their own. That means that their own hands are also
covered with the blood of their own ancestors, the former Bosnian non-Muslim
population. By converting to Islam, they destroyed Christian Bosnia and caused
the Ottomans to rule over Christian Bosnia for a long time.53
Jevtic´ was in many ways typical of the Serbian establishment. For him, as for
many of his colleagues, the antipathy between Serbs and Moslems was
centuries-old, ‘Serbophobia [being] highly developed among fundamentalist
Muslims.’54 Thus, while Serbs may have been the aggressors in Bosnia, they
were simply responding to centuries of Moslem aggression. Novelists also
picked up on similar themes. Draskovic´’s Noz (discussed in Chapter 5) featured
a number of Moslem characters, who appeared primarily as treacherous, cold-
blooded murderers – ethnic Serbs who had abandoned the ‘lessons of
Kosovo’.55 This novel revolves around a massacre of Orthodox Serbs by
Moslems on Christmas Day, 1942. The only survivor, a Serbian baby, is raised
by Moslems, and taught to hate the Serbs. By some twist of fate, he later
discovers his own Serbian identity, and further discovers that his ‘Moslem’
family is also ethnically Serbian.56 With its depictions of Moslem violence and
wanton acts of cruelty, Moslems were presented in it as misguided traitors,
who need to be carefully controlled.
Another novel of this stripe was Vojislav Lubarda’s The Ascension (1990)
with its negative descriptions of Serbian–Moslem relations in Bosnia. Set after
the assassination of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914, the
central action in the story once again consists of a massacre of Serbs by
Moslems. Lubarda’s work was a typical expression of Serbian ‘counteridentifi-
cation’. The Serbs were presented as noble and heroic, always willing to fight
for others, and always willing to forgive and forget. These positive qualities
were contrasted with those of the Moslems, who continuously hated the Serbs
and massacred them whenever possible.57 Lubarda thus drew out stereotypi-
cal characterisations of the Moslems – their supposedly treacherous and
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warlike dispositions, making them little different from their mythical ances-
tor, Vuk Brankovic´. 
Novelists reinforced this anti-Moslem paranoia. So did politicians. In one
collection of essays, Dobrica C´osic´ warned of a ‘pan-Islamic internationaliza-
tion of war in Bosnia’, seeing this as ‘the greatest danger looming over both
the Balkans and south east Europe’.58 While Croatian writers almost always
spoke of Serbs as part of the East, C´osic´ placed the Serbs solidly in the West,
with the Moslems as little better than the Asian hordes and Vandals to whom
Croats compared the Serbs. Serbs had to continue their historic role, to defend
the West against the evils of Islam. According to C´osic´: ‘[It was] the Serbian
people who consented, from the 14th century, to the greatest sacrifices for the
defense of Europe and its civilization.’59
Other Serbian politicians, including Slobodan Milosˇevic´, continued to
hammer out the theme of Serbia standing alone against the forces of Islam,
Serbia as the plucky ‘David’ against an Islamic ‘Goliath’. While he did not fear
Islam, he saw the necessity of controlling it. This ‘plot’ was extremely popular
among Serbian leaders, who enjoyed the symbolism of fighting against a
powerful Islamic menace.60 Radovan Karadzic´ also saw his role in world-
historic proportions. He claimed that his mission as leader of the Bosnian
Serbs was to insure that Islamic fundamentalism did not ‘infect Europe from
the south’. For Karadzic´ and many of his colleagues, Middle Eastern countries,
such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey were trying to use Bosnia as a ‘spring-
board for Islamic penetration of Europe’.61 Serbian leaders enjoyed portraying
themselves as self-sacrificing warriors, waging war in Bosnia in order to
defend the West against a new Ottoman invasion.
Imagining the Islamic state: Serbian perspectives
While general ideas of Moslem treachery and cruelty were important, many
Serbian academics amused themselves by imagining how horrible an Islamic
state could be, what it would look like, how it would operate, and what
features would distinguish it from other state forms. Certainly, a great deal of
creative licence was allowed, as long as this dystopian state was sufficiently
horrific to deter the Serbian public from siding with the Moslems in Bosnia.
Serbian views on what the Moslems were trying to create would have been
laughable, had the authors not been serious. 
For Serbian writers, the key to understanding Moslem objectives in
Bosnia was Alija Izetbegovic´’s now infamous tract, Islamic Declaration (1972).
This publication, which earned him a prison sentence under the Communist
regime, was touted by Serbs and Croats alike as a blueprint for an expansion-
ist Islamic empire. One quote in particular always caught the eye of Serbian
propagandists. Izetbegovic´ supposedly affirmed in his Declaration that ‘there
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can be no coexistence between the Islamic religion and non-Muslim social and
political institutions’ in countries where Muslims represent the majority of the
population.62 This passage became an obvious favourite of both Serb and
Croat writers, being one of the few that alluded to Izetbegovic´’s plans for a
utopian Islamic state. 
However, contrary to Serbian and Croatian claims, Izetbegovic´ had never
called for an Islamic state in Bosnia. In fact, he had concluded that such a state
was impossible, owing to the multiconfessional nature of the republic.
Nevertheless, interpretations of the Declaration gave a clear indication of
Serbian paranoia about a resurgent Islam in the Balkans. Izetbegovic´’s
writing was often portrayed as a blueprint for an ‘Islamic renaissance’,
followed by a ‘holy war (jihad)’ against non-Moslems. Serbs also feared that
Izetbegovic´ was trying to create an expanded state, a ‘great Islamic federation
from Morocco to Indonesia in which the Koran would be the supreme law’.63
One 1993 Serbian Ministry of Information pamphlet, intended for English-
speaking audiences abroad, used a strong form of Orientalism laced with
Islamic conspiracy theories. One of the contributors, an Orthodox priest and
member of the Bosnian Serb Parliament, stressed the immorality and perfidy
of the Moslems and their religion, predicting that: 
They want for the second time to create a Turkish Bosnia or a Bosnia in Turkey ...
with the Shariatic law and other life norms unacceptable in the twenty-first
century. Behind this century-old dream of a primitive man to live off the backs of
a subjugated people, to have his own harem, dreaming of Istanbul, where accord-
ing to him there was a paradise of earth, where ‘fairies are bathing in sherbet’ ...
They [the Moslems] invited to this bloody feast all other worldy bums, murderers
and dogs of war, Mujahadins and jihad fanatics from the Islamic countries came
to fulfil their sacred duty and to exterminate us. This unscrupulousness completely
fits their religion and tradition and culture.64
For this particular writer, the Moslem utopia would be a reversion to some
species of oriental despotism, where loose morals and low standards of behav-
iour would prevail. Sexual depravity and the subjugation of women were also
common themes, as if to arouse in Serbian males the fear that their wives,
mothers, or sisters could be defiled by a Moslem. Thus Serbs objected to the
possibility of an alternative society, where ‘Eastern’ customs and manners
would prevail. For them, the fear of another Ottoman empire was too horrible
to contemplate. Another article in a similar vein, entitled ‘Lying [sic] Hands on
The Serbian Women’, written by a Bosnian Serb official, once more defined
the conflict in terms of a Moslem holy war against Serbs. This document
described a sort of ‘race crime’ being committed against Serbs living in and
around Sarajevo. Here the image of rape as a weapon of war was stressed:
By order of the Islamic fundamentalists from Sarajevo, healthy Serbian women
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from 17 to 40 years of age are being separated out and subjected to special treat-
ment. According to their sick plans going back many years, these women have to
be impregnated by orthodox Islamic seed in order to raise a generation of janis-
saries on the territories they surely consider to be theirs, the Islamic republic.65
Again, the threat of Serbian women being raped was articulated. While
some Serbian women were being raped, and perhaps not only by non-Serbs,
rape was not described as an individual act, but as a weapon of war. This
document was first brought to light by Roy Gutman in 1993, during his jour-
nalistic forays in Bosnia. It was at this time that the world first became
exposed to the so-called ‘Serbian rape camps’, and the Bosnian Serbs were
accused of systematically raping some 20,000 Moslem women. While such
statistics were later proved to be unrealistically high, Serbian propagandists
had a vested interest in deflecting criticism of any Serbian-inspired rape
policy. Thus it made perfect sense to accuse the Bosnian Moslems of religiously
inspired mass rape, which in many ways was seen to be much worse than any
Serbian rapes, since women would have been impregnated in order to raise
‘janissaries’.
While such anecdotal evidence was extremely interesting, so too were the
many compilations put out by the Serbian government. These featured testi-
mony from Serbian women who claimed to have been raped by Bosnian
Moslems. No doubt many of the stories were true, although they were nearly
impossible to verify. Nikola Marinovic´’s evocatively titled Stories from Hell
continued the popular Serbian theme of stereotyping Moslems as sexually
depraved Ottomans: 
The greatest humiliation suffered by Serbian women happens whenever a Moslem
commander proclaims himself ‘bey’, ‘agha’ or ‘vizier’ (a frequent occurrence) and
decides to have a harem. The ‘right to sleep’ with the ‘master’ is then brutally
applied. Young Serbian women are thus brought to the bottom of human dignity.
Such atrocities have particularly been registered in central Bosnia, in the towns of
Zenica, Gornji Vakuf, Travnik, Jajce . . . In these same zones, Serbian boys have
undergone circumcision (the ‘sunnett’), and have been forcibly Islamicised.66
Once again, the fear of Serbian women being forced into harems was
promoted, as well as the fear that Serbian boys would be forcibly converted to
Islam, if the Serbs did not act quickly to take over strategic areas. After more
than four decades of living side by side with Bosnia’s largely secularised
Moslem populations, Bosnian Serbs surely knew that such dystopian visions
were pure nonsense. The most interesting aspect of this quotation was
Marinovic´’s listing of the towns and cities where these harems and forced
conversions supposedly took place. Most of these places were those where a
form of defensive ethnic cleansing had either taken place, or would take place
shortly.
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The Moslems as genocidal killers
Another general theme in propaganda circles was to compare an exaggerated
view of an Islamic conspiracy with the horrors of Nazi Germany. As with the
Croats, Serbs could confidently claim to be defending themselves against a
Moslem-inspired genocide. Such a view was clearly stated by the Bosnian Serb
leader Milorad Ekmecˇic´’s oft-quoted speech to the last Congress of Serbian
Intellectuals, in Sarajevo: 
In the history of the world only the Jews have paid a higher price for their freedom
than the Serbs. Because of their losses in the war, and because of massacres, the
most numerous people in Yugoslavia, the Serbs, have, in Bosnia Hercegovina,
fallen to second place, and today our policy and our general behaviour carry
within themselves the invisible stamp of a struggle for biological survival.67
Ekmecˇic´’s writings and public statements generally focused on Bosnia-
Hercegovina as the target of Eastern and Western expansionism. Sandwiched
between two opposing and equally dangerous forces, Serbs were portrayed as
Jewish like victims of an attempted genocide. This link figured prominently in
many Serbian accounts. 
Similarly, the fear of a Moslem-inspired genocide was linked to the
Bosnian youth magazine, Novi Vox, which supposedly encouraged its readers
to participate in an anti-Serbian game – to collect as many Serbian heads as
possible.68 Another recent Bosnian Serb publication drew out similar themes.
Here, the authors claimed to have uncovered a Moslem plan to kill 100 Serbs
for every Moslem killed, and between 10 and 15 for every wounded. These
figures echoed the ratio of Serb to German deaths during the Nazi occupation
of Serbia during the Second World War. Mixed with this imagery were reports
of Moslem plans to establish an Islamic state, in which all women would be
forced to wear veils, while all men would be forced to attend the mosque.69
Clearly, such imagery was important in creating the impression that Serbs
were merely reacting in self-defence to a planned genocide on the part of the
Moslems. More recently, Milosˇevic´ would regale judges and prosecutors alike
at the Hague with stories of ‘Mujahideen’ coming from Saudi Arabia with
sabres in hand, solely for the purpose of cutting off Serbian heads in order to
‘help Alija Izetbegovic´’.70
Another aspect of this self-defensive posture was the theory that the
Moslems had shelled their own people to court sympathy from the West. The
most publicised examples were two instances of shelling in Sarajevo, the first
in February 1994, where a marketplace was shelled on its busiest day. The
second shelling occurred in August 1995, when another marketplace was
bombed, killing 37 civilians and wounding another 85.71 For Serbian writers,
Izetbegovic´, the skilful ‘dictator-impostor’, was guilty of having staged the
shellings himself, in order to falsely portray the Moslems as victims of Serbian
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aggression.72 Another theory held that the Moslems shelled their own people
in order to deflect Western attention from their extermination campaign
against Serbian civilians. Risto Tubic´ dismissed the marketplace bombings as
a cover for a Moslem ‘Holocaust’ against the Serbs in the 1990s, a ‘third geno-
cide’, which was to be ‘the culmination of all historically known forms of
physical and psychological persecution’.73 Turning the truth completely
upside down, Tubic´ compared the Bosnian Moslems to Nazis, victimising
themselves in order to exterminate Serbs. Thus by denying that the Serbs had
shelled Sarajevo, he was able to make overt parallels between Serbs and Jews: 
Ever since Hitler organised the Crystal Night, this most cynical and filthiest
weapon also became an instrument of modern warfare. Among many, suffice it to
mention the massacres in Vasa Miskin Street and at the Markdale market-place.
The aim was twofold: first to publicise reports on atrocities in order to arouse the
desire for revenge among the public and draw world public support for one side
against the other, and secondly, to alarm the world with such reports that would
force governments to take action, to intervene militarily.74
References such as these were all the more ludicrous in light of the fact
that Serbs had been shelling Sarajevo from their mountain positions continu-
ally during this time. The Sarajevo Olympic Stadium became a huge cemetery
for Moslem casualties, while most Sarajevans were terrified to stray from their
homes, lest they be gunned down by Serbian snipers. Even in such an atmos-
phere, while Moslems were dodging bullets down ‘sniper alley’ in Sarajevo,
the Serbs maintained that Bosnian Moslems were playing the victim to cover
up their own genocide against the Serbs.
From a practical standpoint, it was clear that the image of warlike, fanat-
ical Moslems was a key ingredient in activating Serbian violence in many
regions of Bosnia. Images of Moslems as traitors and ‘Christ-killers’ were
repeated time and time again in the Serbian media, in an attempt to encour-
age and justify Serbian aggression. Constantly repeated in the Serbian press,
such imagery was often used as a pretext for ethnic cleansing.75 Serbian
writers seem to have used reports of atrocities as a precursor to attacks on
strategically important towns and cities. Thus Serbs were reported tortured
and killed in Livno, Jajce, Slavonski Brod, Konjic, Travnik, Vitez, Mostar, and
even Sarajevo.76 Such patterns occurred throughout the conflict, suggesting
that anti-Moslem propaganda had very practical and negative consequences. 
Croatian views of the Bosnian Moslems
While there were many historical instances of co-operation between Croats
and Bosnian Moslems, Croatian attitudes were strikingly similar to those of
the Serbs. Persecution imagery performed an important role, as did the
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argument that Moslems were fallen nationals who had to be brought back to
the fold. Again like the Serbs, Croatian politicians and academics saw the
merits of casting themselves as the victims of a Moslem onslaught as part of
their mission to liberate former Croatian territory. An emphasis on victimhood
prevented domestic criticism of Croatian actions, in particular by the opposi-
tion media. Both Serbian and Croatian government media were issued strict
instructions not to report on the negative activities of their own side in the
conflict, thus rendering a skewed representation of Moslems as the sole aggres-
sors. The Serbian media were keen to portray the conflict as a ‘civil war’, and
media references to the Moslems described them constantly as ‘attackers’.77
Similar views were promoted on the Croatian side, even during periods of
Croatian–Moslem alliances. This was due to the fact that such alliances were
often brokered by the Croatian government, with little regard for the views of
Bosnian Croats (Mate Boban was removed by Tudjman during one such
alliance). Thus, it was common for the Croatian media to promote messages of
goodwill and friendship with the Moslems, while newsrooms in Herceg-Bosna
were condemning Moslems as ‘enemies’ and genocidal killers.78 As with the
Serbs, Croatian propagandists accused the Moslems of trying to take over the
Balkans and Europe. Such imagery began in the official media by late 1992.
At this stage, it focused primarily on Moslem collaboration with KOS, the
Yugoslav military intelligence, and by extension, the Serbs. This soon
changed to specific attacks on Islam, with regular news reports decrying the
dangers of fundamentalist extremism. By early November 1992, Gojko Sˇusˇak,
in a bid for Israeli military support, tried to drum up fears of an Islamic
conspiracy, alleging that there were 11,000 Bosnian Muslims studying in
Cairo alone. He appealed to one Israeli audience by asking: ‘Can you imagine
a fundamentalist state in the heart of Europe?’79
Tudjman likewise referred often to a threat of Islamic Fundamentalism
and to an Islamic holy war. He justified intervention in Bosnia by maintaining
that Izetbegovic´’s government aimed to ‘set up an Islamic state in Europe,
which was part of a conflict between the Islamic and Catholic worlds, and of a
confrontation between the Islamic world and the West’.80 For Tudjman, the
Islamic threat was real. In a 1992 meeting with ambassador Warren
Zimmermann, he outlined the dimensions of the Islamic conspiracy:
The Muslims want to establish an Islamic fundamentalist state. They plan to do
this by flooding Bosnia with 500,000 Turks. Izetbegovic´ has also launched a
demographic threat. He has a secret policy to reward large families so that in a few
years the Muslims will be a majority in Bosnia (at the time they were 44 per cent).
The influence of an Islamic Bosnia will then spread through the Sandzak and
Kosovo to Turkey and to Libya. Izetbegovic´ is just a fundamentalist frontman for
Turkey; together they’re conspiring to create a Greater Bosnia. Catholics and
Orthodox alike will be eradicated.81
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Tudjman’s unsubstantiated theories typified official Croatian views: the
Moslems could not be trusted, and were plotting to create an Islamic state in
Europe. Croatian writers used such fears to legitimise the establishment of
Bosnian Croatian autonomous units, such Herceg-Bosna. As with the Serbian
side, Izetbegovic´’s Islamic Declaration was frequently cited as proof of the
Moslems’ plan to overrun the region. Croatian journalists, like their Serbian
counterparts, often quoted Izetbegovic´’s claim that there could be ‘no peace
and coexistence between the Islamic faith and non-Islamic social and political
institutions.’82 The Declaration was also linked to specific genocidal crimes
perpetrated by Moslems against Croats. Like the Serbs, Croatian writers
portrayed Izetbegovic´’s work as a blueprint for genocide. 
One journalist described how the Bosnian Moslems in 1993, through a
certain Operation ‘Tito’, had begun attacking Croatian settlements in central
Bosnia, laying the foundations for a Moslem-instigated genocide against
Bosnia’s Croatian population. Izetbegovic´ supposedly had plans to make
Sarajevo a European Islamic capital, housing some 15 million European
Moslems. As for the Bosnian Croats, they were nothing more than an obstacle
for Izetbegovic´, who wanted to construct an Islamic empire from ‘Teheran to
Slavonski Brod’.83 One must ask ironically if this would fit inside the Islamic
empire that the Serbs envisaged for Izetbegovic´, destined to stretch from
Indonesia to Morocco. Needless to say, there was no documentary evidence of
an ‘Operation Tito’. The theory that Sarajevo was to become a world Islamic
capital was also pure conjecture. More important were the overt accusations
of genocide levelled against the Moslems. As in the Serbian case, such writings
were useful in obscuring the reality of Croatian ethnic cleansing operations,
which were ongoing in Bosnia at that time. 
Even when Croats and Moslems formed Tudjman-brokered alliances, the
local press continued to condemn the Moslems for trying to destroy their
national distinctiveness with multinational federalism. One recent article,
written well after the Dayton Accords, accused the Bosnian Moslems of trying
to turn the Croats into ‘Bosnian Croats’, which they interpreted as an attempt
to ‘eradicate from their life and consciousness national symbols, tradition and
language, to destroy their identity’.84 For many Croatian nationalists, even
the prefix ‘Bosnian’ implied a Moslem identity rather than the former regional
appellation it used to signify. When forced into an alliance with the Moslems
in 1995, the Bosnian Croats had an extremely difficult time abandoning their
hopes for an internationally recognised Greater Croatia. 
Assigning blame in Bosnia-Hercegovina
Both Serbian and Croatian academics, journalists, military leaders and politi-
cians consistently used the fear of Islamic expansion and violence to
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legitimate their own nationalist expansion and violence. Both Serbs and
Croats ran ‘detention centres’ and ‘collection camps’ where prisoners were
housed, fed little to no food, frequently beaten and terrorised, sometimes sexu-
ally violated, and often killed. While one should note clearly that the majority
of camps were Serb-controlled (13 major camps), the Croats maintained 4
main camps as well. These, however, were only the largest. The International
Red Cross, by August, 1994, had documented a total of 51, many small and
impromptu – located in camp grounds, schools, even movie theatres. Serbian
camps were exposed during 1992, and figured prominently in the famous
ITN-Channel 4 series on Bosnia. Roy Gutman’s prize-winning dispatches also
exposed Serbian crimes, while notably omitting references to Croatian
violence.85 Tudjman publicly admitted to the existence of Croatian ‘collection
centres’, which housed, by 1993, an estimated 20,000 inmates in the terri-
tory of Herceg-Bosna. That ‘others had them too’ was enough of an excuse for
Tudjman, who did not seem to deny, nor regret, that such camps existed.86
While organised militia groups instigated much of the ethnic cleansing in
Bosnia-Hercegovina, the Serbian Orthodox and Croatian Catholic Churches
also proved their complicity in many of the violent activities of their support-
ers. The Serbian warlord Vojislav Sˇesˇelj and his militia were blessed by an
Orthodox priest after having cleansed several Moslem towns near Sarajevo. In
Trebinje, one Orthodox priest led a group of Serbs in expelling several Moslem
families from their homes. The town’s 500-year-old mosque was later
destroyed during celebrations for the feast day of St Sava. Even outside the
region, Metropolitan Christopher in the United States described Bosnia’s
Moslems as slavish followers of the Ayatollah Khomeini, while the Orthodox
bishop of Zvornik described how Moslems killed ‘unbelievers’ as a way of
getting closer to heaven.87 The Church’s involvement often lent crucial moral
and spiritual support to Serbian nationalists. Rather than speaking out
against war, the Church sometimes became a willing collaborator. 
The Croatian Catholic Church also proved instrumental in encouraging
many of the more violent aspects of Croatian nationalism. While the Cardinal
of Zagreb and the Archbishop of Sarajevo bravely condemned the escalation
of violence, local branches of the Church were often supporters, particularly
in Hercegovina. In Mostar, the local clergy and 250 Franciscan friars lent
their support to the HVO, arguing that ‘Islamic states don’t have free speech,
democracy or freedom of religion.’ Priests often compared the Bosnian
government to ‘Turkish occupiers’, while portraits of Ustasˇa leaders such as
Ante Pavelic´ and Ranko Boban were frequent adornments on the walls of
Hercegovinian priests, according to Michael Sells.88
In the Serbian and Croatian cases, both sides used the myths of assimila-
tion and Islamic conspiracy to sanction the ethnic cleansing and mass
destruction that so characterised the Bosnian war. Myths were employed as
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part of a political agenda, in order to legitimate violence, and in some cases, to
instigate it. While the Churches could have prevented the escalation of
violence, they did little to discourage it. Unfortunately, their complicity in
mass murder and the forced expulsion of populations will remain one of the
most enduring and disheartening aspects of the conflict.
The Bosnian Moslem perspective
Serbian and Croatian designs and overall strategies for Bosnia-Hercegovina
were often starkly similar, as were the themes and attitudes expressed in their
national writings. Unsurprisingly, the Moslem leadership also used images of
victimisation and persecution. The fact that the Moslems were the chief
victims obviously had much to do with this. Gow and Tisley put it well when
they rightly noted: ‘If Croatia was weak, but played the victim to emphasise its
position, Bosnia was generally a victim.’89 The Bosnian Moslems, like the
Serbs and Croats, found victim-centred imagery useful in articulating their
case. The Bosnian conflict was perhaps the only one that saw Moslem leaders
comparing themselves to Jews, in order to court Western European support
against a Christian-instigated genocide. Clerics such as Mustafa Spahlic´ were
quick to claim that Bosnian Moslems were ‘the new Jews of Europe’.90
Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Siladzic´, amid fears that violence would
escalate if the arms embargo was lifted by the United States, used Second
World War imagery to advance his case, compared lifting the arms embargo
to bombing the railway lines leading to Auschwitz. As far as he was
concerned, this alone would save tens of thousands of lives. During the
Geneva negotiations, Izetbegovic´ used the same imagery, likening the agree-
ments to those reached between Germany and Czechoslovakia in 1938,
except that ‘Instead of Munich this is Geneva. Instead of little Czechoslovakia,
this is little Bosnia. Instead of Benesˇ, it is me.’91
The purpose of using this imagery for the Moslems was similar, yet differ-
ent to its use by the Serbs and Croats. The Moslem side was largely fighting a
war of self-defence; theirs was clearly the weakest position, and the use of such
imagery was not meant to mask their own atrocities, but figured as a public
relations tactic, to encourage Western support for a united Bosnia. In the
Moslem case, the imagery of persecution and genocide was used in the same
manner as it was by the Armenians, the Romani, the Ukrainians, and other
groups seeking national rights and international recognition in the face of
overwhelming oppression.
Nevertheless, this should not be taken to imply that the Bosnian Moslems
were entirely blameless. True to Serbian and Croatian accounts, the Bosnian
Moslems had indeed received military support from the Middle East – although
as a last resort, and long after war had broken out. Furthermore, the token
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support offered by Middle Eastern countries was more symbolic and political
than practical. Algerian and Saudi veterans of the Afghan wars came to
participate in ‘Jihad’ against the Serbs and Croats, but were alarmed by the
‘liberal’ or folk-Islam practices in Bosnia, particularly the fact that men and
women were fighting side by side. Bosnian Moslems, by contrast, were often
angered by the hardline stance of their newfound allies.92 There was little
financial support from the oil-rich countries of the Middle East, except for
some government funding from Saudi Arabia and a variety of private contri-
butions.93 What was given, and primarily from Iran, were offers of fuel, arms,
and at one stage 10,000 ‘peace-keepers’ (these were refused by the UN). 
Rather than trying to help the Bosnian Moslems, the Iranians seem to
have been motivated by a desire to provoke the United States, while antago-
nising their Saudi rivals. Shiite Iranian relief aid was primarily targeted at
areas that were being helped by similar Sunni Saudi agencies, suggesting that
Middle Eastern politics was being played out in Bosnia, at the expense of the
local population.94 Saudi and Iranian aid was simply too little too late, and
had little effect on the outcome of the war. Contrary to Serbian and Croatian
claims, Bosnia was never a springboard for Islamic penetration into Europe,
and Islamic countries hardly seemed to care at all what happened in Bosnia.
While author Salman Rushdie was hiding for his life from an Iranian fatwah
after the publication of his Satanic Verses, no Islamic regime incited aggression
against Serbian or Croatian leaders.95
By 1994, some 80 per cent of non-Serbs had been expelled from Serbian-
controlled territory. After most of the brutal ethnic cleansing took place, there
were signs that the Bosnian government, feeling that it now had nothing to
lose, began imposing a distinctly Islamic morality on the territory it still
controlled. Several officials in the Bosnian government spoke out against
mixed marriages, arguing that they were doomed to failure and should be
opposed. Mustafa Ceric, the Grand Mufti of Bosnia, opined that while the
policy of systematic rape was ‘horrible and incomprehensible’, it was ‘less
painful and easier to accept than all those mixed marriages and all those chil-
dren born of mixed marriages’.96 The Culture and Education minister Enes
Karic´ initiated new reforms to make what remained of Moslem Bosnia more
Islamic, throwing away ‘European trash’ – such as drugs, alcohol, and prosti-
tution, while banning Croatian and Serbian music from radio stations in
favour of more Arab-sounding music. He also encouraged changes in the
‘Bosnian’ language (including the addition of Turkish words) to reflect an
Islamic heritage.97
Curiously, there was a backlash against these reforms, largely from
Moslems themselves, including members of the SDA government. Events
came to a head in early 1995, when Izetbegovic´ met with members of the
Seventh Muslim Brigade, whose banner bore Arabic writings. His official
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endorsement of Islamic over multiconfessional forces was highly criticised.
His reference to one dead Moslem soldier as a shehid (martyr), brought open
criticism from the boy’s family, angered by the fact that their son was
described using Arabic words, while being the focus of Arabic prayers. This
was a language which neither he nor his family understood.98 What was
obvious among Bosnian Moslems was their continued support for a multicon-
fessional Bosnia, even among those Moslems who were the obvious victims of
Serbian and Croatian aggression. For some reason, a strong sense of national-
ism, or even religious conviction, failed to take hold among the population,
even during the bloodiest periods of the war.99
Conclusions
Serbian and Croatian nationalists advanced startlingly similar ideas and
images in their understanding of the Bosnian Moslems. Both claimed Bosnian
Moslems as their ethnic kin, while similarly claiming the territory of Bosnia-
Hercegovina as historically part of their respective countries. At the same
time, negative myths were used to attack the Moslems as an expansionist and
dangerous religious group – with different cultural practices and sexual
mores. Negative myths of identification, such as ‘counteridentification’,
themes of ‘plot’, ‘threat’, ‘damage’, and ‘universal culprit’, were common, as
well as themes of ‘redemption and suffering’, and ‘unjust treatment’. Both
sides portrayed the Moslems as the vanguard of a dangerous Islamic conspir-
acy, resorting to crude stereotypes and rabid orientalist discourse to assert
their false claims. These similarities are best explained by the fact that both
Serbs and Croats had similar objectives – to legitimate the force necessary to
create autonomous regions of their own, even when this included ethnic
cleansing against the Moslem population. 
While there were assertions of Moslem nationalism by the Bosnian
government, these were certainly mild, and largely in reaction to the atroci-
ties Moslems were forced to endure. The same held for foreign support, which
seemed to have been motivated by Iranian–Saudi rivalry more than anything
else. The Moslem population at large, even by the end of the conflict, still
favoured a multiconfessional society. It remains unclear what the future will
bring, even though the Dayton Accords (1995) seem to have brought about a
type of peaceful co-existence. The legacies of ethnic cleansing, however, still
remain. Around 60 per cent of Bosnia’s inhabitants were forced from their
homes, and more than 1.3 million people (some 30 per cent of the population)
were dispersed in 63 countries.100 There could be no doubt that Serbs and
Croats had been the aggressors throughout the conflict. Their use of victim-
centred propaganda proved to be the most effective means of legitimating
their conduct, which, while not necessarily genocidal, was extremely brutal.
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While there was never any proof that the Moslems wanted to spread Islam
throughout Yugoslavia, or even to make Bosnia an Islamic state, Serbian and
Croatian propagandists worked tirelessly to promote the Moslems as genoci-
dal mujahadeen. In both the Serbian and Croatian cases, the threat of genocide,
from each other or the Bosnian Moslems, was the key to Redemption in an
expanded nation-state. Greater Serbian and Greater Croatian ambitions were
premised on the need to protect one’s fellow co-nationals throughout the
region when Yugoslavia was in the final stages of its life.
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Conclusions: confronting relativism in
Serbia and Croatia
The New Aristocracy will consist exclusively of hermits, bums and permanent
invalids. The Rough Diamond, the Consumptive Whore, the bandit who is good to
his mother, the epileptic girl who has a way with animals will be the heroes and
heroines of the New Tragedy, when the general, the statesman, and the philoso-
pher have become the butt of every farce and joke. (W. H. Auden)
WHEN AUDEN PENNED this cynical projection early in the last century,he reflected on a new state of affairs that was coming to pass, acultural transformation privileging the victim over the aggressor,
the loser over the winner. This extract adequately encapsulates the impor-
tance of the Yugoslav conflict as yet another era when the aestheticisation of
the victim was paramount, along with the demonisation of the powerful and
the proud. In Yugoslavia, Serbs and Croats cast themselves as the natural heirs
to much of Yugoslavia’s land mass – through the argument that their historic
persecution gave them the right to expand their nation states to include all co-
nationals.
This concluding section highlights some of the main themes in this study,
drawing together many of the theoretical and empirical strands that have
been discussed in the preceding eight chapters. As I described throughout, a
teleological understanding of history proved to be of central importance for
both Serbian and Croatian nationalist writers during the 1990s. Myths of
Covenant, Fall, and Redemption were of particular importance, as was the
general theme of good against evil. Serbs and Croats were particularly suscep-
tible to these types of myths because of the religious nature of their national
identification. Religion seemingly imbued each side with primordial national
characteristics – making the self appear more enlightened, democratic, noble,
peace-loving, generous, and sacrificial. Religious faith was presented as the
most basic form of national differentiation, influencing culture, traditions,
language, and openness to the outside world. The clash between positive and
progressive religions and backward and racist religions was seen to be at the
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root of conflict. 
In trying to analyse the successes and failures of Serbian and Croatian
propaganda, we need to understand clearly whether or not any actual geno-
cides took place in the Balkans, either in history, or during the more
contemporary period. This includes the general question of whether the
manipulation of Holocaust imagery is a useful means for nations to advance
their political agendas. I have argued that general Fall imagery and imagery
of the Holocaust have played an extremely important role in rallying co-
nationals for the defence of the nation. As an instrumental means of gaining
power and holding on to it, negative imagery has been very useful.
Nevertheless, Holocaust imagery never succeeded in accomplishing its
primary objective – courting massive Western sympathy and support. The
comparative genocide debate in Serbia and Croatia was very much akin to the
tragedy of the commons – as soon as the Serbs invoked it, Croats, Kosovar
Albanians, and Bosnian Moslems all joined in, and picked this stock of
metaphors and symbols clean. 
Religious nationalism and ‘ethnic’ nations
An obvious aspect of Serbian and Croatian revisionism was the theme of evil.
Northrop Frye identified the importance of a continuous negative agency,
bringing about Falls and driving history forward. For the early Hebrews,
enemies came from a variety of cultural, linguistic, and religious back-
grounds. They all worshipped ‘false gods’, but they were not unified by any
mutual similarity in their belief systems. What unified them was their role as
different aspects of a negative agency, acting to destroy the Hebrew nation.1
While the Egyptians, Philistines, Romans, and others were metaphorically
linked, this was the extent of their connection. 
Serbian and Croatian history was boiled down to a series of monumental
encounters between these two groups, whereas the Hebrews faced a wide
variety of enemies over many centuries. Through the bogeymen of
Serbophobia or Greater Serbia, contemporary politicians and military leaders
were linked to their counterparts a century before. In these two case studies,
true historical enemies were excised from history. In Croatia, the Hungarians,
and not the Serbs, were the objects of Croatian hatred in the nineteenth
century, and their ‘concentration camps’ were quietly forgotten. The sword
on the famous bronze statue of Ban Jelacˇic´ was, after all, pointing at Budapest,
not at Belgrade. His rebellion in 1848 was staged against the growing power
of Hungary, not Greater Serbia. Furthermore, Croats were not forced into the
first Yugoslavia in 1918. Rather, joining with other South Slavs was infinitely
preferable to annexation by Italy, which had coveted the Istrian Peninsula for
many decades. 
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Serbia’s greatest historical enemy – the Ottoman Empire – seemed largely
irrelevant in reinterpretations of Serbian history. While there was a great deal
of anti-Moslem, anti-Islamic rhetoric, there were few attacks on Turkey itself
for its past occupation of the region. Nor was there much anti-Ottoman prop-
aganda. Other traditional enemies – such as Bulgaria, a constant threat
during the first half of the twentieth century and a key mover and shaker
during the Balkan Wars – were consigned to obscurity. When history was
reinterpreted in the 1990s, these other countries were conveniently disre-
garded. Even German and Italian invasion was seen as a facilitator of Serbian
or Croatian genocide, with collaboration often seen to be worse than the
crimes either of these invading countries had perpetrated in the region.
Manufacturing a history of Serbian–Croatian rivalry was much more impor-
tant, and so elements of a useable past were grafted together with pure fiction,
to render a completely new vision of the past.
An important reason for this exclusion of historical enemies had to do
with a teleological view of history maintained by both Serbs and Croats.
History was reinterpreted, not simply as a contest between nations, or coun-
tries, but more importantly as one between religious entities, entities that
seemed more important than race, language, or tradition. At no time did it
appear that nationalism was competing with religion. The nation was never
elevated to be, as William Pfaff put it, ‘a simulacrum of the Deity’.2 Rather, the
Croatian Catholic Church and the Serbian Orthodox Church appear to have
remained exceedingly loyal to their respective regimes, which in turn
promoted religion as a central aspect of national identity. While Kecˇmanovic´
was correct that there were many ‘pseudo-religious qualities’ in Serbian and
Croatian ‘ethnic identification’, nationalism did not replace religion: it collab-
orated with, and manipulated it.3
Catholicism and Orthodoxy, long submerged through decades of
Communism, now had the chance to re-emerge. Because Serbs and Croats
largely defined their sense of national identity by their religious beliefs and
their membership in a religious community, it was natural that their emerg-
ing nationalisms would rely on the moral and spiritual legitimacy conferred
by the Church. Religion and nationalism were one in Communist Yugoslavia.
It was impossible for nationalism to replace religion, because without religion
these nations would, in any practical sense, cease to exist. While the self
would be defined by religious criteria, imparting certain primordial character-
istics to the nation, so too would the others come to be defined by their beliefs. 
Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis was invoked time and
again, to explain why peoples of other faiths were dangerous and threatening.
Both the Serbs and the Croats followed Huntington’s hierarchy of religions,
also described by Milica Bakic´-Hayden as ‘nesting orientalisms’. In this hier-
archy, Protestantism was seemingly the most enlightened and the most
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‘Western’, followed by Catholicism, then Orthodoxy, then Islam, presented as
the most violent, barbaric and backward of all religions. Huntington claimed
that Islam was the religion responsible for most of the world’s conflicts. These
categorisations seem to have been assimilated into Serbian and Croatian prop-
aganda. 
While Milosˇevic´ could happily share a weekend at Karadjordjevo with
Tudjman, carving up Bosnia, there was no friendliness between Milosˇevic´ and
the Kosovar leader Ibrahim Rugova or the Bosnian President Alija
Izetbegovic´. While these men were seemingly in favour of peace, not war,
Milosˇevic´ preferred the company of a fellow warmonger and opportunist. The
Battle of Kosovo had seemingly sealed the fate of the Moslems. There could be
no reconciliation between these two groups.
A similar dynamic was evident in Croatia. While there were many myths
about the Bosnian Moslems as ‘Brother Slavs’ and ‘the flower of the Croatian
nation’, a strong anti-Islamic current informed many Croatian arguments
and government policies. Tudjman’s hatred of the Moslems seemed both
personal and emotional – this was well known among Western diplomats who
met with him. While one might be tempted to believe that the Croato-Moslem
Federation in Bosnia today testifies to the closeness of Croats and Bosnian
Moslems, historically this was decidedly not the case. As we saw in Chapter 8,
Tudjman betrayed the beliefs of his nationalist supporters in Hercegovina in
an attempt to cast himself as a peacemaker. 
For Croatian writers, Serbian Orthodoxy was closer to Islam than it was
to Catholicism, making the Serbs more Eastern – seemingly part of an inferior
civilisation. Because of this Easternness, the Serbian civilisation was
portrayed as less tolerant, less democratic, and less enlightened than that in
Croatia. From the Great Schism of 1054 onwards, the Serbs were presented as
the enemies of the Croats. Like those who converted to Islam, the Serbs had
seemingly chosen to be part of an inferior, more bloodthirsty, more barbaric,
and more backward civilisation. 
For the Serbs, Croatian Catholicism was replete with negative traits –
intolerance, xenophobia, and the desire to convert non-Catholics by force.
Catholics were expansionist and genocidal; and because of this, the Croats
were seen to be only indirectly evil. It was their Catholicism that made them
want to kill Serbs, and their expansionism was motivated by Vatican plans to
enslave the Balkans. Milan Bulajic´’s insistence that most of the Ustasˇa death
camp-officials were members of the Catholic clergy reinforced the idea that the
Catholic faith inspired violent aggression, as well as hatred of Serbs.
Additionally, Serbian national identity, like that of Croats and Moslems,
appeared to hang by a thread. The idea that Serbs could be transformed into
Croats in one generation by a Catholic education indicated that national iden-
tity was far less primordial than many propagandists claimed. 
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Religion was all-important because it created the conditions for a series of
covenants with the divine. Throughout this study, we have seen many exam-
ples of covenantal relationships, as described by Northrop Frye, Conor Cruise
O’Brien,4 Donald Harman Akenson,5 Martin Buber,6 Hans Kohn,7 and others.
Some good examples included the Serbian myth of Kosovo. Lazar’s choice
created a heavenly people of the Serbs – a nation of martyrs. This covenantal
relationship was often likened to that made between God and the Hebrew
people. Both Serbs and Jews had to suffer in order to undergo Redemption.
Nevertheless, each group was seen to have special divine favour. 
For the Croats, the Pacta Conventa could be interpreted as a type of
covenant, although this was not a Covenant with the divine, but more with
History – with a big ‘H’. Certainly, the Pacta myth indicated that the Croatian
nation had been chosen by History, they were allowed to preserve aspects of
their statehood for a thousand years. Several myths, like ‘state right’ tradition
and that of the Antemurale Christianitatis, proved the existence of a civilised,
peace-loving and enlightened Croatia. Similarly, the myth of the Antemurale
Christianitatis was seen to be a form of covenantal relationship. Their adoption
of Roman Catholicism made them more peace-loving, more honest and fairer
in their dealings with others. Their conversion also conferred God’s blessing
and the promise of protection in case of attack. The Croats, through
Medjugorje, maintained a more obvious Covenant with the Virgin Mary,
through her many apparitions during the 1980s. This implied, as Mesˇtrovic´
and his colleagues maintained, that the Croats had been chosen as more
Western, more civilised, more democratic, better educated and more
European than the Serbs, who were relegated to the East. While myths like
that of Medjugorje might at some levels have confirmed, at least in Protestant
eyes, that the Croats were somehow backward, superstitious ‘southern’
Europeans, such myths were high successful domestically. In some respects,
what constituted proof of ‘Westerness’ within Croatia may well have had
different implications outside the country, where Catholicism was not neces-
sarily the be-all and end-all of European culture and tradition.
The Serbs also used Schöpflin’s ‘myths of divine election’, arguing that
they, and not the Croats, were the most enlightened and civilised. Dusˇan
Batakovic´, for example, privileged the nineteenth-century Ottoman millet
tradition as an authentic expression of Serbian democratic and European
values, seemingly a better method of rule than the xenophobic and clerical
system found in Croatia. Both Serbs and Croats adhered to Frye’s view of a
‘covenential cycle’, where every negative event in history was followed by an
equally positive reward, or Redemption.8 However, neither nation had much
interest in exploring a truly teleological view of history. History was for both
nations a series of Falls, some large, and some small, through which nations
were forced to labour. There was little emphasis on Redemption in these
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highly revised historical accounts, nor on the promise of future deliverance. 
A lack of interest in the great positive heroes of the past was a notable
phenomenon in both nationalisms. Heroes such as Prince Lazar, Ban Jelacˇic´,
Drazˇa Mihailovic´, and Alojzije Stepinac were tragic figures. They saw their
nations through times of valiant defeat, rather than dazzling victories. It was
as if nationalists were scared to promote other periods of Redemption, as if it
were necessary to save up every historic Fall – and then cash them in for
statehood.
Contrary to Smith’s assumptions about the Golden Age, neither Serbs nor
Croats tried to recapture historic high points in the life of the nation, but
rather focused most of their attention on proving, and then overcoming, their
many Falls. No one really wanted to, ‘unfold a glorious past’, or ‘a golden age
of saints and heroes’.9 Smith’s ‘myth of the historical renovation’ – where the
nation was to return to its basic national ‘essence’ – was not a top priority.10
The closest example of this type of imagery was the myth of the separate
Croatian language, which was somehow seen to contain their national
essence. 
However, the six hundredth anniversary of Kosovo did, as Smith
described, vividly re-create the ‘glorious past’ of the Serbian nation.11 The
marketing of Kosovo products and the ubiquitous use of the symbols and
images of the Battle did suggest an obsession with a past moment of glory in
Serbian history. Perhaps the willingness to sacrifice for an ideal was a capti-
vating theme for Serbian nationalists; but this was not a time of high culture,
or the spreading of Serbian civilisation around the world. While history was to
a certain extent a usable past, nationalists selected myth of Fall, which were
deemed more necessary for rallying people together to reclaim national great-
ness.12
Holocaust imagery and the comparative genocide debate
Certainly Serbian and Croatian revisionist historians wove a rich tapestry of
myths and images. Myths of persecution and Fall were ‘discovered’ in almost
every period of history. Certainly, we saw many examples of Kecˇmanovic´’s
myths of ‘counteridentification’, myths of ‘plot’, ‘damage’, ‘threat’, and
‘universal culprit’, all of which were used with reference to perceived enemies.
We saw many examples of Claude Lefort’s myth of the ‘people as one’, stand-
ing against a series of dangerous and united external enemies. We also saw
many examples of Schöpflin’s myths of ‘redemption and suffering’, ‘power-
lessness and compensation for powerlessness’, and ‘unjust treatment’. All of
these types of myth proved to be extremely useful in articulating Serbian and
Croatian victimisation. So why invoke Nazism and the Holocaust?
As I argued in Chapter 2, Holocaust imagery has become a more and
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more acceptable way of advancing national, social, and political projects.
With the universalisation of the Holocaust, the symbols and metaphors that
have made the Jewish people ‘the gold standard of oppression’, to quote
Finkielkraut, have become readily available to other groups. Our tendency to
see the Nazis as the ultimate manifestation of secular evil, and the Jews as the
paradigm of the victim, has given nations a template within which to struc-
ture and understand their national histories. 
The frequent use of the terms ‘Holocaust’, ‘death camps’, ‘death marches’,
‘exoduses’, and ‘pogroms’ highlighted the victimised qualities of Serbs and
Croats. These were combined with distinctly Christian images – ‘Calvary’,
‘way of the cross’, and ‘crucifixion’. Such imagery deflected attention from
continuous media reports about Serbs and Croats ‘attacking’ each other,
‘rounding up’ Bosnian Moslems, ‘invading’ territory, and ‘looting’ property,
while committing ‘ethnic cleansing’. In this way, the use of Holocaust
imagery was designed to deflect criticism of the many disreputable acts of
statecraft deemed necessary by Serbian and Croatian leaders to expand their
respective states and consolidate their bases of power. 
By the mid-1990s, Serbian and Croatian troops occupied more than two-
thirds of Bosnia-Hercegovina. They were ‘liberating’ territory that had never
been theirs before, while Serbian and Croatian regions were dotted with
various ‘autonomous republics’, each with their own parliaments, radio
stations, and currencies. But if the ‘liberation’ of territory was part of a historic
mission, there was little rejoicing in the media whenever a town was
conquered. There was little jingoism expressing the awesome power of the
Serbian or Croatian military machines. War was not seen as a means of
punishing enemies – it was portrayed as necessary to protect co-nationals
from the threat of genocide. Military victory was most often portrayed as the
proper state of affairs, the correction of historic injustices. News reports from
liberated towns did not exude a sense of victory, but dwelled instead on the
devastation caused by the aggressor, and the tremendous amount of work yet
to be undertaken. There were few books detailing Serbian or Croatian victo-
ries. What abounded were glossy publications depicting lurid atrocities and
bombed-out buildings. Indeed, it seemed that the only point in ‘liberating’
towns at all was so that the victors could then take pictures of the devastation,
to buttress their claims of victimisation still further. 
In the end, invoking the Holocaust filled in many blanks. Historically,
Serbs and Croats had not been enemies, they had been fellow Slavs, trapped in
neighbouring states controlled by rival empires. By contrast with their
common hatred of Islam, there was little about the other side as such that
could provoke the same revulsion as references to a jihad or to janissaries and
harems. Thus a form of hatred had to be created. Claiming that the enemy was
a genocidal power in the present and in the past allowed each side to recon-
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struct its own history, but also, more importantly, the history of the other.
This was the stage at which narratives were inscripted and performative
dramas were enacted. Fears of a nineteenth-century ‘Greater Serbia’
confronted the ‘Civitas Dei’, and Yugoslavism and Illyrianism were quietly
forgotten. While those promoting South Slavic unity were condemned as
misguided or naïve, Juraj Strossmayer, Ljudevit Gaj and other well-meaning
‘Yugoslavs’ had in fact merely reflected the reality of their age – that Serbs and
Croats were not yet enemies, nor had they any reason to be. 
Unfortunately, historical accuracy gave way to revisionism and demoni-
sation. Rather than interacting with members of the other side as colleagues,
Serbian and Croatian academics and journalists chose to reinterpret their
relationships with their new enemies through their newly-minted historical
propaganda. Bodgan Denitch described this phenomenon very well, when he
wrote:
Each side consistently presented itself as victims, or potential victims, the Other as
a threat or potential threat, so that neither party responded to the Other directly,
but only to its own projections of the Other. Each reacts to the Other as a threat,
and in its own reactions, reinforced the behaviour that appears threatening. Nor
were these perceptions questioned by those who had increasingly identified with
their own ‘people’. Victimisation appeared to be an all-powerful mobiliser of
ethnic solidarity.13
A sense of persecution appealed to Serbian and Croatian historians; but
this sense was somewhat different from that cherished by the Jews. For
example, there was a constant emphasis on sacrifice for an ideal, which was
more a Christian than a Jewish concept. Serbs sacrificed themselves at Kosovo
to become a chosen and holy nation; they sacrificed themselves at the
Antemurale Christianitatis, to defend the West against the East. They sacrificed
themselves in the First World War, during the first Yugoslavia, and then
during the Second World War, through their contributions to Partisan
victory. In the contemporary period, they were defending the West against
Kosovar- and Bosnian Moslem-led Islamic expansionism. They were also
sacrificing themselves to defend the East against the dangers of Roman
Catholic expansionism. 
The Croatian ideal of sacrifice was not as pronounced, but it existed
nonetheless. Croats also sacrificed themselves at the Antemurale
Christianitatis, to defend the West against the East. Croats also sacrificed them-
selves during the Second World War, first of all, to create an independent
state, and then, in order to redeem that state in history, by their massacre at
Bleiburg. They also sacrificed themselves in defending the West against
Islamic expansionism in Bosnia-Hercegovina. These themes of sacrifice are
important, because they draw their strength from the crucifixion, not the loss
of Israel two thousand years ago, the Jewish pogroms, or the Holocaust. There
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is no strong sense of sacrifice in Zionism, no sense of voluntarism, no decision
on the part of Jews to martyr themselves for some larger ideal. Jews suffered
because negative forces were persecuting them. Masada was the exception,
rather than the rule.
However, while this myth of sacrifice played an important role in re-eval-
uating Serbian and Croatian history, Schöpflin’s ‘myths of powerlessness and
compensation for powerlessness’ were not commonly used during the 1990s.
Such myths were typically Christian, as Schöpflin explained, ‘mak[ing] a
virtue of fatalism and passivity’ while allowing the nation to claim, ‘a special
moral superiority for having suffered’.14 While the Serbs articulated this
theme with regard to their many sacrifices for Yugoslavia during the first
Yugoslavia and the Second World War, this was often seen to be a failing on
the part of the Serbian nation, not a strength. The maxim: ‘winners in war,
losers in peace’ underscored Serbian magnanimity, drawing out a sharp
contrast between Serbian generosity and Croatian duplicity. However, during
the contemporary wars, there was little interest in turning the other cheek, or
passively accepting the collapse of the Federation. Both sides fought, and then
used myths to legitimate their ‘self-defensive’ activities. They had little inter-
est in passivity or what it implied. 
Instrumentalising the Fall
From an instrumental perspective, negative imagery and myths of Fall were
crucial to the rise of Tudjman and Milosˇevic´. By portraying national histories
as long periods of Fall, they argued that their own regimes were historical
turning-points, palingenetic moments when all the Falls of the past would be
reversed, and new utopian nations would be forged, bigger, richer, prouder,
and more authentic. In coming to power, both Tudjman and Milosˇevic´ seemed
to have faith in a national renaissance. They understood Henry Tudor’s
description of historical teleology, that ‘mythical time is reversible’, and that
‘what was done is not forever lost’.15 The promise of re-creating the past, of
reversing the years of hardship and Fall, was integral to the appeal of nation-
alism. Kecˇmanovic´’s myths of ‘watershed’ and ‘the right moment’ were often
used to justify Tudjman and Milosˇevic´’s attempts to make ‘a new order
emerge.’16 The use of Schöpflin’s ‘myths of rebirth and renewal’ were equally
apparent.17
Curiously, both Tudjman and Milosˇevic´ seemed to have embraced a
Modernist view of nationalism’s practical uses for gaining power. Ernest
Gellner’s purely instrumental explanation for the nation made sense in
describing Milosˇevic´’s rise to power.18 John Breuilly’s observations also
reflected the reality of Milosˇevic´ and Tudjman’s rise to power, since they both
saw nationalism as ‘institutional’ instrument for gaining control.19 Tom
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Nairn’s view of nationalist legitimacy as a ‘popular revolution’ or ‘national
liberation struggle’ was certainly true. Whether it was ‘Tudjmanism’ or the
‘Happening of the people’, the promise of revolutionary change legitimated
the rise of nationalism.20 That nationalist leaders manipulated history to suit
their own ends comes as no surprise. What was surprising about the conflict
was the extent to which ordinary historians, political scientists, geographers,
and even artists, psychiatrists, dentists and architects were willing to
submerge themselves fully in these nationalist experiments. 
Had more people questioned the established truths of what they were
seeing and hearing, war might have been prevented, or stopped much earlier.
Early in the conflict, British journalist Cvijeto Job rightly criticised intellectu-
als in Serbia and Croatia for contributing to the ‘collective madness’ that was
going on around them.21 He made the following damning quote in 1993,
which expressed, I believe, the fundamental importance of propaganda and
myth-makers during the war:
All nations have self-serving myths, which play havoc with historical truths. But
the public life in many countries permits the challenge of these myths. Stabler and
more tolerant cultures leave room for the puncturing of their own egos, but in
Yugoslavia, the pervasive culture of ethnocentric myths unchallenged even by
their intellectuals weighs down the lives of the people. Yugoslav peoples have
indeed been betrayed by their intelligentsias.22
Job’s statement could apply equally well to Croatia. Nationalist intellectu-
als in both countries appeared to have taken leave of their senses – or at least
their capacity for critical reasoning. By 1993, many Serbs and Croats who
disagreed with their respective regimes had already left. Few objective voices
remained, and most of these people were purged from government institu-
tions, or faced harassment if they spoke against the regime. A strong
Manichaean morality did not allow for any ambiguity. One was either a
supporter of the nation and its objectives or a traitor. While there were often
attacks on the governments of Milosˇevic´ and Tudjman, including demonstra-
tions, few people questioned the rise of nationalism, or the themes expressed
in nationalist writings. 
While it was perhaps permissible to argue that Tudjman or Milosˇevic´
were not doing enough to promote nationalism, it was unacceptable to ques-
tion whether the rise of nationalism was a positive phenomenon. It would
have been impossible to go back to the ‘good old days’ of Communism. As
Slavenka Drakulic´ lamented during the war, Croatian nationalism was like an
‘ill fitting shirt’, with sleeves that were too long, and a collar that was too high.
But she noted with disdain that ‘You might not like the colour and the cloth
might itch. But there is no escape; there is nothing else to wear.’23 Eventually
both Croats and Serbs would rid themselves of their respective shirts – there
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was an escape, and it surprisingly came through the democratic processes.
The rise of Stipe Mesic´ and Ivica Racan in Croatia, and Vojislav Kostunica in
Serbia, all through the democratic process, was indeed a miracle. 
Was there ever genocide in Serbia or Croatia?
Serbs and Croats both cast themselves as victims of ‘holocausts’ during the
Second World War and genocide in the 1990s, and this issue remains highly
contentious. While both nations suffered from atrocious massacres, did either
really suffer from genocide? The Croats were certainly in no danger of being
exterminated at Bleiburg, where Partisans aimed to kill collaborators – not all
Croats. Even though there is clear indisputable evidence of Cˇetnik massacres
of Croats and Moslems throughout the NDH, there was no concrete proof that
the Cˇetniks aimed to exterminate the entire Croatian nation – nor would they
have had the means to do so. The only letter to this effect, describing a plan to
create an ‘ethnically pure Greater Serbia’, was dismissed by impartial histori-
ans as a forgery, according to Tim Judah and others.24
Were the Ustasˇa-run concentration camps geared towards annihilating
all Serbs? This is not an easy question to answer. That one-third of Serbs in the
NDH were targeted for extermination might constitute genocide, in that the
Genocide Convention argues that any attempt to destroy a group ‘in part’ is
constitutive of genocide. While I am not persuaded of a Serbian genocide in
the 1940s, this argument was made recently by Damir Mirkovic´ in the Journal
of Genocide Research, wherein he cites a variety of historians and sociologists,
including Helen Fein, Sava Bosnitch, and others. Bosnitch for one, argues:
‘The genocide, a joint enterprise of the Roman Catholic and Muslim Ustashas,
was to Serbs what the Holocaust was to Jews across Europe.’25
Problematically, however, Mirkovic´ fails to convince us of the past when
he applies his research to the present, citing the 1941 ‘genocide’ as an ‘impor-
tant contributory factor’ in the uprising of Serbs in Croatia, coupled with ‘the
new [Croatian] government’s drastic practices of discrimination and mass
violations of civil rights’.26 While he alludes to the exploitation of genocide by
both Serbian and Croatian leaders during the conflict, Mirkovic´ fails to engage
with Milosˇevic´’s manipulation of the Croatian Serbs, the use of warlords to
terrorise populations, and the role of moderates, such as Jovan Raskovic´, who
were trying to prevent an escalation of violence. Referring to Croatian
‘scorched earth policies’ and ‘blitzkriegs’, he has linked past atrocities with the
1990s, tracing a continuous theme of ‘Croatian ultra-nationalism and
Serbophobia as a driving force that rationalizes destruction, killing, expulsion,
and even forced conversion to Roman Catholicism’.27 While some historians
may contend that the NDH regime was indeed genocidal, Mirkovic´’s use of
stock Serbian genocide propaganda (and I have reviewed much of it) raises
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questions about his motivations, particularly since he has no interest in
discussing Serbian crimes from the Second World War or the more recent
past. 
What interests me particularly about Mirkovic´’s research is his opera-
tionalisation of denialism. He argues that ‘As with other genocides, the
Ustasha genocide has its own deniers’, a phenomenon that he links to politi-
cal correctness movements in North America, and their demonisation of the
Serbs during the 1990s. 28 The labelling of anyone who questions the Serbian
‘genocide’ as a denier certainly echoes Katz, Goldhagen and others who have
used similar imagery in the case of the Holocaust, demonstrating clearly that
even peer-reviewed professional journals in Western countries can be co-
opted into new and ambiguous comparative genocide debates. 
My personal opinion, which may well be refuted in future years, is that
genocide (of Serbs or Croats) in the occupied and divided Yugoslavia during
the Second World War is very difficult to prove, although it seems clear that
here, as elsewhere, the Jews were targeted for mass extermination. I say this
for the following reasons: Raphael Lemkin’s Axis Rule in Occupied Europe
(1944) clearly laid out that genocide was ‘a coordinated plan of different actions
aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with
the aim of annihilating the groups themselves’. While the Genocide Convention
does use the term ‘in part’, the purpose of genocide traditionally has been to
eliminate a group in its entirety. Alain Destexhe has also claimed recently in
Rwanda and Genocide in the 20th Century, that: ‘Genocide is a crime on a differ-
ent scale to all other crimes against humanity and implies an intention to
completely exterminate the chosen group.’29 Claiming that eliminating one-
third in a given territory, while ignoring the target population in
neighbouring areas, constitutes a genocide is a contentious proposition. 
A related problem is the propagandisation of the numbers of dead, which
I have tried to review in Chapters 5 and 6. Mirkovic´’s research, as well as that
of Batakovic´ (whom Mirkovic´ seems to esteem greatly) and others, is rife with
anti-Croatian vocabulary, not only from the past but also in the present. It
seems impossible to separate their present-day political motivations from their
analysis of past events, and this throws their research into question. In evalu-
ating historic genocides in Yugoslavia, some distance and objectivity is
required, and I hope that more impartial historians in the years ahead will
critically examine the past here, once the legacies of Communist corruption
and bloody ethnic conflict have dissipated. 
I would similarly argue that there is little evidence that in the 1990s
either Serbs or Croats were targeted with an outright policy of genocide. While
in 1991 the Croats were clearly the victims of Serbian and JNA aggression, I
have argued that this aggression was not unprovoked. Tudjman’s insensitive
and often xenophobic reactions to Croatia’s Serbian population, and his overt
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support of former Ustasˇa leaders, raised justifiable concerns that Serbian
national rights were under threat. Of course, the Serbian reaction was not an
appropriate reflection of the level of persecution to which they were being
exposed. Milosˇevic´ and his allies needed little pretext to launch a full-scale
invasion of Croatia. Tudjman’s xenophobia gave the Serbs the excuse they
needed, but the invasion would probably have happened anyway. While it
was true that Tudjman brought back elements of an Ustasˇa past, and
remained ambiguous about the NDH throughout his life, Milosˇevic´’s actions
also demonstrated his interest in the Nazi ideal of Lebensraum. But let us be
clear – neither nation can be realistically compared to Nazi Germany. Ethnic
cleansing (at least in Croatia) was not genocide, and it was not a continuation
of the Holocaust. 
The attempt to form greater national states, to invade and conquer terri-
tory while violently expelling populations from it, does not constitute
genocide. Genocide refers to people – specifically defined national or ethnic
groups – not strategic parcels of land in neighbouring countries, although
perhaps it may in the future. Had either Serbs or Croats favoured genocide
over irredentism, many more people would have been killed – millions as
opposed to hundreds of thousands. Both sides – lest we forget – had the capac-
ity to inflict far greater casualties than they did. While I mean no offence to the
victims of Yugoslavia’s wars, compared with the Nazis, Serbian and Croatian
propaganda was relatively mild. Nothing Serbs or Croats ever wrote or filmed
could ever compare with the chilling Nazi classic Der Ewige Jüde, or the prolif-
eration of Nazi textbooks (such as The Poisoned Toadstool), wall charts, and
phrenological heads, detailing the subhuman and parasitic nature of the
enemy. 
The Bosnian Moslem case was obviously more complex, since we do
have proven cases of genocide here. On 2 August 2001, the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia found the Bosnian Serb General
Radislav Krstic´ guilty of genocide for his role in the execution of some 7,000
Bosnian Muslim men and boys near Srebrenica in July 1995.30 More
recently, Milosˇevic´ himself was handed over to the Tribunal, to stand
charges of genocide in Bosnia, evidence having been finally handed over on
27 May 1999, during the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia.31 Croatian leaders
may in turn face trials for genocide in Bosnia, although Tudjman’s death will
at least spare him from sharing the humiliating fate of his former rival. As for
Kosovo, the locus of NATO’s ‘humanitarian’ initiative, a UN court recently
ruled that while the Serbian regime did commit crimes against humanity
and war crimes: ‘the exactions committed by Milosevic’s regime cannot be
qualified as criminal acts of genocide, since their purpose was not the
destruction of the Albanian ethnic group . . . but its forceful departure from
Kosovo.’32
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Despite the charges against Milosˇevic´ and his cohorts, however, Croats
followed an almost identical pattern in their dealings with the Bosnian
Moslems, even if Serbian terror was more widespread, bloody, and brutal.
Each claimed the land for themselves, and each claimed the Bosnian Moslems
as fellow co-nationals. When these strategies did not prove successful on their
own, they resorted to fears of Islamic conspiracies. Within the confines of this
study, it is irrelevant whether or not Bosnian Moslem identity was ‘authentic’
or ‘constructed’. What is of central importance is whether or not Serbian and
Croatian claims were in any sense true. While I gave a short overview of
debates concerning Bosnian Moslem identity and the government’s later
courting of Iranian and Saudi assistance, it was clear that, throughout the
conflict, most Moslems adhered to the ideal of a multinational, multiconfes-
sional state with power-sharing and ethnic tolerance for all, even rejecting the
government-sponsored trappings of an Islamic state. 
Both Serbs and Croats rounded up, interned, beat, and tortured civilians
during the 1990s. Neither side made much attempt to deny the existence of
these internment camps, nor did either side deny that it had committed ethnic
cleansing. They only denied that they had been the first to do so – each
claimed that its own ethnic cleansing was in self-defence. At the same time,
the level of collusion between Serbian and Croatian governments made it
increasingly obvious as the war progressed that these two movements were
operating in tandem, and were mutually beneficial to the Tudjman and
Milosˇevic´ regimes. Each side needed a strong, powerful and dangerous enemy
to justify the centralisation and monopolisation of state power within newly
created national ‘homelands’. 
While we can attempt to come to terms with the war in Bosnia through a
study of propaganda, it ultimately falls short when we encounter the reality of
Serbian and Croatian atrocities. Killing bus-loads of schoolchildren, shelling
maternity clinics, razing entire towns to the ground, pale in comparison to the
estimated 20,000 people who were raped and beaten at the hands of Serbian
and Croatian soldiers. How does one explain why, in the town of Kozarac,
some 2,500 people were killed in just three days, or why the men and boys of
Srebrenica were deliberately massacred by Serbian forces in what was
supposed to be a UN safe haven? How does one account for the 1.8 million
Bosnian Moslems driven out of their homes by 1992, at the beginning of the
conflict, or the death toll of 280,000 at the war’s end?33 And the Serbs were
not the only ones to blame, with Croatian massacres (by HVO forces) in such
towns as Vitez and Varesˇ.34 In Bosnia, more than anywhere else, the full
duplicity of Serbian and Croatian persecution imagery became obvious. At no
time during the real Holocaust did the Jewish victims of Nazi terror ever use
their own victimisation to justify the genocide of others.
While land-grabbing activities were clearly behind the official strategies
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of both nations, how does one explain the gratuitous cruelty and vandalism
that so characterised the war? Did two nations in search of land really have to
create collection centres? Did they really have to destroy half of Mostar, which
even today is a burned-out shell run by the Hercegovinian mafia? Was it really
necessary to destroy well over one thousand mosques and churches? In
coming to terms with the level of destruction, it is unclear why so much of the
region had to be reduced to rubble in order to construct a better future. These
are obviously questions that are far beyond the scope of this study; but they do
bring to mind the obvious contradictions between what Serbs and Croats did
to the Bosnian Moslems, and what they claimed the Moslems were going to do
to them.
In the end, fears of Greater Serbia, and the invention of Serbophobia,
played much the same role for Serbs and Croats as did anti-Semitism for nine-
teenth- and twentieth-century Zionists. As Hannah Arendt maintained, such
generalised fears were ‘an excellent means for keeping the people together ...
an eternal guarantee of . . . existence’.35 For both Serbs and Croats, the
concept of Diaspora was also important. Theodor Herzl’s theory of a Diaspora
in danger as the guiding principle for a homeland was constantly invoked.
External threats to the nation unified disparate co-nationals into ‘one people’.
For Tudjman and Milosˇevic´, as for Herzl, a nation-state that included all co-
nationals was the only adequate solution to the threat of victimisation and
persecution, or even worse – genocide.36
Certainly, we face the possibility of the Holocaust being manipulated over
and over again in the service of nationalism. Curiously, however, few Serbs or
Croats adopted the tone of Stannard, Dadrian, or Hancock (Tudjman of course
being the exception). While they participated in the comparative genocide
debate, they were not looking for Jewish enemies, partly because each side
was looking to Israel as a potential military ally and source of arms, but also
because Holocaust imagery was crucial to the success of both propaganda
campaigns. Unlike serious comparative genocide scholars whose nations had
experienced real genocides, and therefore wanted to promote their histories
within an academic context, neither Serbs nor Croats seemed interested in the
merits of intellectual debate with fellow victims, especially outside the
Balkans. 
David Stannard attacked the idea that the Jews were ‘chosen’, and that
other groups were by definition ‘un-chosen’.37 This was not a strategy
favoured by Serbs or Croats. Both were happy for the Jews to maintain their
pre-eminent role as an archetypal victim, as long as they could continue to
expropriate Jewish symbols. For Serbs and Croats, the comparative genocide
debate was not an end in itself, it was a means to another end. Neither side had
much interest in having Bleiburg or Jasenovac become a major part of school
curriculums in North America or Israel. However, no one can say with any
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degree of certainty how Serbian and Croatian history will appear in twenty or
thirty years’ time. If Beljo, Mirkovic´, Bulajic´, Batakovic´ and others have their
way, future talk of Balkan holocausts may well have a new-found ring of
truth. 
Western reactions: does the comparative genocide debate work?
The above question is not an easy one to answer. At some level, Western
academics, journalists, politicians and statesmen were certainly drawn into
the propaganda war between Serbs, Croats, Bosnian Moslems, and Kosovar
Albanians. Many reacted with horror to the Serbian invasions of Croatia and
then Bosnia-Hercegovina. There was no doubt that the greater part of the
violence had been committed by Serbian paramilitary forces. Western jour-
nalists frequently cited the parallels between the war in Bosnia and the Second
World War. For the most part, however, journalists did maintain a level of
objectivity.
Nevertheless, there were many Western academics co-opted into the
debate over which nations truly were victims of genocide. On the Serbian side,
a good example of this is to be found in the writings of the New York-based
lecturer Barry Lituchy. Lituchy published numerous articles in the United
States, and on Serbian government websites, describing the American
government as ‘the most genocidal nation on earth’. He also argued that the
Americans were the ‘Nazis of the New World Order’, among a plethora of
other accusations.38 Lituchy emerged from the relative obscurity of a Staten
Island community college to gain top billing. For some Western writers, it
appears that joining the propaganda war increased one’s international expo-
sure and range of opportunities. 
On the Croatian side, there were numerous non-Croatian propagandists
who became intimately involved with the regime. C. Michael McAdams, a
former US airforce pilot and historian, became one of the better-known pro-
Croatian writers during the war, with numerous publications and a prolific
presence on the internet. He became a noted specialist on the Bleiburg
massacre and on various other aspects of Second World War history. Another
good example was Philip Cohen, who also seemingly had no ethnic ties to the
Balkans. He too became intimately tied to the HDZ regime and was decorated
by Franjo Tudjman. Like McAdams, Cohen tried to alert the West to the great
dangers posed by Serbian expansionism; both in the process benefited by
receiving accolades well above their abilities as impartial and objective
researchers. Such attributes were seemingly dispensed with when they were
confronted with the TRUTH of Serbian evil.
Nevertheless, the most surprising convert to the Croatian cause was Alain
Finkielkraut, whose pro-Croatian bias became so extreme during the war that
Conclusions: confronting relativism in Serbia and Croatia
266
2441Concl  16/10/02  8:06 am  Page 266
he earned the unfortunate nickname ‘Finkiel-croate’. His chef d’oeuvre on the
Balkans, Comment peut-on être croate?, appeared in 1992, at a time when
many of Croatia’s excesses in Bosnia were not well known. Nevertheless,
Tudjman had been roundly criticised for his autocratic style, his revisionist
writings, and his purges of government institutions and the police force.
While Croatia was the victim of Serbian aggression at that time, Tudjman was
no saint, making Finkielkraut’s musings all the more bizarre. Words such as
‘emancipation’ and ‘democracy’ were bandied about, and Croatian national-
ism was paralleled with the rise of Czech democracy: Tudjman was even
favourably compared with Vaclav Havel.39 Finkielkraut, it appears, was
completely swayed by Croatian fears that Eastern Serbs were attacking a part
of the Western world. He stressed the européanéité, or ‘Europeanness’ of the
Croats, arguing that Croatia deserved to be saved, because of its ‘Roman
churches, its baroque churches and its Venetian palaces’.40
As others had done with the Serbs, Finkielkraut’s text compared the plight
of the Croats with the Jews, and he intimated that each had suffered in a
similar fashion. For him, the Croats were the victims of a ‘double suffering’,
first, suffering under Serbian attacks, and then having the ‘truth of their
suffering’ denied or downplayed.41 He even managed to excuse Tudjman’s
historical revisionism as being an attempt to show up the victimological
pretensions of the Serbs. He went so far as to warn that the Serbs were inher-
ently evil because ‘the Nazis of this history wanted to pass themselves as
Jewish’.42 Their strategy, as Finkielkraut posited, was to make Slavonia
Croatenrein, an obvious reminiscence of the Judenrein policies of the Nazis in
the Second World War.43
Why Finkielkraut completely reversed his arguments only eight years
after his Future of a Negation remains a mystery. While first denouncing
groups who manipulated Holocaust imagery, he now used such arguments to
support a nation whose leader was a Holocaust revisionist, at the helm of an
authoritarian government. While it is tempting to call Finkielkraut a
hypocrite, it is possible that he truly believed the propaganda stories coming
out of Croatia at that time. Much of this information was very persuasive.
Perhaps he truly thought that the Croats were suffering from genocide, and
saw the practical implications of using Holocaust imagery to highlight their
suffering to the world. It is more likely, however, that Finkielkraut became
opportunistic, and thought the dissolution of Yugoslavia a good time for him
to write a J’accuse type of essay, in the style of Emile Zola, to ensure his place in
French intellectual history. Unfortunately, Tudjman’s past and present were
far more sullied than the life of Alfred Dreyfus.
By far the most common reaction to Serbian and Croatian propaganda
was to discount all of it. A form of myopia often informed Western policy-
making, particularly that of the United States. It became far easier for former
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US Ambassador Lawrence Eagleberger to proclaim: ‘Until the Bosnians, Serbs
and Croats decide to stop killing each other, there is nothing the outside world
can do about it.’44 While the CIA estimated by 1992 that some 90 per cent of
atrocities in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina had been carried out by the
Serbs, it was far easier for the American government to present all parties as
moral equals, and therefore to abdicate any responsibility. By believing both
all and none of the propaganda coming out of the Balkans, US policy-makers
were able to avoid plunging headlong into a conflict that held no geostrategic
appeal. One can therefore argue that Serbian and Croatian propaganda
succeeded in spite of itself. 
In reviewing Serbian and Croatian nationalist propaganda from the
collapse of Yugoslavia until the beginning of 1999, the presence of Fall and
persecution imagery was an obvious corollary to the horrific ground wars
that began after 1991. Myth-makers performed a crucial role in legitimating
the rise of Serbian and Croatian nationalism, as well as in excusing the many
violent acts of statecraft that flowed from the expansionist designs of Franjo
Tudjman and Slobodan Milosˇevic´. Clearly, we live in an age when history can
be revised to suit any contingency. The conflict in Yugoslavia demonstrated
how dangerous the manipulation of Biblical and Holocaust imagery could be
in the hands of skilled propagandists. 
This conflict also highlighted the dangers of authoritarianism and of a
lack of critical reflection. Academics, journalists, and politicians bear a heavy
responsibility for the nationalist fever that so dominated these countries in the
1990s. George Santayana’s banal and over-quoted observation that ‘those
who neglect the past are condemned to repeat it’ was thoroughly debunked in
both the Serbian and Croatian cases. It was precisely this obsession with past
mistakes and past injustices that led to the tragedies of war – with the helping
hand of nationalist elites, of course. Future generations will now inherit even
more painful legacies than did their grandfathers and grandmothers in the
1940s. However, with the recent ratification of the Rome Statute finally
establishing a permanent International Court, and the international commu-
nity forging ahead with a new role and new responsibilities, they will
hopefully not have the chance to make the same mistakes all over again.
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